BENJAMIN
LEE,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R.
No. 145498
January
17, 2005
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Petitioner
is now before us on a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
dated July 30, 1999, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 79, Quezon City (RTC) convicting him of violating Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. Q-93-50094; and the Resolution[2]
dated October 11, 2000, denying his motion for reconsideration.
The
facts are as follows:
On
October 4, 1993, an Information was filed against petitioner Dr.
Benjamin F. Lee and a certain Cesar Al. Bautista, for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22, which reads:
That on or about
the 24th day of July 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring together, confederating with, and mutually helping
each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
make or draw and issue to Rogelio G. Bergado to apply on account or for
value United Coconut Planters Bank Check No. 168341 dated July 24, 1993
payable to the order of Rogelio G. Bergado in the amount of
P980,000.00, Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that at the
time of issue they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check when presented for payment was subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Rogelio G. Bergado the
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[3]
Petitioner
pleaded not guilty in his arraignment on February 1, 1995.[4] Presiding
Judge Godofredo L. Legaspi noted in the assailed judgment that trial
proceeded insofar only as petitioner is concerned, “since accused Cesar
Bautista is presently detained at Municipal Jail at Calapan, Mindoro
where he has a pending case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC),
Calapan, Mindoro and despite several notices to the jail warden of
Calapan, Mindoro, the latter failed to bring the person of said accused
to this Court for arraignment.”[5]
For
the prosecution, private complainant Rogelio Bergado testified that: on
July 19, 1992, he loaned Unlad Commercial Enterprises (Unlad for
brevity), through its agent Norma Ilagan, the amount of P500,000.00
with an interest of 4% a month; on September 10, 1992, he loaned
another P400,000.00 through Ilagan for the same interest rate; in
exchange, he received a total of twenty-six checks, four of which were
dishonored for the reason “drawn against insufficient funds”; he went
to Calapan, Mindoro and talked to Bautista and the latter replaced the
dishonored checks with United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No.
ARA 168341, signed by Bautista and herein petitioner dated July 24,
1993, in the amount of P980,000.00 representing the total amount loaned
plus interests; when Bergado deposited the check at UCPB, the
same was dishonored due to “account closed”; through his lawyer,
he sent demand letters to Bautista and petitioner, who, despite having
received the same still failed and refused to make any payment.
Upon cross-examination, Bergado admitted that he did not see or meet
petitioner prior to July 24, 1993 nor did he go to Calapan, Mindoro to
check the existence of Unlad prior to lending it the amount of
P900,000.00.[6]
The
prosecution also presented Zenaida[7] Katigbak, Branch Operations
Officer of UCPB Araneta Avenue, Quezon City, who testified that
Bautista and petitioner are the authorized signatories of Current
Account No. 130-000406-2, against which the check subject of the
present criminal case was issued; and that the account was opened on
August 22, 1988 and closed on January 31, 1992 due to mishandling of
the account, i.e., a check was previously issued against it without
sufficient funds.[8]
The
prosecution presented UCPB Check No. ARA 168341,[9] UCPB Check Return
Slip dated August 5, 1993 stating that Check No. ARA 168341 was
returned unpaid due to “account closed”;[10] a demand letter addressed
to petitioner dated August 9, 1993;[11] registry return slip;[12] a
copy of the complaint affidavit of private complainant;[13] signature
card of the current account of petitioner and Bautista at UCPB;[14] and
the bank statement of the current account of petitioner and Bautista
dated January 31, 1992 reflecting that said account has been closed on
said date.[15]
For
the defense, petitioner testified that: it is Bautista who is the sole
owner of Unlad; he knew Bautista and became his “compadre” because of
Bautista’s wife who was his employee; he does not know anything about
the check issued by Bautista in favor of Bergado nor did he receive any
amount from Bergado or any other person; he agreed to open an account
with Bautista in 1988 because Bautista promised to give him 5% interest
from the proceeds of loans that will be made in favor of other people
from said account; before July of 1989, Bautista also asked him to sign
several checks in exchange for 2.5% interest a month from the proceeds
of loan to be made in favor of other people; after July 1989, he
terminated his accommodation arrangement with Bautista after learning
that Bautista was also giving 5% interest to other investors without
any accommodation agreement; he asked for the checks he previously
signed but Bautista refused to return them saying that he did not have
them anymore; and inspite of these, he continued investing in
Bautista’s business in the amount of more than P500,000.00.[16]
On
cross-examination, petitioner admitted that he signed several checks in
blank on different occasions; that he was the one who asked and
insisted that Bautista execute Exhs. “1” and “2”, affidavits of
Bautista stating that Unlad shall be Bautista’s sole responsibility;
and that despite having severed his relationship with Bautista in July
of 1989, he did not inform UCPB Araneta, Quezon City branch of such
fact and he continued investing in Unlad, from July 1989 to April
1994.[17]
To
bolster his claim, petitioner presented: an affidavit executed by
Bautista dated May 31, 1993 stating that Bautista is the sole
proprietor of Unlad and that any business transaction entered into by
Unlad shall be Bautista’s personal responsibility;[18] an affidavit
executed by Bautista on June 4, 1990, stating that petitioner is no
longer connected with Unlad and that petitioner should not be held
liable regarding any transaction entered into by Unlad after July 1989
since petitioner is no longer a signatory;[19] a business permit issued
by the Municipality of Calapan certifying that Bautista has been
granted a permit to operate a “general merchandise”;[20] a
certification from the Department of Trade and Industry, Oriental
Mindoro Provincial Office stating that Unlad is registered in the name
of Cesar Bautista and/or Placer Bautista;[21] orders of attachment
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro on the
properties of Bautista and petitioner;[22] and checks issued by
Bautista in favor of petitioner and his wife Amelia Lee.[23]
On
July 22, 1997, the RTC promulgated its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in this case finding accused Benjamin Lee
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
and accordingly sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of one (1) year
of prision correccional, and to pay the offended party P980,000.00 and
to pay a fine of P200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and non-payment of the fine by the accused.
SO
ORDERED.[24]
Petitioner
went to the Court of Appeals which modified the trial court’s judgment,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the
Decision is hereby MODIFIED by imposing a penalty of one (1) year and
for the accused to pay the private party the sum of Nine Hundred Eighty
Thousand Pesos (P980,000.00) as civil indemnity.
With
cost against the accused.
SO
ORDERED.[25]
Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied on October 11, 2000.
Hence,
the present petition with the following assignment of errors:
1.
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING
PETITIONER’S DEFENSE THAT HE HAD ALREADY SEVERED, SINCE JULY 1989, HIS
ACCOMODATION ARRANGEMENT WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED BAUTISTA WHO WAS SOLELY
RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE TRANSACTIONS ENTERED INTO BY UNLAD COMMERCIAL
ENTERPRISES AND THEREFORE PETITIONER HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE
SUFFICIENCY OR INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS OF UNLAD’S BANK ACCOUNT.
2.
THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED IN (A) WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW IN
FAILING TO RULE THAT THE SUBJECT CHECK, UCPB CHECK NO. ARA 168341, WAS
NOT ISSUED BY PETITIONER TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ON ACCOUNT OR FOR VALUE.
3.
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THAT AT THE TIME THE SUBJECT CHECK WAS ISSUED BY BAUTISTA IN FAVOR OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, THE LATTER WAS ALREADY AWARE THAT THE RESPECTIVE
ESTATES OF THE ACCUSED WERE ALREADY ATTACHED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CALAPAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO.
4.
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF FACT AND LAW IN NOT
ACQUITTING PETITIONER ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
5.
THE COURT A QUO AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
WHEN THEY FAILED TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22
AGAINST THE ACCUSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.[26]
In
support of his first assigned error, petitioner claims that: he had no
actual knowledge of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the funds
handled by his co-accused Bautista; while it is true that he opened a
joint account with Bautista at UCPB Araneta Avenue, Quezon City and
that he signed several UCPB checks in blank to accommodate Bautista, he
already severed his accommodation arrangement with Bautista as early as
July of 1989; this is evidenced by the affidavits executed by Bautista
dated June 4, 1990 and May 31, 1993 which the court a quo ignored; the
Court of Appeals erroneously held that the affidavits of Bautista are
“self-serving” since there was no showing that Bautista was lying when
he made the statements therein; also, the declarant in this case is
Bautista and not petitioner, thus the principle of self-serving
statements cannot apply; the affidavits of Bautista are declarations
against the interest of the person making it, which are admissible
notwithstanding their hearsay character, since such declarations are
relevant to the case and the declarant is not available as a witness
despite efforts of petitioner to present Bautista in court; the true
test of the reliability of the declaration is not whether it was made
ante litem motam as in this case but whether the declaration was
uttered under circumstances justifying the conclusion that there was no
probable motive to falsify; also, the affidavits of Bautista, having
been acknowledged before a notary public, should be given evidentiary
weight.[27]
Petitioner
also points out that in Lao vs. Court of Appeals[28] the Court held
that if knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is proven to be
actually absent or non-existent, the accused should not be held liable
for the offense defined under Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22; in said case,
petitioner was acquitted, even though she was still connected with the
corporation at the time of the issuance of the check, since she was not
expected or obliged to possess under the organizational structure of
the corporation, knowledge of the insufficiency of funds; and that in
the case at bar, the court a quo affirmed the conviction of petitioner
even though it was established that he had ceased to be connected with
co-accused Bautista’s business for more than three years prior to the
issuance of the subject check and even though it was clear from the
testimony of private complainant himself that he had dealt with
Bautista and Ilagan only.[29]
Anent
the second and third assigned errors, petitioner argues that: in the
case at bar, there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an
obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject
check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993
since petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista
starting July of 1989; when Bautista issued the subject check to
Bergado on July 24, 1993, Bautista had no more authority to use
petitioner’s pre-signed checks thus there was no consideration to speak
of; petitioner was deceived by Bautista into believing that all the
pre-signed checks were already used or issued as of 1989; the court a
quo should not have presumed that when petitioner signed the checks and
handed the same to Bautista, petitioner had knowledge that their
account had no funds; in all criminal cases, suspicion, no matter how
strong cannot sway judgment; even assuming that petitioner had issued
the subject check when he signed the same sometime before July 1989 and
that he had an undertaking to whoever would be the payee, still
petitioner should be exempted from criminal liability since petitioner
could not comply with the said undertaking due to an insuperable cause,
i.e., as early as June 18, 1993, all the properties of petitioner had
already been attached/garnished by the Regional Trial Court of Oriental
Mindoro.[30]
Petitioner
further argues that: private complainant is not a holder in due course
because he knew that the account of Bautista and petitioner with UCPB
Araneta branch had been closed at the time that he deposited UCPB Check
No. ARA 168341 on August 5, 1993; Check No. ARA 374058 in the amount of
P500,000.00, which bounced earlier, was drawn from the same UCPB
account of Bautista and petitioner which had already been closed by the
UCPB on January 31, 1992;[31] private complainant also had knowledge
that the respective estates of both accused were already attached by
the RTC at the time the subject check was given to him by Bautista
since the first order of attachment was issued on June 18, 1993 and was
recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro on the same
date; applying the principle that registration of instrument is notice
to the world, Bergado is presumed to know the various orders of
attachment/garnishment issued by the court.[32]
As to
his fourth assigned error, petitioner argues that: the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the prosecution
failed to rebut the allegation of petitioner that he was not anymore
connected with the business of Bautista and therefore he had no
knowledge of the insufficiency of the funds handled by Bautista; and
the prosecution and the trial court relied solely on the authenticity
of petitioner’s signature on the subject check which fact is not enough
to convict petitioner of the offense charged.[33]
Finally,
anent his fifth assigned error, petitioner claims that the Regional
Trial Court which tried and convicted petitioner had no jurisdiction
over violations of B.P. Blg. 22 considering that the penalty therefor
is imprisonment of thirty days to one year and/or a fine not less than,
and not more than double, the amount, but not to exceed P200,000.00;
and that at the time the Information was filed on October 4, 1993,
violations of B.P. Blg. 22 fell under the jurisdiction of the MTC in
view of Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129 which provides that the MTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not more than four years and two months or a fine of
not more than P4,000.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless
of other imposable accessory or other penalties including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kin, nature, value or amount thereof.[34]
In his
Comment, the Solicitor General contends that: the mere fact that
petitioner was a signatory to the check makes him solidarily liable
with his co-signatory; if it is true that petitioner severed his
accommodation arrangement with Bautista as early as July of 1989, he
should have informed the UCPB Araneta Avenue, Quezon City branch that
any check that would be issued bearing his signature and that of
Bautista and drawn against their joint account after July of 1989
should no longer be honored; the affidavit of Bautista to the effect
that petitioner should not be held answerable for any liability of
Unlad after July 1989 is not admissible as Bautista was not presented
in court nor the prosecution afforded any opportunity to test the
veracity of his allegations; having failed to convincingly establish
that petitioner has severed his accommodation arrangement with his
co-accused Bautista, the presumption stands that he was aware that they
no longer had sufficient funds at the time the check was issued;
the presumption also stands that the check was issued on account or for
value; petitioner also cannot claim that private complainant was
aware that petitioner and Bautista’s joint account was already closed
at the time the subject check was issued and delivered to complainant
since there is nothing on record to show that the reason for the
non-payment of the checks earlier issued to complainant was due to
“account closed”; Bergado claims that the earlier checks were
dishonored due to lack of sufficient funds; there is also no
merit to the argument of petitioner that private complainant was
already aware that petitioner together with Bautista could no longer
make good the subject check in view of the various writs of attachment
issued by the court against their properties, which writs of attachment
were duly recorded with the Register of Deeds; the registration of the
various writs of attachment affected only the real properties of
petitioner and such registration served as warning to those who may
have or intend to have dealings affecting such lands covered by the
attachments; with regard to the attachment of their bank accounts,
there was no showing that private complainant was aware of the same;
there is also no merit to the claim of petitioner that his guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt; the prosecution was able to
establish that petitioner, together with Bautista, issued the subject
check to the complainant in payment of the money loaned by the latter
to Unlad; the check bounced for the reason “account closed” and despite
demand to make good the check, petitioner and his co-accused failed and
refused to pay the complainant; and there is no merit to the claim of
petitioner that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the present case
following Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129 where it is provided that in
order that the offense under the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
the imposable penalty must not exceed four years and two months or a
fine of not more than P4,000.00 or both such fine and imprisonment; in
the case at bar, the imposable fine is way beyond the limit of
P4,000.00 as the amount of the check is P980,000.00 thus the RTC had
jurisdiction over the case.[35]
Simply
stated, the issues that need to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether
the RTC, which tried and convicted petitioner, has jurisdiction over
the case; (2) whether petitioner had actual knowledge of the
sufficiency or insufficiency of funds handled by his co-accused; (3)
whether the check was issued on account or for value; (4) whether the
private complainant, at the time of issuance, had knowledge that the
check had no sufficient funds; and (5) whether the guilt of the accused
was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
First
issue. Whether the RTC, which tried and convicted petitioner, had
jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner
claims that the RTC which tried and convicted him had no jurisdiction
over violations of B.P. Blg. 22 since such jurisdiction is vested on
the MTC in view of Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129.
We do
not agree.
As
clearly provided by Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, to wit:
Sec. 32.
Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.---Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(2)
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including
the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
(Emphasis supplied)
the
MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, OR, a fine of
not more than four thousand pesos or both such fine and imprisonment.
The
Information in this case was filed on October 4, 1993.
On
March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7691 took effect and amended Sec. 32
(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 to read as follows:
Sec. 32.
Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. --- Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(2)
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Since
the Information in the present case was filed prior to the amendment of
R.A. No. 7691, the old rule governs and therefore, considering that the
imposable penalty for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 per Section 1, thereof
is imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year
OR by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine
and imprisonment; and inasmuch as the fine imposable in the present
case is more than P4,000.00 as the subject amount of the check is
P980,000.00, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over
the present case. As we held in People vs. Velasco:[36]
as a general rule
the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising
jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the
final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal.
The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or
is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions
pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the
jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied
to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of a statute.
A
perusal of R.A. No. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions
apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial
stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it
be understood as having retroactive application to criminal cases
pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its
effectivity…At the time the case against the appellant was commenced by
the filing of the information on July 3, 1991, the Regional Trial Court
had jurisdiction over the offense charged.
In
fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the
appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. No.
6425 before amendment) when the information was filed.
Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the action and could not
be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the
jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal
cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.[37]
Second
issue. Whether petitioner had actual knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds.
We
have held that knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to
establish, thus the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption
that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or
credit with the bank at the time of the issuance and on the check’s
presentment for payment if he fails to pay the amount of the check
within five banking days from notice of dishonor.[38]
Sec. 2
of B.P. Blg. 22, provides:
Section 2.
Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be
prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount
due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee.
As a
rule, the prosecution has a duty to prove all the elements of the
crime, including the acts that give rise to the prima facie
presumption. Petitioner, on the other hand, has a right to rebut
such presumption. Thus, if such knowledge of insufficiency of
funds is proven to be actually absent or inexistent, the accused should
not be held liable for the offense defined under the first paragraph of
Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22,[39] thus:
SECTION 1.
Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time
of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not
less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine
shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The
same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit or to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a
period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
In the
present case, the prosecution has established the prima facie
presumption of knowledge of petitioner of insufficient funds through
the demand letter sent to petitioner, Exhibit “C”[40] which was duly
received by petitioner as shown by the registry return receipt, Exhibit
“D”.[41]
Petitioner
tried to rebut the prima facie presumption by insisting that he is not
an owner of Unlad and he has already severed his accommodation
arrangement with Bautista as early as 1989. He argues that the
affidavits of Bautista exonerating him from any responsibility as well
as the private complainant’s own testimony that he never dealt with
petitioner, should be given weight.
We are
not persuaded.
It is
a hornbook doctrine that unless the affiant himself takes the witness
stand to affirm the averments in his affidavits, the affidavits must be
excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible
hearsay.[42] The trial court and the Court of Appeals were
correct in considering the same as hearsay evidence and in not giving
probative weight to such affidavits.
Moreover,
petitioner had admitted that he continued investing in Unlad until
April 1994. Hence, he now cannot claim that he has completely
severed his ties with Bautista as of 1989. With nothing but his
bare assertions, which are ambiguous at best, petitioner has failed to
rebut the prima facie presumption laid down by the statute and
established by the prosecution.
Petitioner’s
insistence that since he is not an owner of Unlad, he could not have
had any knowledge as to the insufficiency of funds is devoid of
merit. As clarified in Lao vs. Court of Appeals,[43] the very
case petitioner is invoking, the doctrine that a mere employee tasked
to sign checks in blanks may not be deemed to have knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds applies only to corporate checks and not to
personal checks.[44] In this case, what is involved is a personal and
not a corporate check.
Worth
mentioning also is the fact that in the Lao case, the notice of
dishonor was never personally received by petitioner, thus the prima
facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds never
arose. Here, as correctly found by the RTC, petitioner was duly
notified of the dishonor of the subject check as shown by Exh. “C,”[45]
a letter, specifically mentioning that the subject check was dishonored
for reason “Account Closed,” with the corresponding registry return
receipt showing that petitioner received the notice on August 16, 1993
which petitioner did not impugn.[46]
Third
issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
Petitioner’s
claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a
check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that
the same was issued for valuable consideration.[47] Valuable
consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest,
profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor,
or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is
an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the
contract, such as the maker or indorser.[48]
In
this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks
in blank, the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest
from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account.
This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued.
That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation
incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by
Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was
no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot
be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to
adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or
Unlad.
At any
rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of
issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor
the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is
because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless
checks and putting them into circulation.[49]
Fourth
issue. Whether the private complainant, at the time of issuance,
had knowledge that the checks had no sufficient funds.
We
have held that knowledge of the payee that the drawer did not have
sufficient funds with the drawee bank at the time the check was issued
is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of the offense
under B.P. Blg. 22.[50] This is because the gravamen of the offense is
the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance
thereof are inconsequential.[51]
In Yu
Oh vs. Court of Appeals[52] the Court held that there is no violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, if complainant was actually told by the drawer that he
has no sufficient funds in the bank.[53] In the present case,
since there is no evidence that a categorical statement was given to
private complainant when the subject check was issued to him, the above
ruling cannot apply.
Fifth
issue. Whether the guilt of the accused was proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Petitioner
maintains that the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt since the prosecution failed to rebut his allegation
that he was not anymore connected with the business of Bautista and the
trial court relied solely on the authenticity of petitioner’s signature
on the subject check to convict him of the offense charged. We
are not convinced.
Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty. Suffice
it to say the law requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in a prejudiced mind.[54]
After
reviewing the entire records of this case, we find that there is no
reason to depart from the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
The weight and quantum of evidence needed to prove the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt were met and established by the
prosecution and correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
However,
in view of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as
clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, establishing a rule
of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P.
Blg. 22; and the recommendation of the Solicitor General in its Comment
that the policy laid down in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals,[55] and Lim vs.
People,[56] of redeeming valuable human material and preventing
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, be
considered in favor of petitioner who is not shown to be a habitual
delinquent or a recidivist,[57] we find that the penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals should be modified by deleting the penalty of
imprisonment and imposing only a fine of P200,000.00.
An
appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and it
becomes our duty to correct any error, as may be found in the appealed
judgment, whether assigned as an error or not.[58] Considering that the
civil aspect of the case is deemed instituted with the criminal case
and considering that the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to
award, in their respective judgments, the interest on the amount due to
private complainant, it is incumbent upon us to correct the patent
error of the lower courts. Private complainant is entitled to a
12% legal interest per annum from the date of finality of judgment.[59]
WHEREFORE,
the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: The sentence of imprisonment is deleted.
Instead, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00, subject to
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency pursuant to Article 39 of
the Revised Penal Code; and petitioner is ordered to pay the private
complainant the amount of P980,000.00 with 12% legal interest per annum
from the date of finality of herein judgment.
SO
ORDERED.
Puno,
J., (Chairman), Callejo,
Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
concur.
[1]
Penned by Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., and concurred in by Justices
Jainal D. Rasul and Ruben T. Reyes; Rollo, pp. 49-57.
[2]
Penned by Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Ruben
T. Reyes and Mariano M. Umali (now retired).
[3]
Records, p. 1.
[4]
Id., p. 45.
[5]
Rollo, p. 63.
[6]
TSN, May 17, 1995, pp. 4-12.
[7]
Spelled as “Zayda” in the TSN, May 24, 1995, but “Zenaida” in the RTC
decision, Rollo, p. 63.
[8]
TSN, May 24, 1995, pp. 4-6 and 9.
[9]
Exh. “A”, Records, p. 76.
[10]
Exh. “B”, Records, p. 76.
[11]
Exh. “C”, Records, p. 77.
[12]
Exh. “D”, Records, p. 78.
[13]
Exh. “E”, Records, pp. 79-81.
[14]
Exh. “F”, Records, p. 82.
[15]
Exh. “G”, Records p. 83.
[16]
TSN, August 13, 1996, pp. 7-8, 13-18.
[17]
TSN, August 20, 1996, pp. 12-17.
[18]
Exh. “1”, Records, p. 189.
[19]
Exh. “2”, Records, p. 190.
[20]
Exh. “3”, Records, p. 191.
[21]
Exh. “4”, Records, p. 192.
[22]
Exhs. “5”, “6”, “7”, “8”, “9”, “10”, “11”, “12”, “13” and “14”;
Records, pp. 193-206.
[23]
Exhs. “15”, “16”, “17”, “18”, “19”, “20”, “21”, “22”, “23”; Records,
pp. 207-209.
[24]
Rollo, p. 68.
[25]
Id., p. 57.
[26]
Rollo, p. 19.
[27]
Rollo, pp. 20-25.
[28]
G.R. No. 119178, June 20, 1997, 274 SCRA 572.
[29]
Rollo, pp. 28-29 and 31.
[30]
Id., pp. 31-34.
[31]
Id., pp. 35-36.
[32]
Id., p. 37.
[33]
Id., p. 41.
[34]
Id., pp. 41-42.
[35]
Rollo, pp. 154-159.
[36]
G.R. No. 110592, January 23, 1996, 252 SCRA 135, 147.
[37]
Id., pp. 147-148.
[38]
Llamado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99032, March 26, 1997, 270 SCRA
423, 429-430.
[39]
Lao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119178, June 20, 1997, 274 SCRA 572,
585-586.
[40]
RTC Records, p. 77.
[41]
Id., p. 78.
[42]
People vs. Quidato, G.R. No. 117401, October 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 1, 8;
People vs. Rendoque, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 622, 635.
[43]
Supra, note 28.
[44]
Id., pp. 591-592.
[45]
RTC Records, p. 77.
[46]
Id., p. 78.
[47]
Ty vs. People, G.R. No. 149275, September 27, 2004.
[48]
Ibid.
[49]
Ibid.
[50]
Ty vs. People, supra; Rigor vs. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17,
2004.
[51]
Rigor vs. People, supra.
[52]
G.R. No. 125297, June 6, 2003, 403 SCRA 300.
[53]
Id., p. 316, citing Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, January 18, 2000, 322 SCRA 73, 79.
[54]
People vs. Esquila, G.R. No. 116727, February 27, 1996, 254 SCRA 140,
147.
[55]
November 16, 1998, 298 SCRA 656.
[56]
G.R. No. 130038, September 18, 2000, 340 SCRA 497.
[57]
Rollo, p. 159.
[58]
People vs. Laguerta, October 30, 2000, 344 SCRA 453, 458; People vs.
Balacano, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 615, 629-630.
[59]
Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation vs. Court of Appeal, January
18, 2000, 322 SCRA 73, 79.
|