THIRD DIVISION
LAPANDAY
AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (L.S. VENTURES, INC.,
ALREADY MERGED WITH LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.),
Petitioner, |
-versus-
G.R.
No. 162109
January
21, 2005
MAXIMO
ESTITA, JUANITO ABASOLO, PEDRO ALQUIZA, ISMAEL ALFAR, MANUEL ALFAR,
ERLINDA S. ARIS, PAULO ABLAÑA, RUFO ALIPUYO, MARY ANIÑON,
ROSALIO
ALFAR, AQUILINO ABILIS, HERSON ALFANTA, GETRODEZ BALANAY, ELENA
BATO-BATO, ALBERTO BOHOLST, PRISCILA CABATUAN, VICTORINO CABATUAN,
RUPERTO CABATUAN, CRISTINO CONANG, PANFILO, CABIGAS, APOLINARIO
CABIGAS, EUSTAQUIO CELEN, ANTONIA COMENDADOR, POLICARPIO CLARIDO, JOSE
CABONITA, CANDELARIO COSEP, GUILLERMO CASINILLO, SEBASTIAN CASINILLO,
JOSE CAMUS, MARGARITO CLARIDO, JUAN CABAÑOG, MARIAS
CABAÑOG, MARIAS
CABAÑOG, TEOFISTA CASAS, ISMAEL CLARIDO, TOMASA BUDIANG, SOZIMA
CASAS,
LEONARDO CEJAS, JOSUE DANDAN, EFREN DEL RIO, LEONARDO DELLO,
PABLO
DINALO, BERNARDITO EUSALINA, EGMEDIO EUSALINA, PELAGIO ESTITA, MAMERTA
ENERO, MARCELINA ENERO, REMEGIO ENERO, MATEO ENERO, PLACIDO ESPINOSA,
ANA FRANCO, MELVIN FRANCO, ELESIO GEONSON, CIRIACO GEONSON, URBANO
GEONSON, CIRIACO GEONSON, MARINA GEONSON, TEOFILO GEONSON, GAUDIOSO
GEONSON, ANACLITO GEONSON, LAREANA GEONSON, URBANO GEONSON, ANDRICA
GIOCA, MARCILA GEALON, RODRIGO GEALON, PATERNO GUMBA, AGAPITO GUMBA,
FRANCISCO HERSAMIO, ROMEO INONG, ABDON INONG, ANDRES
YBAÑEZ, ALBINA
JIMENEZ, SERGIO JIMENEZ, SIMPLICIO LABRADO, ENCARNACION LASCUÑA,
IGNACIA LASCUÑA, MELCHOR LACANG, MAURITO LOQUIÑO,
GAUDIOSO LASCUÑA,
PRIMO MONTAÑEZ, JOSE MONTAÑEZ, BEINVINIDO
MONTAÑEZ, PABLO MENDOZA,
JUANITA MENDOZA, VICENTE MACION, JR., CIPRIANA MACION, EDUARDO MONTOYA,
CESAR MADRAGA, JUSTO NORO, ALEXANDER NORO, DOMINGO NORO, FERMIN NORO,
QUINTIN NORO, MAURO NORO, ULPIANO NORO, GERTRODEZ NORO, ENRIQUE OBENZA,
DANILO OBENZA, LEONARDO PEPITO, EULALIO PANLAAN, EDILITO PAMULAWAN,
LEONILA PACIONES, REMEDIOS PACIONES, REGALADO PACIONES, JAIME RECEBAS,
RODRIGO REBUYAS, AMANCIO RESGONIA, EPETACIO ROLUNA, LEONARDO ROTAQUIOU,
ISIDRA RAMOS, HERMINIGILDO SELGAS, LILIA TAPIC, ISIDRO TALAOGON,
IGMEDIO VILLARIN, EUGENIA BRIGOLE, FLAVIANO BATOBATO, MANUELA PIALA,
CLAUDIA ENERO, GEORGE COSEP, ANTONIO COSEP, ALFREDO MENDOZA, ALBERTO
MENDOZA, QUINTIN JABELLO, DOLORES JABILLO, ROLUNA DIONESIO, LOLITA
ALFOJA, TOCAO RODOLFO, AVELINO, CABONIA, GAUDENCIO VILLARAMIA, MARIA
PESIAO AND SOFIO ANTIPUESTO, VICTORIANO CASAS, CELEDONIO CARILLO,
CONCHITA CARILLO, CORNELIO BAYARCAL, AURELIO GALLARDO, FRANCISCA
CARTAGENA, AVELINO CABONITA, BALBINO HERSAMIO, TEOFISTO ABALAÑA,
NORMA
GANTUANCO and PATERNO GUMBA and/or MEMBERS OF THE DAVAO DEL SUR FARMERS
ASSOCIATION (DASURFA),
Respondents.
|
D
E C I S I O N
GARCIA,
J.:
In
this verified Petition for Review on
Certiorari,
petitioner Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation assails
and seeks the annulment of the following issuances of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71230, to wit:
1. Decision dated
September 3, 2003,[1] declaring as valid an earlier decision dated
January 17, 2001 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 8117, which, in turn, affirmed with
modification the resolution dated October 20, 1997 of the DAR
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur in a
land dispute involving the vast agricultural land of the late Orval
Hughes at Malalag, Davao del Sur; and
2.
Resolution dated January 19, 2004,[2] denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
We
lift from the decision under review and reproduce hereunder the factual
backdrop of the case, thus:
The
instant petition involves a vast tract of an agricultural land with an
area of 716 hectares located at Malalag, Davao del Sur. On July 28,
1924, this land was leased by the Government to Orval Hughes for a
period of twenty-five (25) years under Lease Application No. 815
(E-172). The lease actually expired on May 25, 1952, it having
been extended for three (3) years. Orval Hughes died and was survived
by his five (5) heirs who then filed their Sales Application Nos.
V-11538, V-12992, V-13837, V-14586 and V- 15003 with the Bureau of
Lands. Teodulo Tocao, et al., filed a protest against the sales
application.
On
August 20, 1957, the Office of the President gave due course to the
applications to cover only 317 hectares at 63 hectares per heir as per
OCT No. P-4712 but awarded 399 hectares to 133 protesters [led by
Teodulo Tocao] at three (3) hectares each.
On
September 17, 1981, the Ministry of Natural Resources issued an Order
implementing said decision (Annex “N”, Rollo, pp. 160-164).
However, the 133 petitioners listed in the said Order were not in
possession of the land allotted to them. So, they formed the
Malalag Land Petitioners Association, Inc. (The Association) headed by
one Cecilio R. Mangubat Sr.
On the
other hand, those in possession of the land sought the assistance of
the Malalag Ventures Plantation Inc., in its development into a viable
banana production project to which the corporation acceded.
Meanwhile,
on November 12, 1987, the Supreme Court in Minister of Natural
Resources vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes, 155 SCRA 566, sustained the OP
decision and it became final and executory.
On
December 12, 1991, the association, through its president Mr. Mangubat,
sent a letter to the management of Lapanday Group of Companies, Inc.
manifesting that they were no longer interested in the government grant
under the Order of the Ministry of Natural Resources and offered to
transfer and waive whatever interest they have over the subject land
for a monetary consideration (Annex “O”, Rollo, p. 165).
Mr.
Mangubat was the first to relinquish his right for P54,000.00 (Annex
“P”, Rollo, p. 166). The individual respondents allegedly
followed suit. He facilitated the relinquishment in the Office of
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) (Annex “Q”,
Rollo, pp. 167-169).
It
therefore came as a surprise when, on January 17, 1995, the individual
respondents filed [against Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., the
Heirs of Orval Hughes, the DENR/COSLAP and Cecilio Mangubat, Sr.] the
following cases: forcible entry, reinstatement, nullification of
affidavits of quitclaims, relinquishment, waiver and any other
documents on disposition of lands before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Digos, Davao, del Sur. They alleged
that since 1947, they had been the share tenants-tillers, openly and
continuously, of the late Orval Hughes and his heirs and they remained
as such on the 317 hectares land (Annexes “A” & “B”, Rollo, pp.
40-72).
They
further averred that on February 11, 1991, petitioner-corporation,
Hughes’ heirs and Cecilio Mangubat Sr., conspiring together, misled
them to receive P54,000.00 each as rentals on their respective
landholdings and deceived to sign receipts in English which turned out
to be affidavits of quitclaims in favor of the petitioner (Annex “E”,
PARAD Decision dated July 9, 1997, p. 3; Rollo, p. 111).
Petitioner
[Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation] opposed said
actions for being factually and legally baseless, there being no entity
by the name of Lapanday and L.S. Ventures Inc. which has agricultural
operation in Davao del Sur. The fact is that said company had
already merged with Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation
(Annexes “C” & “M”, Rollo, pp. 73-79 & 159, respectively).
In a
decision dated July 9, 1997,[3] the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur, Mardonio L. Edica, rendered
judgment in favor of the Malalag Ventures Plantation, Inc. and declared
the entire 716-hectare property as covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program or CARP. More specifically, the decision
dispositively reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, a decision is hereby rendered declaring that the
entire 716 hectares shall be covered by CARP. The portion planted
to bananas by the Malalag Plantation Ventures shall be governed by
Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 in favor of Malalag Land
Petitioner Association. The Operation Division of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Office shall implement this decision in accordance with
existing guidelines, rules and regulations.
The
heirs of Orval Hughes are hereby ordered to reinstate the Malalag Land
Petitioners Association. Leasehold tenancy shall be observed
collectively, pending recommendation by the PARO Operations Division,
without prejudice to the outcome of the cases still pending with the
administrative agencies and the regular courts.
SO
ORDERED.
Upon
motion for reconsideration, Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
Mardonio L. Edica, in a Resolution dated October 20, 1997,[4] modified
his aforequoted decision of July 9, 1997 by specifically directing
“Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc.” to turn over the area involved
for CARP coverage, and ordering the Hughes heirs to reinstate the
members of the Davao del Sur Farmer’s Association (DASUFRA) as
leasehold tenants of the subject land. We quote the dispositive portion
of the same Resolution:
“WHEREFORE, the
decision of 9 July 1997 is hereby modified to read:
Declaring that
the entire 716 hectares shall be covered by CARP. The portion
planted to bananas by the Malalag Plantation Ventures, Inc. shall be
governed by Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 in favor of
qualified members of the Malalag Land Petitioners’ Association (MLPA),
and the remaining portion shall be allotted to all deserving and listed
members of the Davao del Sur Farmer’s Association (DASUFRA). The
LAPANDAY, L.S. Ventures and/or the Malalag Plantation Ventures, Inc. is
hereby mandated to turn over the area involved for CARP coverage. The
Operations division of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Davao
del Sur is likewise mandated to implement this resolution in accordance
with existing guidelines, rules and regulations.
The
heirs of Orval Hughes are hereby ordered to reinstate the members of
the DASUFRA. Leasehold tenancy shall be observed collectively pending
documentation of the area by the PARO Operations Division regardless of
the outcome of the cases still pending with the administrative agencies
and the regular courts.
The
local National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines or any of the
component units are hereby directed to assist the DAR in the
enforcement and/or implementation of this resolution xxx.
This
resolution is immediately executory.
SO
ORDERED”.
From
the aforequoted resolution of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator, “Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc.”, went on appeal to
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), at Quezon
City where the appeal was docketed as DARAB Case No. 8117.
In a
decision dated January 17, 2001,[5] the DARAB, ruling that the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator had no jurisdiction to declare
the entire 716-hectare landholding as covered by the CARP and that the
only issue within his competence is to find out whether sufficient
grounds exist to warrant respondents’ dispossession from the
317-hectare portion thereof which was earlier awarded to the heirs of
Orval Hughes, modified the appealed resolution of Provincial
Adjudicator Edica, thus:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appealed Resolution of October 20, 1997, is
hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
1. Ordering
respondents heirs of Orval Hughes to vacate the premises of the 133
(sic, should be 399) hectares which were long ago awarded to 133
awardees who were identified in the Order of Natural Resources Minister
dated September 17, 1981, and turn over the peaceful possession thereof
to the said 133 awardees or their heirs;
2.
Ordering respondents Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures and Hughes’ heirs to
restore petitioners Maximo Estita, et al., to their respective farmlots
within the 317 hectares owned by the Hughes’ Heirs; and
3.
Declaring the nullity of the quitclaims allegedly executed by
petitioners.
The
matter of placing the 317 hectares under CARP shall be pursued in the
proper forum which is the Office of the Honorable DAR Secretary.
This
decision is immediately executory.
SO
ORDERED.
With
their motion for reconsideration of the same decision having been
denied by DARAB in its Resolution of March 15, 2002, “Lapanday and/or
L.S. Ventures, Inc.”, this time under the name Lapanday Agricultural
& Development Corporation (the herein petitioner),
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review,
thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71230.
As
stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision
dated September 3, 2003,[6] denied petitioner’s recourse thereto for
being merely dilatory and accordingly upheld the validity of the
aforementioned DARAB decision of 17 January 2001 and resolution of 15
March 2002, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in
consonance with the Supreme Court’s directive not to further delay the
implementation of the August 20, 1957 Decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED for being dilatory. The assailed Decision of the
DARAB dated 17 January 2001 and Resolution dated 15 March 2002 are
declared VALID.
Petitioner
and its counsel are warned not to further resort to measures of this
nature, otherwise, they shall be dealt with severely for having abused
the processes of the courts.
The
individual respondents who received the amount of P54,000.00 are
ordered to return the same to the petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
In
time, petitioner moved for a reconsideration, which motion was denied
by the same court in the herein equally assailed Resolution dated
January 19, 2004[7] for being merely pro forma.
Hence,
this recourse by petitioner Lapanday Agricultural & Development
Corporation on its basic submission that the Department of Agrarian
Reform thru its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, the DARAB and
the Court of Appeals all erred (1) in assuming jurisdiction over an
issue covering a public land; and (2) in rendering judgment against it
even as it is not a real party-in-interest in the case.
The
petition is bereft of merit.
Before
going any further, however, we shall first address respondents’ concern
as to what remedy petitioner has resorted to in coming to this Court:
whether by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, wherein only “questions of law” may be raised, albeit
jurisprudence extends this remedy even to questions of fact in
exceptional cases,[8] or by the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65, whereunder the main inquiry is whether there is grave
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.
While
the petition raises jurisdictional issue, it is apparent from our
reading thereof that the same is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. For one, the very recourse itself is captioned as a
“petition for review on certiorari”. For another, even as petitioner
came to this Court from a final decision of the Court of Appeals, the
latter is not impleaded as a nominal party-respondent in the petition
thus filed, as in fact the ones impleaded as respondents in the caption
thereof are only the very same original parties to the case while still
in the offices a quo.
We
shall then deal with the petition as one filed under Rule 45 and treat
the alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), the DARAB and the Court of Appeals as allegation
of reversible error.
Petitioner
first contends that the subject landholding is still part of the public
domain, hence, still under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and, therefore, beyond the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
There
can be no debate at all that under the Public Land Act, the management
and disposition of public lands is under the primary control of the
Director of Lands (now the Director of the Lands Management Bureau or
LMB) subject to review by the DENR Secretary[9]
The
hard reality in this case, however, is that the land in question has
ceased to be public, as in fact it is already titled. As found by
both the DARAB and the Court of Appeals, the 317-hectare land awarded
to the Hughes Heirs is covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
P-4712, the existence of which was never refuted by the
petitioner. Specifically, the DARAB decision of January 17,
2001,[10] partly states:
“On August 20,
1957 the Office of the President gave due course to applications to
cover only 317 hectares at 63 hectares each heir as per OCT No. P-4712
but awarding 399 hectares to 133 awardees at three (3) hectares each”
(Emphasis supplied),
a
finding reechoed on page 3 of the CA decision of September
3, 2003.[11]
With
the above, and bearing in mind that the CARP covers, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produce, all public and private
agricultural lands,[12] with the DAR vested with primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate, through its adjudication boards, agrarian
reform matters, and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of the agrarian reform program,[13] we rule and so
hold, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, that the DAR, thru its
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator at Digos, Davao del Sur
correctly took cognizance of the case in the first instance.
Petitioner
next argues that the DARAB decision, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, ordering “Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures Inc. to restore
[respondents] Maximo Estita et al. to their respective farm lots within
the 317 hectares owned by the Hughes Heirs”, has no valid force and
effect against petitioner because it is not a real party-in-interest,
pointing out that “Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc.,” are separate
and distinct from petitioner’s corporate personality. Petitioner
asserts that “Lapanday” has no juridical personality, while the
corporate life of “L.S. Ventures Inc.” has ceased when said entity
merged with petitioner in 1996. Moreover, petitioner points out
that it has no business operations in Davao del Sur where the land in
question lies.
We are
not persuaded.
To
begin with, it is basic in the law of procedure that misjoinder of
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, as parties may
be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on
its own initiative at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as
are just[14]
Then,
too, there is the rule that objections to defects in parties should be
made at the earliest opportunity, that is, at the moment such defect
becomes apparent, by a motion to strike the names of the parties
wrongly impleaded. For, objections to misjoinder cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.[15]
Here,
aside from unsubstantiated denials that it is not the party referred to
in the complaint for forcible entry, etc., commenced by the respondents
before the office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of
Digos, Davao del Sur, petitioner did not even file a motion to strike
its name in all the proceedings below. Quite the contrary, and as
correctly found by the Court of Appeals in the decision under review,
petitioner corporation -
“x x x filed an
Answer (Annex “D”, Rollo, pp.91-96) thereby submitting to the
jurisdiction of the Board. The same answer bears the name
“LAPANDAY AND/OR L.S. VENTURES, INC.”, signed by its representative
Caesar E. Barcenas and assisted by its counsel Jose V. Yap (Ibid,
Rollo, p. 96). This alone negates the petitioner’s stance that
there is no entity by the name of Lapanday and that L.S. Ventures, Inc.
is seperate and distinct from any company (see Annex “M” Rollo, p. 159
on Merger of Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation and
L.S. Ventures, Inc.). And such admission made by the petitioner
in the course of the proceedings in this case, does not require proof
(Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence).”
Petitioner’s
filing of an Answer has thereby cured whatever jurisdictional defect it
now raises. As we have said time and again, “the active participation
of a party in a case pending against him before a court or a quasi
judicial body, is tantamount to a recognition of that court’s or body’s
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case
and will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s or body’s
jurisdiction.”[16]
But
even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that “Lapanday” does not have a
juridical personality, it may nonetheless be sued under such a name
considering that respondents commonly know petitioner by the name
“Lapanday Group of Companies”, as shown in their alleged letter of
intent to relinquish their rights over the subject land.[17] This
brings to mind Section 15, Rule 3, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads:
“SEC. 15. Entity
without juridical personality as defendant. - When two or more persons
not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a
transaction, they may be sued under the name by which they are
generally or commonly known” (Emphasis added).
Aware
of the hopelessness of its cause, petitioner invariably posits that the
herein respondents are not real parties-in-interest and are bereft of
any legal personality to file and initiate the complaint for forcible
entry, etc. before the office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur because they are not tenant-tillers
of the land in dispute. Consequently, so petitioner argues, respondents
are not entitled to be restored thereto.
Petitioner’s
posture cannot hold water.
Both
the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator and the DARAB affirmed
and confirmed the tenancy status of the respondents. We see no reason
why the Court of Appeals should not rely on such a finding in upholding
the respondents’ right to be restored to their respective farmlots as
leasehold tenants thereof.
For
sure, the evidence adduced by the respondents clearly indicate that
they were tenant-tillers of the 317-hectare land owned by the heirs of
Orval Hughes. Indeed, documents[18] showing that the Judicial
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Orval Hughes had filed cases
in court against the respondents for their failure to deliver the
Estate’s share in the harvests, are unmistakable proofs that a tenurial
arrangement exists regarding the agricultural produce of the land.
Besides,
the heirs of Orval Hughes as former landlords of the respondents, never
denied the tenancy status of the latter, as in fact they did not even
bother to answer respondents’ complaint for forcible entry, etc.,
before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator.
In any
event, it need not be stressed that the question regarding the
respondents’ tenancy status is factual in nature, which is not proper
in a petition for review.[19] More so must this be where, as here, the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, the DARAB and the Court of
Appeals were one in upholding the tenancy status of the respondents.
Moreover,
it is axiomatic that findings of administrative agencies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are accorded not only respect but even finality by the
courts[20] In Corpuz vs. Sps. Grospe,[21] we categorically held:
“As a rule, if
the factual findings of the CA coincide with those of the DARAB – an
administrative body which has acquired expertise on the matter – such
findings are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on appeal”
As
tenant-tillers of the 317-hectare land owned by the heirs of Orval
Hughes, respondents are undeniably parties-in-interest to this
controversy. As such, they have the legal personality to institute the
action in the office a quo, namely, the office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator at Digos, Davao del Sur.
But
then, there is petitioner’s contention that respondents’ interests over
the subject land have already been waived when quitclaims to that
effect were allegedly executed and signed by them.
The
submission is equally puerile.
Waivers
of rights and/or interests over landholdings awarded by the government
are invalid for being violative of the agrarian reform laws. To
quote from our decision in Torres vs. Ventura,[22] as reiterated in
Corpuz vs. Sps. Grospe: [23]
“x x x As such
[the farmer-beneficiaries] gained the rights to possess, cultivate and
enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that
particular property were granted by the government to him and no
other. To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the
property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer
except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his successors”
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs
against petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
Panganiban,
J., (Chairman),
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Justice Eliezer De los Santos and concurred in by Justices
Bennie Adefuin-De la Cruz and Jose Mendoza; Rollo, pp. 125-132.
[2]
Rollo, p. 140.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 88-95.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 104-107.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 111-121.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 123-132.
[7]
Rollo, p. 140.
[8] In
Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109849, February 26, 1997, 268
SCRA 703,709, We enumerated such instances as follows:
(1)
when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court
are contradictory;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(2) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(3) when the inference made
by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(4) when there is grave abuse
of discretion in the appreciation of facts;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(5) when the appellate court
, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(6) when the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(7) when the Court of Appeals
fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(8) when the findings of fact
are themselves conflicting;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(9) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citations of the specific evidence on which
they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the
evidence on record.
[9]
Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan, et al. vs. Alberto C. Comorposa, et
al., 408 SCRA 692 [2003].
[10]
Rollo, p. 113.
[11]
Rollo, p. 196.
[12]
Rep. Act No. 6657; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 194 [2000].
[13]
RA 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988; also Executive Order 229 - Providing the Mechanism for the
Implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program.
[14]
Sec. 11, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[15]
F. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW Compendium, Vol. I, 1999 ed., pp. 85-86
citing Garcia vs Chua, [CA], 50 OG No. 2, 653.
[16]
Alcantara vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, 361 SCRA
664, 669 [2001].
[17]
Rollo, p. 77.
[18]
Exhs. “A” to “G”; PARAD Decision, Rollo, p. 92.
[19]
Pascual vs. Court of Appeals, 371 SCRA 338, 344 [2001].
[20]
Nuesa vs. Court of Appeals, 378 SCRA 351, 363 [2002].
[21]
333 SCRA 425, 435 [2000].
[22]
187 SCRA 96,104 [1990].
[23]
333 SCRA 425, 436 [2000].
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