VICENTE
C. JIMENEZ, EUGENIO BERNARDO,
AND VENERANDO R. HABER,
Petitioners,
-versus-
G.R.
No. 153578
January
28, 2005
EULOGIO TOLENTINO, JR., LETICIA TOLENTINO,
GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II THELMA CRUZ,
and JOSE O. MONTERO, JR., OMB PROSECUTOR II,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
In
this Petition for Review on
Certiorari,
petitioners seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision[1]
promulgated on 18 October 2001 dismissing petitioners’ petition for
certiorari as well as the same court’s Resolution[2] of 08 May 2002
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The petition
before the Court of Appeals was for the nullification of the Office of
the Ombudsman’s findings of probable cause for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
The
generative facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals,
are as follows:[3]
(1)
Dolores Banzon, married to Eulogio Tolentino, Sr., was the registered
owner of two (2) parcels of agricultural land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Titles No. T-5368 and No. T-5369 with an aggregate area
of 187,590 square meters more or less, situated in Brgy. Tuyo, Balanga,
Bataan. Dolores Banzon died in March 1979. Ten years later,
her husband died leaving two (2) compulsory heirs, private respondents
herein Eulogio B. Tolentino, Jr. and Leticia B. Tolentino. Both
spouses did not exercise their right of retention under Presidential
Decree No. 27;[4]
(2)
On 25-26 September 1989, a subdivision survey was conducted on the
parcels of land in question, initiated by petitioner Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) Venerando Haber segregating the portions
allocated to each tenants-beneficiaries;
(3)
On 02 May 1990, private respondents (complainant landowners) executed a
General Power of Attorney in favor of their cousin Emilio Dizon to
administer their properties;
(4)
On 19 June 1990, Emancipation Patents were issued to the
tenants-beneficiaries, including those tenants whose qualifications
were not acceptable to private respondents;
(5)
On 11 September 1990, Emilio Dizon executed Deeds of Transfer in favor
of the tenants-beneficiaries, including those tenants whose
qualifications were not acceptable to private respondents. On the
same day, petitioner MARO Haber forwarded copies of the Deeds of
Transfer to the Register of Deeds at Balanga, Bataan, for registration;
(6)
On 26 January 1994, private respondents sent a letter to the Regional
Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), requesting for the
cancellation of the Deeds of Transfer executed by the attorney-in-fact,
Emilio Dizon;
(7)
On 28 January 1994 and 07 February 1994, private respondents applied
for retention of five (5) hectares each pursuant to Section 6 of
Republic Act. No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law);
(8)
On 26 October 1994, petitioner Director Bernardo denied herein private
respondents’ application for retention, upon the recommendation of
petitioner Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Jimenez;
(9)
Private respondents then filed a complaint for violation of Section
3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 against petitioners with the Office of the
Ombudsman. After the preliminary investigation, public respondent
Thelma Cruz issued a resolution which found probable cause for
violation of the anti-graft law and recommended the filing of the
corresponding information. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration which was denied;
(10)
With the information in the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan,
petitioners, prior to their arraignment, prayed for a reinvestigation
of the case. It was granted and a reinvestigation ensued.
On 15 October 1999, the Ombudsman approved the resolution on the
reinvestigation conducted by public respondent Ombudsman Prosecutor II
Montero, Jr. denying the motion for reinvestigation.
From
the adverse resolution of their motion for reinvestigation,
petitioners, on 20 March 2000, went up to the Court of Appeals on
petition for certiorari essentially questioning the findings of
probable cause against them. The Court of Appeals initially
denied the petition for being filed out of time but it reinstated the
same upon motion of petitioners.[5] Subsequently, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition holding that (a) the special action of
certiorari is not the proper remedy to annul the findings of probable
cause following the ruling in Yap v. Intermediate Appellate Court;[6]
and (b) the petition was filed out of time. Petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration suffered the same fate, the Court of Appeals having
held that there were no weighty reasons advanced by the petitioners
that would merit the reversal of its decision.
Hence,
the present petition. Petitioners remonstrate that –
THE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE IN A WAY THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW, THE ESTABLISHED RULES, AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT. SPECIFICALLY, THE COURT A QUO HAS OPTED TO:
(a)
UPHOLD THE FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PETITIONERS DESPITE THE
FACT THAT PETITIONERS WERE MERELY PERFORMING THEIR SWORN DUTY BY
IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF LOI 474;
(b)
DISMISS THE PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT CERTIORARI IS NOT THE PROPER
REMEDY; and
(c)
DISMISS THE PETITION ON THE GROUND OF LATE FILING DESPITE THE FACT THAT
IT HAS ALREADY PREVIOUSLY RECONSIDERED AND REVERSED A SIMILAR RULING
AND ALLOWED THE FILING OF THE INSTANT PETITION.
Private
respondents countered that the Court of Appeals decision is actually
null and void as it had been rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction, following Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989), which provides –
Sec. 14.
Restrictions. -
No
court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on
pure question of law.
Private
respondents then contended that as the petition was misfiled with the
Court of Appeals, necessarily, it did not toll the running of the
period for filing the correct petition before this Court. On the
merits of the case, private respondents averred that it can be implied
from the Court of Appeals’ decision that the Office of the Ombudsman
did not commit reversible error in its findings of probable cause
against petitioners herein.
Like
private respondents, public respondents Ombudsman officers assert that
the Court of Appeals was actually devoid of jurisdiction pursuant to
Section 14 of Rep. Act. No. 6770 and this Court’s ruling in Kuizon v.
Desierto.[7]
In
their consolidated reply, petitioners asseverate that the issue of
whether or not the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to rule on their
petition filed thereat had been rendered moot and academic by the
filing of the instant case before the Supreme Court whose jurisdiction
respondents have allegedly admitted. Thus, this Court should rule
on the merits of their petition, i.e., the resolution of the Ombudsman
finding probable cause against them should be invalidated and set aside.
THE
COURT’S RULING
It is
now beyond cavil that the filing of the special civil action of
certiorari to question the resolution of the Ombudsman finding probable
cause must be made with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals
such that the wrong filing thereof will not toll the running of the
period to file the same with this Court.[8]In Kuizon v. Desierto,[9] we
were emphatic:
It follows that
the instant petition was filed late. A petition for certiorari
should be filed not later that sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed.[10] The
present petition was filed with this Court only on November 24, 1999
which is more than sixty (60) days from the time petitioners were
notified of the adverse resolutions issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman. The erroneous filing of the petition with the Court of
Appeals did not toll the running of the period.
On
this score alone, the instant petition already suffers a fatal
flaw. The adverse resolution of the Ombudsman was received by
petitioners on 08 November 1999.[11] The petition for certiorari
was filed in this Court only on 03 July 2002.[12]
Moreover,
and even if we were to rule on the merits of the case, the instant
petition will still have to be dismissed in the light of the
well-entrenched principle of non-interference in the exercise of the
Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated powers.[13] As highlighted
in Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.[14] –
We have
consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling
reason. This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and
practical considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution
and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate
it from outside pressure and improper influence.
And,
in Ocampo v. Ombudsman[15]--
The rule is based
not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will
be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal
of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that
the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in
court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
It is
past dispute of course that in every rule, there are always settled
exceptions.[16] Hence, the principle of non-interference does not apply
when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of
the Ombudsman.[17] In Cabahug v. People,[18] we expressed the rationale
for the exception in this wise:
While
it is the function of the Ombudsman to determine whether or not the
petitioner should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment
of trial, he cannot do so arbitrarily. This seemingly exclusive
and unilateral authority of the Ombudsman must be tempered by the Court
when powers of prosecution are in danger of being used for
persecution. Dismissing the case against the accused for palpable
want of probable cause not only spares her the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial, but also prevents needless waste of the court’s
time and saves the precious resources of the government.
After
a thorough review of the instant case, however, we find that the public
respondents acted well within their discretion in finding probable
cause against herein petitioners. Public respondents ratiocinated
–
Upon evaluation,
there appears to be probable cause for the charge against respondents,
under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Respondents erred in denying
complainants’ application for retention in question. The General
Power of Attorney executed by complainants, by its terms, did not give
explicit authority to the attorney-in-fact Emilio Dizon, to execute
deeds of transfer in question, which can only be validly made through a
Special Power of Attorney to that effect. The authority thus
given refers only to acts of administration of subject property.
It is also shown that the property was surveyed, without the consent of
the complainants who, being legal heirs of the property in question
were not notified by MARO regarding coverage of the property, and were
not able to exercise their right of retention thereon, notwithstanding
their representations on the matter. Complainants also had
pointed out, besides, that some of the farmers beneficiaries, who were
parties to the subject transfers, were not bona fide tenants of the
landholding in question.
Thus,
respondents caused undue injury to complainants by giving
tenants/beneficiaries and some unqualified parties, unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference, through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith and/or gross unexcusable negligence.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise,
with respect to petitioners’ motions for reinvestigation,[20] public
respondents acted within the bounds of discretion in ruling that[21] --
The issue in the
instant case centers on the right of retention of the landowners,
complainants herein. P.D. No. 27 and R.A. 6657 give the landowner the
right of retention. If the landowner has failed to exercise this
right of retention under P.D. No. 27, the Supreme Court said that: He
is “entitled to the retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657,
which is more liberal than those granted by the decree.” (Small
Landowners Association vs. Sec. Philip Ella Juico, G.R. No. 78742;
Arsenio Acuña, et al. vs. Joker Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 79310;
Inocentes Pabico vs. Hon. P.E. Juico, et al., G.R. No. 79777 in a joint
decision dated July 14, 1989). The foregoing pronouncement is a
consolation to many a landowner who [has] failed to, or did not
exercise his right to retain the 7 hectare rice and/or corn land under
P.D. No. 27 (The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, R.A. No. 6657 and
the Recent Developments Under It by Justice Milagros German, p.
10). Under Sec. 6, par. 2 of R.A. 6657 the landowner even has the
right to choose the area to be retained which shall be compact or
contiguous.
Respondent
Bernardo argues that under Letter of Instruction No. 474 the
predecessors of the complainants have no right of retention and the
complainants having merely stepped into the shoes of their deceased
parents, they both cannot claim a separate retention under R.A.
6657. To say that P.D. No. 27 is impliedly repealed by LOI No.
474 is out of context because the implementing rule can not repeal or
restrict the very law allowing its creation.
At the
outset, the General Power of Attorney given to Emilio Dizon could not
be made as basis for the execution of the Deeds of Transfer because the
power given to Dizon was only for administration and not to cede or
transfer the property to third persons. In the investigation
report for retention prepared and submitted by MARO thru PARO it was
stated therein that SPA (Special Power of Attorney) was attached and
made as basis for executing the deeds of transfer. But what was
actually attached was a General Power of Attorney. In the survey
of the landholding in 1989 the landowners were never notified.
There was never an investigation conducted on the allegation of the
complainants that some of the farmer beneficiaries were not their
legitimate tenants. The MARO and the PARO should have arranged
for a confrontation between the landowners and the farmer-beneficiaries
to verify the allegation of the complainants and if found true the area
occupied by said farmer beneficiaries should have been a suitable area
to satisfy the retention rights of landowners and the controversy
herein should have been averted. They should have given the
complainants the opportunity to ventilate their
complaint/allegation. Also, they should have looked into the
claim of the complainants that they have not been paid of any
compensation or rentals by the tenants. If true, the complainants
had been deprived of their property without just compensation.
While
it is true that the rights of the tenants must be protected, the right
of retention of the landowners under the law must also be
respected. Is it not paradoxical and ironic that the very laws
invoked by the respondents as their bases in denying in a cavalier
manner the right of retention of the complainants are the very same
laws that give the landowners the said right? Respondents put every
roadblock along the way to thwart the landowners in exercising their
right of retention. (Emphasis supplied)
As
correctly pointed out by private respondents, petitioners are not being
indicted for simply performing their duties as officers of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and in committing honest mistakes in the
process.[22] Rather, they are being made criminally accountable by the
Office of the Ombudsman for allegedly performing such duties in a
despotic manner and in gross bad faith which caused considerable damage
and injury to private respondents and which gave unwarranted benefits
to third persons.[23] There being no grave abuse of discretion in the
handling of the case by public respondents, we find no cogent reason to
interfere in their determination of probable cause. Suffice it to
say that our ruling in Gonzales, Jr. v. Alvarez[24] - that Pres. Decree
No. 27 applies and operates only to bona fide tenants-farmers - finds
application to herein disquisition.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 18 October 2001 and
the Resolution dated 08 May 2002 are hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO
ORDERED.
Puno,
J., (Chairman),
Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
Callejo,
Sr., J., on official leave.
[1]
Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with Justices Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr., and Bienvenido L. Reyes concurring (CA Rollo, pp.
117-122).
[2]
Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with Justices Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr., and Bienvenido L. Reyes concurring (Ibid., p. 169).
[3]
See Petition, Rollo, pp. 15-17; Court of Appeals Decision, Rollo, pp.
34-35; Ombudsman Resolution on OMB-1-95-1783, Rollo, pp. 53-54; Court
of Appeals Petition, CA Rollo, pp. 5-6; Public Respondents’ Comment,
Rollo, pp. 111-112.
[4] As
summarized by public respondent Montero in his COMMENT dated 12
November 2002 (Rollo, p. 111).
[5] CA
Decision, CA Rollo, pp.124-125.
[6]
G.R. No. 68464, 22 March 1993, 220 SCRA 245.
[7]
G.R. Nos. 140619-24, 09 March 2001, 354 SCRA 158.
[8]
Kuizon v. Desierto, supra., note 8; Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas), G.R. No. 149148, 05 April 2002, 380 SCRA 325.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[11]
See Court of Appeals Resolution, CA Rollo, p. 73
[12]
Rollo, p. 21
[13]
Nava v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 136470, 16 October 2001, 367 SCRA
263, 271 citing Alba v. Nitorreda, G.R. No. 120223, 13 March 1996, 254
SCRA 753, 765-766.
[14]
G.R. No. 131445, 27 May 2004, citing Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, 19 January 2001, 349 SCRA 767
and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 136192, 14 August 2001, 362 SCRA 730.
[15]
G.R. Nos. 103446-47, 30 August 1993, 225 SCRA 725, 730, as cited in
Young v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 110736, 27 December 1993,
228 SCRA 718, 722-723.
[16]
The established exceptions are:
(1)
When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(2) When necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(3) When there is a prejudicial question which
is sub judice;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(4) When the acts of the officer are without or
in excess of authority;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid
law, ordinance or regulation;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(7) Where the court has no jurisdiction over
the offense;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(8) Where it is a case of persecution rather
than prosecution;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(9) Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and
a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Mendoza-Arce v.
Office of the Ombudsman [Visayas], supra., note 9 at 334-335, citing
Posadas v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 131492, 29 September 2000, 341 SCRA 388;
Venus v. Desierto, G.R. No. 130319, 21 October 1998, 289 SCRA 196;
Brocka v. Enrile, G.R. Nos. 69863-65, 10 December 1990, 192 SCRA 183).
[17]
Sistoza v. Desierto, G.R. No. 144784, 03 September 2002, 388 SCRA 307,
323, citing Cabahug v. People, G.R. No. 132816, 05 February 2002, 376
SCRA 113, 123.
[18]
G.R. No. 132816, 05 February 2002, 376 SCRA 113, 132.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[20]
CA Rollo, pp. 46-51.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 54-55.
[22]
Rollo, pp. 98-103.
[23]
Ibid.
[24]
G.R. No. 77401, 07 February 1990, 182 SCRA 15, 22, citing Elena Vda. De
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43297, 15 December 1986,
146 SCRA 230; Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62063, 28 April
1983, 121 SCRA 859; Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33567, 14
December 1978, 87 SCRA 263.
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