PHILIPPINE SUPREME
COURT
DECISIONS
SECOND DIVISION
NESTOR
M. CAYAGO and VIRGILIO M. FERRER,
Petitioners,
-versus-
G.R.
No. 149539
January
19, 2005
HON. JOEY LINA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, and CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL POLICE
COMMISSION; and CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
Respondents. x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D
E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 53633 upholding Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Resolution No. 991276, which, in turn, affirmed the Decision dated
August 12, 1998 of then Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) Undersecretary Ronaldo V. Puno, dismissing petitioners Nestor M.
Cayago and Virgilio M. Ferrer from the police service for grave
misconduct, as well as the Resolution dated August 9, 2001, denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof.
The
Antecedents
The
petitioners were police officers[2] who were charged with kidnapping
for ransom in an Information dated January 30, 1995, filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-95-60144. Summary dismissal proceedings against the
petitioners then ensued. In a Decision dated July 24, 1995, then Police
Director General, Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Recaredo
A. Sarmiento II dismissed the petitioners from the service. The
pertinent portion of the order reads:
This Headquarters
finds that there exists substantial evidence to prove the
administrative culpability of all the respondents. The totality of the
defense evidence submitted, as obtaining on record, is not legally
sufficient to overcome the overwhelming evidence adduced proving their
guilt.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, SPO1 Nestor Cayago, SPO1 Loreto Francisco, PO3
Cesar Nakar and PO3 Virgilio Ferrer are hereby ordered dismissed from
the police service.
SO
ORDERED.[3]
Thereafter,
Police Chief Superintendent Anselmo Sayson Avenido, Jr., issued Special
Order No. 2017[4] dismissing the petitioners from the police service
effective September 19, 1995. The petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[5] of the said Order dated August 3, 1995, alleging
that the findings of fact made by the disciplinary body were not
supported by substantial evidence. Instead of waiting for their motion
to be resolved, however, the petitioners appealed the decision to the
National Appellate Board (NAB) of the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM), docketed therein as NAB SD Case No. 2-96-113. The NAB
rendered its Decision on July 17, 1996, finding that the petitioners’
appeal was without merit and affirming the latter’s dismissal from the
service. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
In light of all
the foregoing, this Board finds the Appeals filed by SPO1 Nestor Cayago
and PO3 Virgilio Ferrer without merit, and accordingly, affirms their
summary dismissal from the police service as contained in the Decision
dated July 24, 1995 of the Chief, PNP.
So
Ordered.[6]
The
petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.
In the
meantime, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, issued a Resolution dated
February 24, 1997, granting the “Motion to Dismiss By Way of Demurrer
to Evidence” filed by the petitioners in Criminal Case No. Q-95-60144
for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion of the
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the case is hereby dismissed against accused
Nestor Cayago and Virgilio Ferrer as prayed for, and dismissed as
against the other accused motu proprio, on [the] ground of
insufficiency of evidence with costs de oficio.
Consequently,
the bail bonds put up by all the herein accused, are cancelled in
accordance with law.
SO
ORDERED.[7]
The
petitioners submitted a copy of the said resolution to the PNP Chief in
support of their still unresolved motion for reconsideration.
More
than a year after the NAB rendered its decision, the PNP Chief issued a
Resolution dated August 19, 1997, partially granting the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration. The petitioners were found liable for
less grave irregularities in the performance of duties for which they
were meted the penalty of suspension for a period of ninety (90) days.
The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision sought to be reconsidered is hereby
SET ASIDE and the orders issued implemental thereof is likewise hereby
CANCELLED/NULLIFIED. Let another Decision be entered finding SPO1
Nestor Mejia Cayago and PO3 Virgilio Manzon Ferrer guilty of Less Grave
Irregularities in the Performance of Duties and, accordingly, the
penalty of ninety (90) days suspension without pay is hereby imposed on
each of them which penalty is now deemed served.
SO
ORDERED.[8]
The
PNP Chief, thereafter, issued Special Order No. 1910[9] restoring the
petitioners to full duty status effective August 19, 1997. However, in
a Memorandum[10] dated October 14, 1997, NAPOLCOM Commissioner Edgar
Dula Torres directed the PNP Chief to nullify the said order on the
ground that the latter had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
resolve the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The Commissioner
ruled that the NAB Decision dated July 17, 1996, affirming the
dismissal of the petitioners from the service, had long become final
and executory. Hence, Special Order No. 2568[11] dated October 24, 1997
was issued nullifying Special Order No. 1910, effectively dismissing
the petitioners from the police service.
Thereafter,
the petitioners appealed the July 17, 1996 Decision of the NAB to the
CSC. Acting thereon, the CSC issued Resolution No. 980479[12] on March
11, 1998, dismissing the appeal on the ground that it was the DILG
Secretary who had jurisdiction over such appeal. Citing Sections 44 and
45 of Republic Act No. 6975, the CSC ruled that the appeal of the case
before it was premature.
Undaunted,
the petitioners appealed Special Order No. 2568 to then DILG Secretary
Epimaco A. Velasco.[13] On August 12, 1998, then DILG Undersecretary
and Acting Chairman of the NAPOLCOM Ronaldo V. Puno issued an Order[14]
denying the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, considering that the NAB
Decision dated July 17, 1996 had long become final and executory. The
petitioners again elevated the case on appeal to the CSC, which
dismissed the same in Resolution No. 991276 dated June 24, 1999.
Thereafter,
the petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) via
a petition for review on July 19, 1999 on the ground that the NAB
Decision dated July 17, 1996 had
not yet become final and executory, as they were not furnished a copy
thereof. They also maintained that the said decision was void since the
PNP Chief retained his jurisdiction over the case when they filed their
motion for reconsideration. The petitioners further claimed that they
were denied due process since complainant Veloria failed to testify on
his sworn affidavit, and that they were not given the opportunity to
cross-examine him during the summary dismissal proceedings.
The
appellate court denied the petition for lack of merit. It overruled the
petitioners’ claim of not having received a copy of the NAB decision as
a mere bare allegation. The CA pointed out that despite such allegation
of non-receipt, the petitioners were, nevertheless, able to file their
appeal with the CSC, which was, however, dismissed for having been
filed prematurely as it should have first been brought to the DILG
Secretary; the petitioners were then able to elevate the decision of
the DILG Secretary to the CSC, which was, likewise, dismissed for
having been belatedly filed.
The CA
also ruled that, contrary to their claim, the petitioners were accorded
due process. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
Applying the
foregoing jurisprudence in petitioners’ case, there is therefore no
denying that petitioners were accorded due process: (1) they were
apprised of the charges against them; (2) they presented their
counter-affidavits, supplemental affidavits and other pieces of
evidence to rebut the Sworn Affidavit of complainant Veloria; (3)
they were represented by counsel before the Summary Dismissal Hearing
Officer; and (4) they were able to redress their case all the way
from the PNP Director General up to the Civil Service Commission.
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, cross-examination in summary
dismissal proceedings is not mandatory. The Affidavit of complainant
Veloria already comprises his direct testimony. Petitioners’
Counter-Affidavit and other supplemental Affidavits, on the other hand,
take the place of their cross-examination as therein lies their
refutation of complainant’s charges.
.
In
fact, as pointed out in the NAB Decision dated July 17, 1996, “(T)hey
were furnished copies of pertinent documents relative to the case and
promised to submit their respective additional controverting evidence
on June 8, 1995 which they failed to comply.” (p. 36, Rollo)
Finally, their
acquittal from the criminal charges for Kidnapping filed against them
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, bears no
consequence with regard to their administrative liability. It is
fundamental that in administrative cases, the quantum of proof is only
preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt, as against
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge. Their acquittal
merely relieved them from criminal liability but in no way carried with
it relief from the administrative liability of dismissal from the
service. (Jaculina v. National Police Commission, supra, at page 497)
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED.
SO
ORDERED.[15]
The
Present Petition
The
petitioners forthwith filed their petition for review on certiorari
wherein they reiterated the issues and arguments they raised in the CA,
viz:
I
WHETHER
OR NOT THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD (NAB) IS
VOID AB INITIO AS THE LATTER HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
II
WHETHER
OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE ACCORDED DUE PROCESS IN THEIR DISMISSAL FROM
THE SERVICE.[16]
The
petitioners aver that the decision of the NAB was “void ab initio” and,
as such, had not attained finality. They insist that when they filed
their motion for reconsideration before the PNP Chief, the latter
retained jurisdiction over the case. In fact, the petitioners aver,
they were made to understand by the NAB that it could not act on their
appeal in view of the pendency of the motion for reconsideration before
the PNP Chief.
The
petitioners further contend that they could not be blamed for their
filing of a “precautionary appeal” before the NAB, considering that the
PNP Chief slept on their motion for reconsideration. Having been
deprived of their source of livelihood, the petitioners had to adopt
other means and measures within legal bounds just to regain their
employment. They further contend that the “precautionary appeal” before
the NAB could hardly be considered as an abandonment of their motion
for reconsideration, since more often than not, the NAB would not
consider appeals without any motion for reconsideration being first
filed and resolved by the PNP Chief.
The
petitioners further stress that they were not immediately furnished a
copy of the NAB decision; neither was the PNP given a copy of the
decision. In fact, the Resolution of then PNP Chief, Director General
Sarmiento, dated August 19, 1997, did not even mention the NAB
decision. The petitioners stress that they learned of the existence of
the said NAB decision only when the PNP Chief issued Special Order No.
2568 nullifying Special Order No. 1910. The petitioners point out that
the assailed NAB decision could not have become final and executory,
since after receipt of Special Order No. 2568, they immediately filed
an appeal before the CSC, which was, however, dismissed in Resolution
No. 980479 dated March 11, 1998 for being premature; thereafter, they
filed an appeal before the Office of the DILG Secretary. The
petitioners also point out that the appeal before the DILG Secretary
was forwarded to the NAPOLCOM, the very same body which rendered the
July 17, 1996 Decision. The petitioners asseverate that this procedure
is not in accord with the ruling in Cabada v. Alunan III,[17] where the
Court held that the NAPOLCOM has no appellate jurisdiction over
decisions rendered by the NAB. Even assuming that the period to appeal
had already lapsed, the petitioners aver that technicality should give
way to substantial justice.
Anent
the second assignment of error, the petitioners stress that they were
not accorded due process. They aver that under NAPOLCOM Memorandum
Circular No. 92-006, as amended by Circular Nos. 94-021 and 94-022,
respondents in summary dismissal proceedings are entitled to
cross-examine the complainant and his/her witnesses. In this case,
complainant Veloria and his witnesses failed to appear during the
summary hearing and were unable to affirm their respective sworn
statements before the summary hearing officer. They stress that the PNP
Chief, acting on their motion for reconsideration, set aside his
Decision dated July 24, 1995 and admitted that due process was not
observed in dismissing the petitioners from the service.
The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that the
petitioners themselves were the ones who appealed the case to the NAB
even before the PNP Chief could resolve their motion for
reconsideration, and that the NAB did not take cognizance of the case
of its own accord. The mere fact that the petitioners immediately
appealed the case to the NAB without waiting for the PNP Chief’s
resolution did not divest the NAB of its jurisdiction to decide the
appeal. According to the OSG, the petitioners cannot liken their appeal
before the NAB to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, where a prior motion for reconsideration is essential. It
points out that a motion for reconsideration of the PNP Chief’s
Decision and an eventual appeal to the NAB are just two of the
administrative remedies available to the petitioners, which, in turn,
does not mean that they may be resorted to simultaneously at whim. The
OSG claims that it would have been wiser if the petitioners had
observed the usual sequence or hierarchical order in availing of such
remedies. The OSG stresses that there is no such specie of appeal as
“precautionary appeal,” which was what the petitioners resorted to when
they elevated their case to the NAB pending the resolution of their
motion for reconsideration before the PNP Chief. Finally, contrary to
their protestations, the petitioners were given sufficient opportunity
to submit evidence in support of their defense.
The
Ruling of the Court
The
instant petition must fail for the following reasons:
First. Under
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, an appeal by
certiorari to this Court should raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth in the petition. Elementary is the rule that a
review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and
will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The errors raised in the present petition include one of fact
and law, not the proper subject of a petition for review on
certiorari.[18]
Second.
The well-settled rule is that the findings or conclusions of
administrative bodies are generally respected and even given
finality,[19] particularly when amply supported by substantial
evidence. It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting
evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise,
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on
the sufficiency of evidence. It is for the administrative agency
concerned in the exercise of discretion to determine which party
deserves credence on the basis of the evidence received. The rule,
therefore, is that courts of justice will not generally interfere with
purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that
the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when
they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their
action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction.[20]
Third.
The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the NAB
Decision dated July 17, 1996. Moreover, the said decision had already
attained finality at the time the petitioners appealed the same to the
DILG more than a year later, only on November 12, 1997. Even the appeal
before the CSC was belatedly filed. As amply stated by the CSC in
Resolution No. 991276 –
When
Cayago and Ferrer waited for more than one (1) year to lapse before
they appealed the NAB Decision to the DILG Secretary, the same should
no longer be disturbed as it has long attained finality. Thus, when the
appellants appealed the NAB decision to the Commission, said appeal did
not operate to stop the running of the period to appeal to the DILG
Secretary, which should, in the first place, have been the initial and
proper remedy.
It
should be pointed out that even the instant appeal was also filed
outside the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period of filing an appeal to
this Commission.
As
noted, Cayago and Ferrer had categorically admitted in their Appeal
Memorandum that they received the Decision of DILG Secretary Puno
dismissing their appeal thereat on August 27, 1998. It was only on
September 22, 1998 that appellants filed their appeal with the
Commission. Counting the number of days from the date they received the
DILG Secretary’s decision up to the time they interposed their present
appeal, it is clear that almost one (1) month had elapsed.
Applicable
at this juncture is Section 49(1), Chapter 7, Title I(A), Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which provides,
as follows:
“SEC. 49 Appeals.
- (1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely
affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the
decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed,
which petition shall be decided within fifteen (15) days. x x x”.
Corollarily,
Section 37, C (Appeals), Part II (Disciplinary Cases), of the Uniform
Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigations
explicitly states as follows:
“Section 37.
Appeals. – Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces,
cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities, imposing penalties
exceeding thirty (30) days salary, may be appealed to the Commission
proper within a period of fifteen days from receipt thereof.”
(Underscoring supplied)
The
aforequoted provisions state clearly that the decision of the
department head, in this case the DILG Secretary, may be appealed to
the Commission within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. Failure
to appeal the same within the period prescribed by the law and rules
renders the said decision final and executory.
Considering
that Cayago and Ferrer interposed this instant appeal about one month
after they received the decision of DILG Secretary Puno, the instant
appeal should not be entertained.[21]
The
applicable law on the discipline of members of the PNP is Republic Act
No. 6975, otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the Philippine
National Police under a Reorganized Department of Interior and Local
Government, and for Other Purposes.”[22] The pertinent provisions
thereof are Sections 44 and 45, which provide as follows:
SEC. 44.
Disciplinary Appellate Boards. – The formal administrative disciplinary
machinery for the PNP shall be the National Appellate Board and the
regional appellate boards.
The
National Appellate Board shall consist of four (4) divisions, each
division composed of a Commissioner as Chairman and two (2) others as
members. The Board shall consider appeals from decisions of the Chief
of the PNP.
The
National Appellate Board may conduct its hearings or sessions in
Metropolitan Manila or any part of the country as it may deem necessary.
There
shall be at least one (1) regional appellate board per administrative
region in the country to be composed of a senior officer of the
regional commission as Chairman and one (1) representative each from
the PNP, and the regional peace and order council members. It shall
consider appeals from decisions of the regional directors, other
officials, mayors and the PLEBs: Provided, That the Commission may
create additional regional appellate boards as the need arises.
x x x
Sec.
45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. – The disciplinary action imposed
upon a member of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a
disciplinary action imposed by the regional director or by the PLEB
involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the
regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy
of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary
action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal
may be appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof; Provided, furthermore, That the regional or
National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal; Provided,
finally, That failure of the regional appellate board to act on the
appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory
without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party
with the Secretary.
Thus,
when a police officer is dismissed by the PNP Director General and the
dismissal is affirmed by the NAB, the proper remedy of the aggrieved
party is to appeal the dismissal to the DILG Secretary.[23]
In the
case at bar, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
July 24, 1995 Decision of the PNP Chief, and, without waiting for the
same to be resolved, appealed the case to the NAB in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. As pointed out by the appellate court, it
was the petitioners themselves who sought relief from the NAB. As such,
they cannot now deny its jurisdiction over their appeal. By appealing
to the NAB despite their still unresolved motion for reconsideration
with the PNP Chief, they thereby abandoned the said motion for
reconsideration. Indeed, it is not right for a party who has affirmed
and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte face and deny
that same jurisdiction.[24] We note with approval the following
ratiocination of the CA:
[I]t is clear
that the NAB has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary
actions imposed by the PNP Director General. In the present case, the
Court notes that petitioners took that recourse, i.e., filed an appeal
with the National Appellate Board. However, the Court, likewise, notes
that prior to their filing of an appeal with the NAB, petitioners also
filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the PNP Director General. Thus,
arises the dilemma. The NAB rendered its Decision sustaining the PNP
Director General’s decision summarily dismissing petitioners from the
service. On the other hand, the PNP Director General subsequently
reversed its own initial Decision and found petitioners guilty of a
lesser offense. And while petitioners cannot be blamed for their
display of zeal in the pursuit of their case, it must be emphasized
however, that the law provides for the proper remedies. Furthermore,
there is no such specie of appeal such as “precautionary appeal” which
petitioners resorted to when they elevated their case to the National
Appellate Board (NAB), pending resolution of their motion for
reconsideration. Likewise, petitioners cannot simultaneously resort to
the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the PNP Director
General, and an appeal with the NAB. Either they file a motion for
reconsideration, and if denied, appeal their case to the NAB, OR,
without filing a motion for reconsideration, directly appeal their case
to the NAB. Petitioners’ simultaneous filing of these two remedies is a
clear act of trifling with judicial processes, for the distinct
possibility that these two bodies will render conflicting resolutions
of the case is not highly improbable, as what happened in this case. It
is well-settled that a party is not allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in two different fora because such practice works havoc on
orderly judicial procedure. (Professional Regulation Commission, et al.
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118437, July 9, 1998) And now,
petitioners want the Court to settle the quandary that they themselves
created.
In
this light, the Court holds that the Decision rendered by the NAB is
valid as it has jurisdiction over the appeal filed by petitioners. As
adverted to above, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the
summary dismissal imposed by the PNP Director General. (Section 45 of
Republic Act No. 6975) Notably, unlike in other administrative cases,
the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the PNP Director
General is not a condition sine qua non before an appeal may be
assayed. Hence, when petitioners filed an appeal with the NAB, in
effect, they abandoned their Motion for Reconsideration with the PNP
Director General, and appellate jurisdiction was vested with the NAB.
Consequently, the Decision dated July 17, 1996 rendered by the NAB is a
valid decision.[25]
The
petitioners’ contention that the appeal to the NAB from the July 24,
1995 Order of the PNP Director General was merely precautionary is but
an afterthought. As gleaned from the July 17, 1996 Decision of
the NAB, the appeals of the petitioners were in due course, and not
merely precautionary or ex abundantia cautela. The petitioners
failed to show that their appeal to the NAB was without prejudice to
the resolution by the PNP Chief of their motion for reconsideration.
We
also agree with the CA that the petitioners were not in any way denied
due process. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always
and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is
satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given
an opportunity to explain or defend himself.[26] In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity
for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. As long as a party
was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was
not denied due process.[27] As we ruled in Zacarias vs. National Police
Commission:[28]
[T]he essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. And any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the
filing of a motion for reconsideration. A formal or trial-type hearing
is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements
are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is
frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing.[29]
In
this case, the record shows that (1) the petitioners were apprised of
the charges against them; (2) they presented their counter-affidavits,
supplemental affidavits, and other pieces of evidence, to rebut the
Sworn Affidavit of complainant Veloria; (3) they were represented by
counsel before the summary dismissal hearing officer; and (4) they were
able to elevate their case from the PNP Chief, Director General to the
CSC.[30] Thus, the petitioners were adequately apprised of the charges
against them and were afforded the opportunity to answer such
charges.[31]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53633
and the DILG Resolution dated August 9, 2001 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO
ORDERED.
Puno,
J., (Chairman),
Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona (retired), with
Associate Justices Rodrigo vs. Cosico and Alicia L. Santos (retired),
concurring; Rollo, pp. 132-143.
[2]
Nestor M. Cayago was a former Senior Police Officer 1, while Virgilio
M. Ferrer was a Police Officer 3.
[3] CA
Rollo, 36-37.
[4]
Id. at 40.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[6] CA
Rollo, p. 49.
[7]
Id. at 51.
[8]
Id. at 55.
[9]
Id. at 58.
[10]
Id. at 59-60.
[11]
Id. at 61.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 67-70.
[13]
Id. at 71-75.
[14]
Id. at 79-80.
[15]
Id. at 141-143.
[16]
Id. at 21.
[17]
260 SCRA 838 (1996).
[18]
Cano vs. The Chief, Philippine National Police, 392 SCRA 299 (2002).
[19]
See Bulilan vs. Commission on Audit, 300 SCRA 445 (1998).
[20]
Remolona vs. Civil Service Commission, 362 SCRA 304 (2001).
[21]
Rollo, p. 95.
[22]
Approved on December 13, 1990.
[23]
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 386 SCRA 493 (2002).
[24]
See Duremdes vs. Duremdes, 415 SCRA 684 (2003).
[25]
Rollo, pp. 138-139.
[26]
National Police Commission vs. Bernabe, 332 SCRA 74 (2000).
[27]
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 386 SCRA 492 (2002).
[28]
414 SCRA 387 (2003)
[29]
Id. at 393.
[30]
Rollo, pp. 141-142.
[31]
National Police Commission vs. Bernabe, supra.
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