D
E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Under
consideration is this Petition for Review on
Certiorariunder Rule 45
of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the decision dated
November 27, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 28665,
dismissing, for lack of merit, the appeal thereto taken by the herein
petitioners contra an earlier order dated January 22, 1988 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch V, Cebu City, then sitting as a land
registration court.
All
the parties in this case are descendants of the late spouses Regino
Concepcion, Sr. and Concepcion Famador. Petitioner Emmanuel is a son of
the late spouses while the other petitioners Betty, Jimmy, Rosario and
Jernie (all surnamed Concepcion) and the respondents Antonio
Concepcion, Lourdes C. Watts and Ida C. Horvat are grandchildren of the
spouses.
The
deceased spouses Regino Concepcion, Sr. and Concepcion Famador had
seven children namely: Jose (father of respondents Antonio Concepcion,
Lourdes Watts and Ida Horvat), Jesus (father of petitioners Betty
Concepcion and Jimmy Concepcion), Maria, Vicente, Regino, Jr. (father
of petitioners Rosario Vda. De Concepcion and Jernie Concepcion), Elena
and Emmanuel. During their marriage, the couple acquired the following
real properties:
1. A parcel of
land situated at Zulueta Street, Cebu City containing an area of 110
sq. meters, more or less, and with an assessed value of P11,000.00
hereinafter referred to as the Zulueta property, the realty involved in
this case;
2. A
parcel of agricultural land situated at Pit-os, Cebu City, now known as
Lot No. 10110, covered by Tax Dec. No. 007441, with an assessed value
of P2,732.00;
3. A
parcel of agricultural land also situated at Pit-os, Cebu City, now
known as Lot No. 10132, covered by Tax Dec. No. III-05158, with an
assessed value of P740.00; and
4. A
parcel of agricultural land likewise situated at Pit-os, Cebu City, now
known as Lot No. 10129 and covered by Tax Dec. No. 23728 with an
assessed value of P223.00.
Regino,
Sr. died in 1944. Ten (10) years later or in 1954, his wife,
Concepcion Famador, also passed away. Upon the latter’s death,
she left a will[1] disposing of all her paraphernal properties as well
as her share in the conjugal partnership of gains.
The
will was subjected to probate in Special Proceedings No. 1257-R of the
then Court of First Instance of Cebu City. Jose, one of the sons
of the late spouses and father of the herein respondents, contested the
probate on the ground that the disposition made therein impaired his
legitime.
Eventually,
the will was allowed probate. However, on July 6, 1960, the
probate court motu proprio dismissed the probate proceedings because
Jesus, as the estate’s executor, neglected to perform his duties after
the will was probated. Consequently, the probate court was not
able to adjudicate to the heirs their respective shares in the estate.
On
account thereof, Jose filed a complaint for partition with damages
against his six (6) brothers and sisters before the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch XIII, thereat docketed as Civil Case No.
R-13850. In a decision[2] dated August 10, 1978, said court
rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Declaring the plaintiff (i.e., Jose) entitled to a share of 1,183.57
square meters as his legitime from his mother’s estate and 1,829 square
meters as his intestate share from the estate of Regino Concepcion, Sr.;
2.
Ordering defendants Regino, Jesus and Emmanuel Concepcion to contribute
proportionately to the completion of plaintiff’s legitime.
3.
Confirming the titles of the additional defendants over the
properties conveyed to them.
SO
ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
The
decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken there from
by the herein petitioners. Thereafter, the same court (CFI-Cebu,
Branch XIII) issued a writ of execution[3] dated February 23,
1982. However, the writ was returned unsatisfied. Hence, on
February 12, 1987, said court issued an alias writ of execution.[4] To
this, a Sheriff’s Report was submitted stating, among others, that the
“writ of execution is only partially complied with pending the turn
over of the share of the plaintiff (Jose) by the defendants (Jesus,
Regino, Jr. and Emmanuel).”
Inasmuch
as the herein respondents have not yet complied with the
aforementioned August 10, 1978 decision of CFI-Cebu, Branch XIII,
the same court issued an Order dated 27 May 1987[5], directing
its branch sheriff Candido A. Gadrinab to execute a deed of
conveyance covering the Zulueta property in favor of Jose.
Complying
with the above, Sheriff Gadrinab executed a Deed of Conveyance over the
Zulueta property in favor of Jose. Unfortunately, when Jose presented
the same deed for registration, the Register of Deeds required him to
surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-52227 covering the
Zulueta property, which title was then in the possession of the
petitioners. Despite demands, petitioners refused delivery of the
title.
Hence,
Jose filed with the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City, Branch V, then
sitting as a land registration court, a Petition for the Cancellation
of TCT No. T-52227. In an Order dated January 22, 1988[6], said
court granted Jose’s petition thus:
WHEREFORE, the
foregoing premises considered, defendant Mr. Jesus F. Concepcion,
defendant in Civil Case No. R-13850, is hereby ordered to surrender
and/or deliver to the Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu the owner’s
copy of TCT No. 52227 covering Lot No. 204-B-SWO-24914 [Zulueta
property] within ten (10) days after this Order becomes final and
executory.
SO
ORDERED.
There
from, herein petitioners went to the Court of Appeals via an ordinary
appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 28665.
As
stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in the herein
assailed decision dated November 27, 2000,[7] dismissed the appeal for
lack of merit.
Petitioners
are now with us via the present recourse, on their following
submissions:
I.
THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA G.R.-CV NO. 28665 AND
SUBJECT HEREOF IS A TOTAL DEPARTURE FROM ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES, EXPRESS
LEGAL PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF LAW; THUS SAID APPELLATE COURT, IN
SUSTAINING THE FINAL ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO A WANT, IF NOT TOTAL LACK, OF JURISDICTION;
II.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO REVERSIBLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN IGNORING AND DEFYING THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE FOR
PETITIONERS (OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS THEREAT) WHICH SHOW THE GLARING
VIOLATION OF SAID COURT IN ITS DECISION OVER THE BASIC RIGHTS OF HEREIN
PETITIONERS.
It is
petitioners’ thesis that the cadastral court (RTC, Cebu City, Branch
V), had no authority to order the surrender and/or delivery to the
respondents of the owner’s copy of TCT No. T-52227 covering the Zulueta
property, because the parcel of land subject thereof had been devised
to them by their common ascendant, the late Concepcion Famador, as
indicated in her will.
The
pivotal issue, then, is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing petitioners’ appeal in CA-G.R. CV 28665, thereby effectively
sustaining the cadastral court’s order dated January 22, 1988.[8]
We
resolve the issue in the affirmative.
Before
going any further, we find it necessary to speak herein on the
jurisdiction of cadastral courts in the light of what transpired in
this case prior to the issuance of the questioned order of January 22,
1988.
The
pleadings before us disclose that in the proceedings before the
cadastral court, petitioners filed an opposition claiming that the
action of Sheriff Gadrinab in levying the Zulueta property was with
grave abuse of authority since said property is not within the scope of
the dispositive portion of the decision dated August 10, 1978 of
CFI-Cebu, Branch XIII, in Civil Case No. R-13850.
In
dismissing said opposition and in eventually ordering the surrender
and/or delivery of the title covering the Zulueta property, the
cadastral court explained in its same order of January 22, 1988:
“The matters
brought out by the oppositors in their written opposition are not
within the province of this Court to resolve, acting as a Cadastral
Court with special and limited jurisdiction. Oppositors’ complaint on
the way the decision in said civil case was executed must be brought
before the Court which tried the civil case and which have already
resolved the issue of ownership between the parties therein”,
a view evidently
shared by the Court of Appeals in its impugned decision of November 27,
2000.
In
Junio vs. De Los Santos and Register of Deeds of Pangasinan,[9] we made
clear the following:
[d]octrinal
jurisprudence holds that the Court of First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Court), as a Land Registration Court, can hear cases otherwise
litigable only in ordinary civil actions, since the Court of First
Instance are at the same time, [c]ourts of general jurisdiction and
could entertain and dispose of the validity or invalidity of
respondent’s adverse claim, with a view to determining whether
petitioner is entitled or not to the relief that he seeks. (Emphasis
supplied)
In
Ligon vs. Court of Appeals,[10] we even went further by saying:
Under Sec. 2 of
P.D. 1529, it is now provided that ‘Courts of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of titles to lands, including
improvements and interest therein and over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions.’ The above
provision has eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as
a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the
change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the
regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for
original registration but also over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or petitions. (Emphasis supplied)
Clear
it is from the foregoing that both the cadastral court and the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in holding that the former is without
jurisdiction to entertain and resolve the opposition thereat filed by
the petitioners.
Be
that as it may, it is, to us, improper for the cadastral court to issue
its order of January 22, 1988, directing the petitioners to surrender
and/or deliver the title covering the Zulueta property. That order is
void and definitely without force and effect.
As it
were, said order is premised on an earlier order issued on May 27, 1987
by the RTC-Cebu (former CFI-Cebu) Branch XIII in its Civil Case No.
R-13850, which latter order is very much challenged by the herein
petitioners. Accordingly, the propriety or validity of the
cadastral court’s order of January 22, 1988 is, in turn, dependent on
the propriety or validity of the order dated May 27, 1987 of RTC-Cebu,
Branch XIII, in Civil Case No. R-13850.
It is
undisputed that the August 10, 1978 decision of RTC-Cebu, Branch XIII,
in the main case (Civil Case No. R-13850) has long become final and
executory. In fact, a writ of execution as well as two (2) alias
writs of execution have been previously issued by the same court.
It was the non-satisfaction of these writs that prompted said court to
issue its order dated May 27, 1987, directing Branch Sheriff Gadrinab
to execute a deed of conveyance on the Zulueta property in favor of
Jose Concepcion.
By
issuing its order of May 27, 1987, RTC-Cebu, Branch XIII, sought to
amend its August 10, 1978 decision. We must emphasize, however,
that there is nothing in the August 10, 1978 decision of said court
which authorizes the surrender and/or delivery of the title covering
the Zulueta property. It merely required the defendants therein
to “contribute proportionately to the completion of the plaintiff’s
legitime.” In fact, said court has previously denied a “Motion
for Projected Partition and Execution of Judgment” filed before it by
the respondents precisely because, according to it, to allow partition
of the Zulueta property will “in effect amend or alter the decision
(referring to its earlier decision dated August 10, 1978) which has
long become final and executory.”
The
subsequent issuance of the order dated May 27, 1987 which amends the
final and executory decision dated August 10, 1978 cannot be
allowed. We have repeatedly held that a judgment that has become
final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected except for
clerical errors and mistakes. This rule holds true regardless of
whether the modification is to be made by the magistrate who rendered
the judgment or by an appellate tribunal which reviewed the same.[11]
Doubtless, then, the order dated May 27, 1987 of RTC-Cebu, Branch XIII,
in Civil Case No. R-13850 is a nullity.
And
because a spring cannot rise higher than its source, it follows that
the cadastal court’s order of January 22, 1988 which merely seeks to
implement the earlier void order dated May 27, 1987 in Civil Case No.
R-13850 is infected with the same nullity.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED and the
assailed Decision dated November 27, 2000 of the Court of Appeals VACATED and SET ASIDE.
SO
ORDERED.
Panganiban,
J., (Chairman),
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
[1]
Appendix “D”, Petition, Rollo, pp. 63-64.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 160, et seq.
[3]
Appendix “F”, Petition, Rollo, pp. 66-67.
[4]
Appendix “G-1”, Petitioners’ Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 264-265.
[5]
Appendix “G”, Petition, p. 68.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 59-61.
[7]
Appendix “A”, Petition; Rollo, pp. 37-45.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 59-61.
[9]
217 Phils. 203, 209 [1984] citing Luna vs. Santos, 102 Phils. 588
[1957]; Franco vs. Monte de Piedad, 117 Phils. 672 [1963]; and
Almiranez vs. Devera, 121 Phils. 322 [1965].
[10]
314 Phils. 689, 697 [1995] citing Averia vs. Caguioa, 146 SCRA 459
[1986] and PNB vs. ICB, 199 SCRA 508 [1991].
[11]
i.e. Marcopper Mining Corporation vs. Briones, 165 SCRA 464 [1988];
Times Transit Credit Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 363 Phils. 386 [1999];
and Aboitiz Shipping Employees Association vs. Hon. Undersecretary of
Labor and Employment, 343 Phils. 910 [1997].
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