BEL-AIR
TRANSIT SERVICE CORPORATION (DOLLAR RENT-A-CAR),
Complainant,
-versus-
Adm.
Case No. 6107
January
31, 2005
ATTY.
ESTEBAN Y. MENDOZA,
Respondent. x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D
E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
In a
verified Complaint
[1]
dated June 11,
2003, Bel-Air Transit Service Corporation (Dollar Rent-A-Car) charged
Atty. Esteban Y. Mendoza with grossly immoral and unethical conduct,
praying for his disbarment and that his name be stricken-off from the
Roll of Attorneys.
The
complainant narrated that, on September 19, 2001, the respondent rented
a car from it, a Toyota Camry with Plate No. WMK 232, for the amount of
P5,549.00. Under the terms of the Rental Agreement No. 97206,
[2]
which the
respondent personally signed, the latter was to be fetched at his
residence at No. 483 Northwestern Street, East Greenhills, Mandaluyong
City. The respondent rented another Toyota Camry from the
complainant on September 28, 2001, this time with Plate No. WRT 557,
and was, likewise, fetched at his residence in accordance with the
Rental Agreement No. 97420.
[3]
This
second contract was also personally signed by the respondent. The
statements of account
[4]
were,
thereafter, sent to the respondent at his office and business address
at Martinez & Mendoza Law Office, Cityland Show Tower, Mandaluyong
City. Despite repeated demands for payment, the respondent
refused to pay his account, which constrained the complainant to send a
formal and final demand for payment through counsel.
[5]
This
formal demand was, likewise, ignored by the respondent, further
compelling the complainant to resort to filing a complaint
[6]
for recovery of
money on March 12, 2003 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 65, docketed as Civil Case No. 81392.
According
to the complainant, the respondent’s refusal to pay for the
complainant’s car rental services constitutes deceit and grossly
immoral and unethical conduct, which violates the Canons of
Professional Ethics and Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code on
Human Relations. The complainant further alleged that this is a
sufficient ground for the respondent’s disbarment, considering that the
respondent even ignored the complainant’s repeated demands for payment.
[7]
In
his Comment, the respondent denied the allegations against him. He
averred that it was the law firm of Martinez & Mendoza which
engaged the services of the complainant, and that all the trips
undertaken were for an out-of-town engagement in Lucena City. To
support his claim, the respondent incorporated a letter
[8]
addressed to the
Chief Operations Manager of the complainant requesting for the latter’s
services.
The
respondent alleged that the driver assigned to him by the complainant
during the trip from Lucena City on September 19, 2001 did not exercise
extraordinary diligence. He averred that they almost figured in
an accident, and when he inquired as to why the said driver was not
cautious with his driving, the latter replied that he had just been on
another out-of-town trip driving for another client and only had three
hours of sleep the night before. The respondent decided not to
report the incident to the complainant, thinking that it was going to
be the first and last incident. However, during the trip of
September 28, 2001, the respondent again almost figured in an accident,
prompting the respondent to contact the complainant to complain as to
why the latter was providing drivers to their law firm who had not had
enough sleep. No one from the complainant’s staff could provide
him with a decent answer, merely “Pasensiya na.” The respondent
then demanded a meeting with the complainant’s president in order to
resolve the matter, but despite repeated requests, the latter refused
to meet with him. The respondent further averred, thus:
14.
It is not only inaccurate but also unfair for the complainant to
baselessly accuse the respondent or M&M of refusing to pay their
claims. As shown above, M&M immediately paid all of complainant’s
billings for August 2001. It was only the billings for September
2001 that remained unpaid because M&M and respondent first wanted
to meet with the President of the complainant to resolve their
complaint. M&M and respondent do not have a history of not honoring
their obligations. As officers of the court, it is cognizant that
[they] should conduct [themselves] properly so as not to do injustice
to anyone, including the complainant.
14.1.
Respondent almost met an accident because the complainant provided him
with drivers that did not have enough rest and sleep before they drove
for him. It is the respondent who is the aggrieved party here and
not the complainant. Thus, it is very unfortunate that it is the
respondent who is slapped with a disbarment case. M&M did not even
file a complaint with the Department of Trade and Industry for
violation of the Consumers Act of the Philippines because it wanted to
resolve its complaint amicably.
14.2
Respondent respectfully manifests that, only to buy peace, the
questioned billings of the complainant which [were] made the subject of
a complaint they filed against him had already been fully satisfied.
A
copy of Official Receipt No. 52095 dated 4 September 2003 in the name
of “Martinez & Mendoza Law Office” is attached hereto and made an
integral part hereof as Annex “H.”
[9]
The
respondent concluded that the complainant did not have a cause of
action for disbarment against him, as he was merely exercising his
right to contest its questionable billings.
The
case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation and was assigned to IBP
Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay. During the hearing of March 1,
2004, the counsel for the complainant manifested that although the
respondent had already paid his account, such payment was made only
after the court had already decided the case against the respondent and
after the filing of a motion for execution,
[10]
which the
respondent admitted. Thus, the parties agreed during the hearing
that as far as the monetary obligation was concerned, the said judgment
had already been satisfied by the respondent. The parties were
then required to file their respective position papers, which were
basically reiterations of their previous allegations.
In
his Report and Recommendation dated April 19, 2004, Commissioner Dulay
made the following findings:
Respondent offers
two reasons for non-payment: First, that the obligation was
incurred not by him but by his law office Martinez & Mendoza.
Second, that the respondent almost met an accident on the two occasions
he used the services of the complainant and therefore “he should not be
penalized for exercising its right to contest complainants’
questionable billings.”
.
As to the first
reason, we reiterate that as decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
respondent was liable for the obligation to the complainant.
Indeed, respondent cannot avoid the obligation and pass it on to his
law firm and just make a complete denial considering that he is a name
partner in the firm and law partnership of Martinez and Mendoza.
The Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore, ruled that respondent was,
nevertheless, liable for the obligation of his law partnership.
Independent of the said decision, we find that the documents attached
as Annexes “A” and “B” to the complaint appear to have been signed by
the respondent and even assuming that it was the law firm that was
liable, there is nothing on record to show that the law firm questioned
the billings of the complainant or that the respondent referred the
same to the law firm for proper disposition.
As to the second
reason, respondent admits that there was no written demand made for the
complainant to account and answer for the “near accidents” alleged by
respondent, which “near accidents” as we understand are his reasons for
not immediately paying. We find the absence of a written demand
from the respondent quite odd especially in the case of a lawyer who is
seeking to exercise his “right to contest complainant’s questionable
billings” or otherwise hold complainant accountable for the said “near
accidents.” It would perhaps be understandable if the omission was made
by a layman; but for a lawyer not to put his demand in writing, it
would be uncharacteristic to say the least. Neither was a demand
made by the law firm of Martinez and Mendoza as a basis for
non-payment. We are, therefore, inclined to look at this reason,
(near accident) as a mere afterthought and would not justify respondent
in not paying for two (2) years what appears to be a clear and simple
obligation to complainant. As pointed out by complainant, it was
only after a writ of execution was issued when payment was made.
The reason
offered by respondent for not paying complainant particularly the
alleged “near accident” is, therefore, not justifiable. The said
reason appears to us trite and contrived. Lack of funds to pay an
obligation may perhaps be a good reason but to use as a reason the said
“near accident” on the bare assertion of respondent alone and not
supported by any corroborating evidence may not be readily
acceptable. We are, on the other hand, also not convinced that
respondent was deceitful or grossly negligent by his actions.
There is no evidence to show that respondent was acting with deceit in
not paying for the obligation incurred. However, we find respondent
lacking in probity and forthrightness in dealing with the complaint and
quite simply negligent in the handling of this particular obligation to
complainant. Taken in the light of the circumstances presented,
we believe respondent should be admonished and warned to avoid such
similar conduct in the future.
It was, thus,
recommended that the respondent be admonished and advised to be more
forthright in the handling of his monetary obligations in the
future. On July 30, 2004, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
then issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-378, adopting and approving the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, considering that
there was no evidence to show that the respondent had acted with deceit
in not paying for the questioned obligation.
It is settled
that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting
in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.
[11]
A lawyer
must, at all times, uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. Indeed, a lawyer brings honor to the legal profession
by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. To this end, a member of the legal
fraternity should refrain from doing any
act which might
lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty and integrity in the legal profession.
[12]
Thus,
lawyers must promptly pay their financial obligations.
[13]
Their
conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[14]
In
this case, the respondent refused to pay for the services of the
complainant, constraining the latter to file charges in order to
collect what was due to it under the contracts, in which the respondent
himself was the signatory. Moreover, as pointed out by IBP
Commissioner Dulay, the respondent’s claim that he almost twice figured
in accidents due to the negligent drivers employed by the complainant
and that he intended to question the company’s billings (which he also
posited was a valid excuse for non-payment), appears to have been
concocted as a mere afterthought.
Verily,
the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar,
and should be admonished for his actuations.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Esteban
Y. Mendoza is hereby ADMONISHED
to be more circumspect in his financial obligations and his dealings
with the public. He is STERNLY WARNED that similar conduct in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let
a copy of this Decision be included in the respondent’s files which are
with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and circularized to all courts
and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO
ORDERED.
PUNO,
J., (Chairman),
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, TINGA and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-5.
[2]
Annex “A.”
[3]
Annex “B.”
[4]
Annexes “C” and “D.”
[5]
Annex “E.”
[6]
Annex “G.”
[7]
Rollo, p. 3.
[8]
Id. at 24.
[9]
Id. at 20-21.
[10]
TSN, 1 March 2004, p. 3.
[11]
Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408 (1997).
[12]
Id. at 413.
[13]
Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 227 (2003).
[14]
Id. at 232.
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