TERESITA
V. IDOLOR,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R.
No. 161028
January
31, 2005
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN
and ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN and HON. JOSE G. PINEDA, Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 220, Quezon City,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This
Petition for Review on
Certiorari
assails the September 1, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72494 which reversed the May 27, 2002 order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, in Civil Case No.
Q-98-34728, denying respondent-spouses Motion for Immediate Issuance of
Writ of Possession.
Petitioner
Teresita V. Idolor obtained a loan from respondent-spouses Gumersindo
and Iluminada De Guzman secured by a real estate mortgage over a
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25659.[2]
Upon
default by petitioner in the payment of her obligation,
respondent-spouses instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
against the real estate mortgage. During the auction sale,
respondent-spouses emerged as the highest bidder and were issued a
Certificate of Sale.[3]
On
June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 220, a complaint for annulment of the Certificate of Sale
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-98-34728.
The
trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the Court
of Appeals in a petition for certiorari filed by respondent-spouses,
annulled the same for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. We affirmed said decision of the appellate court in
Idolor v. Court of Appeals.[4]
The
ownership over the subject property having been consolidated in their
name, respondent-spouses De Guzman moved for the issuance of a writ of
possession with the Regional Trial Court where the case for the
annulment of the Certificate of Sale was pending.[5] On May 27, 2002,
the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the “the lifting of the
writ of preliminary injunction does not ipso facto entitle defendant De
Guzman to the issuance of a writ of possession over the property in
question. It only allows the defendant Sheriff to issue a final
deed of sale and confirmation sale and the defendant De Guzman to
consolidate the ownership/title over the subject property in his
name.”[6]
In a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the appellate
court found that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
denying the motion for the issuance of the “writ of possession to the
mortgagee or the winning bidder is a ministerial function of the court
and that the pendency of an action questioning the validity of a
mortgage cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession after title
to the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee.”[7] Hence, it
reversed and set aside the May 27, 2002 order of the trial court.
The
following issues are raised for our consideration:
A. WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION ON THE MOTION OF THE MORTGAGEE
TO APPLY FOR A WRIT OF POSSESSION NOTWITHSTANDING NON-PAYMENT OF DOCKET
FEES;
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGEE, BY MERE MOTION, NOT BY A PETITION, MAY
APPLY FOR A WRIT OF POSSESSION IN THE SAME CASE FOR ANNULMENT OF THE
SHERIFF’S CERTIFICATE OF SALE OF WHICH HE IS A DEFENDANT.[8]
A writ
of possession is an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a
person in possession of a real or personal property.[9] It may be
issued under the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings
under Sec. 17 of Act 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor
is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a
party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (3) extrajudicial
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Sec. 7 of Act 3135 as
amended by Act 4118,[10] to which the present case falls.
Section
7, Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, provides:
SECTION 7. In any
sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition
the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property
or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during
the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the
use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such
petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte
motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is
registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property
registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and
ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property
encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any
register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case
the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect
the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and
fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act
Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon
approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed
to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who
shall execute said order immediately.
Under
the provision cited above, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may
apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing
for that purpose an ex parte motion under oath, in the corresponding
registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of a property with
torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of
the corresponding bond, the court is expressly directed to issue the
writ.[11]
Upon
the expiration of the redemption period, the right of the purchaser to
the possession of the foreclosed property becomes absolute. The
basis of this right to possession is the purchaser’s ownership of the
property. Mere filing of an ex parte motion for the issuance of
the writ of possession would suffice, and the bond required is no
longer necessary, since possession becomes an absolute right of the
purchaser as the confirmed owner.[12]
In
this case, respondent-spouses acquired an absolute right over the
property upon the failure of petitioner to exercise her right of
redemption and upon the consolidation of the title in their name.
The
pendency of the case for the annulment of the Certificate of Sale is
not a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession. Upon the
filing of the motion, the trial court has no discretion to deny the
same, thus:
This
Court has consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a
writ of possession is ministerial. Such writ issues as a matter
of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond. No discretion is left to the trial
court. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the
sale, as well as the consequent cancellation of the writ, is to be
determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act
3135. Such question cannot be raised to oppose the issuance of
the writ, since the proceeding is ex parte. The recourse is
available even before the expiration of the redemption period provided
by law and the Rules of Court.[13]
The
judge to whom an application for writ of possession is filed need not
look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its
foreclosure. As a rule, after the consolidation of title in the
buyer’s name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of
possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser
in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.
As such, the court neither exercises its official discretion nor
judgment.[14] Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or
its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a
writ of possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a
pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself,
the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of
course to the eventual outcome of said case.[15]
Contrary
to petitioner’s assertion, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has
jurisdiction to act on respondent’s motion for writ of
possession. Section 7, Act 3135, as amended, is clear that in any
sale made under its provisions, “the purchaser may petition the Court …
of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is
situated…” Since the property subject of this controversy is in Quezon
City, then the city’s Regional Trial Court should rightly take
cognizance of the case.
The
Court of Appeals correctly observed:
Thus, it is clear
under the aforesaid law that the RTC of the place where the property is
situated has the appropriate authority to issue the writ of possession
and, specifically in the instant case, it is the RTC of Quezon
City. And when jurisdiction pertains to the RTC of Quezon City,
it includes all branches thereof including the court a quo where a
related proceeding is being conducted.[16]
Further,
in Bacalso, et al. v. Ramolete, et al.,[17] we held:
The various
branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth
Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the
totality of which is only one Court of First Instance. The
jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. And when
a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not
attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other
branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continue by and before
another branch or judge. It is for this reason that Section 57 of
the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the
administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the
different branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the
coordination of the work by the different branches of the same
court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does not
involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction; the jurisdiction
attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of
the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the
court.
Necessarily,
therefore, Branch 220 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has
jurisdiction over respondent-spouses’ application for writ of
possession over a property in Quezon City.
The
Court of Appeals properly debunked petitioner’s claim that the Regional
Trial Court acquired no jurisdiction over the case due to alleged
non-payment of docket fees by the respondent. This allegation,
having been raised for the first time on appeal, should be
disallowed. Besides, the fees mentioned in Section 7, Act 3135 in
relation to Section 114, Act 496, pertain to fees payable upon
registration of land titles, and not to court or docket fees, as
erroneously claimed by petitioner.
An
ex-parte petition for issuance of possessory writ under Section 7 of
Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial process”.
Even if the same may be considered a judicial proceeding for the
enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure
sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party
“sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.”[18] It is a non-litigious proceeding
and summary in nature as well. As such, the rigid and technical
application of the rules on legal fees may be relaxed in order to avoid
manifest injustice to the respondent. After all, rules of
procedure are used to help secure and not override substantial
justice. Even the Rules of Court mandates a liberal construction
in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Since
rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice, their strict and rigid application which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice must always be avoided.[19]
This
rule is applicable in the present case. Although respondent-
spouses have been declared as the highest bidder and despite having
consolidated the title in their name, they still failed to take
possession of the property through numerous legal maneuverings of the
petitioner. A simple ex parte application for the issuance of a
writ of possession has become a litigious and protracted proceeding.
Thus,
if we strictly apply the Rules, justice long been denied to respondent
would be effectively defeated. At any rate, should there be fees
and costs relative to the issuance and implementation of the writ of
possession, the same may be assessed and collected from the
respondent-spouses De Guzman.
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72494
is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220
is ordered to issue a writ of possession in favor of respondent-spouses
Gumersindo and Iluminada De Guzman.
SO
ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred in by
Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and Rosalinda
Asuncion-Vicente; Rollo, pp. 17-21.
[2] CA
Rollo, p. 5.
[3]
Id., pp. 5-6.
[4]
G.R. No. 141853, 7 February 2001, 351 SCRA 399, 409.
[5] CA
Rollo, 15-20.
[6]
Id., p. 24.
[7]
Rollo, p. 19.
[8]
Id., p. 11.
[9]
Chailease Finance Corporation v. Ma, G.R. No. 151941, 15 August 2003,
409 SCRA 250, 252.
[10]
Sps. Ong v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 857, 863-864 [2000].
[11]
Samson, et al. v. Judge Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 154355, 20 May 2004.
[12]
Sps. Uy Tansipek v. PBC, 423 Phil. 727, 734 [2001].
[13]
Samson, et al. v. Judge Rivera, supra at 11.
[14]
Sps. Yulienco v. Court of Appeals, 441 Phil. 397, 407 [2002].
[15]
Sps. Ong v. Court of Appeals, supra at 10.
[16]
Rollo, p. 20.
[17]
128 Phil. 559, 564-565 [1967], cited in Maloles II v. Court of Appeals,
381 Phil. 179, 194 [2000].
[18]
See Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 757, 770
[2002].
[19]
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.146923, 30
April 2003, 402 SCRA 449, 454-455.
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