JIMMY
ANG,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R.
No. 143169
January 21, 2005
ELEANOR R. LUCERO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY of JUSTICE,
and THE CITY PROSECUTOR of MAKATI CITY,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review
[1]
assails the 29
October 1999 Decision
[2]
and 25 April
2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44778.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner Jimmy Ang and affirmed the Resolutions issued by former
Secretary of Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
The Antecedents
The present controversy stemmed from a criminal complaint for estafa
through falsification of public documents filed by respondent Eleanor
Lucero (“Lucero”) against petitioner Jimmy Ang (“Ang”) before the City
Prosecution Office of Makati (“CPO Makati”).
As summarized by then Secretary of Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(“Secretary of Justice”) and quoted by the Court of Appeals in the
assailed decision, the antecedent facts are as follows:cralaw:red
The record shows
that complainant [Lucero], an American citizen, is a businesswoman and
a native of Pangasinan. On August 8, 1989, she entered into a
memorandum of agreement with E. Ganzon, Inc. for the purchase of
Condominium Unit 1512, Makati Cinema Square Tower located along Pasong
Tamo, Makati for P2,417,655.00. As she is a resident of Guam, she
appointed by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney,
[3]
Graciano P.
Catenza, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact on November 20, 1990 to manage and
administer all her businesses and properties in the Philippines,
including the condominium unit. Catenza, however, delegated his
authority to the respondent.
Complainant
claims that respondent [Ang] took advantage of the trust and confidence
she reposed in him when he falsified two documents, namely: letter of
authorization
[4]
dated July 6,
1992 by making it appear that she is authorizing E. Ganzon, Inc., the
condominium developer and owner to register her condominium unit under
his name; and Deed of Assignment
[5]
dated June 22,
1992 wherein respondent made it appear that she is transferring to him
the ownership of the condominium unit. She further claims that
the falsification was made possible when the respondent typed the
authority to transfer in a blank sheet of paper containing her
signature which he previously requested for the purpose of securing
permit from a government agency in connection with her bus service
business prior to her departure for Guam. Moreover, she avers
that her signature in the deed of assignment was forged by
respondent. She adds that she was not in the Philippines when the
document was allegedly signed by her on June 22, 1992 and notarized
before Atty. Rene B. Betita on July 1, 1992.
Through
the use of the aforementioned fictitious documents, her title was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, condominium Certificate of Title No.
23578 was issued in the name of respondent by the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City which title he used as a collateral to secure a loan in the
amount of P2,000,000.00 from the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC). When she learned of the fraudulent transfer, she executed
an affidavit of adverse claim and annotated it on the title on March
21, 1994. The day after the thirty-day effectivity period of the
adverse claim lapsed, respondent, to add insult to injury, immediately
secured an additional loan in the amount of P700,000.00 with the same
bank (RCBC) using the same property as collateral even after the
transport business he was managing for the complainant had ceased
operation already. Respondent failed to act on complainant’s
demands for accounting and for the reconveyance to her of Condominium
Unit No. 1512.
In his
defense, respondent claims that the questioned documents were prepared
with the prior knowledge of complainant and his authority was relayed
by her through the telephone. The transfer of ownership and
issuance of a new condominium title in his name were necessary since
RCBC did not want to transact business with her because of her lack of
track record and her citizenship. He avers that he had to do this
since complainant failed to send money needed to support her business
projects and to pay her outstanding obligations. As a proof of
her knowledge, complainant gave him P500,000.00 on October 5, 1993 to
pay the RCBC loan. To disprove the allegation that she never
appeared before a notary public, he claims that complainant executed
two (2) more documents and had them notarized after she left for Guam
which she never questioned.
xxx
[6]
(Emphasis
supplied)
The CPO Makati referred the notarized Deed of Assignment dated 22 June
1992 and Authorization Letter dated 6 July 1992, both allegedly
executed by Lucero in favor of Ang, to the National Bureau of
Investigation (“NBI”) for verification of signature.
On 16 January 1995, the NBI submitted its report to the CPO
Makati. The NBI found the signature on the Deed of Assignment and
Lucero’s sample signatures to have been written by “one and the same
person.” However, the NBI found the signature on the Authorization
Letter a “traced forgery.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
After the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Edgardo C. Bautista
(“Prosecutor Bautista”) of the CPO Makati issued a Resolution dated 17
April 1995 finding probable cause against Ang. Prosecutor
Bautista recommended the filing of two (2) informations, (1) for estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (c) of the Revised Penal Code
[7]
and (2) for
estafa through falsification of public document.
Ang moved for a reinvestigation. Prosecutor Wilfredo Ong of the
CPO Makati reconsidered Prosecutor Bautista’s resolution of 17 April
1995 and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Lucero filed a motion for reconsideration which the CPO Makati denied
on 11 October 1995.
Lucero appealed the dismissal of the complaint to the Department of
Justice. The Secretary of Justice issued Letter-Resolution No. 106
Series of 1997 dated 18 February 1997 (“First Resolution”) disposing as
follows:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, your
resolution is accordingly reversed. You are hereby directed to
file the appropriate information for estafa through falsification of
public document against respondent and to report the action taken
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
[8]
Ang
filed a motion for reconsideration which the Secretary of Justice
denied in his Letter-Resolution dated 10 June 1997.
Ang filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order.
On 16 October 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting
Ang’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The Court of Appeals enjoined the CPO Makati from filing the
information for estafa as the Secretary of Justice directed in his
First Resolution, pending the proceedings before the Court of Appeals.
Thereafter, the CPO Makati filed a Manifestation stating that it
already filed an information for estafa against Ang in Criminal Case
No. 97-697 as early as 14 May 1997. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals issued a Resolution dated 18 December 1997 enjoining the
Secretary of Justice and the CPO Makati from proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 97-697 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 64.
On 29 October 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing
the petition for certiorari and affirming the resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit, and the challenged Resolution No. 106 Series [of] 1997, dated
February 18, 1997, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 10, 1997 of the
public respondent Secretary of the Department of Justice are hereby
AFFIRMED. The Resolution of this Court dated December 18, 1997
enjoining the respondents from proceedings (sic) with Criminal Case No.
97-697 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
64, is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The said trial court is
ordered to continue with the proceedings with dispatch.
SO
ORDERED.
[9]
Hence,
this petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Special Power of Attorney (“SPA”)
[10]
which Lucero
granted to Graciano P. Catenza (“Catenza”) pertains only to acts of
administration and does not include acts of strict dominion. The
SPA even prohibited Catenza from transferring Lucero’s titles to real
property by sale or gratuity to third persons without Lucero’s prior
written consent. Catenza allegedly delegated this power to Ang.
The Court of Appeals also found that Lucero granted Ang a general and
not a special power of attorney.
[11]
The Court of
Appeals added that even assuming Lucero granted Ang a special power of
attorney to sell her Makati Cinema Square Tower Condominium Unit No.
1512 (“Property”), it does not include the power to mortgage the
Property.
Assuming further that Lucero signed a blank sheet of paper that turned
out to be a Deed of Assignment conveying to Ang all her rights and
interest in the Property, such assignment was not Lucero’s real
intention.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that Ang relied heavily on the NBI’s
finding that the signature in the Deed of Assignment and Lucero’s
specimen signature were written by one and the same person.
However, Ang ignored the NBI’s finding that the signature appearing in
the Authorization Letter is a “traced forgery.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Issues
Ang seeks a reversal of the assailed decision by contending that:cralaw:red
I
THE
COURT OF APPEALS HAD OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT PETITIONER CAN ACTUALLY
MORTGAGE THE PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INSTANT CASE.
II
THE
COURT OF APPEALS HAD FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS ALREADY ESTOPPED FROM DISOWNING THE TRANSACTIONS THAT
PETITIONER ENTERED INTO IN HER BEHALF.
III
THE
COURT OF APPEALS HAD ERRED IN RULING THAT THE POWER OF ATTORNEY GIVEN
TO PETITIONER DID NOT GRANT HIM MORE THAN ACTS OF ADMINISTRATION.
[12]
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The issue in this case is the propriety of the Secretary of Justice’s
finding of probable cause for estafa.
Ang insists that there is no probable cause to hold him liable for
estafa. Ang contends that Lucero granted him the authority not
only to sell but also to mortgage the Property. Ang insists that
even assuming he is not authorized to sell the Property, he is
nevertheless allowed to mortgage the Property if it is urgent and
indispensable to preserve “the things under his administration.”
Ang further claims that he was justified in mortgaging the Property
because the proceeds of the mortgage would be used for the needs and
expenses of Lucero’s business.
Ang also argues that Lucero’s facsimile letter dated 29 December 1993
shows that Lucero is estopped from questioning the transactions entered
on her behalf.
Ang claims that Lucero knowingly and voluntarily signed the documents
and blank papers to further her business interests. Ang contends
that “the nature and import of the pre-signed documents” show that
Lucero impliedly authorized Ang to execute more than acts of
administration.
Ang’s contentions are untenable.
In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines
whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
[13]
It does not call
for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits.
[14]
As implied
by the words themselves, “probable cause” is concerned with
probability, not absolute or moral certainty.
[15]
The
complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable
doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence.
[16]
In this case, Ang calls on this Court to assume the function of a
public prosecutor. Ang’s arguments are essentially evidentiary
matters that must be presented and heard during the trial. Whether
Lucero granted Ang the authority to sell and mortgage the Property is a
question which requires an examination of the parties’ evidence.
The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the
exercise of the public prosecutor’s function without any showing of
grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his findings. Ang
miserably failed to show the presence of any of these exceptional
circumstances to warrant an assessment of the parties’ evidence
presented thus far in the preliminary investigation.
Contrary to Ang’s claims, Lucero sufficiently established the existence
of probable cause for estafa in this case.
First, the SPA Lucero executed in Catenza’s favor is clear. Paragraph 7
of the SPA provides:cralaw:red
xxx
7. To
make, sign, execute and deliver contracts, documents, agreements and
other writings of whatever nature or kind, involving the administration
of my business(es), with any and all third persons, concerns or
entities, upon terms and conditions acceptable to my said attorney,
including agreements, whether or not they be urgent and indispensable
for the preservation of my property under his administration; Provided,
however, that contracts by which ownership of any immovable owned by me
is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for valuable
consideration shall not be entered into by my said attorney-in-fact
without my prior written consent.
xxx
[17]
(Emphasis
supplied)
The provision clearly shows that Catenza is not allowed to enter into
any contract for the transfer or acquisition of Lucero’s real property
without her prior written approval. The same prohibition applies to
Ang. There is no showing that Catenza validly delegated his
authority under the SPA to Ang. Even assuming there was a valid
delegation, Ang merely stepped into the shoes of Catenza and could not
exercise more power than what Catenza had under the SPA.
Thus, the prohibition on Catenza applied to Ang, assuming there was a
valid delegation.
Second, the NBI found the signature on the Authorization Letter a
traced forgery.
Third, Ang obtained a loan from Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(“RCBC”) using the Property as collateral. There is no showing how Ang
applied the loan proceeds.
Fourth, Ang obtained an additional loan
[18]
of P700,000 from
RCBC with the Property as collateral after Lucero annotated an adverse
claim on the Property’s certificate of title which was already in Ang’s
name. The adverse claim clearly indicates Lucero’s objection to the
registration of the title to Ang. However, Ang inexplicably ignored the
adverse claim and proceeded with the loan.
Fifth, Ang admitted that Lucero signed blank sheets of paper. Ang
typed the Deed of Assignment in one of these sheets of paper with
Lucero’s signature.
[19]
Lucero,
however, denies authorizing Ang to type any deed of assignment
involving the Property over her signature. Instead, Lucero claims
that Ang requested her signature to secure a permit for her bus service
business.
Lastly, Ang refused to render an accounting of his alleged transactions
on Lucero’s behalf despite the latter’s repeated demands. If Ang
merely performed his duties as Lucero’s agent in connection with the
latter’s businesses, then there is certainly no reason to evade
Lucero’s valid requests.
Considering these circumstances, there is indeed probable cause to hold
Ang liable for estafa in this case. Estafa or swindling is committed by
defrauding another through any of the means enumerated in Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(c), estafa is committed by taking undue
advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and by
writing any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of
the offended party or any third person. In this case, Ang admitted
typing the Deed of Assignment over Lucero’s signature in blank.
Thereafter, Ang used the Deed of Assignment to transfer the ownership
of the Property from Lucero to him. Lucero claims that she was
prejudiced by virtue of the Deed of Assignment. However, whether
Ang took advantage of Lucero’s signature is a question that should be
presented and resolved during the trial.
There is also probable cause that Ang committed estafa by falsification
of public document. The Deed of Assignment is a public document since
it is notarized.
[20]
Lucero
claims that the Deed of Assignment was falsified because she was out of
the country when it was executed. Moreover, though the signature
in the Deed of Assignment appears to be her signature, it was not
Lucero’s intention to transfer the Property to Ang.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the Petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 October 1999 and its Resolution dated 25 April 2000 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 44778. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, J., (Acting Chairman),
Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on leave.
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-dela Cruz, with Associate
Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurring.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 50-53. The pertinent provisions of the Special Power
of Attorney in favor of Graciano P. Catenza, Jr. read:
SPECIAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY
KNOW
ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I,
ELEANOR R. LUCERO, of legal age and residing at No. 392 A. P. Reyes
corner J. P. Rizal Streets, Makati, Metro Manila, do hereby name,
appoint and constitute NR (sic), MR. GRACIANO P. CATENZA, JR., of legal
age, Filipino citizen, and residing at 4342 Rosemallow Road, Sunvalley
Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, to be my true and lawful
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, for me and in my name, place and stead, to do and
perform the following acts and deeds, to wit:
1.
To manage and administer all my business affairs in the Philippines,
including the operation of EAR LUCERO BUS SERVICE located at No. 9 San
Roque Bagong-Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila. xxx
2.
xxx
3.
To sign and execute any paper, document, voucher and check in
connection with daily operation of my business, including those
pertaining to the disbursement of expenses and payments due from
operation of the bus service business;
4.
xxx
5.
xxx
6.
xxx
7.
To make, sign, execute and deliver contracts, documents, agreements and
other writings of whatever nature or kind, involving the administration
of my business(es), with any and all third persons, concerns or
entities, upon terms and conditions acceptable to my said attorney,
including agreements, whether or not they be urgent and indispensable
for the preservation of my property under his administration; Provided,
however, that contracts by which ownership of any immovable owned by me
is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for valuable
consideration shall not be entered into by my said attorney-in-fact
without my prior written consent.
8.
To delegate in whole or in part any of the power herein granted or
conferred, by means of an instrument in writing, in favor of any third
person or persons whom my said attorney may select upon my prior
written consent.
xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
[4]
Ibid., p. 54. The Authorization Letter reads:
July 6, 1992
E.
Ganzon, Inc.
EGI
Homes Condominium
Mola
corner Primo Rivera Sts.
Makati,
Metro Manila
Attention of Mr.
Alex Guda
Head,
Realty Services Division
Re
:
Condominium Unit No. 1512
Makati Cinema
Square Tower Condominium
Gentlemen:
This
is to authorize you to register under the name of JIMMY Y. ANG, of
legal age, Filipino, single, and a resident of #9 A. Labrador Street,
B.F. Homes, Quezon City, the above-described condominium unit, of which
I was the original buyer and which full payment of the purchase price
was made by Jimmy Y. Ang, and to deliver to him the corresponding
condominium certificate of title (CCT) covering the aforementioned unit.
Very
truly yours,
(signed)
ELEANOR
R. LUCERO
[5]
Ibid., pp. 55-56. The Deed of Assignment reads:
DEED OF ASSIGNMENT
KNOW
ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This
Deed of Assignment, executed this 22nd day of June, 1992 at Makati,
Metro Manila, by and between:
ELEANOR R.
LUCERO, of legal age, Filipino, and with residence address at Unit 1512
Makati Cinema Square Tower, Pasong Tamo Street, Makati, Metro Manila,
hereinafter called the “ASSIGNOR”
-and-
JIMMY
Y. ANG, of legal age, Filipino, and with residence address at #9 Alejo
Labrador Street, B.F. Homes, Quezon City, hereinafter called the
“ASSIGNEE”.
WITNESSETH, That
WHEREAS, ASSIGNOR
is a party to the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 8, 1989,
executed by and between ASSIGNOR and E. Ganzon, Inc. the developer and
owner, for the reservation of Unit No. 1512 of the MAKATI CINEMA SQUARE
TOWER located at Pasong Tamo, Makati, Metro Manila, with Parking Space
No. 135 situated at the Lower Basement of the Makati Cinema Square
Commercial Complex;
WHEREAS,
ASSIGNOR is desirous of assigning all of her rights, title and interest
in and to said condominium unit under said Memorandum of Agreement, and
ASSIGNEE is ready, willing and able to accept the Assignment thereof;
NOW,
THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises and the
mutual covenants hereinafter set forth; the ASSIGNOR hereby assigns,
transfers, and convey[s], absolutely unto ASSIGNEE, his heirs,
successors and assigns, all of her rights, title and interest over the
condominium unit, containing an area of 149.70 square meters located at
the Fifteenth Floor of the Makati Cinema Square Tower as specifically
described in the Memorandum of Agreement.
IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this
22nd day of June, 1992 at Makati, Metro Manila.
(signed)
(signed)
ELEANOR R.
LUCERO
JIMMY Y. ANG
Assignor
Assignee
[6]
Ibid., pp. 264-265.
[7]
Paragraph 1 (c), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code states:
(c) By
taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank,
and by writing any document above such signature in blank, to the
prejudice of the offended party or any third person.
[8]
Rollo, p. 268.
[9]
Ibid., p. 36.
[10]
Ibid., pp. 50-53.
[11]
Ibid., pp. 115-116. The pertinent provisions of the Power of
Attorney state:
xxx
1.
To manage and administer the operations of my businesses in the
Philippines;
2.
To make, execute, sign and deliver contracts, documents, agreements and
writings of whatever nature or kind with any agency, institution and/or
other parties and concerns under such terms and conditions acceptable
to him in relation to the affairs of the said business;
3.
To negotiate, execute, sign and deliver other pertinent papers,
contracts and documents for and in my personal behalf;
4.
To disburse and receive any amount that maybe required and/or due me or
my company/ies.
xxx
[12]
Ibid., p. 14.
[13]
People v. CA, 361 Phil. 401 (1999).
[14]
Microsoft Corporation, et al. v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, 13
September 2004.
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
Supra note 13 citing Ledesma v. CA, 344 Phil. 207 (1997).
[17]
Rollo, p. 52.
[18]
The first loan was for P2,000,000.
[19]
Rollo, p. 72.
[20]
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
xxx
Public
documents are:
xxx
(b)
Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
xxx
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