FILIPINAS
BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC.,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R.
No. 141994
January
17, 2005
AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL
CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN
COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, (AMEC-BCCM) and ANGELITA F. AGO,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
CARPIO,
J.:
The
Case
This
Petition for Review[1] assails the 4 January 1999 Decision[2] and 26
January 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
40151. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the 14
December 1992 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 8236. The Court of Appeals held Filipinas
Broadcasting Network, Inc. and its broadcasters Hermogenes Alegre and
Carmelo Rima liable for libel and ordered them to solidarily pay Ago
Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine
moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
The
Antecedents
“Exposé”
is a radio documentary[4] program hosted by Carmelo ‘Mel’ Rima (“Rima”)
and Hermogenes ‘Jun’ Alegre (“Alegre”).[5] Exposé is aired every
morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network,
Inc. (“FBNI”). “Exposé” is heard over Legazpi City, the Albay
municipalities and other Bicol areas.[6]
In the
morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various
alleged complaints from students, teachers and parents against Ago
Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine
(“AMEC”) and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts
were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago (“Ago”), as Dean of AMEC’s
College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages[7] against FBNI,
Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990. Quoted are portions of the
allegedly libelous broadcasts:
JUN ALEGRE:
Let us
begin with the less burdensome: if you have children taking
medical course at AMEC-BCCM, advise them to pass all subjects because
if they fail in any subject they will repeat their year level, taking
up all subjects including those they have passed already. Several
students had approached me stating that they had consulted with the
DECS which told them that there is no such regulation. If [there]
is no such regulation why is AMEC doing the same?
xxx
Second:
Earlier AMEC students in Physical Therapy had complained that the
course is not recognized by DECS. xxx
Third:
Students are required to take and pay for the subject even if the
subject does not have an instructor - such greed for money on the part
of AMEC’s administration. Take the subject Anatomy: students
would pay for the subject upon enrolment because it is offered by the
school. However there would be no instructor for such
subject. Students would be informed that course would be moved to
a later date because the school is still searching for the appropriate
instructor.
xxx
It is
a public knowledge that the Ago Medical and Educational Center has
survived and has been surviving for the past few years since its
inception because of funds support from foreign foundations. If
you will take a look at the AMEC premises you’ll find out that the
names of the buildings there are foreign soundings. There is a
McDonald Hall. Why not Jose Rizal or Bonifacio Hall? That is a
very concrete and undeniable evidence that the support of foreign
foundations for AMEC is substantial, isn’t it? With the report
which is the basis of the expose in DZRC today, it would be very easy
for detractors and enemies of the Ago family to stop the flow of
support of foreign foundations who assist the medical school on the
basis of the latter’s purpose. But if the purpose of the
institution (AMEC) is to deceive students at cross purpose with its
reason for being it is possible for these foreign foundations to lift
or suspend their donations temporarily.[8]
xxx
On the
other hand, the administrators of AMEC-BCCM, AMEC Science High School
and the AMEC-Institute of Mass Communication in their effort to
minimize expenses in terms of salary are absorbing or continues to
accept “rejects”. For example how many teachers in AMEC are
former teachers of Aquinas University but were removed because of
immorality? Does it mean that the present administration of AMEC have
the total definite moral foundation from catholic administrator of
Aquinas University. I will prove to you my friends, that AMEC is
a dumping ground, garbage, not merely of moral and physical
misfits. Probably they only qualify in terms of intellect.
The Dean of Student Affairs of AMEC is Justita Lola, as the family name
implies. She is too old to work, being an old woman. Is the
AMEC administration exploiting the very [e]nterprising or compromising
and undemanding Lola? Could it be that AMEC is just patiently making
use of Dean Justita Lola were if she is very old. As in
atmospheric situation – zero visibility – the plane cannot land,
meaning she is very old, low pay follows. By the way, Dean
Justita Lola is also the chairman of the committee on scholarship in
AMEC. She had retired from Bicol University a long time ago but
AMEC has patiently made use of her.
xxx
MEL
RIMA:
xxx My
friends based on the expose, AMEC is a dumping ground for moral and
physically misfit people. What does this mean? Immoral and
physically misfits as teachers.
May I
say I’m sorry to Dean Justita Lola. But this is the truth.
The truth is this, that your are no longer fit to teach. You are
too old. As an aviation, your case is zero visibility.
Don’t insist.
xxx
Why did AMEC still absorb her as a teacher, a dean, and chairman of the
scholarship committee at that. The reason is practical cost
saving in salaries, because an old person is not fastidious, so long as
she has money to buy the ingredient of beetle juice. The elderly
can get by – that’s why she (Lola) was taken in as Dean.
xxx
xxx On
our end our task is to attend to the interests of students. It is
likely that the students would be influenced by evil. When they
become members of society outside of campus will be liabilities rather
than assets. What do you expect from a doctor who while studying
at AMEC is so much burdened with unreasonable imposition? What do
you expect from a student who aside from peculiar problems – because
not all students are rich – in their struggle to improve their social
status are even more burdened with false regulations. xxx[9]
(Emphasis supplied)
The
complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning
institution. With the supposed exposés, FBNI, Rima and
Alegre “transmitted malicious imputations, and as such, destroyed
plaintiffs’ (AMEC and Ago) reputation.” AMEC and Ago included
FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and
Alegre.
On 18
June 1990, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, through Atty. Rozil Lozares, filed an
Answer[10] alleging that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and
true. FBNI, Rima and Alegre claimed that they were plainly
impelled by a sense of public duty to report the “goings-on in AMEC,
[which is] an institution imbued with public interest.”
Thereafter,
trial ensued. During the presentation of the evidence for the
defense, Atty. Edmundo Cea, collaborating counsel of Atty. Lozares,
filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] on FBNI’s behalf. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss. Consequently, FBNI filed a separate
Answer claiming that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI claimed that before hiring a
broadcaster, the broadcaster should (1) file an application; (2) be
interviewed; and (3) undergo an apprenticeship and training program
after passing the interview. FBNI likewise claimed that it always
reminds its broadcasters to “observe truth, fairness and objectivity in
their broadcasts and to refrain from using libelous and indecent
language.” Moreover, FBNI requires all broadcasters to pass the
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (“KBP”) accreditation test and
to secure a KBP permit.
On 14
December 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision[12] finding FBNI and
Alegre liable for libel except Rima. The trial court held that the
broadcasts are libelous per se. The trial court rejected the
broadcasters’ claim that their utterances were the result of straight
reporting because it had no factual basis. The broadcasters did not
even verify their reports before airing them to show good faith.
In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that FBNI
failed to exercise diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
In
absolving Rima from the charge, the trial court ruled that Rima’s only
participation was when he agreed with Alegre’s exposé. The
trial court found Rima’s statement within the “bounds of freedom of
speech, expression, and of the press.” The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, this court finds for the plaintiff.
Considering the degree of damages caused by the controversial
utterances, which are not found by this court to be really very serious
and damaging, and there being no showing that indeed the enrollment of
plaintiff school dropped, defendants Hermogenes “Jun” Alegre, Jr. and
Filipinas Broadcasting Network (owner of the radio station DZRC), are
hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay plaintiff Ago Medical and
Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM) the
amount of P300,000.00 moral damages, plus P30,000.00 reimbursement of
attorney’s fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO
ORDERED. [13] (Emphasis supplied)
Both
parties, namely, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, on one hand, and AMEC and Ago,
on the other, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment with modification. The
appellate court made Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre.
The appellate court denied Ago’s claim for damages and attorney’s fees
because the broadcasts were directed against AMEC, and not against her.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification
that broadcaster Mel Rima is SOLIDARILY ADJUDGED liable with FBN[I] and
Hermo[g]enes Alegre.
SO
ORDERED.[14]
FBNI,
Rima and Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of
Appeals denied in its 26 January 2000 Resolution.
Hence,
FBNI filed this petition.[15]
The
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling that the questioned
broadcasts are libelous per se and that FBNI, Rima and Alegre failed to
overcome the legal presumption of malice. The Court of Appeals found
Rima and Alegre’s claim that they were actuated by their moral and
social duty to inform the public of the students’ gripes as
insufficient to justify the utterance of the defamatory remarks.
Finding
no factual basis for the imputations against AMEC’s administrators, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the broadcasts were made “with reckless
disregard as to whether they were true or false.” The appellate
court pointed out that FBNI, Rima and Alegre failed to present in court
any of the students who allegedly complained against AMEC. Rima and
Alegre merely gave a single name when asked to identify the
students. According to the Court of Appeals, these circumstances
cast doubt on the veracity of the broadcasters’ claim that they were
“impelled by their moral and social duty to inform the public about the
students’ gripes.”
The
Court of Appeals found Rima also liable for libel since he remarked
that “(1) AMEC-BCCM is a dumping ground for morally and physically
misfit teachers; (2) AMEC obtained the services of Dean Justita Lola to
minimize expenses on its employees’ salaries; and (3) AMEC burdened the
students with unreasonable imposition and false regulations.”[16]
The
Court of Appeals held that FBNI failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees for allowing Rima and Alegre
to make the radio broadcasts without the proper KBP
accreditation. The Court of Appeals denied Ago’s claim for
damages and attorney’s fees because the libelous remarks were directed
against AMEC, and not against her. The Court of Appeals adjudged
FBNI, Rima and Alegre solidarily liable to pay AMEC moral damages,
attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
Issues
FBNI
raises the following issues for resolution:
I.
WHETHER THE BROADCASTS ARE LIBELOUS;
II.
WHETHER AMEC IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES;
III.
WHETHER THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES IS PROPER; and
IV.
WHETHER FBNI IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH RIMA AND ALEGRE FOR PAYMENT OF
MORAL DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT.
The
Court’s Ruling
We
deny the petition.
This
is a civil action for damages as a result of the allegedly defamatory
remarks of Rima and Alegre against AMEC.[17] While AMEC did not point
out clearly the legal basis for its complaint, a reading of the
complaint reveals that AMEC’s cause of action is based on Articles 30
and 33 of the Civil Code. Article 30[18] authorizes a separate
civil action to recover civil liability arising from a criminal
offense. On the other hand, Article 33[19] particularly provides
that the injured party may bring a separate civil action for damages in
cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. AMEC also
invokes Article 19[20] of the Civil Code to justify its claim for
damages. AMEC cites Articles 2176[21] and 2180[22] of the Civil
Code to hold FBNI solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre.
I.
Whether
the broadcasts are libelous
A
libel[23] is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act or omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead.[24]
There
is no question that the broadcasts were made public and imputed to AMEC
defects or circumstances tending to cause it dishonor, discredit and
contempt. Rima and Alegre’s remarks such as “greed for money on
the part of AMEC’s administrators”; “AMEC is a dumping ground, garbage
of xxx moral and physical misfits”; and AMEC students who graduate
“will be liabilities rather than assets” of the society are libelous
per se. Taken as a whole, the broadcasts suggest that AMEC is a
money-making institution where physically and morally unfit teachers
abound.
However,
FBNI contends that the broadcasts are not malicious. FBNI claims that
Rima and Alegre were plainly impelled by their civic duty to air the
students’ gripes. FBNI alleges that there is no evidence that ill
will or spite motivated Rima and Alegre in making the broadcasts.
FBNI further points out that Rima and Alegre exerted efforts to obtain
AMEC’s side and gave Ago the opportunity to defend AMEC and its
administrators. FBNI concludes that since there is no malice,
there is no libel.
FBNI’s
contentions are untenable.
Every
defamatory imputation is presumed malicious.[25] Rima and Alegre failed
to show adequately their good intention and justifiable motive in
airing the supposed gripes of the students. As hosts of a documentary
or public affairs program, Rima and Alegre should have presented the
public issues “free from inaccurate and misleading information.”[26]
Hearing the students’ alleged complaints a month before the
exposé,[27] they had sufficient time to verify their sources and
information. However, Rima and Alegre hardly made a thorough
investigation of the students’ alleged gripes. Neither did they inquire
about nor confirm the purported irregularities in AMEC from the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Alegre testified that he
merely went to AMEC to verify his report from an alleged AMEC official
who refused to disclose any information. Alegre simply relied on
the words of the students “because they were many and not because there
is proof that what they are saying is true.”[28] This plainly shows
Rima and Alegre’s reckless disregard of whether their report was true
or not.
Contrary
to FBNI’s claim, the broadcasts were not “the result of straight
reporting.” Significantly, some courts in the United States apply the
privilege of “neutral reportage” in libel cases involving matters of
public interest or public figures. Under this privilege, a republisher
who accurately and disinterestedly reports certain defamatory
statements made against public figures is shielded from liability,
regardless of the republisher’s subjective awareness of the truth or
falsity of the accusation.[29] Rima and Alegre cannot invoke the
privilege of neutral reportage because unfounded comments abound in the
broadcasts. Moreover, there is no existing controversy involving AMEC
when the broadcasts were made. The privilege of neutral reportage
applies where the defamed person is a public figure who is involved in
an existing controversy, and a party to that controversy makes the
defamatory statement.[30]
However,
FBNI argues vigorously that malice in law does not apply to this
case. Citing Borjal v. Court of Appeals,[31] FBNI contends that
the broadcasts “fall within the coverage of qualifiedly privileged
communications” for being commentaries on matters of public
interest. Such being the case, AMEC should prove malice in fact
or actual malice. Since AMEC allegedly failed to prove actual
malice, there is no libel.
FBNI’s
reliance on Borjal is misplaced. In Borjal, the Court elucidated on the
“doctrine of fair comment,” thus:
[F]air
commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The
doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every
man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his
public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it
must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
True,
AMEC is a private learning institution whose business of educating
students is “genuinely imbued with public interest.” The welfare
of the youth in general and AMEC’s students in particular is a matter
which the public has the right to know. Thus, similar to the
newspaper articles in Borjal, the subject broadcasts dealt with matters
of public interest. However, unlike in Borjal, the questioned
broadcasts are not based on established facts. The record
supports the following findings of the trial court:
xxx Although
defendants claim that they were motivated by consistent reports of
students and parents against plaintiff, yet, defendants have not
presented in court, nor even gave name of a single student who made the
complaint to them, much less present written complaint or petition to
that effect. To accept this defense of defendants is too
dangerous because it could easily give license to the media to malign
people and establishments based on flimsy excuses that there were
reports to them although they could not satisfactorily establish
it. Such laxity would encourage careless and irresponsible
broadcasting which is inimical to public interests.
Secondly,
there is reason to believe that defendant radio broadcasters, contrary
to the mandates of their duties, did not verify and analyze the truth
of the reports before they aired it, in order to prove that they are in
good faith.
Alegre
contended that plaintiff school had no permit and is not accredited to
offer Physical Therapy courses. Yet, plaintiff produced a
certificate coming from DECS that as of Sept. 22, 1987 or more than 2
years before the controversial broadcast, accreditation to offer
Physical Therapy course had already been given the plaintiff, which
certificate is signed by no less than the Secretary of Education and
Culture herself, Lourdes R. Quisumbing (Exh. C-rebuttal).
Defendants could have easily known this were they careful enough to
verify. And yet, defendants were very categorical and sounded too
positive when they made the erroneous report that plaintiff had no
permit to offer Physical Therapy courses which they were offering.
The
allegation that plaintiff was getting tremendous aids from foreign
foundations like Mcdonald Foundation prove not to be true also.
The truth is there is no Mcdonald Foundation existing. Although a
big building of plaintiff school was given the name Mcdonald building,
that was only in order to honor the first missionary in Bicol of
plaintiffs’ religion, as explained by Dr. Lita Ago. Contrary to
the claim of defendants over the air, not a single centavo appears to
be received by plaintiff school from the aforementioned McDonald
Foundation which does not exist.
Defendants
did not even also bother to prove their claim, though denied by Dra.
Ago, that when medical students fail in one subject, they are made to
repeat all the other subject[s], even those they have already passed,
nor their claim that the school charges laboratory fees even if there
are no laboratories in the school. No evidence was presented to
prove the bases for these claims, at least in order to give semblance
of good faith.
As for
the allegation that plaintiff is the dumping ground for misfits, and
immoral teachers, defendant[s] singled out Dean Justita Lola who is
said to be so old, with zero visibility already. Dean Lola
testified in court last Jan. 21, 1991, and was found to be 75 years
old. xxx Even older people prove to be effective teachers like
Supreme Court Justices who are still very much in demand as law
professors in their late years. Counsel for defendants is past 75
but is found by this court to be still very sharp and effective.
So is plaintiffs’ counsel.
Dr.
Lola was observed by this court not to be physically decrepit yet, nor
mentally infirmed, but is still alert and docile.
The
contention that plaintiffs’ graduates become liabilities rather than
assets of our society is a mere conclusion. Being from the place
himself, this court is aware that majority of the medical graduates of
plaintiffs pass the board examination easily and become prosperous and
responsible professionals.[33]
Had
the comments been an expression of opinion based on established facts,
it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it
might reasonably be inferred from the facts.[34] However, the comments
of Rima and Alegre were not backed up by facts. Therefore, the
broadcasts are not privileged and remain libelous per se.
The
broadcasts also violate the Radio Code[35] of the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas, Ink. (“Radio Code”). Item I(B) of the
Radio Code provides:
B. PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, PUBLIC ISSUES AND COMMENTARIES
1.
x x x
4.
Public affairs program shall present public issues free from personal
bias, prejudice and inaccurate and misleading information. x x x
Furthermore, the station shall strive to present balanced discussion of
issues. x x x.
x x x
7.
The station shall be responsible at all times in the supervision of
public affairs, public issues and commentary programs so that they
conform to the provisions and standards of this code.
8.
It shall be the responsibility of the newscaster, commentator, host and
announcer to protect public interest, general welfare and good order in
the presentation of public affairs and public issues.[36] (Emphasis
supplied)
The
broadcasts fail to meet the standards prescribed in the Radio Code,
which lays down the code of ethical conduct governing practitioners in
the radio broadcast industry. The Radio Code is a voluntary code
of conduct imposed by the radio broadcast industry on its own
members. The Radio Code is a public warranty by the radio
broadcast industry that radio broadcast practitioners are subject to a
code by which their conduct are measured for lapses, liability and
sanctions.
The
public has a right to expect and demand that radio broadcast
practitioners live up to the code of conduct of their profession, just
like other professionals. A professional code of conduct provides
the standards for determining whether a person has acted justly,
honestly and with good faith in the exercise of his rights and
performance of his duties as required by Article 19[37] of the Civil
Code. A professional code of conduct also provides the standards
for determining whether a person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another has acted in a manner contrary to morals or good customs under
Article 21[38] of the Civil Code.
II.
Whether
AMEC is entitled to moral damages
FBNI
contends that AMEC is not entitled to moral damages because it is a
corporation.[39]
A
juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because,
unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or
such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or
moral shock.[40] The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB,
et al.[41] to justify the award of moral damages. However, the
Court’s statement in Mambulao that “a corporation may have a good
reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of
moral damages” is an obiter dictum.[42]
Nevertheless,
AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219[43]
of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the
recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form
of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff
is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as
a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of
defamation and claim for moral damages.[44]
Moreover,
where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages.[45] In
such a case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or
reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages.[46]
Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence
of actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of some
damages.[47] In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se.
Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
However,
we find the award of P300,000 moral damages unreasonable. The
record shows that even though the broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC
has not suffered any substantial or material damage to its reputation.
Therefore, we reduce the award of moral damages from P300,000 to
P150,000.
III.
Whether
the award of attorney’s fees is proper
FBNI
contends that since AMEC is not entitled to moral damages, there is no
basis for the award of attorney’s fees. FBNI adds that the
instant case does not fall under the enumeration in Article 2208[48] of
the Civil Code.
The
award of attorney’s fees is not proper because AMEC failed to justify
satisfactorily its claim for attorney’s fees. AMEC did not adduce
evidence to warrant the award of attorney’s fees. Moreover, both
the trial and appellate courts failed to explicitly state in their
respective decisions the rationale for the award of attorney’s
fees.[49] In Inter-Asia Investment Industries, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[50] we held that:
[I]t is an
accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the
exception rather than the rule, and counsel’s fees are not to be
awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to
award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is
a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court must
explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not only in the
decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorney’s
fees.[51] (Emphasis supplied)
While
it mentioned about the award of attorney’s fees by stating that it
“lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the
circumstances of each case,” the Court of Appeals failed to point out
any circumstance to justify the award.
IV.
Whether
FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for moral damages,
attorney’s fees and costs of suit
FBNI
contends that it is not solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for the
payment of damages and attorney’s fees because it exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI maintains that its
broadcasters, including Rima and Alegre, undergo a “very regimented
process” before they are allowed to go on air. “Those who apply
for broadcaster are subjected to interviews, examinations and an
apprenticeship program.”
FBNI
further argues that Alegre’s age and lack of training are irrelevant to
his competence as a broadcaster. FBNI points out that the “minor
deficiencies in the KBP accreditation of Rima and Alegre do not in any
way prove that FBNI did not exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family in selecting and supervising them.” Rima’s accreditation
lapsed due to his non-payment of the KBP annual fees while Alegre’s
accreditation card was delayed allegedly for reasons attributable to
the KBP Manila Office. FBNI claims that membership in the KBP is
merely voluntary and not required by any law or government regulation.
FBNI’s
arguments do not persuade us.
The
basis of the present action is a tort. Joint tort feasors are jointly
and severally liable for the tort which they commit.[52] Joint tort
feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a
tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit.[53] Thus, AMEC correctly anchored its cause of action against
FBNI on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
As
operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily
liable to pay for damages arising from the libelous broadcasts. As
stated by the Court of Appeals, “recovery for defamatory statements
published by radio or television may be had from the owner of the
station, a licensee, the operator of the station, or a person who
procures, or participates in, the making of the defamatory
statements.”[54] An employer and employee are solidarily liable for a
defamatory statement by the employee within the course and scope of his
or her employment, at least when the employer authorizes or ratifies
the defamation.[55] In this case, Rima and Alegre were clearly
performing their official duties as hosts of FBNI’s radio program
Exposé when they aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither
alleged nor proved that Rima and Alegre went beyond the scope of their
work at that time. There was likewise no showing that FBNI did not
authorize and ratify the defamatory broadcasts.
Moreover,
there is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI merely showed that it exercised
diligence in the selection of its broadcasters without introducing any
evidence to prove that it observed the same diligence in the
supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI did not show how it exercised
diligence in supervising its broadcasters. FBNI’s alleged
constant reminder to its broadcasters to “observe truth, fairness and
objectivity and to refrain from using libelous and indecent language”
is not enough to prove due diligence in the supervision of its
broadcasters. Adequate training of the broadcasters on the industry’s
code of conduct, sufficient information on libel laws, and continuous
evaluation of the broadcasters’ performance are but a few of the many
ways of showing diligence in the supervision of broadcasters.
FBNI
claims that it “has taken all the precaution in the selection of Rima
and Alegre as broadcasters, bearing in mind their qualifications.”
However, no clear and convincing evidence shows that Rima and Alegre
underwent FBNI’s “regimented process” of application. Furthermore, FBNI
admits that Rima and Alegre had deficiencies in their KBP
accreditation,[56] which is one of FBNI’s requirements before it hires
a broadcaster. Significantly, membership in the KBP, while voluntary,
indicates the broadcaster’s strong commitment to observe the broadcast
industry’s rules and regulations. Clearly, these circumstances show
FBNI’s lack of diligence in selecting and supervising Rima and Alegre.
Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay damages together with Rima and
Alegre.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant Petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of 4 January
1999 and Resolution of 26 January 2000 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 40151 with the MODIFICATION
that the award of moral damages is reduced from P300,000 to P150,000
and the award of attorney’s fees is deleted. Costs against
petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, with Associate
Justices Corona Ibay-Somera and Mariano M. Umali concurring.
[3]
Penned by Judge Antonio A. Arcangel.
[4] As
AMEC and Ago alleged in their Memorandum in the trial court. Records,
p. 243.
[5]
Alegre substituted Larry (Plaridel) Brocales who was absent then.
[6]
Records, p. 2.
[7]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 8236.
[8]
Exhibit “A-2,” Exhibits Folder, pp. 21-22.
[9]
Exhibit “A-3,” Exhibits Folder, pp. 23-25.
[10]
Records, pp. 28-30.
[11]
Ibid., pp. 147-155.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 52-68.
[13]
Ibid., pp. 67-68.
[14]
Ibid., p. 48.
[15]
Rima and Alegre did not join the instant petition.
[16]
Rollo, p. 45.
[17]
In Lopez, etc., et al. v. CA, et al., 145 Phil. 219 (1970), the Court
stated the following:
It
was held in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui, that “the repeal of the old
Libel Law (Act No. 277) did not abolish the civil action for
libel.” A libel was defined in that Act as a “malicious
defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or
pictures, or the like, ***, tending to blacken the memory of one who is
dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the
alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him
to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” There was an express
provision in such legislation for a tort or quasi-delict action arising
from libel. There is reinforcement to such a view in the new
Civil Code providing for the recovery of moral damages for libel,
slander or any other form of defamation. (Emphasis supplied)
[18]
Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings
are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance
of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
[19]
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
[20]
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
[21]Art.
2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
[22]
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible.
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx
[23]
Should be difamaciόn as stated in Lu Chu Sing and Lu Tian Chiong v. Lu
Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669 (1946).
[24]
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code.
[25]
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. – Every defamatory imputation
is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following
cases:cralaw:red
1. A private communication made by any person to another in
the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
[26]
Radio Code of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas, Ink.,
Exhibit “4.”
[27]
TSN, 22 April 1991, pp. 15, 18-19. Rima, however, testified that
he and Alegre made the exposés after three or four days from the
time the students approached them. (TSN, 26 September 1992, pp. 47-48).
[28]
TSN, 22 April 1991, p. 18.
[29]
50 Am Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander § 313.
[30]
Ibid.
[31]
361 Phil. 1 (1999).
[32]
Ibid.
[33]
Rollo, pp. 65-67.
[34]
Borjal v. Court of Appeals, supra note 31.
[35]
1989 Revised Edition, Exhibit “4.”
[36]
Ibid.
[37]
Supra note 20.
[38]
Article 21 of the Civil Code provides: “Any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
[39]
Rollo, p. 28.
[40]
People v. Manero, Jr., G.R. Nos. 86883-85, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 85.
[41]
130 Phil. 366 (1968). See also People v. Manero, Jr., G.R. Nos.
86883-85, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 85.
[42]
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CA, 361 Phil. 499 (1999).
[43]
Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides: “Moral damages may be
recovered in the following and analogous cases: x x x (7) Libel,
slander or any other form of defamation; x x x.”
[44]
See Yap, et al. v. Carreon, 121 Phil. 883 (1965), where the appellants
included Philippine Harvardian College which was an educational
institution.
[45]
See Phee v. La Vanguardia, 45 Phil. 211 (1923). See also Jimenez
v. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52 (1914).
[46]
Phee v. La Vanguardia, 45 Phil. 211 (1923).
[47]
Ibid. Article 2216 of the Civil
Code also provides that “No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary
in order that moral, xxx damages may be adjudicated. The
assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the
discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case.”
[48]
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered,
except:
(1)
When exemplary damages are awarded;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding
against the plaintiff;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable
claim;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(6) In actions for legal support;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers,
laborers and skilled workers;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and
employer’s liability laws;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising
from a crime;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
[49]
Koa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84847, 5 March 1993, 219 SCRA 541
citing Central Azucarera de Bais v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87597, 3
August 1990, 188 SCRA 328. See also Abrogar v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, No. L-67970, 15 January 1988, 157 SCRA 57.
[50]
G.R. No. 125778, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 452.
[51]
Ibid. See PNB v. CA, 326 Phil. 504 (1996). See also ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corp. v. CA, 361 Phil. 499 (1999).
[52]
Worcester v. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42 (1912).
[53]
Ibid.
[54]
50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander § 370.
[55]
Ibid., § 358.
[56]
Rollo, p. 31.
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