SPOUSES
SALVADOR F. DE VERA and FELIZA V. DE VERA,
Petitioners,
-versus-
G.R. No. 155673
January
14, 2005
HON. GUILLERMO P. AGLORO, Presiding Judge, RTC – Branch 83,
Malolos, Bulacan and BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari
with urgent application for temporary restraining order/preliminary
injunction of the March 22, 2002 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67164.
On
March 25, 1996, the Spouses Salvador F. De Vera and Feliza V. De Vera
secured a loan in the amount of P1,200,000.00 from the BPI Family
Savings Bank, Inc. (the Bank, for brevity).[2] To secure the payment
thereof, the Spouses executed a Real Estate Mortgage over their
property located in Guiguinto, Bulacan, with an area of 232 square
meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-85716.[3]
When the Spouses De Vera defaulted in the payment of the balance of
their loan amounting to P1,091,484.01 and failed to pay despite demands
of the Bank, the latter filed a petition[4] with the ex-officio sheriff
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. At the public
auction scheduled on October 9, 1998, the Bank was declared the highest
bidder for the property. On October 18, 1998, the Sheriff executed a
certificate of sale[5] in favor of the Bank. On November 18, 1999, the
Bank filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds an affidavit for the
consolidation of its ownership over the property.[6] Thus, on December
1, 1999, TCT No. T-133862 was issued in the name of the Bank.[7]
On
February 11, 2000, the Spouses De Vera filed a Complaint[8] for the
nullification of the real estate mortgage against the Bank and the
Sheriff with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, as well as the extrajudicial
sale of the property at public auction. The Spouses prayed that, after
due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is
most respectfully prayed that, after hearing, judgment be rendered:
1. Setting aside
the Mortgage Loan Agreement and any/all contracts, accessory or
subsidiary thereto;
2.
Setting aside the foreclosure proceedings and the issuance of new title
to the defendant Bank;
3.
Allowing the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant Bank what is legal,
just and equitable under the premises;
4.
Sentencing defendant Bank to pay plaintiffs the following items of
damages:
a. At
least P500,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages;
b. At
least P100,000.00 as moral damages;
c. At
least P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d. 25%
of total recovery as attorney’s fees;
e.
Cost of suit.[9]
The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 109-M-2000 and was raffled to
Branch 83 of the court. On February 23, 2000, the Bank filed an
Ex Parte Petition for Writ of Possession with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan, docketed as LRC Case No. P-97-2000. The case was raffled
to Branch 83 of the court. The Bank impleaded the Spouses as
respondents and prayed that after an ex parte hearing, an order be
issued as follows:
1. Granting
petitioner a writ of possession over the properties covered by TCT No.
T-133862 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, together with all the
improvements thereon; and
2.
Ordering the Sheriff or any of his duly authorized deputies to
immediately place petitioner in possession thereof.
3.
Petitioner further prays for such other reliefs as may be deemed just
and equitable under the premises.[10]
The
trial court set the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of August 16,
2000 at the Building of the Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Provincial Capitol
Compound in Malolos, Bulacan.[11]
When
the petition was called for hearing on August 16, 2000, no oppositor
appeared. Forthwith, the trial court authorized its Branch Clerk
of Court to receive the evidence of the Bank ex parte,[12] and the Bank
adduced its testimonial and documentary evidence ex parte on August 28,
2000.
On
September 8, 2000, the Spouses De Vera filed in LRC Case No. P-97-2000
an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings to await the resolution of
Civil Case No. 109-M-2000 or for the consolidation of the two
cases. The Spouses cited the rulings of this Court in Barican vs.
IAC[13] and Sulit vs. Court of Appeals.[14] Opposing the motion,
the Bank alleged that the pendency of Civil Case No. 109-M-2000 was not
a bar to the petition for a writ of possession because the issuance of
the said writ was ministerial on the part of the trial court. The
petitioner cited the rulings of this Court in Ong vs. Court of
Appeals[15] and Vaca vs. Court of Appeals.[16]
In an
Order[17] dated February 13, 2001, the trial court denied the motion of
the Spouses. Citing the case of Vda. de Zaballero vs. CA,[18] the trial
court ruled that the purchaser of the foreclosed property, upon ex
parte application and the posting of the required bond, has the right
to acquire possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month
redemption period. According to the trial court, this is
sanctioned under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118. The trial court also declared that considering that the
redemption period had already expired, the Bank as purchaser, can, and
with more reason, demand for a writ of possession.
The
trial court emphasized that it is its ministerial duty to issue the
writ of possession in favor of a purchaser at public auction, and that
such duty could not be defeated by the pendency of a civil case, in
this instance Civil Case No. 109-M-2000.[19]
A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the Spouses De Vera which was
denied in an Order[20] dated September 7, 2001. The trial court cited
the case of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. IAC,[21] which
reiterated the rule that a purchaser in a foreclosed sale of mortgaged
property is entitled to a writ of possession and that upon an ex parte
petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial upon the trial court to
issue such writ in the latter’s favor. It added that the pendency
of a separate civil action questioning the validity of the mortgage or
its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of
the writ of possession.
Aggrieved,
the Spouses De Vera filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction before
the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67164. Therein, they alleged
that:
A.
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN NOT SUSPENDING THE PETITION
FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO.
109-M-2000, WHICH IS A VIRTUAL REFUSAL TO PERFORM A BOUNDEN DUTY
ENJOINED BY LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, TENDING TO RENDER SAID CASE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC, AND EXPOSING THE PETITIONERS TO GREAT AND IRREPARABLE
INJURIES AS THEY STAND TO BE OUSTED FROM THEIR HOUSE AND LOT.
B.
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DESPITE
CLEAR GROUND TO RECONSIDER THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2001.
The
Bank posited that Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118, authorizes it to obtain a writ of possession by filing a petition
under oath in the registration or cadastral proceedings in the form of
an ex parte motion. It further emphasized that the issuance of a
writ of possession is a ministerial duty of the trial court, as held in
Spouses Ong vs. Court of Appeals.[22]
On
March 22, 2002, the CA rendered a decision denying due course to and
dismissing the petition. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE
and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit.[23]
The CA
ruled that the respondent judge did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when he denied the petitioners’ motion to suspend
proceedings. It reasoned that since the subject parcel of land
(with all its improvements) was not redeemed within one (1) year from
the registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, it follows that
the bank, as purchaser thereof, acquired an absolute right to the writ
of possession. It emphasized that the land registration court has
the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon mere motion,
conformably to Section 7, Act No. 3135, as amended. Thus, the CA
found that the Spouses De Vera failed to show that the injunctive
relief prayed for was warranted.
The
Spouses filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court
denied in a Resolution[24] dated October 15, 2002.
The
Spouses forthwith filed their petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision and the October
15, 2002 Resolution of the CA, asserting that:
A. THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSPENDING THE PROCEEDINGS IN LRC CASE NO. N-3507
BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. 109-M-2000 FILED BY
PETITIONERS SEEKING THE NULLITY, NOT ONLY OF THE FORECLOSURE AND
AUCTION SALE, BUT ALSO OF THE MORTGAGE ITSELF.[25]
B. THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD [HAVE] CONSOLIDATED THE P-97-2000 LRC CASE NO.
3507 WITH CIVIL CASE NO. 109-M-2000 (BRANCH 83, RTC, BULACAN).[26]
The
petition has no merit.
Section
6 of Act No. 3135[27] provides that the mortgagor or his
successor-in-interest may redeem the foreclosed property within one (1)
year from the registration of the sale with the Register of
Deeds. Under Section 7[28] of the law, if the mortgagor fails to
redeem the property, the buyer at public auction may file, with the RTC
in the province or place where the property or portion thereof is
located, an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession
within one (1) year from the registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate
of Sale, and the court shall grant the said motion upon the
petitioner’s posting a bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the
property for a period of twelve (12) months. On the strength of
the writ of possession, the Sheriff is duty-bound to place the buyer at
public auction in actual possession of the foreclosed property.[29]
After the one-year period, the mortgagor loses all interest over
it.[30] The purchaser, who has a right to possession that extends after
the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of
the property when no redemption is made.[31] Thus, the bond required
under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer needed. The possession of
land becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner.[32]
The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new
transfer certificate of title. After the consolidation of title in the
buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the
writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial
function.[33]
In the
present case, the petitioners-mortgagors failed to redeem the property
within one (1) year from the registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate
of Sale with the Register of Deeds. The respondent, being the
purchaser of the property at public auction, thus, had the right to
file an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession; and
considering that it was its ministerial duty to do so, the trial court
had to grant the motion and to thereafter issue the writ of possession.
The
bare fact that the petitioners were impleaded in the ex parte petition
for a writ of possession filed by the respondent did not alter the
summary nature of the proceedings in Act No. 3135. Indeed, there
was no need for the respondent to implead the petitioners as
parties-respondents in its petition with the RTC. Hence, the
petitioners cannot claim that they were denied due process when the RTC
took cognizance of the respondent’s petition without prior service of
copies of the petition and of the notice of hearing thereof on them.
Neither
was there a need for the court to suspend the proceedings merely and
solely because the petitioners filed a complaint in the RTC for the
nullification of the real estate mortgage, the sale at public auction
and the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale issued in favor of the respondent.
First.
An ex parte petition for the issuance of a possessory writ under
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial
process” as contemplated in Article 433 of the Civil Code.[34] It is a
judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as
purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed
in court, by which one party “sues another for the enforcement of a
wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.” It is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act No. 3135, as
amended.[35] It is brought for the benefit of one party only, and
without notice to, or consent by any person adversely interested.[36]
It is a proceeding where the relief is granted without an opportunity
for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard.[37] No
notice is needed to be served upon persons interested in the subject
property. Hence, there is no necessity of giving notice to the
petitioners since they had already lost all their interests in the
property when they failed to redeem the same.[38]
Second.
As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a
writ of execution.[39] The right of the purchaser to have possession of
the subject property would not be defeated notwithstanding the pendency
of a civil case seeking the annulment of the mortgage or of the
extrajudicial foreclosure.[40] Indeed, under Section 8 of Act No.
3135,[41] even if the mortgagor files a petition assailing the writ of
possession granted to the buyer and the sale at public auction within
thirty (30) days from the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
the buyer at public auction of the property, and the court denies the
same, the buyer may appeal the order of denial. However, the
buyer at public auction remains in possession of the property pending
resolution of the appeal. We have consistently ruled that it is
the ministerial duty of the court to issue writ of possession in favor
of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale. The trial court has no
discretion on this matter.[42]
On the
issue of whether the RTC was mandated to consolidate LRC Case No.
P-97-2000 and Civil Case No. 109-M-2000, we agree with the following
ruling of the CA:
Neither can the
prayer for mandamus be granted under the present circumstances.
The reason is simple: Mandamus as a remedy applies only where
petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law and not when it is
doubtful. It will not issue to give to him something to which he
is not clearly and conclusively entitled.
Here,
respondent JUDGE’s ministerial duty in issuing the questioned issuance
of the writ of possession finds ample support not only in the
jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court in Navarra, but also in
the case of Philippine National Bank vs. Adil:
“The
rule, therefore, is that after the redemption period has expired, the
purchaser of the property has the right to be placed in possession
thereof. Accordingly, it is the inescapable duty of the Sheriff to
enforce the writ of possession especially as in this case, a new title
has already been issued in the name of the purchaser.” (Emphasis
supplied)
Therefore,
petitioners, who failed to establish a clear right, cannot compel
respondent JUDGE to deviate from his duty to issue the writ of
possession which is ministerial in nature, not requiring the exercise
of sound discretion, especially since, as we have said, the redemption
period has expired and a new title has already been issued in the name
of BPI. As correctly pointed out in the assailed Order dated February
13, 2001:
“x x x it is its
ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession in favor of a
purchaser in a foreclosure sale and the right of the petitioner cannot
be defeated notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 109-M-2000
being invoked by herein oppositor.”[43]
Section
1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
Section 1.
Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or
fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or
trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order
all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
It is
plain as day that the trial court is not mandated to consolidate two or
more related cases. The trial court is vested with discretion
whether or not to consolidate two or more cases.[44] The grant of
discretion to the trial court is incompatible with the clear legal
duty, the existence of which is essential to warrant the issuance of a
writ of mandamus.
It
bears stressing that consolidation is aimed to obtain justice with the
least expense and vexation to the litigants. The object of
consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression or abuse, prevent delays and save the litigants unnecessary
acts and expense.[45] Consolidation should be denied when prejudice
would result to any of the parties or would cause complications, delay,
prejudice, cut off, or restrict the rights of a party.[46]
In the
present case, the trial court acted in the exercise of its sound
judicial discretion in denying the motion of the petitioners for the
consolidation of LRC Case No. P-97-2000 with Civil Case No. 109-M-2000.
First.
The proceedings in LRC Case No. P-97-2000 is not, strictly speaking, a
judicial process and is a non-litigious proceeding; it is summary in
nature. In contrast, the action in Civil Case No. 109-M-2000 is an
ordinary civil action and adversarial in character. The rights of
the respondent in LRC Case No. P-97-2000 would be prejudiced if the
said case were to be consolidated with Civil Case No. 109-M-2000,
especially since it had already adduced its evidence.
Second.
The matter of whether or not consolidation is proper has certainly
become moot and academic. The RTC had already issued an order
granting the writ of possession in favor of the respondent herein, and
declared that the latter had already been placed in actual possession
of the property per its Order of November 8, 2002. The
petitioners herein had already appealed the said order of the RTC
granting the writ of possession to the CA on December 2,
2002. In the meantime, Civil Case No. 109-M-2000 is still
pending trial in Branch 83 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67164 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
Puno,
J., (Chairman),
Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, with Associate
Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales (now an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court) and Sergio L. Pestaño, concurring; Rollo, pp.
27-34.
[2]
Exhibit “C,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.
[3]
Records, pp. 7-8.
[4]
Folder of Exhibit, pp. 6-9.
[5]
Exhibit “P,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 17.
[6]
Exhibit “Q,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 18.
[7]
Exhibit “R,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 19.
[8]
Records, pp. 161-165.
[9]
Id. at 164.
[10]
Id. at 5.
[11]
Id. at 20.
[12]
Id. at 26.
[13]
162 SCRA 358 (1988).
[14]
268 SCRA 441 (1997).
[15]
209 SCRA 350 (1992).
[16]
234 SCRA 146 (1994).
[17]
Records, p. 84.
[18]
229 SCRA 810 (1994).
[19]
Records, pp. 83-84.
[20]
Id. at 118.
[21]
142 SCRA 44 (1986).
[22]
333 SCRA 189 (2000).
[23]
Rollo, p. 33.
[24]
Id. at 35.
[25]
Id. at 14.
[26]
Id. at 21.
[27]
Sec. 6. Redemption. – In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is
made under the special power herein before referred to, the debtor, his
successors-in-interest or any person having a lien on the property
subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is
sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from
and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed
by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to four
hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so
far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
[28]
Sec. 7. Possession during redemption period. – In any sale made
under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court
of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any
part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the
redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use
of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor
in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act.
Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in the form of an ex
parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the
property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of
property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred
and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real
property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of
any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each
case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition,
collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred
and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and
the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the
property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
[29]
Chailease Finance Corporation vs. Ma, 409 SCRA 250 (2003).
[30]
Yulienco vs. Court of Appeals, 393 SCRA 143 (2002).
[31]
Spouses Rempson Samson and Milagros Samson; and Rempson Realty &
Development Corporation vs. Judge Mauricio M. Rivera, et. al., G.R. No.
154355, May 20, 2004.
[32]
Chailease Finance Corporation vs. Ma, supra.
[33]
Yulienco vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[34]
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a
disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort
to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
[35]
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 374 SCRA 22 (2002).
[36]
Laureano vs. Bormaheco, Inc., 351 SCRA 270 (2001).
[37]
Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 244
(1989).
[38]
Laureano vs. Bormaheco, Inc., supra.
[39]
Ong vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[40]
Spouses Rempson Samson and Milagros Samson; and Rempson Realty &
Development Corporation vs. Judge Mauricio M. Rivera, et. al., supra.
[41]
Sec. 8. Setting aside of sale and writ of possession. – The debtor may,
in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later
than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition
that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled,
specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not
violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions
hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in
accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one
hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if
it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his
favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained
possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the order of
the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four
hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in
effect during the pendency of the appeal.
[42]
China Banking Corporation vs. Ordinario, 399 SCRA 430 (2003).
[43]
Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[44]
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Teodoro, Sr., 97 Phil. 461 (1955).
[45]
Raymundo vs. Felipe, 42 SCRA 615 (1971).
[46] 1
CJS, Actions pp. 1347-1348.
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