D
E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This
is a Petition for Review of the Resolutions
[1]
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73353 filed by the Bukluran ng
Manggagawa sa Clothman Knitting Corporation – Solidarity of Unions in
the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (the petitioner union) and
Raymond Tomaroy, Roel Sardonidos, Joseph Sederio, Maritchu Javellana,
Enrique Omadto, Efren Mogar, Francisco Bertulfo, Judy Roquero, Paterno
Silvestre, Cayetano Palmon, Teodoro Ocop and Joseph Estifano.
Respondent
Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC) is a domestic corporation engaged
in knitting/textiles.
[2]
It has
approximately one hundred forty-four (144) rank-and-file
employees. The petitioner union is a legitimate labor
organization of rank-and-file employees therein. The petitioners
were rank-and-file employees of the respondent and were also members
and officers of the petitioner union.
In the
year 2001, the rank-and-file employees at the CKC banded together and
formed the petitioner union. It was registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on February 23, 2001.
In reaction thereto, the respondent, headed by its President, Paul U.
Lee, gathered the employees and advised them not to listen to outsiders.
[3]
Meanwhile,
another group of rank-and-file employees banded together and formed the
Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Corporation – Katipunan
(NLM-Katipunan). The NLM-Katipunan was issued a certificate of
registration on April 23, 2001 by the DOLE.
[4]
A petition
for certification election was later filed by the petitioner union with
the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
Pending
the resolution of the petition for certification election, the
respondent issued a Memorandum
[5]
dated March 2,
2001, informing the employees of the change in the schedule brought
about by the decrease in the orders from the customers.
On
March 10, 2001, another Memorandum
[6]
was issued by
the respondent informing its employees at the Dyeing and Finishing
Division that a temporary shutdown of the operations therein would be
effected for one week, from March 12 to 17, 2001. The employees
were advised to go on vacation leave, and were asked to verify any
changes in the schedule from the Human Resources Division on March 17,
2001.
Unable
to solve its financial problems, the respondent decided to temporarily
shutdown its operations at the Dyeing and Finishing Division effective
the next day, scheduled to resume until further notice. It
notified the DOLE of the said shutdown on May 26, 2001.
[7]
The operations
of the other divisions of the CKC remained normal.
For
its reduced dyeing and finishing needs, the respondent brought the
textiles to Crayons, Inc., a sister company. On June 11, 2001,
while the respondent’s service truck with plate number TBK-158 was to
deliver fabrics in Bulacan, the group of petitioner Raymond Tomaroy and
some companions approached the truck as it made its way towards Don
Pedro Street and blocked its way. As a result, the driver of the
service truck decided to return to the respondent’s compound.
Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy, with sixteen (16) members of the
petitioner union, staged a picket in front of the respondent’s
compound, carrying placards with slogans that read:
1. Itigil
ang sabwatan ng KATIPUNAN (FABIAN GROUP) at management BMC-SUPER.
2.
Mr. Paul Lee – Huwag mong ipitin ang mid-year, 13th month pay ng mga
manggagawa sa CKC. BMC-SUPER.
3.
Ibalik ang pasok sa Finishing Department.
4.
Mr. Paul Lee – Magagara ang sasakyan mo, Montero, BMW, Pajero pero
kaunting benepisyo ng manggagawa ay di mo maibigay. BMC-SUPER.
5.
Kilalanin ang karapatan ng manggagawa na magtatag ng unyon.
BMC-SUPER.
[8]
On
June 14, 2001, twenty-three (23) members of the petitioner union
gathered in front of the respondent’s compound carrying the same
placards. Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy agreed to talk to
the management with the following priority demands: (a) resumption of
work; and (b) 13th month pay.
[9]
The next day,
members of the petitioner union and their supporters gathered in front
of the respondent’s compound.
[10]
From June 16,
2001 up to June 18, 2001, the members, as well as supporters of the
union, gathered again in front of the company’s compound.
[11]
On
June 25, 2001, the respondent filed a petition to declare the strike
illegal before the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC-NCR 06-03332-2001.
[12]
The respondent
alleged that the picket of the members of the union from June 11, 2001
to June 18, 2001 in front of the company’s compound constituted an
illegal strike. It cited the following reasons:
a)
The strikers/picketers did not conduct a strike vote and no cooling-off
period was observed;
b)
The strikers/picketers did not file a notice of strike;
c)
The reasons for the strike/picket involve a non-strikeable issue;
d)
The work slowdown/picket caused damages to the petitioner in the sum of
FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00);
e)
The illegal acts of respondents constrained petitioner to seek the
services of undersigned counsel for an attorney’s fee of P50,000.00 and
P2,000.00 per appearance.
[13]
In a
Decision dated October 18, 2001, the Labor Arbiter granted the
petition, declared the strike illegal and the employment status of the
union officers who participated therein as terminated:
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the petition filed by the petitioner is hereby
GRANTED.
The
strike conducted by the respondents is hereby declared as illegal.
Consequently,
due to their illegal activities, the respondents namely: RAYMOND
TOMAROY, President, ROEL SARDONIDOS, Vice-President, JOSEPH SEDERIO,
Secretary, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, Treasurer, ENRIQUE OMADTO, Auditor,
EFREN MOGAR, P.R.O., and FRANCISCO BERTULFO, P.R.O. and Board of
Directors: JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO
OCOP and JOSEPH ESTIFANO are hereby declared to have lost their
employment status with the petitioner.
[14]
The
Labor Arbiter found that the continued decline in job prompted the
respondent to implement a reduced working day from the original six (6)
days to three (3) days per week because of the continued decrease of
job orders, which further led to its decision to temporarily stop the
operation in its Dyeing and Finishing Division for one (1) week – March
12 to 17, 2001. The affected employees were then requested to
utilize their vacation leaves and were, thereafter, admitted back to
work. However, Tomaroy and members of the union staged a strike,
and the labor unrest resulted in the cancellation of job orders
amounting to P6,380,817.50. The aforestated losses prompted the
petitioner to close and stop the business operations of its Dyeing and
Finishing Division.
It is
worthy to note that the whole company did not cease to operate and that
it was only the workers in the Dyeing and Finishing Division who were
affected by the temporary lay-off. Thus, when the respondents
conducted a picket in front of the company’s premises, the whole
business operations of the respondent was affected. As borne out
by the records, the Labor Arbiter found that the petitioners therein
failed to comply with the requirements for a valid strike, to wit:
1. It was
not based on a valid factual ground, either based on Collective
Bargaining Deadlock and/or Unfair Labor Practice;
2.
No notice of strike was filed with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board of the DOLE;
3.
There was no strike-vote taken by the majority members of the union;
4.
There was no strike-vote report submitted to the DOLE at least seven
(7) days before the intended date of the strike;
5.
The cooling-off period prescribed by law was not observed; and
6.
The 7-day visiting period after submission of the strike vote report
was not fully observed.
[15]
Thus,
the Labor Arbiter ruled that the strike staged by the petitioner union
was illegal; hence, the union officers who knowingly participated in an
illegal strike, already lost their employment status.
[16]
Aggrieved,
the petitioner union interposed an appeal before the NLRC, docketed as
NLRC-CA-030216-01. In a Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2002,
the NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter:
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, and finding no cogent reason to disturb the
finding of the Labor Arbiter a quo, the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
[17]
The NLRC reasoned that it found no instances and/or situation befitting
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter.
Dissatisfied,
the petitioner union filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied in a Resolution
[18]
dated July 24,
2002.
The
petitioner union filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73353, raising the following error:
I.
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS, THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER AND THE COMMISSIONERS
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED PATENT GRAVE
ABUSED (SIC) OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN THEY FAILED TO APPRECIATE FACTS AND EVIDENCES, APPLICABLE LAWS AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND, IF NOT CORRECTED, WOULD CAUSE IRREPARABLE
DAMAGE TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS.
[19]
In a
Resolution
[20]
dated October
25, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA found that,
contrary to Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner union did not
contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and
the respondents, as the petition merely mentioned “BMC-SUPER, et al.”
as the petitioners. Further, the petition and the certification
on non-forum shopping were signed by Raymond P. Tomaroy, who claimed to
be the union president/authorized representative of petitioners
without, however, any such authorization from the labor union and the
other petitioners covered by the abbreviation et al. Moreover,
the petition was not verified as required by Section 1, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, did not produce legal effect as
provided for in Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In
addition, the petition was signed by petitioner Raymond P. Tomaroy in
his capacity as union president/authorized representative, assisted by
Enrique T. Belarmino, Legal Head of Solidarity of Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms, neither of whom was a duly
authorized member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Hence, according to the appellate court, neither of them had authority
to conduct litigation before the CA.
[21]
A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioner union which was similarly
denied in a Resolution
[22]
dated April 21,
2003. The CA reasoned that, contrary to the petitioners’
insistence that the verification was signed by Raymond P. Tomaroy, page
16 of the petition filed before it did not bear such signature.
Moreover, the special power of attorney attached to the motion for
reconsideration was subscribed and sworn to by the signatories therein
before Notary Public Orlando C. Dy only on November 20, 2002, i.e.,
more than one (1) month after the filing of the petition on October 15,
2002. Consequently, the special power of attorney did not cure
the defect in the certification against forum shopping signed by
Raymond Tomaroy, which was, likewise, not accompanied by proof that he
was authorized to file the petition on behalf of the petitioner union.
The CA
clarified that the authority of non-lawyers to represent the labor
organization or members thereof applies only to proceedings before the
NLRC or Labor Arbiters, as provided for in Article 222 of the Labor
Code. On the other hand, a non-lawyer may appear before it only
if he is a party-litigant. However, Raymond P. Tomaroy did not
appear to be a party in the case before the CA as his name was not
mentioned in the caption nor in the body of the petition.
[23]
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition contending that:
I
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’
APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF TECHNICALITIES.
II
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION ERRED [WHEN] IT AFFIRMED
THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED
ILLEGAL STRIKE.
[24]
On the
first ground, the petitioners allege that they complied with Section 3,
Rule 46 and Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. They contend
that the petition filed before the CA by the petitioner union’s
president was sanctioned by Article 242 of the Labor Code, and the
cases of Liberty Manufacturing Workers Union v. CFI of Bulacan,
[25]
Davao Free
Workers Front v. CIR,
[26]
and La Carlota
Sugar Central v. CIR.
[27]
The petitioner
union insists that it would be illogical for the union, as an entity,
to require all its members to sign the said petition and the
certificate of non-forum shopping. It avers that a labor union is
a judicial entity which functions thru its officers. Thus, the
president, as an officer of the union, needed no special power of
attorney to sign for the union. It stresses that it did not
violate Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The
petitioner union further invokes the policy that the “rules of
technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial
justice;” when the rules strictly applied resulting in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, this Court is
empowered to support the rules.
The
petitioners argue that they did not stage a strike, much more an
illegal strike. They explain that a strike means work
stoppage. Considering that the Dyeing and Finishing Division of
the respondent was shutdown, it could not have caused a work
stoppage. The union members merely picketed in front of the
respondent’s factory to urge the respondent to open and order the
resumption of the operations in its Dyeing and Finishing
Division. There was, thus, no need to comply with the
requirements laid down by Article 263 of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules.
For
its part, the respondent prayed that the petition be dismissed on the
ground that the petition filed before the CA failed to comply with
Section 1 of Rule 65, Section 3 of Rule 46, and Section 7 of Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, and that the requirement as to the signatories in
the petition failed to comply with Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court. The respondent reiterates that the petitioners staged an
illegal strike, and that as officers of the union who participated
therein, the petitioners are deemed to have lost their employment
status.
The
contention of the petitioners is erroneous. They are of the
erroneous impression that the only respondent in the NLRC was the
petitioner union and that it was sued in its representative
capacity. The fact of the matter is that the respondent sued not
only the petitioner union as respondent, but also its officers and
members of its Board of Directors as principal respondents, and sought
the termination of the employment of the said officers. The Labor
Arbiter rendered judgment against all the respondents therein and
declared the officers to have lost their employment status. The
NLRC affirmed the decision on appeal. It was not only the union
that assailed the decision of the NLRC in the CA, but also the
dismissed officers. The petitioners (respondents therein) prayed
for the reversal thereof and that another judgment be rendered as
prayed for by them in their position paper in the NLRC, thus:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is respectfully prayed to this Honorable Labor
Arbiter that, after submission of this Position Paper, the above
entitled case be considered submitted for resolution, and the decision
be rendered in favor of the respondents employees:
1.
Declaring Petitioners guilty of illegal reduction of working days,
shutdown and UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES against individual respondents;
2.
Ordering petitioners be, jointly and severally, liable to pay
respondents actual damages, payment of MORAL and EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in
the amount of not less than P50,000.00 each individual employees and
10% of the total monetary award for the Office of BMC-SUPER plus
P10,000.00 litigation expenses;
3.
Ordering that Petitioner Paul Lee be in contempt of court and be fined
to pay individual respondents in the amount of P50,000.00 each or
imprisonment of Two (2) to Four (4) Years or both.
Other
relief and remedies equitable in the premises are, likewise, prayed for.
[28]
Under
Section 3 of Rule 46 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for certiorari shall contain the full names and
actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents, and that
the failure of the petitioners to comply with the said requirement
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition:
Sec. 3.
Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements. – The petition shall contain the full names and actual
addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement
of the matters involved, the factual background of the case and the
grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
It
shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof
of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended
for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true
copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof,
such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and
other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification
shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly
authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court,
tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized
representative. The other requisite number of copies of the
petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all
documents attached to the original.
The
petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn
certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if
there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of
the same; and if he should, thereafter, learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and
other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
The
petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to
the clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the
time of the filing of the petition.
The
failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.
Moreover,
under Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the title of the action
indicates the names of the parties who shall be named in the original
petition:
Section 1.
Caption. – The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of
the action, and the docket number, if assigned.
The
title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They
shall all be named in the original complaint or petition; but in
subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first
party on each side be stated with an appropriate indication when there
are other parties.
Their
respective participation in the case shall be indicated.
In
this case, the title of the petition for certiorari filed in the CA
does not contain the names of the petitioners officers of the
petitioner BMC-SUPER and of the members of the Board of Directors; even
the petition itself does not contain the full names and addresses of
the said officers and members of the Board of Directors of the
petitioner union. We quote the title of the petition and the
averments thereof having reference to the parties-petitioners:
BUKLURAN NG
MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION –
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT
AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ET AL.,
Petitioner,
-vs-
CLOTHMAN
KNITTING CORPORATION,
Respondents.
[29]
.
Petitioners,
BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN – SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), et al., is a legitimate labor
organization with Charter Certificate No. S-102, can be served with
summons and other processes at 4th Floor Perlas Building, 646 Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City.
Private
Respondent, CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION, is a domestic corporation
organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine Laws engaged
in textile industry with principal place of business at No. 57 Don
Pedro Street, Don Pedro Village, Marulas, Valenzuela City.
Public
Respondents, National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division,
herein impleaded as the tribunal exercising judicial functions who
issued the assailed decision in NLRC Case No. 05-03332-2001.
[30]
The
petitioners’ reliance on the ruling of this Court in Davao Free Workers
Front v. CIR
[31]
is
misplaced. In the said case, the Court held that the failure to
specify the details regarding the number and names of the striking
members of a labor union in the decision or in the complaint was of no
consequence. This is due to the fact that it was established that
all the union members went on strike as a result of the unfair labor
practice of the employer, in consonance with the rule that it is
precisely the function of a labor union to carry the representation of
its members, particularly against the employer’s unfair labor practices
against it and its members, and to file an action for their benefit and
behalf without joining each and every member as a separate party.
Significantly,
the full names and addresses of the officers and members of the Board
of Directors of the petitioner union are set forth in their petition at
bench; proof that, indeed, there is a need for the full names and
addresses of all the petitioners to be stated in the title of the
petition and in the petition itself. We quote the title of the
petition and the allegation therein having reference to the
parties-petitioners:
BUKLURAN NG
MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION – SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN
THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), AND RAYMOND
TOMAROY, ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE
OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO
SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO,
Petitioners.
[32]
1. Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN – SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS
FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH
SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO
BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO
OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO, the former is a legitimate labor organization
with Charter Certificate No. S-102, and the latter are members of the
former; they can be served with summons and other processes of this
Honorable Court at c/o H.O. VICTORIA AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, Unit
305 Web-Jet Building, 64 Quezon Avenue cor. BMA Avenue, Quezon City.
[33]
On the
other hand, Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court
reads:
Sec. 5.
Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has
not, therefore, commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should,
thereafter, learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
Failure
to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a
false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice
to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the
acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well
as a cause for administrative sanctions.
As
gleaned from the petition for certiorari in the CA, only the petitioner
Raymond P. Tomaroy signed the certification of non-forum shopping in
his capacity as the president of the petitioner union. The
officers and members of the Board of Directors, who were, likewise,
principal petitioners, did not execute any certification of non-forum
shopping as mandated by the said Rule. The rule is that the
certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the
petitioners and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient.
[34]
Although
petitioner Tomaroy was authorized by virtue of his position as
president of the petitioner union to execute the certification for and
in its behalf, he had no authority to do so for and in behalf of its
petitioners-officers, as well as the members of the Board of Directors
thereof. The execution by the individual petitioners of a special
power of attorney subsequent to the dismissal of the petition by the CA
authorizing petitioner Tomaroy to execute the requisite certification
does not cure the fatal defect in their petition.
[35]
The
respondent alleges that the petition for certiorari filed before the CA
was correctly dismissed as it was not signed by counsel. The
respondent noted that petitioner Tomaroy was not a lawyer and that
petitioner Enrique Belarmino did not manifest in the petition that he
was the lawyer. The respondent, thus, contends that Tomaroy and
Belarmino engaged in the illegal practice of law, in violation of
Section 34, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court
.
We do
not agree.
Section
3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him.
[36]
Considering that
the union is one of the petitioners, Tomaroy, as its president, may
sign the pleading. For this reason alone, the CA cannot dismiss
the petition.
Even
if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the petitioners and
resolved the petition on its merits, we find that the petitioner union,
along with its supporters, staged a strike without complying with the
requirements laid down in Article 263 of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules.
The
petitioner union alleges that it could not have staged a strike because
the operations at the Dyeing and Finishing Division were temporarily
stopped. It insists that it merely protested the unjustified
closing of the respondent’s Dyeing and Finishing Division by forming a
picket in front of the respondent’s compound to urge the re-opening
thereof.
We do
not agree.
A
strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.
[37]
A labor dispute
includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of
employment or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee.
[38]
The
members and the supporters of the petitioner union, headed by
petitioner Tomaroy, thru concerted action, caused a temporary stoppage
of work as a result of an industrial dispute. This is evidenced
in the June 13, 2001 spot report of the Atlantic Security &
Investigation Agency:
On or about 1445H
of June 11, 2001, Mr. Jojo Flores and Mr. Rene Fabian were about to
deliver fabrics in Bulacan with service truck TBK-158. Upon
reaching the corner of Don Pedro St. and McArthur Highway, they gave
way to a big truck turning to Don Pedro St. and at the same time the
group of Mr. Raymond Tomaroy, the leader of BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA
CLOTHMAN – SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS – BMC SUPER were on their way to CKC compound. Seeing the
group, Mr. Fabian greeted them by giving a quick forward motion of his
head. But instead, according to Mr. Fabian, Mr. Tomaroy with
finger pointing on to Mr. Fabian accusing him as the one responsible
for the delay of their 13th month pay. Mr. Fabian just told the
group BMC-SUPER to read the Memorandum of the HRD dated June 8,
2001. Mr. Flores and Mr. Fabian returned to CKC, Don Pedro St.,
Marulas, Valenzuela, to report the matter.
At
about 1517H of same date, Mr. Tomaroy with 16 members of BMC SUPER
staged a rally and/or gathered in front of Clothman Knitting
Corporation gate carrying placards with slogan read as follows:
1. Itigil
ang sabwatan ng KATIPUNAN (FABIAN GROUP) at management BMC-SUPER;
2.
Mr. Paul Lee – Huwag mong ipitin ang mid-year, 13th month pay ng mga
manggagawa sa CKC. BMC-SUPER;
3.
Ibalik ang pasok sa Finishing Department;
4.
Mr. Paul Lee – Magagara ang sasakyan mo, Montero, BMW, Pajero pero
kaunting benepisyo ng manggagawa ay di mo maibigay BMC-SUPER;
5.
Kilalanin ang karapatan ng manggagawa na magtatag ng unyon BMC-SUPER.
On or
about 1640H at the same date, a PNP-Valenzuela Mobil car had SPO1
Palma, PO2 Manresa and PO1 Isip on board. The police with the
BMC-SUPER.
The
Valenzuela Police left at about 1727H.
At
about 1810H of the same date, the group of BMC-SUPER abandoned the area.
[39]
The
subsequent Reports dated June 14, 15, 16 and 18, 2001 of the same
agency further stated that members of the petitioner union, along with
other employees particularly from the knitting department, joined in
the picket.
[40]
It is, thus,
apparent that the concerted effort of the members of the petitioner
union and its supporters caused a temporary work stoppage. The
allegation that there can be no work stoppage because the operation in
the Dyeing and Finishing Division had been shutdown is of no
consequence. It bears stressing that the other divisions were
fully operational. There is nothing on record showing that the
union members and the supporters who formed a picket line in front of
the respondent’s compound were assigned to the finishing
department. As can be clearly inferred from the spot reports,
employees from the knitting department also joined in picket. The
blockade of the delivery of trucks and the attendance of employees from
the other departments of the respondent meant work stoppage. The
placards that the picketers caused to be displayed arose from matters
concerning terms or conditions of employment as well as the association
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment.
Clearly,
the petitioner union, its officers, members and supporters staged a
strike. In order for a strike to be valid, the following
requirements laid down in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the
Labor Code must be complied with: (a) a notice of strike must be filed;
(b) a strike-vote must be taken; and (c) the results of the strike-vote
must be reported to the DOLE.
[41]
It bears
stressing that these requirements are mandatory, meaning,
non-compliance therewith makes the strike illegal. The evident
intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote
report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is
essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in
the law.
[42]
Considering
that the petitioner union failed to comply with the aforesaid
requirements, the strike staged on June 11 to 18, 2001 is
illegal. Consequently, the officers of the union who participated
therein are deemed to have lost their employment status.
[43]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Petition is DENIED. The
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73353 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
Puno,
J., (Chairman),
Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate Justices
Renato C. Dacudao and Mario L. Guariña III, concurring; Rollo,
pp. 51-53.
[2]
Rollo, p. 112.
[3]
Id. at 125.
[4]
Id. at 131.
[5]
Id. at 126.
[6]
Id. at 130.
[7]
Id. at 132.
[8]
Id. at 154.
[9]
Id. at 156.
[10]
Id. at 157.
[11]
Id. at 158-159.
[12]
Id. at 142-159.
[13]
Id. at 144-145.
[14]
Id. at 100.
[15]
Id. at 99.
[16]
Id. at 91-100.
[17]
Id. at 107.
[18]
Id. at 109.
[19]
Id. at 205.
[20]
Id. at 82-84.
[21]
Id. at 83-84.
[22]
Id. at 55-57.
[23]
Id. at 56-57.
[24]
Id. at 19.
[25]
48 SCRA 273 (1972).
[26]
60 SCRA 408 (1974).
[27]
64 SCRA 78 (1975).
[28]
CA Rollo, pp. 89-90.
[29]
CA Rollo, p. 2.
[30]
Id. at 4.
[31]
Supra at note 27.
[32]
Rollo, p. 3.
[33]
Id. at 6.
[34]
Docena v. Lapesura, 355 SCRA 658 (2001).
[35]
Shipside, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 334 (2001).
[36]
Sec. 3. Signature and address. – Every pleading must be signed by the
party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address
which should not be a post office box.
The signature of
counsel constitute a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An
unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court
may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it
shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not
intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule or alleges
scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report to
the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action.
[37]
Article 212(o) of the Labor Code.
[38]
Article 212(l) of the
Labor Code
.
[39]
Rollo, p. 154.
[40]
Id. at 156-159.
[41]
Grand Boulevard Hotel v. Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel
Restaurant and Allied Industries (GLOWHRAIN), 406 SCRA 688 (2003).
[42]
Stamford Marketing Corporation v. Josephine Julian, et al., G.R. No.
145496, February 24, 2004.
[43]
Article 264(a) of the
Labor Code
.
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