MARILYN
ODCHIMAR GERLACH,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R.
No. 148542
January
17, 2005
REUTERS
LIMITED, PHILS.,
Respondent.
D
E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:
Before
us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated September 29,
2000 and its Resolution[2] dated June 21, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51495.
On
February 15, 1982, respondent Reuters Limited, Phils. (Reuters), a
company engaged in news dissemination with offices worldwide, hired
Marilyn Odchimar Gerlach, petitioner, as its local correspondent.
On
October 1, 1983, respondent Reuters implemented a local Retirement
Benefit Plan[3] (Plan) for its Philippine-hired employees. The
Plan is funded by the company, but an employee-participant may
volunteer to contribute a percentage of his basic monthly salary to the
fund. Petitioner was automatically covered by the Plan by reason
of her age and length of service. However, she opted not to contribute
to the fund. She worked in Reuters Philippines up to December 23,
1983.
On
January 23, 1984, respondent assigned petitioner as a journalist to
Reuters Singapore. Before leaving, Rachel Addison, Reuters’
Eastern Region Staff Manager, apprised her of the details of her
forthcoming assignment, specifically that her home base will always be
the Philippines, thus:
“I am writing
formally to confirm various details about your forthcoming training
assignment as a Journalist in Singapore. In this appointment you
will report to Mr. Francis Daniel, News Editor, ASEAN.
x
x x
From
16 January your Philippine salary will cease and you will receive a
Singapore salary of Singapore Dollars 3,500 per month, paid 13 times a
year. In addition, the company will provide you with furnished
accommodation x x x.
x
x x
I
confirm that your home base will continue to be Manila and should you
return there at the end of this assignment or following subsequent
assignments your terms and conditions of employment would revert to
those of local staff.
x
x x”[4]
Again,
on December 7, 1983, Addison wrote petitioner regarding her social
security and pension funds during her stay in Singapore, thus:
“It has
been agreed that it would not be appropriate for you to join the
Singaporean Central Provident Fund since Singapore is not your home
base and the duration of your assignment is expected to be one
year. You should therefore join the Retirement Benefit Plan which
is being introduced in the Philippines with effect from 1 October
1983. It is a non-contributory fund. For the purpose of
calculating the Company contribution to the retirement plan, you will
retain a notional Philippine salary of Peso 5,980 per month payable 13
times a year. Your notional salary will be reviewed on 1 October
in line with other Manila office staff.”[5]
Petitioner
stayed in Singapore up to December 1985. In a letter of
April 15, 1985, Addison informed her of the corresponding increases in
her actual and notional salaries, thus:
“Following your
Singapore salary increase in January, I am writing to confirm that your
notional Peso salary has been increased to 6,900 per month and pension
contributions will be adjusted accordingly.”[6]
On
March 26 to June 4, 1986, petitioner was assigned to Reuters
Hongkong. Thereafter, or in July, 1986, she was appointed
correspondent in Sri Lanka and that her peso salary was increased to
P12,600.00 per month, thus:
“x
x x
With
immediate effect, you are appointed Correspondent, Sri Lanka reporting
to Mr. Dalton de Silva.
From 1
October 1986, you will be paid a salary of Rupees 212,000 per annum
which will be drawn locally and which will be subject to Sri Lankan
income tax from the same date.
x
x x
Your
home base will continue to be the Philippines and should you return
there at the end of this assignment or any subsequent assignment your
terms and conditions of employment would be those of national
staff. You will remain a member of the pension plan for
Philippines-based and contributions to be based on your notional peso
salary. I am pleased to confirm that from 1 October 1986 your
Peso salary has been increased to Pesos 12,600 per month.
x
x x”[7]
While
in Sri Lanka, petitioner’s notional peso salary was increased twice.
On
October 12, 1988, she was directed to return to Manila and resume her
post by December 15, 1988. However, she requested to be assigned
to the Reuters Office either in Bonn, West Germany or in London.
But due to the worldwide reduction of personnel, respondent denied her
request. She then applied for a 14-month study leave to take up
economic subjects at Bonn University. Respondent approved her
request for a 14- month leave without pay from January 1, 1989 up to
March 1, 1990.
On May
20, 1990, petitioner resigned from Reuters.
On
March 1, 1991, petitioner received her retirement benefits under the
Plan in the amount of P79,228.04, which amount was determined by the
trustee bank (Bank of the Philippine Island) in accordance with the
provisions of the Plan. The computation was based on her notional
salary. However, she questioned the amount she received as well
as her entitlement to a disturbance grant, contending that her
retirement benefits must be computed on the basis of her actual salary
abroad, not on her notional salary.
On
October 25, 1991, respondent, through its Manila Office Manager,
Roberto Moreno, replied with the following explanation:
“Mr.
Burns in Hong Kong and we in Manila have thoroughly reviewed the issues
you raised and have reached the following conclusions:
a)
My initial reply to you on your benefits which the bank computed is
only for six years. But the final amount you got was computed at
seven years as corrected by the bank after your recomputation
request. Bank computation attached.
b)
We appreciate your views about the notional salary issue, but cannot
agree with them since the concept of a notional salary is standard
practice globally and the notional salary is routinely mentioned in
assignment and salary increase letters including letters to you.
c)
P Burns and V Berger do however believe there is a good case for
increasing the final salary on which your retirement payment is
computed. The figure has been raised from Pesos 305,000 to Pesos
350,750 – an increase of 15 per cent to take account of likely salary
rises up to your final departure date. I have asked the bank to
compute the difference based on this higher final salary and we will
pay you the extra when this has been done.
d)
Though the history of your assignments/movements was complicated, P
Burns has ruled that you definitely are entitled to a resettlement
allowance. At the time this stood at STG 1,750 but he has
recommended we pay you the present rate of STG 2,050 in peso
equivalent. We can send the cheque to you in Bonn, but please
advise if you prefer another payment method.”[8]
Eventually,
petitioner filed with the Office of the Labor Arbiter, NCR, a money
claim against respondent, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-05002-92.
On
March 28, 1994, the Labor Arbiter rendered its first Decision
ordering respondent to pay petitioner additional retirement
benefits in the sum of P436,000.00, which amount was based on her
actual salary abroad, not on her notional salary; a disturbance grant
in the sum of Stg 1,750 or its equivalent in pesos; and attorney’s
fees.[9]
On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), rendered its
Decision dated August 31, 1994 setting aside the appealed Decision and
remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter for trial on the merits.[10]
On
July 31, 1996, the Labor Arbiter issued a second Decision awarding
exactly the same amounts stated in the first Decision.[11]
Respondent
appealed. On May 30, 1997, the NLRC reversed the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit,
thus:
“WHEREFORE, for
the reasons aforediscussed, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and the complaint DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.”[12]
Forthwith,
petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration which was granted by
the NLRC. In its Decision/Resolution dated August 29, 1997, it
dismissed respondent Reuters’ appeal.[13] Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated January 15,
1998.[14]
Hence,
respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Pursuant to
our Decision in St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC,[15] we referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals.
On
September 29, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered its Decision reversing
the Resolutions of the NLRC dated August 29, 1997 and January 9, 1998
and reinstating the NLRC Decision dated May 30, 1997 dismissing
petitioner’s complaint, with the modification that petitioner be
paid her disturbance and resettlement grant, thus:[16]
“WHEREFORE, IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (Second
Division) dated August 29, 1997 and January 09, 1998 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Commission’s Decision of May 30, 1997 is
REINSTATED with the modification that private respondent be paid her
disturbance and resettlement grant. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO
ORDERED.”[17]
In
finding for respondent Reuters, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated as
follows:
“In this case,
petitioner, on its own volition, established a retirement plan for its
Philippine-hired employees. The rules governing the plan are
denominated as ‘The Reuters Limited, Philippines Retirement Benefit
Plan’ (Annex ‘1’, ibid.). The plan is totally funded by the
company but employee-participants thereof are given the option to
contribute thereto if they wish to. (Private respondent opted not
to contribute to the fund.) The company’s contribution to the fund of
the plan is ten percent (10%) of the Basic Monthly Salary of each
participant starting October 1, 1983 (Section 2[a][1], Article VI, The
Reuters Limited, Philippines Retirement Benefit Plan; Annex ‘1’, p. 37,
ibid.). The rules, however, are not clear as to the computation
of the company’s contribution to the fund with respect to participants
assigned overseas.
If the
rules were solely to be considered, there is reason to uphold private
respondent’s claim that the computation of her retirement benefits must
be based on her basic annual salary while stationed abroad which was
much higher than the notional salary imposed on her. However,
considering the surrounding circumstances of this case, We are inclined
to agree with petitioner when it insists that the computation of said
benefits must be based on private respondent’s notional Philippine
salary.
We
recall that from the very start of her first assignment overseas,
private respondent was apprised of a notional Philippine salary upon
which the company’s contribution to her retirement fund would be based
(Letter dated December 7, 1983; Annex ‘3’, p. 47, ibid.). And the
records are clear that private respondent was always informed of said
notional Philippine salary whenever she was to be transferred to her
next overseas assignment or when there were increases in her salary,
both actual and notional (Annexex ‘4’ to ‘7’, pp. 47-52, ibid.).
It has also been established that this notional salary upon which is
based the company’s contribution to the retirement plan of a local
employee detailed abroad is a practice of Reuters worldwide (pp. 85-92,
ibid.) and that private respondent was not being discriminated against
when such was applied to her case. From these attendant
factors, it can be gleaned that imputing a notional salary is actually
a company policy which should be deemed incorporated in the rules
governing petitioner’s Retirement Plan.
Further,
that it is the notional salary and not the actual salary upon which
private respondent’s retirement benefit should be based is also
justified by the application of the rules on construction.
Petitioner’s retirement plan is that agreement between the employer and
employee mentioned in the law in force at that time on
employer-initiated retirement benefits (Article 287, Labor Code, prior
to its amendment by RA No. 7641). Since only the company is
obliged to contribute to the fund of the retirement plan, the agreement
is a gratuitous contract between the petitioner and the employees
qualified thereto. As such, it should be construed in a manner
that the least transmission of rights and interests shall prevail
(Article 1378, New Civil Code). Considering that the application
of the notional Philippine salary will result in the least transmission
of rights and interests between the parties, it is that interpretation
that is best in accord with the law.
x
x x
With
respect to private respondent’s claim for resettlement and disturbance
grant, it is Our opinion that she is entitled to it and that the same
has not yet prescribed. x x x ”[18]
Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Appellate Court in a
Resolution dated June 21, 2001.[19]
Hence,
the present recourse, petitioner ascribing to the Court of Appeals the
following assignments of error:
“I
WITH
ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REINSTATING THE EARLIER DECISION OF THE NLRC WHICH REVERSED THE
FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER BELOW.
II
WITH
ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
REVERSED THE FINDING OF THE NLRC WHICH DISMISSED PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
APPEAL FOR HAVING BEEN FILED OUT OF TIME.
III
WITH
ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO HER CLAIM FOR ADDITIONAL
COMPENSATION UNDER THE COMPANY’S RETIREMENT PLAN.”[20]
Respondent
maintains that petitioner fails to raise any question of law, hence,
the petition should be dismissed.
At the
outset, it bears stressing that in a petition for review on certiorari,
the scope of this Court's judicial review of decisions of the Court of
Appeals is generally confined only to errors of law,[21] questions of
fact are not entertained.[22] Thus, only questions of law may be
brought by the parties and passed upon by this Court in the exercise of
its power to review.[23] Also, judicial review by this Court does not
extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which
the proper labor tribunal has based its determination.[24]
Evidently,
the issues in this case are factual in nature and would require a
thorough reevaluation of the sufficiency of evidence. Firm is the
doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with
greater force in labor cases.[25] In this case, the factual issues have
already been determined by the Court of Appeals. Such findings
are accorded respect, even finality, and will not be disturbed
especially that such findings are supported by substantial
evidence.[26] One of the exceptions, however, is when there is a
variance between the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, as
in this case.
There
are three kinds of retirement schemes. The first type is
compulsory and contributory in character. The second type is one
set up by agreement between the employer and the employees in
collective bargaining agreements or other agreements between them.[27]
The third type is one that is voluntarily given by the employer,
expressly as in an announced company policy or impliedly as in a
failure to contest the employee's claim for retirement benefits.[28] It
is this third type of retirement scheme which covers respondent’s Plan.
Article
287 of the Labor Code reads:
"Article
287. Retirement. – Any employee may be retired upon reaching the
retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or
other applicable employment contract.
In
case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such
retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any
collective bargaining agreement and other agreements." (Emphasis
supplied)
The
first paragraph of the above provisions deals with the retirement age
of an employee established in (a) a collective bargaining agreement or
(b) other applicable employment contract.
The
second paragraph deals with the retirement benefits to be received by a
retiring employee which he may have earned under (a) an existing law,
(b) a collective bargaining or (c) other agreements.
In
Llora Motors, Inc. vs. Drilon,[29] we held that Article 287, does not
in itself purport to impose any obligation upon employers to set up a
retirement scheme for their employees over and above that already
established under existing laws, like the Social Security Act.
Nonetheless,
Section 14(a), Rule 1 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book VI
of the Labor Code, provides:
"Sec. 14.
Retirement benefits. – (a) An employee who is retired pursuant to a
bona fide retirement plan or in accordance with the applicable
individual or collective agreement or established employer policy shall
be entitled to all the retirement benefits provided therein."
Thus,
in the instant case, respondent based petitioner’s retirement benefits
on its Plan and established policy, which is in accord with the above
provision. Consequently, petitioner’s theory that the computation
of her retirement benefits should be based on her basic annual salary
while stationed abroad is untenable.
We
agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner’s retirement benefits
must be based on her notional Philippine salary. It is very clear
that from the very start of her first assignment overseas, respondent
apprised her that the company’s contribution to the Plan is based on
her notional Philippine salary.[30] In fact, under the Plan, the
company’s contribution to the fund is 10% of the basic monthly salary
of each participant. Respondent also informed petitioner of the
amount of her notional Philippine salary whenever she was transferred
to her next overseas assignment or when there were increases in her
salary, both actual and notional.[31] Significantly, respondent
was able to prove that it has been its practice worldwide that the
notional salary of an employee is its basis in computing its
contribution to the retirement plan for a local employee detailed
abroad. It follows that the amount of retirement benefits of a
retiring employee assigned abroad is based on his notional salary.
Besides,
it is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof is on the part
of the party who makes the allegations[32] – ei incumbit probatio, qui
dicit, non qui negat.[33]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
Panganiban,
J., (Chairman), Corona,
Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and concurred in by
Associates Justices Oswaldo Agcaoili and Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr.
All had retired.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. (retired).
[3]
Rollo at 180-191.
[4]
Id. at 66.
[5]
Id. at 67.
[6]
Id. at 67-68.
[7]
Id. at 68.
[8]
Id. at 73-74.
[9]
Id. at 96.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id. at 96-112.
[12]
Id. at 114-121.
[13]
Annex “H” of the instant petition, Rollo at 124-125.
[14]
Id. at 77.
[15]
G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494.
[16]
Rollo at 84.
[17]
Id. at 84.
[18]
Id. at 78-84.
[19]
Id. at 87-88.
[20]
Id. at 49-50.
[21]
Viloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119974, June 30, 1999, 309 SCRA
529.
[22]
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc., 306
SCRA 762, May 5, 1999; Villarico vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105912,
June 28, 1999, 309 SCRA 193.
[23]
Alipoon vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127523, March 22, 1999, 305 SCRA
118; Baguio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 119682, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA
450.
[24]
Social Security System Employees Association vs. Bathan-Velasco, G.R.
No. 108765, August 27, 1999, 313 SCRA 250.
[25]
Ropali Trading Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 122409, September 25,
1998, 296 SCRA 309.
[26]
Belaunzaran vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 120038, December 23, 1996, 265 SCRA 800;
See also Oscar Ledesma and Company vs. NLRC, 246 SCRA 471 (1995) and
Ala Mode Garments, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 122165, February 17, 1997,
268 SCRA 497.
[27]
Llora Motors, Inc. vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 82895, November 7, 1989, 179
SCRA 175.
[28]
Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. vs. Ople, No. L-49678, June 29, 1979,
91 SCRA 265.
[29]
Llora Motors, Inc. vs. Drilon, supra.
[30]
Letter dated December 7, 1983; Annex ‘3’, Rollo at 195.
[31]
Annexes ‘4’ – ‘7’, Rollo at 196-200.
[32]
Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 128395, December
29, 1998, 300 SCRA 713, 719; Jimenez vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 116960, April
2, 1996, 256 SCRA 84, 89.
[33]
The proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon him who denies. (BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 516 [1991], 6th ed.)
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