INOCELIA
S. AUTENCIO,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R.
No. 152752
January
19, 2005
City
Administrator, RODEL M. MAÑARA
and The CITY OF COTABATO,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------x
D
E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
The
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is simply the
opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Furthermore, the counsel’s
actions and mistakes on procedural matters bind the client. On
the other hand, the complainant’s manifestations or representations on
questions of law do not bind the decision makers or the courts.
The
Case
Before
us is a Petition for Review
[1]
under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, challenging the September 12, 2001 Decision
[2]
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 56061. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition is dismissed for lack of
merit and the assailed resolution of the CSC is affirmed in its
entirety.”
[3]
Petitioner
also assails the February 8, 2000 CA Resolution
[4]
denying her
Motion for Reconsideration.
The
Facts
The CA
summarized the facts in this manner:
“On December 27,
1996, City Administrator Rodel M. Mañara lodged a complaint
against petitioner Inocelia S. Autencio with the Office of the City
Mayor for dishonesty and misconduct in office. The complaint
alleged that on the third week of October 1996, Riza Bravo, an employee
of the City Assessor’s Office charged with the preparation of the
payroll of casual employees, changed the September 1996 payroll
prepared by her upon the order of petitioner. The first prepared
payroll for the said month reflected five (5) days attendance of seven
(7) casual employees. It was made to appear in the second
prepared payroll that the seven casual employees worked for the whole
month of September. Despite the fact that the seven casual
employees rendered services only for five days for the month of
September and two weeks for the month of October 1996, the petitioner
directed them to prepare and reflect in their respective daily time
records full attendance for the months in question. The
petitioner told them that one-half of their salaries for the month of
September 1996 will be deducted as their contributions for the
Christmas party of their office and that this matter will be a surprise
for the regular employees and must be kept secret among themselves.
“Mrs.
Bravo personally collected the salaries of the seven casual employees
from the City Treasury Office upon instruction of the petitioner on
October 28, 1996, and distributed to them only one-half of their salary
and gave the remainder to the petitioner.
“Pending
investigation of the administrative complaint, on January 2, 1997,
petitioner was preventively suspended for a period of ninety (90) days.
“After
x x x hearing, the Office for Legal Services of the City of Cotabato,
on June 30, 1997, issued a resolution/decision which was approved by
the City Mayor Ludovico D. Badoy, declaring the petitioner guilty of
misconduct in office for allowing irregularities to happen which led to
illegal payment of salaries to casuals. However, as regards to
the charge of dishonesty, the same was found wanting due to
insufficiency of evidence. A penalty of forced resignation with
forfeiture of retirement benefits except for earned leave accumulated
before the filing of the complaint was imposed.
“The
petitioner appealed the said resolution to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). On June 9, 1998, the CSC issued Resolution No. 981413
modifying the decision of the City Mayor to grave misconduct and
imposed on her the penalty of dismissal for cause with all its
accessories. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CSC on
September 21, 1999 issued Resolution No. 99-2135 denying the same.”
[5]
In her Motion for Reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 98-1413,
petitioner alleged that she had waived her right to present her
evidence at a formal hearing and agreed to submit the case for
resolution, only because of the manifestation of the complainant and
the hearing officer that she could be held liable only for the lesser
offense of simple negligence.
On
September 21, 1999, the CSC issued Resolution No. 99-2135 denying her
Motion. According to the CSC, regardless of whether she agreed to
submit the case for resolution, the fact remains that she caused the
changes in the payroll of the seven casuals and made it appear that
they had worked for the full month of September.
Raising
the issues of whether she was denied due process and whether the
penalty imposed by the CSC was “harsh,” petitioner elevated the case to
the CA.
On
September 12, 2001, the CA affirmed the CSC Resolutions.
Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration, appending thereto the
Manifestation of incumbent Cotabato City Mayor Datu Muslimin G.
Sema. The mayor stated therein that, based on the records,
petitioner had been misled into waiving her right to a formal hearing;
and that he had no objection to the reopening of the case. On
February 8, 2002, the CA denied reconsideration.
Ruling
of the Court of Appeals
Ruling
that petitioner had not been denied due process, the CA reasoned that
“the requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy.” Petitioner was given this opportunity -- records
show that she was informed of the formal charges against her; she was
able to file her Answer as well as documents evidencing her claim; and
she was represented by a lawyer during the pre-hearing
conference. The CA said that “[t]he failure of petitioner and her
counsel to take full advantage of the opportunity to be heard does not
change the fact that they were accorded such opportunity.” One may be
heard not only through oral argument but also through pleadings.
The CA
likewise held that the penalty imposed by the CSC was not
“harsh.” It affirmed the CSC’s finding that the evidence had
sufficiently shown her grave misconduct in allowing the irregularities
leading to the illegal payment of salaries to casuals.
Pursuant to the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987, the commensurate penalty for such serious offense is
dismissal from the service.
Hence,
this Petition.
[6]
Issue
The
lone issue raised by petitioner in her Memorandum involves a pure
question of law:
“x x x [W]as the
petitioner deprived of substantial due process?”
The
Court’s Ruling
The
Petition is devoid of merit.
Lone
Issue:
Denial
of Substantial Due Process
Petitioner
insists that she waived her right to a formal hearing, only because she
was made to believe that she would be liable for the lesser offense of
simple negligence. She relies emphatically on the Manifestation
of the incumbent city mayor of Cotabato stating that an injustice was
committed against her because she had been deceived to the point that
she waived her right to present evidence. According to her, this
Manifestation constituted a judicial admission that the present counsel
of the city government did not object to, and that the appellate court
should have taken into consideration.
We
find no merit in petitioner’s contention. The legal presumption
is that official duty has been duly performed.
[7]
Government
officials are presumed to have regularly performed their functions;
[8]
and strong
evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption.
[9]
The Manifestation
is insufficient to overturn this principle. It contains mere
conclusions, not statements of fact.
In the
court -- not the witnesses or the parties -- lies the duty of drawing
legal conclusions from the evidence presented. Significantly, the
author of the Manifestation was not the city mayor
[10]
at the time the
investigation of petitioner’s case was conducted. How could he
have known about the alleged misrepresentation? Petitioner did
not explain.
Fraud
is never presumed; it must be established by clear and convincing
evidence.
[11]
In the present
case, apart from the Manifestation, there is no clear evidence of
fraud. While respondent’s counsel did not object to the admission
of the Manifestation, the leeway to consider and assess its probative
value
[12]
nonetheless lay
in the appellate court.
In her
original appeal to the CSC, petitioner did not raise the issue of
respondent’s alleged misrepresentation, which had allegedly induced her
to agree to submit the case for resolution without any formal
hearing. Instead, she merely questioned the harshness of the
penalty imposed by the City Government. Failure to invoke a
defense within the prescribed period constitutes a waiver thereof.
[13]
Defenses not
invoked below cannot be raised on appeal.
[14]
In
waiving the presentation of evidence in a formal hearing, the counsel
of petitioner might have believed in the futility of resisting the
charge; thus, he opted to waive her right to present evidence.
That he allegedly relied on respondent’s statement that she could be
held liable only for the lesser offense of simple negligence was a risk
he took on her behalf. It is jurisprudentially settled that
mistakes of counsel as to argumentation, the relevancy or irrelevancy
of a certain evidence or the introduction thereof are -- among others
-- all mistakes of procedure that bind the client.
[15]
At
this point, we stress that complaints against public officers and
employees relating or incidental to, or in connection with, the
performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public
interest.
[16]
The need to
maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government
demands that the proceedings in administrative cases should not be made
to depend on the whims and caprices of complainants.
[17]
Administrative
proceedings are akin to criminal prosecutions in the sense that no
compromise may be entered into between the parties as regards the penal
sanction. Complainants are not vested with the power of removal
or suspension. That prerogative belongs to the proper government
officials.
Moreover,
in a real sense, complainants in administrative cases are just
witnesses.
[18]
Therefore,
regardless of their desistance or representations, courts will not
desist from imposing the appropriate disciplinary sanction, if the
evidence so warrants.
[19]
If
administrative actions are made to depend upon the whim or will of
complainants, the disciplining authorities and the courts would be
stripped of their prerogative.
[20]
We
agree with the CA that petitioner was afforded due process. On the
formal charge against her, she had received sufficient information
which, in fact, enabled her to prepare her defense. She filed her
Answer controverting the charges against her and submitted Affidavits
of personnel in the Assessor’s Office to support her claim of
innocence. A pre-hearing conference was conducted by the legal
officer, during which she -- assisted by her counsel -- had
participated. Finally, she was able to appeal the ruling of City
Mayor Badoy to the CSC, and then to the CA.
In
administrative cases, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
one’s side suffices to meet the requirements of due process.
[21]
A formal or
trial-type hearing is not always necessary.
[22]
For the purpose
of ascertaining the truth, an investigation will be conducted, during
which technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings need not
always be adhered to.
[23]
And where the
party has the opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of, defects in procedural due process may
be cured.
[24]
Finally,
settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an
administrative agency must be respected, so long as they are supported
by substantial evidence.
[25]
It is not the
task of this Court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the
latter in respect of the sufficiency of evidence.
[26]
In any event,
the Decisions of the CSC and the Court of Appeals finding petitioner
guilty of the administrative charge prepared against her are supported
by substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-17.
[2]
Annex “C” of Petition; id., pp. 30-34. Penned by Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion and concurred in by Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili (chairman of
the Special Seventeenth Division) and Juan Q. Enriquez Jr. (acting
member).
[3] CA
Decision, p. 5; id., p. 34.
[4]
Rollo, p. 36.
[5] CA
Decision, pp. 1-2; id., pp. 30-31.
[6]
This case was deemed submitted for decision on May 25, 2004, upon this
Court’s receipt of petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. V. Emmanuel
C. Fontanilla. Respondents’ Memorandum, signed by Atty. Datu Mando V.
Sinsuat Jr., was received on May 17, 2004.
[7]
§3 (m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
[8]
Sps. Romero v. Tan et al., GR No. 147570, February 27, 2004; Corpuz v.
Siapno, 404 SCRA 83, June 17, 2003; Columbus Philippines Bus
Corporation v. NLRC, 417 Phil. 81, September 7, 2001.
[9]
Agpalo, The Law of Public Officers (1st ed., 1998), p. 190.
[10]
The city mayor at the time was Hon. Bandoy, while the incumbent city
mayor who made the Manifestation was Hon. Sema.
[11]
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Sps. Vazquez, 399 SCRA 207, March 14,
2003; Maestrado v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 418, 435, March 9, 2000;
Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 171, February 23, 2000.
[12]
See Bitong v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 516, July 13, 1998.
[13]
Mendoza v. Civil Service Commission, 233 SCRA 657, July 5, 1994.
[14]
Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, 335 Phil. 1150, February 26, 1997;
Manila Bay Club Corp. v. CA, 315 Phil. 805, July 11, 1995; Reparations
Commission v. Visayan Packing Corp., et al., 193 SCRA 531, February 6,
1991.
[15]
Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
VI, 208 SCRA 523, May 8, 1992.
[16]
Sy v. Academia, 198 SCRA 705, July 3, 1991.
[17]
Estreller v. Manatad Jr., 335 Phil. 1077, February 21, 1997.
[18]
Ibid.
[19]
Abenojar v. Lopez, 203 Phil. 385, November 2, 1982.
[20]
Ibid.
[21]
Rubenecia v. CSC, 314 Phil. 612, May 31, 1995; Padilla v. Sto. Tomas,
312 Phil. 1095, March 31, 1995; Esber v. Sto. Tomas, 225 SCRA 664,
August 26, 1993 (citing Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 43,
September 26, 1990; Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso, 161 SCRA
732, May 31, 1988).
[22]
Padilla v. Sto. Tomas, supra (citing Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, supra).
[23]
§48, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, 1987 Administrative Code.
[24]
Cordenillo v. Executive Secretary, 342 Phil. 618, August 4, 1997;
Casuela v. Office of the Ombudsman, 276 SCRA 635, August 4, 1997;
Rubenecia v. CSC, supra; Esber v. Sto. Tomas, supra.
[25]
Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590, August 2, 2001.
[26]
Ibid; Rubenecia v. CSC, supra.
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