VICENTE
C. ETCUBAN, JR.,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R.
No. 148410
January
17, 2005
SULPICIO LINES, INC.,
Respondent.
D
E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
The
stakes are high in a position imbued with trust, and for petitioner
Vicente C. Etcuban, Jr., the loss of trust in him by his employer cost
him his job after 16 years of service. He cries that the penalty
was too harsh for an unproved and petty infraction. Upon the other
hand, his employer avers that it acted well within its rights in
terminating the petitioner’s services after the investigation revealed
that the latter failed to live up to the trust and confidence expected
of him as Chief Purser. The Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) agreed with the petitioner, while the Court
of Appeals ruled for the employer.
The
Antecedents
Respondent
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
domestic shipping. Among its fleet of inter-island vessels was the M/V
Surigao Princess, plying the Cebu–Cagayan de Oro–Jagna–Bohol route.[1]
The
petitioner was employed by the respondent on January 30, 1978 until his
dismissal on June 10, 1994 for loss of trust and confidence.[2]
At the time of his dismissal, the petitioner was the Chief Purser of
the M/V Surigao Princess receiving a monthly salary of P5,000.00.[3] As
the Chief Purser, the petitioner handled the funds of the vessel and
was the custodian of all the passage tickets and bills of lading.[4] It
was his responsibility, among other things, to issue passage tickets
and to receive payments from the customers of the respondent, as well
as to issue the corresponding official receipts therefor.[5] He was
also tasked to disburse the salaries of the crewmen of the vessel.[6]
Sometime
in the last week of May 1994, the newly designated jefe de viaje[7] of
the M/V Surigao Princess, in a surprise examination, discovered that
several yellow passenger’s duplicate original[8] of yet to be sold or
unissued passage tickets already contained the amount of P88.00 – the
fare for adult passengers for the Cagayan de Oro to Jagna, Bohol route.
He noticed that three other original copies which made up the full set
did not bear the same impression, although they were supposed to have
been prepared at the same time. Acting on what appeared to be a strong
evidence of short-changing the company, the jefe de viaje dug deeper on
what he uncovered. As expected, he found inordinate amount of ticket
issuances for children at half the fare of P44.00 in Voyage 434 of the
vessel.[9] When word of the anomaly reached the respondent, it waited
for the petitioner to return to Cebu City in the hope of shedding more
light on the matter.
On May
30, 1994, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Surigao Princess at
the port of Cebu, the petitioner received a memorandum of even date
from Personnel Officer Artemio F. Añiga relative to the
irregularity in the “alleged involvement in anomaly of ticket
issuance,” instructing him to forthwith report to the main office and
to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be meted on him
or to submit himself to an investigation. The memorandum warned the
petitioner that his failure to comply with the aforementioned
instructions would be construed as a waiver of his right to be heard.
It also informed the petitioner of his immediate preventive suspension
until further notice.[10] The petitioner, however, refused to
acknowledge receipt of the memorandum which was personally served on
him,[11] prompting the respondent to mail the same, and which the
petitioner received days later.[12]
Meanwhile,
upon his arrival at the office, the petitioner was questioned by Mr.
Carlo S. Go, Senior Executive Vice-President and General Manager of
respondent. Thereafter, petitioner was preliminarily investigated by
Mr. Añiga wherein his statements were taken down.[13] After the
initial investigation, the petitioner was told to sign its minutes but
he adamantly refused, claiming the same to be “self-incriminatory.”[14]
The next day, the petitioner was replaced by Mr. Felix Almonicar as the
Chief Purser of the M/V Surigao Princess.[15] As a result of his
replacement, the petitioner thought he was fired from his job.
Barely
a week after the petitioner’s preventive suspension and pending his
administrative investigation, he filed a complaint against the
respondent for illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, 13th
month pay and other monetary benefits with the NLRC, Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VII, Cebu City. The case was docketed as NLRC
No. RAB-VII-06-0607-84. The petitioner alleged that the ground for his
dismissal, i.e., loss of trust and confidence, was ill-motivated and
without factual basis. He did not deny that the anomalous tickets were
in his possession, but denied that he was guilty of any wrongdoing. He
dismissed the handwriting on the tickets as his, and claimed that he
was singled out for the dismissal. He averred that the “trumped-up”
charge was a clever scheme resorted to by his employer so it could
avoid paying him monetary benefits, considering that he was with the
company for more than sixteen (16) years. He argued that assuming that
it was he who wrote those entries in the tickets, the fact remains that
they were still unissued; hence, no money went to his pocket and no
material prejudice was caused to the respondent. According to the
petitioner, he would not jeopardize his livelihood for something as
miniscule as P88.00. He prayed not for reinstatement but for separation
pay, monetary benefits plus damages.[16]
On
June 9, 1994, the respondent received its summons.[17] Short of
pre-empting its administrative investigation, coupled with the
petitioner’s obstinate refusal to submit to further investigation, the
respondent decided to terminate the petitioner’s employment for loss of
trust and confidence in connection with passage tickets nos.
636742-636748.[18] A copy of the notice of termination[19] dated June
10, 1994 was sent by mail to the petitioner.
After
hearing on the merits, Labor Arbiter Ernesto F. Carreon rendered his
Decision dated March 13, 1995, finding the petitioner’s dismissal
illegal. He ruled that the respondent failed to substantiate and prove
that the petitioner committed any wrongdoing. He found the evidence of
impression on the tickets inadequate, considering that the petitioner
was not the only person in the vessel handling or issuing the passage
tickets. According to the Labor Arbiter, the anomalous entries on the
unissued tickets could not be attributed entirely to the petitioner;
thus, there was no reason for the respondent to lose its trust and
confidence on the petitioner.[20] The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent
Sulpicio Lines, Inc., to pay the complainant Vicente C. Etcuban, Jr.
the following :
1.
Separation pay -------------------------------- P80,480.00
2.
Backwages ------------------------------------
40,703.23
3.
Proportionate 13th Month Pay -------------
2,235.50
P123,418.73
The
other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Both
parties appealed to the NLRC, 4th Division, Cebu City. In its appeal,
the respondent insisted that the dismissal was justified.[22] The
petitioner, on the other hand, questioned the computation of his
backwages, besides reiterating his claim for moral damages.[23]
On
February 21, 1996, a Decision[24] was rendered by the NLRC affirming
the challenged decision with the modification that the backwages to be
paid to the petitioner shall be reckoned from the time of his actual
dismissal on June 10, 1994, up to the issuance of the writ of execution
on the finality of the decision, but not to exceed five (5) years. In
fixing the additional backwages, the NLRC concluded that the respondent
has “the open recourse to the Supreme Court” which could “prolong his
(petitioner’s) agony.” The decretal part of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the assailed decision is MODIFIED with respect to
the monetary awards. The award of backwages shall be computed from the
date of the actual dismissal or 10 June 1994 up to the issuance of the
Writ of Execution on the finality of the decision in this case but not
to exceed five (5) years. The backwages shall include the corresponding
13th month pay and leave (sick and vacation) benefits for the whole
period covered.
SO
ORDERED.[25]
In
affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC ruled as follows –
We do not find
the allegedly highly irregular condition of the tickets valid reason to
even suspend, much less terminate the complainant-appellant for loss of
trust and confidence. It has not been established by clear and
competent evidence that the alleged irregular condition of the tickets
was attributable to the complainant or to other members of the team of
inspectors who have equal access to the tickets. This is vital in
view of the complainant’s denial to have committed the same.
Moreover, there is no showing at all on record that the respondent
suffered damage as a consequence of the existence of these tickets with
entry of the rate or cost of transportation from Cagayan de Oro City to
Jagna, Bohol, or that the complainant has benefited from the
same. To establish loss of confidence, the employer must have
reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the
trust and confidence demanded of his position, and makes him absolutely
unfit to continue with his employment.
With
more reason, we do not find valid loss of confidence to warrant
dismissal the alleged “stabbing the back” by the complainant-appellant
of the respondent-appellant by the mere filing of the case. This
act of the complainant-appellant is not a misconduct. It is a
valid recourse to the instrumentality of the government that can give
him ample protection and labor justice especially when he felt that his
16 years of service is being threatened.[26]
The
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration[27] which was denied by
the NLRC in a Resolution[28] promulgated on April 15, 1996. It stressed
its finding that the petitioner’s alleged breach of trust was not
sufficiently established by the evidence on record. It further ruled
that the petitioner’s indefinite suspension from work amounted to his
constructive dismissal.[29]
On
June 14, 1996, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari[30] with
this Court, ascribing to the NLRC, among others, grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that the preventive suspension of the
petitioner was tantamount to constructive dismissal. Following the
pronouncement in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC,[31] the petition was
referred to the Court of Appeals for its appropriate action and
disposition.[32]
On
December 28, 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the NLRC
decision.[33] It ruled that there was valid and just cause for the
petitioner’s dismissal, as there was sufficient basis for loss of trust
and confidence on him. The appellate court amplified that in cases of
dismissal for loss of trust and confidence, it is not required that
there is proof beyond reasonable doubt. It ratiocinated, thus:
The
office of a purser involves a high degree of trust and confidence.
Private respondent had access to company funds as it was his sensitive
duty to issue tickets and accept payments from the passengers of the
vessel. When the passenger copies of unissued tickets in his
custody were written with the amount of P88.00 while the other copies
were clean, this already constituted culpable tampering of the
tickets. This Court is fully aware of the standard operating
procedure that tickets should be accomplished only at the time of their
issuance and that the duplicate or triplicate copies should contain
exact carbon impressions of the entries in the original copies.
It was then highly anomalous that the original copies of the tickets
were already written with the amount of P88.00 when they were still
unissued. More so, because the amount of P88.00 were not
duplicated in the other copies of the tickets. There was a clear
case of tampering of the unissued tickets in private respondent’s
possession. This clearly was intended to facilitate the anomaly of
entering in the duplicate copies an amount different if not lower than
what is stated in the original copy and remitting to the petitioner the
lower amount.
Complainant
was the custodian of the tickets with the authority to issue the
same. The tampered tickets were in his possession. As such, it
was therefore reasonable and logical for petitioner to conclude if not
certain a well-grounded moral conviction that private respondent
Etcuban committed the tampering. Even if it is allowed that
another person committed the tampering, private respondent was still
culpable as the tampered tickets were found in his possession and the
same could not have been done without his conformity or
negligence. His possession of the tickets with unexplained
written entries in the passenger copies of the unissued tickets was by
itself sufficient basis enough to prove respondent’s culpability.
He was the custodian of the tickets and he should be culpable for any
violation of the integrity of the tickets. On this score, this
Court agrees with petitioner that the anomalous entries in the tickets
in his custody was sufficient basis for petitioner to lose trust and
confidence on private respondent.
In
cases of dismissal for loss of trust and confidence, it is not required
that there is proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient that
there is sufficient basis for loss of trust and confidence.[34]
In the
instant case, this Court holds that there was sufficient basis for
petitioner to lose trust and confidence in private respondent so as to
justify his termination. It may be pertinent to note that private
respondent’s overall conduct is inconsistent with innocence.
Private respondent did not wait for the result of petitioner’s
investigation and filed a complaint for illegal dismissal despite
private respondent’s admission that he was merely placed under
preventive suspension. Preventive suspension is allowed under Section
3, Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code. While it is
true that no penalty should be attached to an employee’s recourse to
the NLRC, his immediate filing of the case in the light of the
discovery of the anomalous tickets only betrays his culpability.
It
bears emphasis that private respondent’s position as purser was highly
sensitive. As such, he must demonstrate utmost honesty and fidelity to
the trust reposed in him. On its part, petitioner was well within
its prerogative to require from its purser a high degree of uprightness
and probity. Their integrity was impaired by the tampered tickets
in his possession. There was sufficient basis for petitioner to lose
trust and confidence in private respondent. Having lost its trust
and confidence, petitioner cannot be expected to allow private
respondent to handle the funds of the corporation. It would be
highly unfair to require petitioner to continue employing private
respondent in such sensitive post in the absence of full trust and
confidence.
The
requirement of due process has been fully satisfied in the instant
case. Private respondent was served notice for investigation as he
himself admitted that he submitted himself to an investigation on May
30, 1994 though he did not signed (sic) the statement as it was
self-incriminatory. It is true that when he filed the case,
private respondent has not been served notice of termination precisely
because he took it upon himself to consider that he was terminated
without waiting for the result of the investigation. At any rate,
after petitioner received the summons of the instant case, it
subsequently served upon private respondent a notice of termination.[35]
The
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration[36] was denied by the Court of
Appeals for lack of merit in its Resolution[37] dated May 31, 2001.
Aggrieved
at the unfortunate turn of events, the petitioner took the present
recourse, and now asks the Court to reinstate and uphold the NLRC
decision. The petitioner anchors his petition for review on the
following grounds:
I
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ACTED IN VIOLATION OF EXISTING LAWS WHEN IT ORDERED THE
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE HIS LONG YEARS IN THE COMPANY AND
THE MINIMAL AMOUNT INVOLVED IN THE CASE.
II
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ACTED IN VIOLATION OF EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO LOSS OR
PREJUDICE WAS SUFFERED BY THE COMPANY FROM HIS SUPPOSED INFRACTION.
III
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF
THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT OTHER EMPLOYEES COULD HAVE
FILLED-UP THE TICKETS IN QUESTION.
IV
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT LEGALLY ERRED IN DELETING THE AWARD OF 13TH MONTH PAY
PREVIOUSLY GRANTED TO PETITIONER.[38]
The
petition is bereft of merit.
The
petitioner insists that his dismissal was without factual and legal
basis. Echoing the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, he
maintains that the handwriting on the irregular tickets was not proven
to be his. He argues that the reluctance of the respondent to take on
his challenge to subject the same tickets to a handwriting expert
proved his inculpability.[39] Moreover, he points out that the very
testimony of the respondent’s Personnel Officer, Mr. Añiga, to
the effect that the latter had no idea whose handwriting it was on the
questioned tickets, helped clear his innocence.[40]
Upon
the other hand, the respondent counters that there was sufficient basis
for its loss of trust and confidence on petitioner; the tampered
tickets were found in his possession, and as Chief Purser, he was the
custodian of the unissued tickets. The respondent avers that proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary to justify loss of trust and
confidence, it being sufficient that there is some basis to justify
it.[41]
We
agree with the respondent.
Law[42]
and jurisprudence have long recognized the right of employers to
dismiss employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence.[43] More
so, in the case of supervisors or personnel occupying positions of
responsibility, loss of trust justifies termination.[44] Loss of
confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised
from the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and
confidence. This situation holds where a person is entrusted with
confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care
and protection of the employer’s property. But, in order to
constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be
“work-related” such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to
continue working for the employer.[45]
The
degree of proof required in labor cases is not as stringent as in other
types of cases.[46] It must be noted, however, that recent decisions of
this Court have distinguished the treatment of managerial employees
from that of rank-and-file personnel, insofar as the application of the
doctrine of loss of trust and confidence is concerned. Thus, with
respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as
ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged
events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and
accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. But as regards a
managerial employee, the mere existence of a basis for believing that
such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for
his dismissal. Hence, in the case of managerial employees, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is
some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible
for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation
therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by
his position.[47]
In the
present case, the petitioner is not an ordinary rank-and-file employee.
The petitioner’s work is of such nature as to require a substantial
amount of trust and confidence on the part of the employer. Being the
Chief Purser, he occupied a highly sensitive and critical position and
may thus be dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
One of the many duties of the petitioner included the preparation and
filling up passage tickets, and indicating the amounts therein before
being given to the passengers. More importantly, he handled the
personnel funds of the MV Surigao Princess. Clearly, the petitioner’s
position involves a high degree of responsibility requiring trust and
confidence. The position carried with it the duty to observe proper
company procedures in the fulfillment of his job, as it relates closely
to the financial interests of the company.
The
requirement that there be some basis or reasonable ground to believe
that the employee is responsible for the misconduct was sufficiently
met in the case at bar. As Chief Purser, the petitioner cannot feign
ignorance on the irregularity as he had custody of the tickets when the
anomaly was discovered. It would not be amiss to suppose that the
petitioner, who would benefit directly or indirectly from the fruits of
such fraudulent scheme, was a party to such irregularity. That
there were other pursers who could have done the irregularity is of no
moment. It bears stressing that the petitioner was the Chief Purser who
was tasked to directly supervise each and every purser under him.
While, indeed, it was not proved that he was the one who made the
irregular entries on the tickets, the fact that he did not lift a
finger at all to determine who it was is a sad reflection of his job.
In fact, even if the petitioner had no actual and direct participation
in the alleged anomalies, his failure to detect any anomaly in the
passage tickets amounts to gross negligence and incompetence, which
are, likewise, justifiable grounds for his dismissal. Be that as it
may, to our mind, it is no longer necessary to prove the petitioner’s
direct participation in the irregularity, for what is material is that
his actuations were more than sufficient to sow in his employer the
seed of mistrust and loss of confidence.
Neither
are we impressed with the petitioner’s claim that he was singled out,
or that his dismissal was a ploy to obviate payment of his retirement
benefits. There is nothing in the records to show that beyond making
these allegations, the petitioner did nary of anything to substantiate
the same.
Finally,
the petitioner theorizes that even assuming that there was evidence to
support the charges against him, his dismissal from the service is
unwarranted, harsh and is not commensurate to his misdeeds, considering
the following: first, his 16 long years of service with the company;
second, no loss or damages was suffered by the company since the
tickets were unissued; third, he had no previous derogatory record;
and, lastly, the amount involved is miniscule.[48] Citing
jurisprudence,[49] he appeals for compassion and requests that he be
merely suspended, or at the very least, given separation pay for his
length of service.[50]
We
find no merit in the petitioner’s contention.
We are
not unmindful of the foregoing doctrine, but after a careful scrutiny
of the cited cases, the Court is convinced that the petitioner’s
reliance thereon is misplaced. It must be stressed that in all of the
cases cited, the employees involved were all rank-and-file or ordinary
workers. As pointed out earlier, the rules on termination of
employment, penalties for infractions, insofar as fiduciary employees
are concerned, are not necessarily the same as those applicable to the
termination of employment of ordinary employees. Employers, generally,
are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the
employment of managerial personnel or those of similar rank performing
functions which by their nature require the employer’s trust and
confidence, than in the case of ordinary rank-and-file employees.[51]
The
fact that the petitioner has worked with the respondent for more than
16 years, if it is to be considered at all, should be taken against
him. The infraction that he committed, vis-a-vis his long years of
service with the company, reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty.
Loyalty that he should have strengthened instead of betrayed. If an
employee’s length of service is to be regarded as a justification for
moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize
for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and
undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all
undesirables.[52]
The
argument that the petitioner was not guilty of anything because the
tickets were never issued or that he had received nothing from the
passengers that he could short-change the company would not mitigate
his liability, nor efface the respondent’s loss of trust and confidence
in him. Whether or not the respondent was financially prejudiced is
immaterial. Also, what matters is not the amount involved, be it paltry
or gargantuan; rather the fraudulent scheme in which the petitioner was
involved, which constitutes a clear betrayal of trust and confidence.
In fact, there are indications that this fraudulent act had been done
before, and probably would have continued had it not been discovered.
Moreover,
the records show that the petitioner is not as blameless as he claimed
to be. In 1979 and 1980, he was suspended by the respondent for several
company infractions,[53] which the petitioner did not deny. It must
also be stressed that when an employee accepts a promotion to a
managerial position or to an office requiring full trust and
confidence, he gives up some of the rigid guaranties available to an
ordinary worker. Infractions which, if committed by others, would be
overlooked or condoned or penalties mitigated may be visited with more
serious disciplinary action.[54]
It
cannot be over emphasized that there is no substitute for honesty for
sensitive positions which call for utmost trust. Fairness dictates that
the respondent should not be allowed to continue with the employment of
the petitioner who has breached the confidence reposed on him.[55]
Unlike other just causes for dismissal, trust in an employee, once
lost, is difficult, if not impossible, to regain.[56] There can be no
doubt that the petitioner’s continuance in the extremely sensitive
fiduciary position of Chief Purser would be patently inimical to the
respondent’s interests. It would be oppressive and unjust to order the
respondent to take him back, for the law, in protecting the rights of
the employee, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer.[57]
Anent
the petitioner’s request for separation pay, the Court is constrained
to deny the same. Well-settled is the rule that separation pay shall be
allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed
for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his
moral character.[58] Inasmuch as reason for which the petitioner was
validly separated involves his integrity, which is especially required
for the position of purser, he is not worthy of compassion as to
deserve at least separation pay for his length of service.[59]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
Puno,
J., (Chairman),
Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1]
Records, p. 17.
[2]
Id. at 28.
[3]
Id. at 7.
[4]
Id. at 17.
[5] Id.
[6]
Id. at 20.
[7]
Id. at 71.
[8]
Exhibit “5.” A set is composed of four (4) duplicate originals: White
for Office Copy; Yellow for Passenger Copy; Light Green for File Copy;
and, Pink for Gangway Pass.
[9]
Records, p. 18.
[10]
Id. at 27.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id. at 72.
[14]
Id. at 11.
[15]
Id. at 187.
[16]
Id. at 9-12.
[17]
Id. at 4.
[18]
Id. at 34-35.
[19]
Id. at 28.
[20]
Id. at 287-288.
[21]
Id. at 291.
[22]
Id. at 301.
[23]
Id. at 318.
[24]
Id. at 366.
[25]
Id. at 366.
[26]
Id. at 364-365 (Emphasis ours).
[27]
Id. at 367.
[28]
Id. at 387.
[29]
Id. at 389.
[30]
CA Rollo, p. 3.
[31]
295 SCRA 494 (1998).
[32]
CA Rollo, p. 166.
[33]
Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired), with
Associate Justices Alicia L. Santos (retired) and Josefina
Guevara-Salonga, concurring; Id. at 227-234.
[34]
Id. at 230-232.
[35]
Id. at 232-233.
[36]
Id. at 235.
[37]
Id. at 256.
[38]
Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[39]
Id. at 17.
[40]
Id. at 17-18.
[41]
Id. at 168-171.
[42]
As provided for in the Labor Code, Art. 282. An employer may terminate
an employment for any of the following causes:
(c) Fraud or
willful breach of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his
duly-authorized representative.
[43]
Caoile v. NLRC, 299 SCRA 76 (1998).
[44]
Kwikway Engineering Works v. NLRC, 195 SCRA 526 (1991), citing Lamsan
Trading v. Leogardo, 144 SCRA 571 (1986); New Frontier Mines, Inc. v.
NLRC, 129 SCRA 502 (1984); Associated Citizens Bank v. Ople, 103
SCRA 130 (1981).
[45]
Caoile v. NLRC, supra.
[46]
Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Inc. v. NLRC, 182 SCRA 446 (1990).
[47]
Caoile v. NLRC, supra.
[48]
Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[49]
PAL v. PALEA, 57 SCRA 489 (1974); Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. v.
NLRC, 176 SCRA 295 (1989); Itogon-Suyok Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, 117 SCRA
523 (1982).
[50]
Rollo, p. 16.
[51]
Gonzales v. NLRC, 355 SCRA 195 (2001).
[52]
Flores v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 350 (1993).
[53]
Records, p. 87.
[54]
Metro Drug Corporation vs. NLRC, 143 SCRA 132 (1986).
[55]
Salvador v. Philippine Mining Service Corporation, 395 SCRA 729 (2003).
[56]
Id. at 730.
[57]
San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 115 SCRA 329 (1982).
[58]
PLDT v. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671 (1988).
[59]
Pacaña v. NLRC, 172 SCRA 473 (1989).
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