D
E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
When
Marciano A. Roxas died intestate on June 4, 1950, he was survived by
his widow, Cirila Roxas and their nine children, namely, Maximiano,
Virginia, Benjamin, Eleazar, Elisa, Prescilla, Fortunato, Lydia and
Uriel, all surnamed Roxas; and the children of their son Vicente, who
predeceased Marciano, namely, Rosalinda, Vicente, Jr. and Sergio, all
surnamed Roxas.
On
April 14, 1955, the said heirs filed an action for specific performance
against the heirs of Gregorio Galindo, namely, Florencio, Felisa,
Mercedes and Urbano, all surnamed Galindo, including his grandson
Federico de Guzman, with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Bulacan to compel the latter to execute a deed of absolute sale over
Lot 1048 located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The said lot had an area of
48,089 square meters and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-2145. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1067. After
the trial, the following facts emerged:
Lot
1048 which formed part of the Sta. Maria de Pandi Estate was possessed
by the late Gregorio Galindo who, during his lifetime, had been paying
rentals thereon to the government. On July 5, 1911, the Government of
the Philippines, through the then Acting Director of Lands, agreed to
sell to Gregorio Galindo the said Lot 1048 for the sum of P859.50
payable in annual installments of P42.00 (Exhibit “F”). On July 4,
1916, Gregorio Galindo died intestate leaving as his only heirs his
children Florencio, Felisa, Mercedes and Urbano, all surnamed Galindo,
and a grandson Federico de Guzman. Subsequently on December 1, 1916,
Florencio, Felisa, Mercedes, all surnamed Galindo, and Federico de
Guzman, represented by his father Luis de Guzman, sold whatever rights
and interests Gregorio Galindo had in Lot 1048 in favor of Marciano A.
Roxas (Exhibit “B,” deposition). Urbano Galindo, being then a minor,
did not sign the document. In the said document, the signatories
thereto obligated themselves to transfer the land to Marciano A. Roxas
as soon as it would become feasible to do so, and as security that
Urbano Galindo would ratify the same upon reaching the age of majority,
Florencio Galindo ceded to Marciano A. Roxas title to Lot 833. Since
the execution of the document Exhibit “B”-deposition, possession and
enjoyment of Lot 1048 were immediately transferred to Marciano A. Roxas
but the possession and enjoyment of Lot 833, although given as security
by Florencio Galindo, remained in the latter. On May 23, 1931, Urbano
Galindo, who was a minor at the time of the execution of the first
document, executed an affidavit signifying his conformity to the sale
executed by his brother and sisters. Since Marciano A. Roxas took
possession of Lot 1048 he had been religiously paying the installments
due to the government (Exhibits “G,” “G-1” to “G-10”). While the
receipts for payment of the installments due to the government were
issued in the name of Gregorio Galindo, yet the property had been
declared for tax purposes in the name of Marciano A. Roxas who paid the
real estate taxes thereon during his lifetime. On February 13, 1948,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2145 covering the property in
question was issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of
the legal heirs of Gregorio Galindo. This, on account of the fact that
the sale of the right of Gregorio Galindo made by his heirs in favor of
Marciano A. Roxas was not registered with the Bureau of Lands because
of the minority of Urbano Galindo at the time.
In the
light of the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, the Court
is convinced that plaintiffs are entitled to the title over Lot 1048.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit “B”-deposition which is the “Documento de
Compromiso” clearly states that the signatories thereto sold whatever
rights they have to the property in favor of plaintiffs’ predecessor
Marciano A. Roxas, obligating themselves to execute the final deed of
sale must have been occasioned by the minority of Urbano Galindo who
was not made a signatory to the document. But on May 23, 1931, when
Urbano Galindo was already of age, he ratified the actuation of his
brother and sisters by executing an affidavit whereby he signified that
he was agreeable thereto. Since 1931 up to the date of the filing of
the complaint, 24 years had elapsed without any of the defendants
having taken any step to nullify the two documents aforementioned.
Florencio
Galindo’s testimony contained in his deposition taken at the instance
of plaintiffs is quite enlightening to the mind of the Court. He had
acknowledged in all sincerity that he and his brother and sisters have,
indeed, sold their rights to Lot 1048 in favor of Marciano A. Roxas.
Without prejudice, therefore, to defendants taking the necessary legal
steps to recover title to Lot 833 which admittedly was only placed has
guarantee that defendant Urbano Galindo would ratify the sale made by
his brother and sisters.[1]
On
August 12, 1965, the trial court rendered judgment[2] in favor of the
plaintiffs. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs, ordering the
defendants to execute in favor of the heirs of Marciano A. Roxas a deed
of absolute sale transferring to the latter Lot 1048 of the Sta. Maria
de Pandi Estate.
Without
costs.
SO
ORDERED.[3]
The
defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which docketed the
appeal as CA-G.R. No. 37697-R. The CA rendered judgment[4] on February
5, 1973, affirming the decision of the CFI. The decision became final
and executory. However, the said decision was not enforced under
Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In the
meantime, Urbano Galindo died intestate. On December 16, 1997,
Felicissima, the widow of Urbano, and their children, Nestor, Juanita,
Beatriz, Catalina, Danilo, Librada and Cesar, all surnamed Galindo,
executed an “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Urbano Galindo and/or the Deceased Gregorio Galindo with Waiver of
Rights”[5] in which they adjudicated unto themselves, as owners, the
undivided rights and interests which they claimed Urbano had over Lot
1048. In the said deed, they also waived their respective claims over
the lot in favor of Juanita Galindo Rivera. The latter, as one of the
legal heirs of Gregorio, undertook to preserve the property left by the
said deceased and, thereafter, executed an affidavit of loss of the
owner’s copy of TCT No. T-2145[6] and, on the basis thereof, secured
TCT No. 335593(M) over the property in her name on September 8, 1998.[7]
On
April 7, 1999, a complaint was filed by the Heirs of Marciano Roxas,
through Reginald S. Roxas, as plaintiffs, against Juanita Galindo
Rivera in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, for annulment of
documents, cancellation of title and damages with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that:
Reginald S. Roxas was the representative of the heirs of Marciano Roxas
who died on June 4, 1950, namely, Maximiano Roxas, Benjamin Roxas,
Eleazar Roxas, Lydia Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-de Perio, Virginia
Roxas-Santos and Uriel Roxas, now all deceased; and Elisa Roxas Medina
and Fortunato Roxas; Reginald Roxas was one of the eight children of
the deceased Eleazar Roxas; the extrajudicial settlement of the estates
of the deceased Gregorio and Urbano Galindo executed in favor of the
defendant, the affidavit of loss executed by her and TCT No. 335593(M)
issued by the Register of Deeds are null and void for being contrary to
the decision of the CFI in Civil Case No. 1067 declaring Marciano Roxas
to be the lawful owner of the property, which was affirmed by the CA in
CA-G.R. No. 37697-R and had long become final and executory.
The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:
I.
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE.
II.
THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
On the
first ground, the defendant alleged that there was no allegation in the
complaint that the heirs of Marciano Roxas had authorized Reginald S.
Roxas to file the complaint against her in their behalf.
On the
second ground, the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs’ cause of
action based on the decision of the CFI dated August 12, 1965 and
affirmed by the CA, on February 5, 1973, not having been enforced was
barred by the statute of limitations. Citing Article 1144 of the New
Civil Code, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs should have filed
their complaint within ten years from the finality of the said decision
of the CFI. The defendant, likewise, cited the decision of this Court
in Heirs of Juan Sindiong v. Committee on Burnt Areas and Improvements
of Cebu[8] to support her submission that a final and executory
decision must be enforced within ten years from the finality thereof.
The
trial court issued an Order denying the motion on September 7, 1999. It
ruled that based on the plaintiffs’ allegation in the complaint that
they were the legitimate children of the deceased Marciano Roxas, such
plaintiffs are the real parties-in-interest. On the second ground, the
trial court ruled that the complaint of the plaintiffs was an action
for quieting of title, the prescriptive period for which commenced only
in 1998.
In her
motion for the reconsideration of the order, the defendant averred,
this time, that the action of the plaintiffs was one for the
enforcement of a constructive trust which prescribed in ten years. The
defendant also reiterated her original submission that the complaint
was one to enforce the decision of the CFI which was affirmed by the
CA; hence, it prescribes within ten years from the finality of the said
decision. She also maintained that the action was barred by the
decision of the RTC and the CA.
The
trial court denied the motion of the defendant in its Order[9] dated
November 26, 1999.
The
defendant, now the petitioner, joined by Felicissima, Nestor, Beatriz,
Catalina, Danilo, Librada and Cesar, all surnamed Galindo, filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA, assailing the September 7, 1999 and
the November 26, 1999 Orders of the trial court. However, the CA
rendered judgment[10] on April 4, 2001, denying due course and
dismissing the petition, on the ground that the petitioners failed to
show that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to dismiss. The appellate court, likewise, ruled that even if
the assailed orders of the RTC were erroneous, the same were merely
errors of judgment, correctable through an appeal by writ of error.
The
petitioners now seek relief from the Court via a petition for review on
certiorari, contending that the CA erred in denying due course and
dismissing their petition for certiorari. In support of their petition
at bar, the petitioners reiterated the same grounds and arguments which
they raised in the CA.
In
their comment on the petition, the respondents assert that the
petitioners, except petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera, were not parties
in the RTC and the CA; hence, are not proper parties as petitioners.
They also aver that the grounds raised by the petitioners in their
petition are factual, besides being matters of defense which should be
threshed out and resolved only after trial.
The
issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether Felicissima,
Nestor, Beatriz, Catalina, Danilo, Librada and Cesar, all surnamed
Galindo, are proper parties as petitioners in this case; and (b)
whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion in
denying petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera’s motion to dismiss on the
ground that Reginald S. Roxas had no legal capacity to sue for and in
behalf of the heirs of Marciano Roxas, and that the action of the
respondents had already prescribed when they filed their complaint on
April 7, 1999.
On the
first issue, the respondents aver that of the eight petitioners in this
case, only petitioner Juanita Galindo Roxas was the petitioner in the
CA and the sole defendant-movant in the RTC. The seven other
petitioners were not parties in the CA and in the RTC. Hence, the
respondents aver, the said seven petitioners are not bound by the
orders of the trial court; as such, they are not the proper parties in
this case as petitioners.
While
we agree with the respondents’ premise that the petitioners herein,
except petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera, were not parties-defendants
in the RTC and parties-petitioners in the CA, and, as a general rule,
are not proper parties as petitioners in this case, the Court finds and
so holds that they are indispensable parties and should be impleaded as
parties-petitioners in this case.
The
general rule is that only those parties in a case and their privies and
successors-in-interest are bound by the order or decision of the trial
court. Persons or entities who are not parties to the case are not and
should not be bound or adversely affected by the said order or
decision; otherwise, they will be deprived of their right to due
process. Since the petitioners, except petitioner Juanita Galindo
Rivera, were not parties in the RTC and in the CA, they are not bound
by the assailed orders of the RTC and the decision of the CA against
petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera; hence, they are not the proper
parties to appeal from and assail the said orders of the RTC and the
decision of the CA.
It
bears stressing, however, that the respondents, the plaintiffs in the
RTC, sought the nullification of the “Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of the Deceased Urbano Galindo and/or the Deceased Gregorio
Galindo with Waiver of Rights” executed by all the petitioners in which
they adjudicated unto themselves as co-owners thereof the rights and
interests which they claimed the deceased Urbano Galindo had over Lot
1048 covered by TCT No. 335593(M) which was issued to and under the
name of petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera on the basis of the said
deed, and the retention of TCT No. T-2145 under the names of the heirs
of Gregorio Galindo. Thus, all the petitioners, who executed the said
deed, are indispensable parties as parties-defendants in the RTC and as
parties-petitioners in the CA under Section 7, Rule 3[11] of the Rules
of Court, and should have been impleaded by the respondents in their
complaint. Without the presence of the said petitioners as defendants,
the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief to
the respondents. The failure of the respondents to implead all the
petitioners as parties-defendants constituted a legal obstacle to the
trial court and the appellate court’s exercise of judicial power over
the said cases and rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein a
nullity.[12] The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.[13] The RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the
complaint.[14]
The
petitioners themselves must have realized the need to join petitioner
Juanita Galindo Rivera as a party-petitioner without waiting for the
court to order the same because they eventually joined petitioner
Juanita Galindo Rivera as such party.
The
respondents even failed to implead the seven brothers/sisters of
respondent Reginald Roxas, all of whom inherited the undivided share of
their father Eleazar Roxas in the property subject of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement, as well as the children of their uncle
Vicente Roxas, namely, Rosalinda, Vicente, Jr. and Sergio, all surnamed
Roxas. Respondent Reginald Roxas, his siblings and the children of
Vicente Roxas were co-owners of the property; hence, they are,
likewise, indispensable parties as plaintiffs in the RTC.[15] Their
absence warranted the dismissal of the complaint as well.
On the
second issue, we agree with the petitioners that the RTC committed a
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in denying their motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of the respondents’ failure, as plaintiffs, to sufficiently
allege in their complaint and prove that Reginald Roxas had the
representative capacity to sue as such representative of all the heirs
of the deceased Marciano Roxas.
Section
1, Rule 3[16] of the Rules of Court provides that only persons or
juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a
civil action. Section 4, Rule 8[17] of the said Rules further provides
that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity
must be averred in the complaint. In order to maintain an action in a
court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence,
that is, he or she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a
legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit
can lawfully be prosecuted in the name of that person.[18] The party
bringing suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the
representative character that he claims. If a complaint is filed by one
who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not
authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court
does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. An unauthorized
complaint does not produce any legal effect.[19] Corollary, the
defendants can assail the facts alleged in the complaint through a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff has no capacity to
sue under Section 1(d) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, that is, that
he does not have the representative he claims.[20]
Section
1, Rule 7[21] of the Rules of Court, likewise, provides that the names
of the parties should be included in the caption of the original
complaint.
In
this case, the caption of the complaint of the respondents states that
the “Heirs of Marciano Roxas,” represented by Reginald S. Roxas, are
the plaintiffs. The following were, likewise, alleged in the body of
the complaint:
1.
That plaintiffs’ representative, Reginald S. Roxas, is of legal age,
married, and a resident of 36 Narcisus St., Roxas District, Quezon
City; whereas, defendant is of legal age, married, and a resident of
Alley Guevarra St., Pag-asa, Obando, Bulacan, where she may be served
with summons and other processes of this Court;
2.
That the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, is impleaded in his
official capacity to accord complete relief where it may be served with
summons at its office address at Meycauayan, Bulacan;
3.
That plaintiffs are the legitimate children of the late Marciano A.
Roxas, namely: Maximiano Roxas (deceased), Benjamin Roxas (deceased),
Eleazar Roxas (deceased), Lydia Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-De Perio
(deceased), Elisa Roxas-Medina, Virginia Roxas-Santos (deceased), Uriel
Roxas (deceased) and Fortunato Roxas; plaintiffs’ representative,
Reginald S. Roxas, is one of the eight (8) children of the said
deceased Eleazar Roxas;
4.
That the said late Marciano A. Roxas (died on June 4, 1950) is an owner
of a parcel of land consisting of 48,089 sq.m., more or less, under Lot
No. 1048 of the Sta. Maria de Pandi Estate situated at Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, as evidenced by a Decision dated August 12, 1965 rendered by
the then Court of First Instance of Malolos, Bulacan, under Civil Case
No. 1067 and billed as “Heirs of M. Roxas vs. F. Galindo, et al.” for
Specific Performance, copy of a certified xerox copy of the same is
attached hereto and marked as Annex “A” and submarkings.[22]
As
gleaned from the averments of the complaint, of the nine plaintiffs,
six are already deceased, namely, Maximiano Roxas, Benjamin Roxas,
Eleazar Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-de Perio, Virginia Roxas-Santos and
Uriel Roxas. There is no allegation in the complaint that a special
proceeding to settle the estate of the said deceased had been filed and
was pending. Indeed, neither a dead person nor his estate may be a
party-plaintiff in a court action.[23] As explained by this Court:
A deceased person
does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much
so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the
court. An action begun by a decedent’s estate cannot be said to have
been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity;
such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff
will not, likewise, lie, there being nothing before the court to amend.
Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity
to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be
sued and may not be named a party defendant in a court action.[24]
In
fine, the deceased Maximiano, Benjamin, Eleazar and Uriel, all surnamed
Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-de Perio and Virginia Roxas-Santos have no
capacity to sue and may not be sued as parties-plaintiffs. Neither does
respondent Reginald Roxas have the capacity to represent the said
deceased as party-plaintiff, nor is there any allegation in the
complaint that Lydia Roxas, Elisa Medina and Fortunato Roxas are of
legal age and have the capacity to sue.
We
agree with the ruling of the trial court that the action of the
respondents against petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera was one for
quieting of title under the second paragraph of Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court[25] and not one for the enforcement of the decision of the CFI in
Civil Case No. 1067. It bears stressing that the nature of an action
and the court which has jurisdiction over the case are determined by
the material allegations of the complaint, the law existing at the time
of the filing of the action and the character of the relief prayed for
by the plaintiff irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to such relief prayed for. The jurisdiction of the court
cannot be made to depend upon the consent or waiver of the parties.[26]
Neither is the caption of the complaint determinative of the nature of
an action.
In
this case, the respondents alleged the following in the complaint:
1.
That plaintiffs’ representative, Reginald S. Roxas, is of legal age,
married, and a resident of 36 Narcisus St., Roxas District, Quezon
City; whereas, defendant is of legal age, married, and a resident of
Alley Guevarra St., Pag-asa, Obando, Bulacan, where she may be served
with summons and other processes of this Court;
2.
That the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, is impleaded in his
official capacity to accord complete relief where it may be served with
summons at its office address at Meycauayan, Bulacan;
3.
That plaintiffs are the legitimate children of the late Marciano A.
Roxas, namely: Maximiano Roxas (deceased), Benjamin Roxas (deceased),
Eleazar Roxas (deceased), Lydia Roxas, Prescilla Roxas-De Perio
(deceased), Elisa Roxas-Medina, Virginia Roxas-Santos (deceased), Uriel
Roxas (deceased) and Fortunato Roxas; plaintiffs’ representative,
Reginald S. Roxas, is one of the eight (8) children of the said
deceased Eleazar Roxas;
4.
That the said late Marciano A. Roxas (died on June 4, 1950) is an owner
of a parcel of land consisting of 48,089 sq. m., more or less, under
Lot No. 1048 of the Sta. Maria de Pandi Estate situated at Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, as evidenced by a Decision dated August 12, 1965 rendered by
the then Court of First Instance of Malolos, Bulacan, under Civil Case
No. 1067 and billed as “Heirs of M. Roxas vs. F. Galindo, et al.” for
Specific Performance, copy of a certified xerox copy of the same is
attached hereto and marked as Annex “A” and submarkings;
5.
That the said Decision (Annex “A” of the complaint) was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in its Decision on February 5, 1973, copy of a
certified xerox copy the latter decision is attached hereto and marked
as Annex “B” and submarkings;
6.
That in the said Decision (Annex “A” of the Complaint), defendants
therein, F. Galindo, et al., were ordered to execute in favor of the
plaintiffs therein, heirs of Marciano A. Roxas, a deed of absolute sale
transferring to the latter Lot No. 1048 of the Sta. Maria de Pandi
Estate;
7.
That the said parcel of land was previously registered under T.C.T. No.
T-2145 under the name of the legal Heirs of Gregorio Galindo but the
same was not cancelled as the defendants in the said civil case,
despite demands were made, failed and refused to execute the deed of
absolute sale in favor of the plaintiffs therein, copy of a certified
xerox copy of said title is attached hereto and marked as Annex “C” and
submarkings;
8.
That in 1998, plaintiffs discovered that the said parcel of land is now
under the name of the defendant under T.C.T. No. T-335593(M), copy of a
certified xerox copy of which is attached hereto and marked as Annexes
“D” and “D-1”;
9.
That after verification was made in the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, plaintiffs discovered that the defendant had
submitted a document billed as “Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
the Deceased Urbano Galindo and/or the Deceased Gregorio Galindo with
Waiver of Rights” purportedly executed in 1997 by the heirs of Urbano
Galindo and by defendant herself, despite the existence of the said
decision (Annex “A” of the Complaint) copy of said settlement as well
as supporting documents thereto are attached hereto and marked as Annex
“E” and submarkings;
10.
That the said settlement (Annex “E” of the Complaint) is of no legal
force and effect as the parties thereto, including the defendant, were
fully aware of infirmity or flaw in their title by virtue of the said
final decision (Annex “A” of the Complaint);
11.
That plaintiffs also found out that defendant had executed an Affidavit
of Loss on February 3, 1998 purportedly to support the said settlement
(Annex “E”) and, consequently, to cancel the previous title (Annex “C”)
and a new one be issued (Annex “D”) in her name, all of which were
employed by her in violation of law; copy of the certified xerox copy
of said Affidavit is attached hereto and marked as Annex “F”;
12.
That all the allegations stated by the defendant in her affidavit
(Annex “F”) were all lies and surreptitiously made to render
ineffective the said decision (Annex “A”) to the damage and prejudice
of the plaintiffs;
13.
That TCT No. T-335593(M) (Annex “D” of the Complaint) is, likewise,
null and void, being a resultant of an invalid document;
14.
That, by reason of the foregoing unlawful acts of the defendant,
plaintiffs suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety and similar
feelings the amount of which, if quantified in terms of money, would be
not less than P50,000.00 as moral damages;
15.
That to give other persons similarly inclined as that of the defendant,
the amount of P50,000.00 shall be awarded by way of exemplary damages;
16.
That by reason of the foregoing unlawful acts of the defendant,
plaintiffs were constrained to hire the services of the undersigned for
an agreed amount of P20,000.00 as acceptance fee plus P2,000.00 per
court appearance.[27]
The
respondents, thereafter, prayed that, after due hearing, they be
granted the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed, after due hearing
and judgment, that:
a)
Upon filing of the complaint, a temporary restraining order be issued
directing defendant and all persons acting in her behalf to refrain
from selling the subject property;
b)
After due hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued;
c)
Annulling the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Urbano Galindo and/or the Deceased Gregorio Galindo with Waiver of
Rights (Annex “E” of the Complaint), and the Affidavit of Loss dated
February 3, 1998 executed by the defendant (Annex “F” of the Complaint);
d)
Cancelling TCT No. T-335593(M) issued in the name of the defendant
(Annex “D” of the Complaint);
e)
Restoring TCT No. T-2145 under the name of the legal Heirs of Gregorio
Galindo (Annex “C” of the Complaint); and
f)
To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00
as exemplary damages; P20,000.00 plus P2,000.00 per court appearance
and attorney’s fees and the cost of this suit.
Plaintiffs
further pray for such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.[28]
As
gleaned from the averments of the complaint, the respondents herein,
who were the plaintiffs in the RTC, sought to quiet their ownership
over the property and remove any cloud thereon caused by (a) the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Gregorio and Urbano
Galindo executed by the petitioners; (b) the Affidavit of Loss executed
by petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera; and (c) the issuance of TCT No.
335593(M) in favor of the latter.
While
it may be true that the respondents prayed, in their complaint, that
the said deed and TCT No. 335593(M) be nullified by the court, it
cannot thereby be concluded that the action of the respondents was for
the enforcement of the decision of the CFI in Civil Case No. 1067. The
respondents, in fact, did not pray, in their complaint, that the
petitioners be ordered to execute a deed of absolute sale over the
property as decreed in the decision of the CFI in Civil Case No. 1067;
that the property covered by the said title be reconveyed to them; or
that a new title over the property be issued to under their names as
owners thereof. The plea of the respondents for the nullification of
the said deed and title is but the consequences of and incidental to
their plea that their ownership over the lot be not clouded by the
contrary claim of the petitioners. It must be stressed that an action
to quiet title is imprescriptible.[29]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Bulacan is ordered to dismiss
the complaint. No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
Puno,
J., (Chairman), Tinga,
and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.
Austria-Martinez,
J., no part.
Participated in CA Decision.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 61-63.
[2]
Id. at 53-63.
[3]
Id. at 63.
[4]
Id. at 64-76.
[5]
Id. at 84-86.
[6]
Id. at 87.
[7]
Id. at 83.
[8] 10
SCRA 715 (1964).
[9]
Rollo, p. 107.
[10]
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices
Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court) and Hilarion L. Aquino (retired), concurring; Rollo, pp. 257-261.
[11]
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. –
Parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
[12]
Lozano v. Ballesteros, 195 SCRA 681 (1991).
[13]
Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 20 (1997).
[14]
Ibid.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. – Only
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action. The term “plaintiff” may refer to the
claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third
(fourth, etc.) – party plaintiff. The term “defendant” may refer
to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the
cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) – party defendant.
[17]
Sec. 4. Capacity. – Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue
or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized
association of persons that is made a party, must be averred. A
party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party
or the capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include
such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader’s
knowledge.
[18]
Ventura v. Militante, 316 SCRA 226 (1999).
[19]
Neil Tamondong v. Court of Appeals and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 158397, November 26,
2004.
[20]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., Vol. I, p. 89, cited in
Workers of Antique Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, 333 SCRA 181
(2000).
[21]
Section 1. Caption. – The caption sets forth the name of the
court, the title of the action, and the docket number if assigned.
The
title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They
shall all be named in the original complaint or petition; but in
subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first
party on each side be stated with an appropriate indication when there
are other parties.
Their
respective participation in the case shall be indicated.
[22]
Rollo, pp. 77-78.
[23]
Ventura v. Militante, supra.
[24]
Id. at 234.
[25]
Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof,
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An
action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under
Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
[26]
Serdoncillo v. Benolirao, 297 SCRA 448 (1998).
[27]
Rollo, pp. 77-80.
[28]
CA Rollo, p. 35.
[29]
Ordoñez v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 109 (1990).
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