PHILIPPINE SUPREME
COURT
DECISIONS
EN BANC
SULTAN
OSOP B. CAMID,
Petitioner,
-versus
G.R. No. 161414
January 17, 2005
THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT
of BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE),
Respondents. |
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
This Petition for
Certiorari presents this Court with
the prospect of our own Brigadoon
[1]
—the municipality of Andong, Lanao del
Sur―which like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not
supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and
thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly
or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of
Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab
initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists
that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and
hence, its legal personality should be given judicial
affirmation. We disagree.
The factual antecedents
derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General
[2]
in 1965. As discussed therein, then
President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders
[3]
creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur
which was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 107.
[4]
These executive orders were
issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities
involved in that case had failed to pass Congress.
[5]
President Diosdado Macapagal
justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President
Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition,
alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section
68 having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370,
[6]
and said orders constituting an undue
delegation of legislative power.
[7]
After due deliberation, the
Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null
and void. A majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice
(later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements
for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch,
[8]
while three justices opined that the
nullity of the issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the
1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over
local governments.
[9]
Pelaez was disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in
question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by
the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.
[10]
Among the Executive Orders
annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of
Andong. Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition
is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of the Municipality
of Andong.
Petitioner Sultan Osop B.
Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong,
[11]
suing as a private citizen and
taxpayer whose locus standi “is of public and paramount interest
especially to the people of the Municipality of Andong, Province of
Lanao del Sur.”
[12]
He alleges that Andong “has
metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of
officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality
and its constituents,”
[13]
even though he concedes that since
1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any
of the elective local government positions of Andong.
[14]
Nonetheless, the municipality of
Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of
Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen (17)
“barangay units” with their own respective chairmen.
[15]
From 1964 until 1972, according to
Camid, the public officials of Andong “have been serving their
constituents through the minimal means and resources with least (sic)
honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former President
Diosdado Macapagal.” Since the time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has
allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the
“Interim Officials” serving their constituents “in their own little
ways and means.”
[16]
In support of his claim that
Andong remains in existence, Camid presents to this Court a
Certification issued by the Office of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) certifying the total land area of the Municipality of
Andong, “created under Executive Order No. 107 issued [last] October 1,
1964.”
[17]
He also submits a Certification issued
by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning the
population of Andong, which is pegged at fourteen thousand fifty nine
(14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a list of governmental agencies
and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong, and notes that
other municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly for the immediate implementation of the revival or
re-establishment of Andong.
[18]
The petition assails a
Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local
Government Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG).
[19]
The Certification enumerates eighteen
(18) municipalities certified as “existing,” per DILG records. Notably,
these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the thirty-three (33),
along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez.
These municipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog in Zamboanga
del Sur; Siayan and Pres. Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga del Norte;
Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella in Davao; Badiangan and Mina in
Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur; Gloria in Oriental Mindoro; Maasim in
Sarangani; Kalilangan and Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in Compostela
Valley.
[20]
Camid imputes grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DILG “in not classifying [Andong] as a
regular existing municipality and in not including said municipality in
its records and official database as [an] existing regular
municipality.”
[21]
He characterizes such
non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong,
especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen
(18) municipalities similarly annulled by reason of Pelaez. As
appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG
Certification dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG to classify
Andong as a “regular existing municipality;” all public respondents, to
extend full recognition and support to Andong; the Department of
Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, to immediately
release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public
respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the “Interim Local
Officials” of Andong.
[22]
Moreover, Camid insists on
the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues that
Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events consisting of
subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Particularly cited is our Decision
in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez,
[23]
wherein the Court affirmed the unique
status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a “de facto
municipal corporation.”
[24]
Similar to Andong, the municipality of
San Andres was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner
which the Court in Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. Moreover,
San Narciso cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 as basis for the current recognition of the
impugned municipality. The provision reads:
Section 442. Requisites for Creation. -
xxx
(d) Municipalities existing
as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist
and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities.
[25]
There are several reasons
why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better discerned upon
examination of the proper scope and application of Section 442(d),
which does not sanction the recognition of just any municipality. This
point shall be further explained further on.
Notably, as pointed out by
the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of
certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of
factual questions. There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camid’s
astonishing factual allegations pertaining to the purported continuing
operation of Andong in the decades since it was annulled by this Court.
No trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of
these factual claims, the appreciation of which is beyond the function
of this Court since it is not a trier of facts.
The importance of proper
factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the
legal principles governing the recognition of de facto municipal
corporations. It has been opined that municipal corporations may exist
by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and
exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of
the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long
enough to afford title by prescription.
[26]
These municipal corporations
have exercised their powers for a long period without objection on the
part of the government that although no charter is in existence, it is
presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that
their charters had been lost.
[27]
They are especially common in England,
which, as well-worth noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand
years. The reason for the development of that rule in England is
understandable, since that country was settled long before the Roman
conquest by nomadic Celtic tribes, which could have hardly been
expected to obtain a municipal charter in the absence of a national
legal authority.
In the United States,
municipal corporations by prescription are less common, but it has been
held that when no charter or act of incorporation of a town can be
found, it may be shown to have claimed and exercised the powers of a
town with the knowledge and assent of the legislature, and without
objection or interruption for so long a period as to furnish evidence
of a prescriptive right.
[28]
What is clearly essential is
a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal
corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence
thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state. Camid does not
have the opportunity to make an initial factual demonstration of those
circumstances before this Court. Indeed, the factual deficiencies
aside, Camid’s plaint should have undergone the usual administrative
gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the
Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the
necessary factual determinations. Camid’s seeming ignorance of the
principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of
courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition,
cannot be countenanced.
It is also difficult to
capture the sense and viability of Camid’s present action. The assailed
issuance is the Certification issued by the DILG. But such
Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or
revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the
Certification will really do nothing to serve Camid’s ultimate cause-
the recognition of Andong. Neither does the Certification even
expressly refute the claim that Andong still exists, as there is
nothing in the document that comments on the present status of Andong.
Perhaps the Certification is assailed before this Court if only to
present an actual issuance, rather than a long-standing habit or
pattern of action that can be annulled through the special civil action
of certiorari. Still, the relation of the Certification to Camid’s
central argument is forlornly strained.
These disquisitions aside,
the central issue remains whether a municipality whose creation by
executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain
recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute.
Apparently, the question has never been decided before, San Narciso and
its kindred cases pertaining as they did to municipalities whose bases
of creation were dubious yet were never judicially nullified. The
effect of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities
such as Andong warrants explanation. Besides, the residents of Andong
who belabor under the impression that their town still exists, much
less those who may comport themselves as the municipality’s “Interim
Government,” would be well served by a rude awakening.
The Court can employ a
simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the
petition, merely by pointing out that the Municipality of Andong never
existed.
[29]
Executive Order No. 107, which
established Andong, was declared “null and void ab initio” in 1965 by
this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33) other executive
orders. The phrase “ab initio” means “from the beginning,”
[30]
“at first,”
[31]
“from the inception.”
[32]
Pelaez was never reversed by
this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases of
Municipality of San Joaquin vs. Siva,
[33]
Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito,
[34]
and Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya.
[35]
No subsequent ruling by this
Court declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent
legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of
Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why
Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.
This ratiocination does not
admit to patent legal errors and has the additional virtue of blessed
austerity. Still, its sweeping adoption may not be advisedly
appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code and
our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, both of which admit to the
possibility of de facto municipal corporations.
To understand the
applicability of Municipality of San Narciso and Section 442(b) of the
Local Government Code to the situation of Andong, it is necessary again
to consider the ramifications of our decision in Pelaez.
The eminent legal doctrine
enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still is, not
empowered to create municipalities through executive issuances. The
Court therein recognized “that the President has, for many years,
issued executive orders creating municipal corporations, and that the
same have been organized and in actual operation. ”
[36]
However, the Court ultimately
nullified only those thirty-three (33) municipalities, including
Andong, created during the period from 4 September to 29 October 1964
whose existence petitioner Vice-President Pelaez had specifically
assailed before this Court. No pronouncement was made as to the other
municipalities which had been previously created by the President in
the exercise of power the Court deemed unlawful.
Two years after Pelaez was
decided, the issue again came to fore in Municipality of San Joaquin
vs. Siva.
[37]
The Municipality of Lawigan was
created by virtue of Executive Order No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan was not
one of the municipalities ordered annulled in Pelaez. A petition for
prohibition was filed contesting the legality of the executive order,
again on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the petition, but the
Supreme Court reversed the ruling and entered a new decision declaring
Executive Order No. 436 void ab initio. The Court reasoned without
elaboration that the issue had already been squarely taken up and
settled in Pelaez which agreed with the argument posed by the
challengers to Lawigan’s validity.
[38]
In the 1969 case of
Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito,
[39]
what was challenged is the validity of
the constitution of the Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur,
also created by an executive order,
[40]
and which, similar to Lawigan, was not
one of the municipalities annulled in Pelaez. This time, the officials
of Balabagan invoked de facto status as a municipal corporation in
order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They alleged that
its status as a de facto corporation cannot be collaterally attacked
but should be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at
the instance of the State, and not by a private individual as it was in
that case. In response, the Court conceded that an inquiry into the
legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto, but only if the municipal corporation is a
de facto corporation.
[41]
Ultimately, the Court
refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even though
it had been organized prior to the Court’s decision in Pelaez. The
Court declared void the executive order creating Balabagan and
restrained its municipal officials from performing their official
duties and functions.
[42]
It cited conflicting American
authorities on whether a de facto corporation can exist where the
statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional.
[43]
But the Court’s final conclusion was
unequivocal that Balabagan was not a de facto corporation.
In the cases where a de
facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact
that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could
fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other
valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the
case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when
the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de
facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code
provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of
authority to its creation.
[44]
The Court did clarify in
Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the
exercise of its corporate powers were not necessarily a nullity.
[45]
Camid devotes several pages of his
petition in citing this point,
[46]
yet the relevance of the citation is
unclear considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any
corporate act of Andong prior to its judicial dissolution.
Notwithstanding, the Court in Malabang retained an emphatic attitude as
to the unconstitutionality of the power of the President to create
municipal corporations by way of presidential promulgations, as
authorized under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.
This principle was most
recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya.
[47]
The municipality of Santo Tomas,
created by President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against
another municipality, who challenged Santo Tomas’s legal personality to
institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly nullified by
prior judicial action, yet the Court refused to recognize its legal
existence. The blunt but simple ruling: “Now then, as ruled in the
Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality.
Since [Santo Tomas] has no legal personality, it can not be a party to
any civil action….”
[48]
Nevertheless, when the Court
decided Municipality of San Narciso
[49]
in 1995, it indicated a shift in the
jurisprudential treatment of municipalities created through
presidential issuances. The questioned municipality of San Andres,
Quezon was created on 20 August 1959 by Executive Order No. 353 issued
by President Carlos P. Garcia. Executive Order No. 353 was not one of
the thirty-three issuances annulled by Pelaez in 1965. The legal status
of the Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only in 1989,
through a petition for quo warranto filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Gumaca, Quezon, which did cite Pelaez as authority.
[50]
The RTC dismissed the petition for
lack of cause of action, and the petitioners therein elevated the
matter to this Court.
In dismissing the petition,
the Court delved in the merits of the petition, if only to resolve
further doubt on the legal status of San Andres. It noted a
circumstance which is not present in the case at bar—that San Andres
was in existence for nearly thirty (30) years before its legality was
challenged. The Court did not declare the executive order creating San
Andres null and void. Still, acting on the premise that the said
executive order was a complete nullity, the Court noted “peculiar
circumstances” that led to the conclusion that San Andres had attained
the unique status of a “de facto municipal corporation.”
[51]
It noted that Pelaez limited its
nullificatory effect only to those executive orders specifically
challenged therein, despite the fact that the Court then could have
very well extended the decision to invalidate San Andres as well.
[52]
This statement squarely
contradicts Camid’s reading of San Narciso that the creation of San
Andres, just like Andong, had been declared a complete nullity on the
same ground of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power found
in Pelaez.
[53]
The Court also considered
the applicability of Section 442(d)
[54]
of the Local Government Code of
1991. It clarified the implication of the provision as follows:
Equally significant is Section 442(d)
of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts
"organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of
unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made,
would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function
of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated
Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would
have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to
the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. (Emphasis
supplied)
[55]
The holding in San Narciso
was subsequently affirmed in Municipality of Candijay vs. Court of
Appeals
[56]
and Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz
[57]
In Candijay, the juridical personality
of the Municipality of Alicia, created in a 1949 executive order, was
attacked only beginning in 1984. Pelaez was again invoked in support of
the challenge, but the Court refused to invalidate the municipality,
citing San Narciso at length. The Court noted that the situation of the
Municipality of Alicia was strikingly similar to that in San Narciso;
hence, the town should likewise “benefit from the effects of Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code, and should [be] considered as a
regular, de jure municipality.”
[58]
The valid existence of
Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 executive order, was among
the issues raised in Jimenez. The Court, through Justice Mendoza,
provided an expert summation of the evolution of the rule.
The principal basis for the
view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation
is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the creation of
municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and
therefore the President was without power to create by executive order
the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been
reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since
held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is
later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity,
its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San
Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following
factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation,
which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive
order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General:
(1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of
the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following
the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the
validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the
fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class
municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and
considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it
was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character
of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the
Local Government Code of
1991
(R. A. No. 7160), §442(d) of which
provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."
Here, the same factors are
present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto
municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been
recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been
in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was
decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating
it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years
later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid
claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact
must be underscored because under Rule 66, §16 of the Rules of
Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its
charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act
complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and
even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's
corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13,
1978 of this Court, as reiterated by §31 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted
part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez
had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement
with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in
Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.
Indeed Sinacaban has
attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the
country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of
Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of
San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of
Sinacaban.
[59]
From this survey of relevant
jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its
offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create
municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular
municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However,
with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal
cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive
order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such
municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by
this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed
curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had
labored under.
Is Andong similarly entitled
to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There
are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San
Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the
executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this
Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andong’s de facto status by reason
of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would
in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court. Court
decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer
defiance by the parties aggrieved.
It bears noting that based
on Camid’s own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set
forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d)
requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order
may receive recognition, they must “have their respective set of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of [the Local Government] Code.” Camid admits that Andong
has never elected its municipal officers at all.
[60]
This incapacity ties in with the fact
that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our
ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the
existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and
refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality.
The failure to appropriate
funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in
the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by
the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon
by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office,
can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andong’s legal efficacy.
In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon
the request of Camid, “to support the restoration or re-operation of
the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,”
[61]
thus obviously conceding that the
municipality is at present inoperative.
We may likewise pay
attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had
also been relied upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which
apportioned the seats of the House of Representatives to the different
legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various
municipalities that are encompassed by the various legislative
districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of
Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that matter.
[62]
On the other hand, the municipalities
of San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as
part of Quezon,
[63]
Bohol,
[64]
and Misamis Occidental
[65]
respectively.
How about the eighteen (18)
municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing
in the DILG Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails
to mention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez, legislation was
enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.
[66]
It is thus not surprising that
the DILG certified the existence of these eighteen (18) municipalities,
or that these towns are among the municipalities enumerated in the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been
similarly reestablished through statute. Clearly then, the fact
that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation recreating
these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord
a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen (18)
other municipalities.
We thus assert the proper
purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code—that it does not
serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities
such as Andong, which had been previously created by presidential
issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal
personalities only of those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia,
and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal
basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled.
On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases
such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless
recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the
eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those
municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential
issuances or executive orders which originally created them or from
Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were
enacted to revive them.
And what now of Andong and
its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has
obliterated Andong into a hole on the ground. The legal effect of the
nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios
of the voided town back into their original municipalities, namely the
municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and Tubaran.
[67]
These three municipalities subsist to
this day as part of Lanao del Sur,
[68]
and presumably continue to exercise
corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong.
If there is truly a strong
impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is
through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. If
indeed the residents of Andong have, all these years, been governed not
by their proper municipal governments but by a ragtag “Interim
Government,” then an expedient political and legislative solution is
perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention of Andong’s
legal personality solely on the basis of collective amnesia that may
have allowed Andong to somehow pretend itself into existence despite
its judicial dissolution. Maybe those who insist Andong still exists
prefer to remain unperturbed in their blissful ignorance, like the
inhabitants of the cave in Plato’s famed allegory. But the time has
come for the light to seep in, and for the petitioner and like-minded
persons to awaken to legal reality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.
[1] A 1954 film based on the
well-known eponymous Broadway musical by Alan Jay Lerner and Frederick
Loewe. The plot pertains to a magical Scottish town touted to appear
once every hundred years on some otherworldly plain according to legend.
[2] 122 Phil. 965 (1965).
[3] Executive Orders Nos. 93
to 121, 124 and 126 to 129. Pelaez vs. Auditor General, supra note 1 at
969.
[4] Pelaez vs. Auditor
General, supra note 1 at 970.
[5] Id. at 980.
[6] The Barrio Charter Act.
[7] Id. at 971.
[8] The particular flaws
included the failure to enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President, the absence of standards sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects. Id. at 975. Moreover, the creation
of municipalities was declared to be a function eminently legislative
in character, and not administrative. Id. at 977.
[9] Id. at 986, J. Bengzon,
concurring and dissenting.
[10] Id. at 983.
[11] Rollo, p. 5.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Id. at 13.
[14] Id. at 14.
[15] Id. at 15.
[16] Id. at 16.
[17] Id. at 17.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Id. at 44. The
Certification was signed by OIC Assistant Director Mariano A. Gabito.
[20] Rollo, p. 11.
[21] Id. at 22.
[22] Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[23] G.R. No. 103702, 6
December 1994, 239 SCRA 11.
[24] Id. at 32-33.
[25] Id. at 31-32.
[26] R. Martin, Public
Corporations (1983 ed.) at 18, citing Cooley’s Mun. Corp. 52.
[27] Id. at 18 citing 37 Am
Jur., 629-630.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Such an approach was
employed by the Court in Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya, infra.
[30] Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary: Unabridged (1993 ed.), p.3.
[31] W. Burton, Burton’s
Legal Thesaurus (3rd ed. 2001), p. 1.
[32] H.C. Black, Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th ed., 1990), p. 6.
[33] 125 Phil. 1004 (1967).
[34] 137 Phil. 358 (1969).
[35] G.R. No. L-41322, 29
September 1988, 166 SCRA 70.
[36] Pelaez, supra note 2,
at 983.
[37] Supra note 32.
[38] Id. at 1005.
[39] Supra note 34.
[40] Particularly, Balabagan
was created by Executive Order No. 386 by President Carlos P. Garcia.
Id. at 360.
[41] Id. at 361, citing Hunt
vs. Atkinson, (Tex. Com. App.), 12 S.W. 2d 142, 145 (1929), re’g 300
S.W. 656 (1927).
[42] Id. at 365.
[43] Particularly citing the
ruling in Brandenstein vs. Hoke, 101 Cal. 131, 35 P. 562 (1894) and
Atchison T. & S.F.R.R. vs. Board of Commissioners, 58 Kan. 19, 48
P. 583 (1897) on one hand, and Lang vs. City of Bayonne, 74 N.J.L. 455,
68 A. 90 (1907); St. Louis vs. Shields, 62 Mo. 247 (1876); School
District No. 25 vs. State, 29 Kan. 57 (1882) on the other hand. Id. at
362.
[44] Id. at 363-364.
[45] Citing primarily the
opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371,
374 (1940), which noted in part: “The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination [of invalidity], is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects—with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in
the light of the nature of both the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination.” Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito,
supra note 34, at 364. See also J. Gutierrez, concurring and
dissenting, Cruz vs. Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. L-75983, 15 April 1988, 160
SCRA 700, 713-714.
[46] See Rollo, pp. 25-30.
[47] Supra note 35.
[48] Id. at 72.
[49] Supra note 23.
[50] Id. at 15.
[51] “Created in 1959 by
virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had
been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965,
Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have
sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality
of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the
contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's
recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San
Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district,
Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a
fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement
laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that
comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order
No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this Court pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the
Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal
Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
At the present time, all
doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled.
Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats
of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the
Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve
(12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of
Quezon.” Id. at 20.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Rollo, p. 32.
[54] Infra.
[55] Municipality of San
Narciso vs. Mendez, supra note 23, at 21.
[56] 321 Phil. 922 (1995).
[57] 333 Phil. 1 (1996).
[58] Municipality of
Candijay vs. Court of Appeals, supra note 56 at 930.
[59] Supra note 57, at
192-193.
[60] Rollo, p.14.
[61] See Rollo, pp. 131, 135.
[62] Vide Appendix A to I.
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1998 ed., at 452, which replicates the 1987
Constitution and the appended Ordinance thereto.
[63] Id. at 446.
[64] Id. at 448.
[65] Id. at 426.
[66] The following are the
eighteen (18) municipalities referred to in the DILG Certification, and
their respective organic statutes, all of which were enacted after
Pelaez was decided in 1965:
1. Midsalip, Zamboanga del Sur –
Republic Act No. 4871 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
MIDSALIP IN THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR enacted without Executive
approval on May 8, 1967.
2. Pitogo, Zamboanga del Sur
– Republic Act No. 6490 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
PITOGO IN THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR approved on June 17, 1972.
3. Naga, Zamboanga del Sur
Republic Act No. 4875 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA
IN THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR approved on May 18, 1967.
4. Magsaysay, Davao –
Republic Act No. 4976 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
MAGSAYSAY IN THE PROVINCE OF DAVAO enacted without Executive approval
on June 17, 1967.
5. Sta. Maria, Davao –
Republic Act No. 4743 entitled AN ACT CREATING A NEW MUNICIPALITY IN
THE PROVINCE OF DAVAO TO BE KNOWN AS THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTA MARIA
approved on June 18, 1966.
6. Badiangan, Iloilo -
Republic Act No. 5006 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
BADIANGAN IN THE PROVINCE OF ILOILO enacted without Executive approval
on June 17, 1967.
7. Mina, Iloilo – Republic
Act No. 5442 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF MINA IN THE
PROVINCE OF ILOILO enacted without Executive approval on September 9,
1968.
8. Maguing, Lanao del Sur –
Presidential Decree 1134 entitled CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAGUING
IN THE PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR by then Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos on
May 4, 1977.
9. Bayog, Zamboanga del Sur
- Republic Act No. 4872 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
BAYOG IN THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR approved on May 8,
1967.
10. Gloria, Oriental Mindoro
– Republic Act No. 4651 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
GLORIA IN THE PROVINCE OF ORIENTAL MINDORO approved on June 9, 1966.
11. Maasim, Sarangani –
Republic Act No. 5866 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
MAASIM IN THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO enacted without Executive
approval on June 21, 1969. However, said municipality was transferred
to the Province of Sarangani by virtue of Section 1 of Republic Act No.
7228 enacted on March 16, 1992.
12. Siayan, Zamboanga del
Norte – Republic Act No. 2553 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE BARRIO OF
SIAYAN IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF SINDANGAN, PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL
NORTE enacted without Executive approval on June 21, 1959.
13. Pres. Manuel A Roxas,
Zamboanga del Norte – Republic Act No. 5077 entitled AN ACT CREATING
THE MUNICIPALITY OF PRESIDENT MANUEL A. ROXAS IN THE PROVINCE OF
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE enacted without executive approval on June 17, 1967.
14. Kalilangan, Bukidnon –
Republic Act No. 4788, as amended entitled, AN ACT CREATING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF KALILANGAN IN THE PROVINCE OF BUKIDNON approved on June
18, 1966.
15. Lantapan, Bukidnon –
Republic Act No. 4787 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
LANTAPAN IN THE PROVINCE OF BUKIDNON approved on June 18, 1966.
16. Tampakan, Cotabato –
Republic Act No. 5661 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
TAMPAKAN IN THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO approved on June 21, 1969.
17. Maco, Compostela Valley
– Republic Act No. 4975 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
MACO IN THE PROVINCE OF DAVAO which was enacted without Executive
approval on June 17, 1967. Said municipality was transferred to the
province of Compostela Valley by virtue of Section 1, Republic Act No.
8470 which was approved on January 30, 1998.
18. New Corella, Davao –
Republic Act No. 4747 entitled AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF NEW
CORELLA, PROVINCE OF DAVAO which took effect upon its approval on June
18, 1966.
[67] See Executive Order No.
107 (1964).
[68] See Cruz, supra note
62, at 452.
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