ChanRobles Virtual law Library
PHILIPPINE LAWS, STATUTES & CODES
A collection of Philippine laws, statutes and codes not included or cited in the main indices of the Chan Robles Virtual Law Library.
:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
PLEASE CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST ➔ PHILIPPINE LAWS, STATUTES & CODES
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 34 -
SUSPENDING MR. JOSUE C. GASPAR FROM OFFICE AS ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL
FISCAL OF NUEVA ECIJA
This refers to the administrative complaint
filed by Mrs. Juana Rimando de Calix against Nueva Ecija Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Josue C. Gaspar for grave misconduct, ignorance of
the law and inefficiency.
Sometime in 1975, complainant bought an irrigation pump set under a
financing arrangement with the Development Bank of the Philippines. On
May 24, 1976, she entered into an agreement with one Eduardo Viernes
whereby the latter undertook to apply with the bank for the transfer of
her rights and to assume all her loan accountabilities. Without filing
the agreed application and without complainant's knowledge and consent,
Viernes took the irrigation pump set and sold it. With the assistance
of the Integrated National Police, complainant was able to trace and
find the irrigation engine in the possession of Francisco Pascual and,
with Pascual's consent, recovered possession of the engine.
On April 27, 1977, she filed a criminal complaint for estafa (I.S. No.
19-G-77) against Viernes and Santiago Manangkil with the Provincial
Fiscal's Branch Office at Guimba, Nueva Ecija. In the course of the
preliminary investigation, respondent, as the investigating fiscal,
ordered complainant to bring the engine to the fiscal's office, which
she did on October 4, 1977. On November 7, 1977, respondent released
the engine to Pascual upon the latter's request, prompting complainant
to charge respondent with grave misconduct, ignorance of the law and
inefficiency for (a) his failure to resolve her complaint for estafa as
of the date of her administrative complaint and within the period
prescribed under Presidential Decree No. 911, and (b) releasing the
engine to Pascual even during the pendency of the preliminary
investigation.
Respondent denied the charges and claimed that he had resolved the
criminal complaint "as of November 3, 1978", and recommended the filing
of the corresponding information. Respondent further averred that he
ordered the release of the engine to Pascual out of compassion to save
the latter's standing crop and prevent the destruction of the engine by
disuse.
After due investigation, or on October 22, 1980, the then Ministry (now
Department) of Justice found respondent guilty of the charges and
recommended that he be suspended from office for one (1) month without
pay. The then Deputy Minister (now Undersecretary) of Justice
reiterated the foregoing recommendation in his letter of December 6,
1986.
After a review of the case, we concur in the findings and
recommendation of the Justice Department. There is no question that the
complaint for estafa was filed on April 27, 1977, and resolved, per
respondent's admission, only on November 3, 1978, or after the lapse of
approximately one (1) year and seven (7) months after its filing.
Clearly therefore, the case was resolved way beyond the period
prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 911. Respondent, however,
maintains that the delay was neither wilfull nor deliberate but was
caused by his efforts to identify and have the vital witness (referring
to Pascual) testify, by the absence of his stenographer, and by work
overload. The engine was released to Pascual on November 7, 1977.
Obviously, Pascual must have appeared and testified at the preliminary
investigation prior thereto, thus completing complainant's evidence.
And yet, it took respondent almost a year thereafter to resolved the
case.
Lack of personnel and work overload may constitute a plausible
justification for a reasonable period of delay, but certainly not for a
period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months. The delay in the
resolution of the case may not have been wilfull or deliberate as
claimed by respondent, but the stubborn fact remains that there was an
unwarranted delay attributable to no other than respondent's fault or
negligence.
Respondent disputes the allegations that it was complainant alone who
brought the engine to his office and asserts that she was accompanied
by Pascual. We are more inclined to believe complainant's allegation.
The engine was then in the factual and legal possession of complainant,
and respondent knew for a fact that it was the very same engine that
was the subject of the estafa complaint. While respondent had the
authority to release the engine for good and valid reasons, such
authority involved the exercise of proper discretion. The engine should
have been released to complainant who had the legal title or, at least,
a better claim thereto. Respondent's release of the engine in effect
divested complainant, who had the legal title or better claim to its
possession, and transferred that possession to one who had not
established his claim or right thereto. Complainant's title or better
right to the engine, already demonstrated by the evidence presented,
was in fact recognized in the respondent's ultimate finding of a prima
facie case for estafa. The release of the engine to Pascual by
respondent was an improper exercise of discretion and cannot be
sanctioned by the supposed "humanitarian" and "practical" reasons
claimed by respondent. Humanitarian reasons must be applied not just to
one party but to all parties. Practical reasons cannot sanction what is
illegal.
WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the Secretary of Justice, Mr. Josue C.
Gaspar is hereby suspended from office as Assistant Provincial Fiscal
of Nueva Ecija for one (1) month without pay, effective upon receipt of
a copy of this Order.
Done in the City of Manila,
this 21st day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and eighty-seven.
chanrobles virtual law library
Back
to Main
Since 19.07.98.