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ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
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ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 37 -
IMPOSING A FINE ON CORAZON B. MARCOS, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE TARIFF
COMMISSION, EQUIVALENT TO HER THREE (3) MONTHS' SALARY TO BE DEDUCTED
FROM WHATEVER RETIREMENT AND OTHER BENEFITS SHE MAY RECEIVE FROM THE
GOVERNMENT
This refers to the administrative case
filed by Ms. Herminia J. Tayco, Special Assistant to the Chairman of
the Tariff Commission, against Ms. Corazon B. Marcos, then Acting
(later regular) Chairman of the said Commission, for "grave abuse of
authority, oppression and conduct unbecoming" of an official arising
from respondent's refusal to pay the former's salaries as such Special
Assistant, notwithstanding the decisions of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), and the Office of the President, and, as updated by
complainant's subsequent letters and as later particularized, from
respondent's continued refusal to pay said salaries despite the
decisions/orders of the Office of the President, the CSC, the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the Budget Commission,
Commission on Audit (COA), and the Minister of Justice, all upholding
the validity of such complainant's appointment and directing the
payment of her salaries.
The complaint, dated December 26, 1974, was filed with the NEDA to
which the Tariff Commission was attached. NEDA indorsed it to this
Office on April 12, 1976. On February 22, 1977, this Office required
the respondent to submit her answer to the complaint within seventy-two
(72) hours. No compliance with this order is shown by the record of the
case.
On January 17, 1983, this Office required the complainant to "make
statement of particulars and/or specifications of the charges" to
enable it "to arrive at an intelligent decision or take appropriate
action on the case." The record is bare on complainant's compliance
with this order.
In 1986, this Office received letters from the complainant, dated March
12, April 7, 16, and 23, 1986, all expressing her relentless pursuit of
the case. Likewise, this Office received a communication from the new
Chairman of the Tariff Commission, Chula J. Alarcon, dated April 28,
1986, seeking information on the status of the case in order that the
Commission could act on the application of the respondent who resigned
as Chairman of the Commission, effective April 16, 1986, "for
administrative clearance as a requirement for her retirement benefits.. ."
In view thereof, and considering that the complainant and the
respondent have not yet complied with the aforesaid orders of February
22, 1977 and January 17, 1983, respectively, this Office, on June 25,
1986, directed the complainant to submit verified specifications of her
charges and the respondent to file a verified answer thereto.
Briefly, complainant's charges, as particularized, are based on
respondent's refusal to pay her salaries as Special Assistant to the
Chairman of the Tariff Commission, notwithstanding the decision of this
Office confirming the authority of Tariff Commission Chairman Razon T.
Haresco to issue her appointment as such Special Assistant and the
decisions of the CSC upholding the validity of her said appointment and
dismissing the protest of Rosalia A. Saldaña against her
appointment; on respondent's continued refusal to pay her said
salaries, to act on her GSIS loan and on her request for payment of her
MEDICARE premiums; despite the directives of the NEDA and this Office
for payment of her salaries as such Special Assistant; on respondent's
subsequent act of revoking her appointment and considering her position
as vacant; on respondent's act of proposing for the abolition of her
item after failing to invalidate her appointment; on respondent's act
of withholding from Chairman Haresco the directives of the Budget
Commissioner and this Office directing the payment of her salaries, and
of disclaiming knowledge of such directives and refusing to act on her
salary vouchers; on respondent's determined effort to cause the
nullification of her appointment, notwithstanding decisions of
appropriate government agencies upholding its validity; on respondent's
act of requesting General Fabian C. Ver for a thorough and immediate
investigation of all officials and employees who caused the issuance of
her appointment and payment of her salaries; on respondent's act of
requesting her recall and questioning her services from February 17,
1975 (the effective date stated in Special Order No. 9 terminating her
detail) although said Order No. 9 was issued only on March 11, 1975 and
she received it only on March 17, 1975; on respondent's act of issuing
Office Order No. 6-A dated February 17, 1975 or while she was still on
detail at the Development Management Staff (Malacañang),
assigning her to the Office of the Executive Director and requiring her
to use the bundy clock although personnel of lower rank were not
required to do the same; and on respondent's act of questioning the
directive of Chairman Manuel L. Alba directing the Cashier of the
Tariff Commission to pay her accumulated salaries. All these acts of
the respondent, so complainant asserts, show harassment, oppression,
and vindictiveness on the part of the respondent, done in wanton
disregard of her rights and in gross and evident bad faith utilizing
the powers of her office and her affinity with then President Marcos,
with clear malice and obvious intent to cause damage and prejudice to
her. To further support her charges, complainant submitted a copy of
the decision or the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Branch
IX) in Civil Case No. Q-20481, ordering respondent to pay moral and
exemplary damages, among others.
Respondent, in her answer, interposed the defense of good faith and
honesty in her belief on the nullity of complainant's appointment and
that she was just overzealous in protecting the people's money.
After the submission of the above-required pleadings, this Office
created a Committee under Memorandum Order No. 41, dated September 25,
1986, to investigate the charges of the complainant against the
respondent.
During the November 6, 1986 hearing, respondent presented a Motion to
Dismiss, dated October 29, 1986, anchored on the grounds (a) that the
case has been rendered moot and academic by the acceptance by the
President of respondent's resignation, effective April 16, 1986; and
(b) that this Office has lost jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent. The Committee, however, deferred the resolution of said
motion until the reception of evidence, and allowed the complainant to
file a written opposition thereto, which she did, and required the
parties to submit their evidence, in addition to those already filed
with this Office. The additional evidence being all documentary, the
parties agreed to submit them together with their respective position
papers/memoranda, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision.
The Report of the Committee, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows:
"Respondent,
in seeking the dismissal of the case based on the acceptance by the
President of her resignation as Chairman of the Tariff Commission
effective April 16, 1986 — which, according to her, rendered the case
moot and academic and deprives this Office of jurisdiction over the
person — relies upon the case of Diamalon vs. Quintillan (Adm. Case No.
116, August 29, 1969 SCRA 347) wherein the Supreme Court ruled that an
administrative proceeding against a judge may be dismissed after the
judge's resignation has been accepted by the President during the
pendency of the case, because an administrative proceeding is
predicated on the holding by the respondent of an office or position in
the Government (at p. 350). This ruling, however, was explained and
modified, if not superseded, by the subsequent cases of Perez vs.
Abiera (Adm. Case No. 223-J, June 11, 1975, 64 SCRA 302); Pesole vs.
Rodriguez (Adm. Case No. 755-MJ, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 208); and
People vs. Valenzuela (L-63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135, SCRA
712).
"In explaining the Quintillan
ruling and in disposing Judge Abiera's theory of mootness and lack of
jurisdiction similar to that of respondent's in this case, the Supreme
Court said:
'It was not the intent of the
Court in the case of Quintillan to set down a hard and fast rule that
the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge as the case may be
renders moot and academic the administrative case pending against him;
nor did the Court mean to divest itself of jurisdiction to impose
certain penalties short of dismissal from the government service should
there be a finding of guilt on the basis of the evidence. In other
words, the jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the
pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent public officials innocent of the charges or
declares him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with
injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For
what remedy would the people have against a judge or any other public
official who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his last
days in office? What would prevent some corrupt and unscrupulous
magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing
fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune
to all administrative penalties? . . . . If innocent, respondent
official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the
government which he served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves
to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable
under the situation.' (Perez vs. Abiera, supra, at pp. 306-307; Pesole
vs. Rodriguez, supra, at p. 211; People vs. Valenzuela, at p. 718;
Emphasis supplied.)
"Thus, notwithstanding the
retirement of Judge Abiera shortly after the filing of the
administrative case against him, the Supreme Court required him to
answer the complaint and the case investigated and finding him guilty
of serious misconduct in office, imposed upon him a fine equivalent to
three (3) months salary, deductible from whatever retirement benefits
he is entitled to and will receive from the government. (Perez vs.
Abiera, supra, at pp. 109-110). Likewise, an administrative case
against a municipal judge was pursued and investigated notwithstanding
his compulsory retirement (Rañeses vs. Tomines, Adm. Matter No.
518-MJ, May 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 94; Daily Papa vs. Almora, Adm. Matter
No. 543-MC & 1525-MJ, Dec. 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 376) and even after
the death of the respondent official (Hermosa vs. Paraiso, Adm. Case
No. P-189, February 14, 1975, 62 SCRA 361), if only to determine if his
heirs are entitled to retirement benefits on account of such death
which are deemed forfeited in the event that his guilt is established
at the investigation. (Ibid, at p. 362.)
"Indeed —
'the cessation from office of a
respondent judge either because of resignation, retirement or some
other similar cause does not per se warrant the dismissal of an
administrative complaint which was filed against him while still in the
service. Each case is to be resolved in the context of the
circumstances present thereat.' (Perez vs. Abiera, supra, at p. 308;
Emphasis supplied.)
But before we examine the facts
of this case to determine if circumstances warranting its dismissal
exist, we must first dispose of respondent's theory of double jeopardy
invoked by respondent in her motion to dismiss, albeit the opening
paragraph of said motion indicates that the same is based only on two
(2) grounds, namely: (a) mootness, and (b) jurisdiction.
"Respondent's theory of double
jeopardy proceeds from her characterization of her resignation as
'forced resignation' and is, therefore, a penalty within the meaning of
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 8, series of 1970, prescribing guidelines
in the application of penalties in administrative cases and other
matters relative thereto. She argues that, since such penalty of
'forced resignation' was imposed by the acceptance of her resignation
by the President without imposing therein any condition adversely
affecting her right to enjoy benefits, she should be allowed to enjoy
retirement and other benefits due her under existing laws, because
'forced resignation' as a penalty under MC No. 8, supra, may or may not
contain condition with respect to the enjoyment of benefits or
reinstatement or reemployment.
"The urgency of the need to
dispose of this case expeditiously was precisely precipitated by
respondent's application for retirement benefits. If the acceptance by
the President of her resignation was in fact an imposition of the
penalty of 'forced resignation' as respondent now contends, there would
be no legal basis for the payment of retirement benefits to her, for,
contrary to her allegation, the very CSC MC No. 8 invoked by her
mandates the forfeiture of her retirement benefits as Clause III (2)
thereof reads as follows:
'2.
This must however be read in
relation to the provision invoked by respondent, namely Clause VII (1,
2), MC No. 8, supra, providing that 'the penalty of forced-resignation'
carries with it the forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits
and disqualification for employment in the government service unless
otherwise provided therein. So that, in the absence of such
qualification, the penalty of 'forced resignation' shall be deemed to
include forfeiture of retirement benefits, among others.
"Clause III(2) and Clause VII(2)
may be restated thus: the penalty of 'forced resignation' carries with
it the forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits and
disqualification for employment in the government service unless
otherwise provided therein. So that, in the absence of such
qualification, the penalty of 'forced resignation' shall be deemed to
include forfeiture of retirement benefits, among others.
"As admitted by respondent, the
President's acceptance of her resignation does not contain a condition
that she shall enjoy retirement benefits. Hence, the same shall be
deemed to carry with it the forfeiture of her retirement benefits.
"This is so because 'forced
resignation' is the same as 'considered resigned' as explicitly
admitted by respondent when she invoked Opinion No. 50, series of 1977,
of the Minister of Justice relative to the cases of officers and
employees 'purged' or 'considered resigned' in September 1975 whose
petitions for reinstatement or for reconsideration of the acceptance of
their resignations were then pending before the Appeals Committee
created under Administrative Order No. 370, series of 1975, as shown by
the portion of the opinion quoted in respondent's motion to dismiss.
And the penalty of 'considered resigned' has been construed by no less
than the Supreme Court as dismissal for cause with forfeiture of
retirement benefits (Aquino vs. General Manager, GSIS, L-24859, January
31, 1968, 22 SCRA 415). It was in recognition of the disabilities
inherent in the penalty of 'forced resignation' or 'considered
resigned' that then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in order to remove
such disabilities issued Letter of Instructions No. 647, dated December
27, 1977, granting executive clemency to those officers and employees
purged in September 1975 who were not recommended for reinstatement by
the Appeals Committee, so that they may be allowed to be reemployed in
the government (par. 1) and, with respect to those who cannot be
reinstated or reemployed for any reason, to retire and receive
retirement and other benefits granted by law (par. 2).
"And Sec. 4 of PD 1146
(Revised GSIS Charter) as amended by PD 1981, provides that a
government officer or employee-member of the GSIS who is separated for
cause or considered resigned automatically forfeits whatever benefits
that shall have accrued or been earned at the time of separation.
"However, as our duty here is to
render justice, we cannot seize this opportunity to pin down the
respondent on the basis of her misapprehension of the true character of
her separation from the service and of the rule (CSC No. 8, supra) she
invokes. We must decide the case on the basis of the law applicable and
of the true facts of the case.
"Not much reliance can we place
on CSC MC No. 8, series of 1970, even if we assume its continued
operation (it was issued to implement the provisions on discipline of
R.A. 2260, as amended by R.A. 4380 and 6040) notwithstanding the
promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the
'Civil Service Decree of the Philippines', on October 6, 1975 (or
before the filing of the instant case on December 27, 1974) because it
must be deemed consistent with the subsequent law, particularly P.D.
807, and the provisions of the latter law on discipline are applicable
only in 'Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees'
(Sec. 38, P.D. 807); hence, inapplicable to respondent being a
presidential appointee.
"And we cannot go along with
respondent's characterization of her separation from the service as
'forced resignation'. It was a voluntary act, a courtesy resignation
usually tendered by ranking government officials whenever a new
administration comes into power. Respondent herself so described it in
her resignation letter dated February 26, 1986 in this clear language:
'To pave the way for the reorganization of the government on account of
the assumption to office by the President, I have the honor to tender
my resignation as Chairman of the Tariff Commission.'
"'Courtesy resignation' has
never been characterized in this jurisdiction as a 'forced
resignation'. Neither the acceptance thereof considered as an
imposition of the penalty of 'forced resignation'. It has always been
considered as a voluntary act done by key officials in the government
in the interest of the nation and of good government, to give the new
leadership a free hand in running the affairs of the government.
"There is, therefore, no basis
for respondent's invocation of the rule on double jeopardy as the
acceptance by the President of her courtesy resignation is, in no
proper sense, an imposition of the penalty of 'forced resignation'.
Hence, such acceptance, by itself alone, cannot deprive her of whatever
benefits due her under existing laws.
"Moreover, double jeopardy
applies only in criminal cases (see: Rule 117, Sec. 9, Rules of Court;
Art. IV, Sec. 22, 1973 Constitution; Art. 11, Sec. 21, 1987
Constitution). Pascual, Jr. vs. Board of Medical Examiners (L-25018,
May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA 344) invoked by respondent, is wholly
inapplicable to the instant case as it involves the self-incrimination
clause (not double jeopardy rule) in that petitioner therein was being
compelled to testify against himself (so also in the case cited
therein, namely: Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059) and the administrative
proceeding therein involves the imposition of sanction, criminal or
penal in character (see: Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, supra,
at p. 348), namely the revocation of Pascual's license as medical
practitioner, and in the Cabal case the forfeiture of properties under
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. (Ibid.)
"The instant case possesses no
criminal or penal aspect, but is an ordinary administrative
disciplinary proceeding involving only, if the circumstances so
warrant, the suspension or dismissal of the respondent from public
office (and the other administrative disabilities inherent thereto)
which is a public trust (Santos vs. Secretary of Labor, L-21524, Feb.
27, 1968, 22 SCRA 848, 450; Morfe vs. Mutuc, L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968, 22
SCRA 424, 432; Art. XIII, Sec. 1, 1973 Constitution; Art. XI, Sec. 1,
1987 Constitution) from which no vested right can arise (Segovia vs.
Noel, No. 23226, March 4, 1925, 47 Phil. 543, 547) and the holder
thereof may be removed the moment he loses the faith and trust of the
public or the moment he fails to 'serve (them) with the highest degree
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency' (Art. XIII, Sec. 1, 1973 Constitution), or in the language of the 1987 Constitution
(Art. XI, Sec. 1) to 'serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest (life)' because it is required that he 'must at all times be
accountable to the people.' (Ibid; see also: Art. XII, Sec. 1, 1973
Constitution.)
"Respondent, in her REPLY TO
COMPLAINANT'S OPPOSITION TO DISMISS, dated December 15, 1986, also
seeks dismissal of the instant case on the ground that this Office, per
5th Indorsement of then Presidential Assistant Juan C. Tuvera, dated
January 31, 1977, had long considered this case 'closed'. For a full
appreciation and clarity, we quote hereunder the said Tuvera 5th
Indorsement as follows:
'Respectfully returned, through
the Honorable, the Director General, National Economic and Development
Authority, to the Chairman, Tariff Commission, Quezon City, the within
preceding 4th indorsement dated December 24, 1976, relative to the
appointment of Herminia J. Tayco as special assistant to the Chairman,
that Commission, with the information that the same has been duly noted
and the case accordingly considered closed insofar as this Office is
concerned.' (Emphasis supplied.)
"As clearly suggested by the
language of the said 5th Indorsement, the case that was therein
'considered closed' was the case involving the validity of
complainant's appointment as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the
Tariff Commission and her right to receive the corresponding salary,
because those were the only matters that were then decided upon by this
Office in at least four (4) decisions, dated March 7, 1974; June 26,
1975; OP Decision No. 2269, dated October 8, 1976; and OP Decision No.
2389, dated December 3, 1976, let alone the 2nd Indorsement of this
Office, dated May 30, 1975, authorizing the payment of complainant's
accumulated salaries as such Special Assistant from February 1, 1974.
"Then Presidential Assistant
Tuvera could not have contemplated in his said 5th Indorsement of
January 31, 1977 the instant administrative case against the
respondent, not only because no investigation has yet then been
conducted on the case, much less decision rendered thereon, but also
because he subsequently requested, in a 1st Indorsement dated February
22, 1977, the respondent to submit 'her reply within 72 hours from
receipt (of said Indorsement) to the letter-complaint of Herminia J.
Tayco, Special Assistant to the Chairman, . . .' Likewise, this Office
requested on January 17, 1983 complainant to make specifications of her
charges against the respondent. It is thus highly incongruous for this
Office to require respondent to answer or reply to, and complainant to
make specifications of the charges in, the complaint in a case it had
already 'considered closed'.
"III.
"From the evidence submitted by
the parties and from the records of this Office, the following sequence
of events, from which the guilt or innocence of respondent may be
determined, emerges:
"Complainant was a former
Administrative Officer II of the Tariff Commission. On January 31,
1974, then Tariff Commissioner Razon T. Haresco issued an appointment
to complainant as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Tariff
Commission, effective February 1, 1974, with an annual compensation of
P12,516.00. On February 6, 1974, this Office, thru Assistant Executive
Secretary Roberto V. Reyes, advised the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
that the said appointment, together with that of Mr. Abundio R.
Querson, as such Special Assistant may be given due course, effective
February 1, 1974, as an exception to Memorandum Circular No. 593 of
this Office, dated August 8, 1972. Likewise, in a 1st Indorsement,
dated February 6, 1974, Director Tomas W. Flores of Wage and Position
Classification Office (WAPCO), Budget Commission, forwarded to the CSC
the said appointments of complainant and of Mr. Guerson, with the WAPCO
classification of the position indicating as Special Assistant to the
Chairman, Tariff Commission, and the salary allowable in the amount of
P12,516.00 per annum, and informing, among other things, that said
positions are embodied in the staffing pattern of the Tariff
Commission. Complainant's appointment as such Special Assistant was
subsequently approved by the CSC as permanent pursuant to Sec. 24(b)
of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended. HISAET
"On February 13, 1974, a protest
was filed with the CSC by Rosalia A. Saldaña, another employee
of the Tariff Commission, against the appointment of complainant, upon
the grounds of (a) violation of CSC laws, rules and regulations and (b)
prematureness of the appointment allegedly because the reorganization
of the Commission has not yet then been effected. In view thereof, on
February 20, 1974, respondent, then Assistant Commissioner, requested
the deferment of the payment of complainant's salary.
"Due to the doubt on her
authority to appoint personnel of the Tariff Commission engendered by
the conversion of said Commission from a single-headed entity to a
collegiate body, then Commissioner Haresco, in a letter dated February
22, 1974, inquired from this Office whether she was empowered by law to
sign and issue the appointment extended to the complainant, among
others, and on February 26, 1974, recalled said appointments.
"In a decision dated March 7,
1974, this Office (thru Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B.
Zamora) answered the same in the affirmative. For this reason,
Commissioner Haresco withdrew the recall of the said appointments.
"In May, 1974, then Acting
Chairman Haresco left for Bangkok, Thailand as UN-ASEAN MTN Team
Leader. As her temporary replacement, respondent, then Commissioner,
was designated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in a letter dated
March 22, 1974, as Acting Chairman of the Commission. As such Acting
Chairman, she ordered the deferment of the payment of complainant's
salaries as Tariff Commission Chairman's Special Assistant pending
resolution by the CSC of Saldaña's protest against complainant's
appointment.
"On June 10, 1974, the CSC
dismissed the protest of Saldaña against complainant's
appointment and upheld the validity thereof. In view thereof,
complainant, on July 1, 1974, requested the payment of her salaries as
Special Assistant, but respondent, as Acting Chairman, denied the same
in her letter of July 3, 1974, due to the pendency of Saldaña's
motion for reconsideration of said CSC decision. Likewise, respondent
did not act on or indorse to the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) complainant's application for GSIS salary loan.
"On September 16, 1974, the CSC
denied Saldaña's motion for reconsideration and accordingly
reiterated its original decision on June 10, 1974 and its prior
approval of complainant's appointment as Special Assistant to the
Tariff Commission Chairman. Saldaña did not elevate the case to
higher authority.
"In a letter to the CSC, dated
November 19, 1974, respondent, as Acting Chairman of the Tariff
Commission, declared complainant's position of Special Assistant to the
Tariff Commission as vacant and so informed the CSC as she is revoking
complainant's appointment thereto.
"The following day, November 20,
1974, complainant, apparently unaware of said respondent's latest move,
requested respondent to allow the payment of her accumulated salaries
as Tariff Commission Chairman's Special Assistant. Respondent, in a
letter dated November 25, 1974, denied the same, insisting that, as
conveyed in her aforecited November 19, 1974 letter to the CSC,
complainant is, for all legal intents and purposes, an Administrative
Officer II. On November 22, 1974, complainant requested a copy of
respondent's letter to the CSC, dated November 19, 1974. Respondent did
not honor said request.
"On December 27, 1974,
complainant filed her aforesaid administrative complaint against the
respondent with the NEDA to which the Tariff Commission was
attached.
"In the meantime, respondent
submitted under 1st Indorsement dated January 31, 1975, to the Budget
Commission, thru the NEDA Director General, the Tariff Commission
Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 1975-76, proposing therein the
abolition of the 'positions of Special Assistant to the Chairman and
Executive Assistant to the Member-Commissioners' of the Tariff
Commission.
"On the same day, in a 1st
Indorsement (dated January 31, 1975), the CSC answered respondent's
November 19, 1974 letter by holding that the Tariff Commission, 'thru
the designated Acting Chairman (respondent herein) has no longer
authority to revoke the said approved appointment' of complainant,
'much more declare said position already filled by virtue of a valid
appointment, vacant,' and directing that complainant 'be allowed to
assume the office of Special Assistant to the Chairman, (Tariff)
Commission, with all the rights, compensation and privileges thereof,
as provided in said appointment and under existing laws.'
"On February 13, 1975,
respondent requested the recall of complainant who was then on detail
with the Development Management Staff (DMS), Office of the Executive
Secretary, this Office.
"On February 17, 1975,
respondent issued Office Order No. 6-A assigning complainant to
Executive Director Emilio M. Cruz, effective immediately, and requiring
her to use bundy clock for her daily attendance.
"On February 18, 1975, then
Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director General Gerardo Sicat
submitted to the Budget Commission the Budget Estimates of the Tariff
Commission for Fiscal Year 1975-76, stating, among other things, that
'(T)hat other position of Special Assistant must be retained in view of
a recent decision of the Civil Service Commission upholding the
appointment of a certain employee of the Commission to the said
position.'
"On February 24, 1975, Secretary
and NEDA Director General Sicat, thru whom the aforesaid CSC's 1st
Indorsement of January 31, 1975 was coursed, indorsed the same to the
respondent as Acting Chairman of the Tariff Commission, enjoining
immediate compliance therewith.
"On February 26, 1975, Secretary
and NEDA Director General Sicat enjoined the Tariff Commission Acting
Chairman to comply with the CSC decision of January 31, 1975.
"Thereafter, in a letter dated
March 7, 1975, respondent advised this Office that her office cannot
allow the payment of complainant's salaries as Special Assistant for
several reasons, among which, the said position does not appear in the
staffing pattern recommended by the NEDA on October 19, 1973, pursuant
to Section s 501, 503 and 512 of Presidential Decree No. 34 and its
creation and funding were proposed subsequent to the approval of the
staffing pattern and was incorporated and itemized only under
Presidential Decree No. 503; that complainant's appointment was of
doubtful validity as it was recalled by Commissioner Haresco herself;
and that the Saldaña protest against complainant's appointment
was decided by the CSC on doubtful technicality.
"On March 11, 1975, this Office
issued Special Order No. 9, terminating complainant's detail effective
February 17, 1975. This was received by complainant on March 17, 1975.
"On March 14, 1975, respondent
wrote this Office questioning the fact that complainant did not report
to the Tariff Commissioner effective February 17, 1975. In answer
thereto, this Office, thru DMS Head Executive Assistant Lorenzo B.
Ballecer, in a letter dated April 14, 1975, advised respondent that
complainant's services for February 18, 1975 to March 11, 1975 are
counted as services rendered to DMS.
"In May 1975, Haresco returned
from Bangkok and re-assumed her responsibilities as Acting Chairman of
the Tariff Commission, and ordered the preparation of voucher for the
payment of complainant's accumulated salaries as Special Assistant.
Respondent objected thereto, prompting Acting Chairman Haresco to
inquire from the Budget Commission and the Department of Justice
relative to the legality of such payment.
"In a 1st Indorsement, dated May
30, 1975, Budget Commissioner F. Sy-Changco recommended to this Office
that the Tariff Commission be directed to pay complainant's accumulated
salaries. In conformity thereto, this Office thru Deputy Executive
Secretary Roberto V. Reyes, in a 2nd Indorsement of May 30, 1975,
authorized the payment of said accumulated salaries. These
communications of the Budget Commissioner and this Office were both
forwarded to respondent's office on June 2, 1975.
"On June 10, 1975, Acting
Chairman Haresco issued Office Order No. 24, recalling Office Order No.
6-A issued by the respondent (requiring complainant to use the bundy
clock in recording attendance).
The following day, June 11,
1975, respondent issued a Memorandum for Acting Chairman Haresco,
advising the latter that the salaries of the complainant and Aurelio R.
Orig are being held in abeyance pending receipt of further instructions
from Malacañang. In answer thereto, Acting Chairman Haresco, in
a memorandum to the respondent, dated June 19, 1975, reiterated her
stand that the CSC decision is executory and the payment of
complainant's accumulated salaries is already long overdue, and
inquired about the whereabouts of the aforesaid authority from this
Office for payment of said accumulated salaries and of the Budget
Commission's 1st Indorsement, both dated May 30, 1975, which were both
forwarded to respondent's office on June 2, 1975, and reminded
respondent about her (Haresco's) pending request for a copy of
respondent's letter to the Executive Secretary, dated March 7,
1975.
"Subsequently, this Office, in a
1st Indorsement, dated June 26, 1975, thru then Deputy Executive
Secretary Roberto V. Reyes, ruled that the objections raised by
respondent in her letter of March 7, 1975, were all untenable and
accordingly ordered that complainant be allowed to assume her office of
Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Commission, with all the
rights, compensation and privileges appertaining thereto.
"At about this time, Acting
Chairman Haresco left again for Bangkok, Thailand, as UN-ASEAN MTM Team
Leader, and the respondent was again designated as Acting Chairman in
her absence.
"On June 30, 1975, then
Secretary of Justice (later Supreme Court Associate Justice) Vicente
Abad Santos rendered Opinion No. 96 holding that he possesses no
revisory authority over the decisions of the CSC, the Office of the
President, the NEDA Director General who has administrative supervision
over the Tariff Commission, and the Commissioner of the Budget, stating
that the same decisions are presumed to be valid and legal and should
therefore be obeyed by government officials and employees concerned and
inviting attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mitra vs.
Subido (21 SCRA 130, 142) holding that the moment the appointee assumes
a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, as
complainant did, he acquires legal right protected not only by law but
also by the Constitution and the same cannot be revoked nor the
appointee be removed except for cause. This was received by
respondent's office on July 2, 1975.
"On July 21, 1975, Economic
Planning Secretary and NEDA Director General Sicat, in a 2nd
Indorsement, enjoined the Tariff Commission Acting Chairman to execute
the decision of this Office, dated June 26, 1975, on complainant's
claim for accumulated salaries.
"Undaunted, respondent once
again acting as Acting Chairman of the Commission, in her letter, dated
August 4, 1975, advised this Office that her office is holding in
abeyance complainant's claim for accumulated salaries as Special
Assistant 'notwithstanding that 1st and 2nd Indorsements by the Deputy
Executive Secretary and Secretary of Economic, Planning dated 28 May
1975 and 21 July 1975, respectively, directing and enjoining to pay
said claim' as she insisted therein that complainant's appointment is
null and void ab initio.
"On August 15, 1975, Secretary
and NEDA Director General Sicat issued memorandum to the Tariff
Commission Acting Chairman for the immediate release of complainant's
accumulated salaries as Special Assistant.
"On August 21, 1975, complainant
advised respondent that she is refiling her application for GSIS salary
loan in view of the deadline for payment of school fees of her
children, and on the following day, August 22, 1975, requested
respondent to make immediate payment of her MEDICARE premiums, which
have not been paid for more than a year already, in view of the need of
her daughter to enter the hospital for the removal of a cyst. No action
was taken by the respondent on both requests.
"On September 15, 1975,
complainant filed Civil Case No. Q-20481, for damages, against
respondent with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal 17th Judicial
District, Branch IX, Quezon City.
"On September 23, 1975, then
newly appointed Chairman of the Tariff Commission, Manuel S. Alba,
issued Memorandum to the Cashier of the Commission ordering the payment
of complainant's accumulated salaries as Special Assistant to the
Chairman. Respondent objected thereto in her note of October 13, 1975,
to which Chairman Alba replied (Memorandum of October 15, 1975) that
his memorandum merely implements the decisions of the Office of the
President, the Budget Commission, the NEDA Director General and the
Civil Service Commission, and that the civil case for damages has
nothing to do with the case already resolved by higher authorities and
that he cannot understand respondent's idea of contempt of court, and
that, in any case, his directive for payment of complainant's
accumulated salaries still holds. Thus, complainant was paid in
November 1975 of her accumulated salaries.
"On March 9, 1975, complainant
wrote the NEDA Director General complaining about the inaction on her
administrative complaint against the respondent and about the alleged
non-compliance by the respondent with the directive requiring her to
submit her answer to or comment on said complaint, and submitting
additional documents to substantiate her charges, including acts and
actions done or taken after the filing of her administrative complaint.
"On April 12, 1976, Acting NEDA
Director General Manuel S. Alba indorsed to this Office complainant's
administrative complaint against the respondent, the latter being a
presidential appointee. Thus, complainant followed up the case in this
Office in 1976 thru her letters of June 9 and July 30, 1976.
"In the meantime, this Office
rendered OP Decision No. 2269, dated October 8, 1976 directing the
Chairman, Tariff Commission, for the immediate implementation of its
decision, dated June 26, 1975, warning that 'otherwise it will be
constrained to take such disciplinary action as may be deemed warranted
under the circumstances.' On October 26, 1976, Chairman Alba advised
Presidential Assistant Tuvera that upon his assumption of office, he
ordered the payment of complainant's accumulated salaries and the same
were paid in November, 1975 and the only issue pending is the
administrative case filed by complainant against the respondent.
"The following, day, or on
October 27, 1976, respondent wrote this Office reiterating her previous
opinion to the effect that complainant's appointment as Special
Assistant to the Chairman of the Tariff Commission was a nullity.
Finding her arguments advanced therein to be rehash of those already
resolved in the June 26, 1975 decision, this Office dismissed the same
for lack of merit and confirmed and reiterated the said decision in OP
Decision No. 2389, dated December 3, 1976.
"Thereafter, or on December 16,
1976, respondent wrote Major General Fabian C. Ver, then Commanding
General of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) and Director General
of the National Intelligence Security Authority (NISA), urging the
latter to conduct an immediate and thorough investigation and
prosecution of all officials and employees who caused the issuance,
preparation, processing, release, recording and approval of the
appointment of the complainant as Special Assistant to the Chairman of
the Tariff Commission and those who caused the payment, accounting and
auditing of her accumulated salaries as she still clings to her
position that the same appointment is null and void ab initio.
"In a 5th Indorsement, dated
January 31, 1977, this Office thru then Presidential Assistant Juan C.
Tuvera, returned to the Chairman of the Tariff Commission, thru the
Director General of the NEDA, the '4th indorsement dated December 25,
1976, relative to the appointment of Herminia J. Tayco (complainant
herein) as special assistant to the Chairman, that Commission, with the
information that the same has been duly noted and the case considered
closed insofar as this Office is concerned.'
"Thereafter, this Office, in a
1st Indorsement dated February 22, 1977 signed by then Presidential
Assistant Juan C. Tuvera, required respondent, then Commissioner of the
Tariff Commission, to answer or reply to the aforesaid letter-complaint
of the complainant within 72 hours.
"On March 30, 1977, then Acting
Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. of the Commission on Audit, to whom
respondent's letter of December 16, 1976 was referred by then Major
General Ver, rendered Opinion No. 207, holding that the legality of the
appointment of complainant and the auxiliary issue of payment of her
salary as special assistant are no longer open to question.
On May 12, 1981, the CFI of Quezon City (Branch IX) promulgated its decision in Civil Case No. Q-20481 ordering respondent to pay complainant P20,000.00 as actual and moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damage; P5,000.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs of suit, a copy of which decision this Office was furnished by complainant in her letter dated July 13, 1981.
On January 17, 1983, this Office wrote complainant requesting her to 'make a statement of particulars and/or specifications of the charges in order to enable this Office to arrive at an intelligent decision or take appropriate action on the case.'
On February 26, 1986, respondent, then already Chairman of the Tariff Commission, tendered to the President her resignation as such Chairman 'to pave the way for the reorganization of the government on account of the assumption to office by the new President.'
On March 21, 1986, complainant wrote this Office regarding her complaint against the respondent.
Five (5) days thereafter, or on March 26, 1986, the Executive Secretary informed the respondent of the acceptance by the President of her resignation as Chairman of the Tariff Commission effectively immediately.
Subsequently, this Office received from complainant a series of letters, dated April 7, 16 (coursed thru then Budget Minister Alberto G. Romulo), and 23, 1986, all about her administrative case against the respondent.
On April 28, 1986, the new Chairman of the Tariff Commission wrote this Office inquiring about the status of the instant administrative case which was forwarded by NEDA to this Office on April 14, 1976, in order that it can act on the application for retirement benefits filed by the respondent who has resigned as Chairman of the Tariff Commission effective April 16, 1976.
"IV.
"The complainant charges
respondent of oppression, grave abuse of authority, and conduct
unbecoming of a public official.
"'Oppression' has been defined
as an 'act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination or
excessive use of authority.' (Ochate vs. Deling, L-13298, March 30,
1959, 105 Phil. 384, 390.)
"'Abuse' means 'to make
excessive or improper use of a thing, or to employ it in a manner
contrary to the natural or legal rules for its use. To make an
extravagant or excessive use, as to abuse one's authority' (Black's Law
Dictionary Fifth Ed., p. 11). It includes 'misuse' (City of Baltimore
v. Cornellsville & S.P. Ry, Co., 6 Phils. 190, 191, 3 Pitt 20, 23).
The word 'grave', as modifier in 'grave abuse of discretion' which is
akin to 'grave abuse of authority' means 'wanton and capricious'
(Caoile vs. Puno, SP-0022, June 19, 1971, cited in Moreno's Philippine
Law Dictionary, p. 270).
"'Grave abuse of authority' may
thus, be defined as the use or misuse of one's authority in a wantonly
and capriciously excessive or extravagant manner contrary to the
natural or legal rules for its use.
"'Conduct unbecoming of public
official' means that conduct of public official 'which has a great
tendency to destroy public respect' (Carlisle Borough v. Adams, Pa., 12
Cumb. 53).
"Now,
does the above narration of facts show commission by respondent of
these administrative offenses?
"The ominous suggestion from the
facts narrated above is toward an affirmative answer. With
Saldaña keeping her peace with the said CSC decisions,
complainant's agony should have ended upon the receipt by the Tariff
Commission of the CSC resolution of September 16, 1974 holding, among
other things, that Saldaña's motion for reconsideration was
filed outside the reglementary period. But it was not to be so. A more
formidable obstacle was soon thrown her way, not by a mere co-employee
like Saldaña, but by no less than her boss, the respondent, who
was determined to block at all costs her appointment even if it meant
an open defiance of laws and decisions and orders of higher
authorities.
"Respondent's acts of defiance
"Under Republic Act No. 2260, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6040 (approved on August 4, 1969), under
whose regime complainant's appointment as Special Assistant to the
Chairman of the Tariff Commission was issued by then Tariff
Commissioner Haresco and approved by the CSC, appointments do not
require previous approval by the CSC for their effectivity [Sec. 24(d)]
and, therefore —
'". . . such appointments shall
become immediately effective upon the assumption of duties of the
appointees, entitling them to receive all the corresponding salaries
and benefits, until notice of the final decision of disapproval. . . ."
(Sec. 16(h), R.A. 260, as amended by R.A. 6040; emphasis supplied.)'
As found in the decision of this
Office, dated June 26, 1975, complainant assumed and performed her
duties as such Special Assistant 'since the effective date of her
appointment on February 1, 1974'. She was, therefore, entitled to
receive her salaries as such Special Assistant from, February 1, 1974,
even without prior approval by the CSC, pursuant to Sec. 16(h) of
R.A. 2260, as amended by R.A. 6040. And better still, her appointment
was approved by the CSC in February 1974.
"However, notwithstanding this
statutory command for the immediate payment of complainant's salaries
as Special Assistant to the Tariff Commission Chairman, we nonetheless
grant good faith in respondent's act of holding in abeyance payment of
complainant's salaries during the pendency of Saldaña's protest
against complainant's appointment. But, after this Office has upheld
and confirmed then Tariff Commissioner Haresco's authority to issue
complainant's appointment and after the CSC has dismissed
Saldaña's motion for reconsideration of said decision which had
become final and executory it not having been elevated by
Saldaña to higher authorities, there was no more valid reason
for respondent, as Acting Chairman of the Tariff Commission, to further
delay the payment complainant's accumulated salaries. Instead of
abiding by and respecting the decisions of this Office and the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) by paying complainant's salaries, respondent,
as such Acting Chairman, recalled complainant's CSC-approved
appointment and declared her position as vacant and, to insure
complainant's ouster from the Commission, proposed to the Budget
Commission for its abolition to which then Economic Planning Secretary
and NEDA Director General Sicat (who has administrative supervision
over the Tariff Commission) objected to, for, in his own fair and just
rationalization, the said position 'must be retained in view of a
recent decision of the CSC upholding the appointment of a certain
employee (complainant Tayco) of the (Tariff) Commission to the said
position.' (1st Indorsement, dated Feb. 18, 1975.)
"Again, after the CSC (in its
decision of January 31, 1975) rebuked her act of recalling
complainant's appointment and declaring her position vacant, and
directed her to allow complainant to assume her position 'with all the
rights, compensation and privileges thereof', it became respondent's
bounden responsibility as head of the Tariff Commission, and in
pursuance of the rule of law, to cause the immediate payment of
complainant's accumulated salaries. And the very agency
institutionalized in the 1973 Constitution as an independent body
(Civil Service Commission) to decide matters of appointment in the
civil service has already made its decision on the matter. Then there
was that order (dated February 24, 1975) of respondent's immediate
supervisor and superior (Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director
General Sicat) enjoining her to immediately comply with the said CSC
decision of January 31, 1975.
"But not even her said superior
could change respondent's stand. And not even after this Office has
authorized (2nd Indorsement dated May 30, 1975) the payment of said
accumulated salaries, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Budget
who had expressed the view that complainant's 'right to her accumulated
salaries is legally unassailable' (1st Indorsement, dated May 30,
1975). Notwithstanding this authority given by no less than this
Office, respondent, as Acting Chairman of the Tariff Commission, still
refused to pay complainant's accumulated salaries insisting that her
appointment is null and void ab initio.
"Again, after this Office has
brushed aside (decision of June 26, 1975) all respondent's grounds for
holding complainant's appointment a nullity and accordingly ordered
her, as Acting Chairman of the Tariff Commission, to allow the
complainant to assume her position 'with all the rights, compensation
and privileges appertaining thereto,' still respondent continued to
refuse to pay complainant's accumulated salaries when, as aptly held by
then Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos (Opinion No. 96, dated
June 30, 1975), the said decision of this Office (and that of the Civil
Service Commission, of the NEDA Director General and of the Budget
Commissioner) is 'presumed to be valid and legal and should therefore
be obeyed by the government officials and employees concerned.'
Concerned and irritated by respondent's open defiance not only of the
decisions of the Civil Service Commission, the NEDA Director General
and the Budget Commissioner but also of its own decision (sustained by
no less than the Legal Counsel of the Republic of the Philippines — the
Secretary of Justice), this Office (whose jurisdiction was sought by
respondent herself precisely to resolve the grounds of her objections
to the validity of complainant's appointment and the payment of her
accumulated salaries), directed the immediate implementation of its
decision of June 26, 1975 and warned: 'otherwise, it (this Office) will
be constrained to take such disciplinary action as may be deemed
warranted under the circumstances.' (OP Decision No. 2269, s. 1976)
Respondent's objections were once again brushed aside by this Office in
OP Decision No. 2389, series of 1976.
"Again, when newly appointed
regular Tariff Commission Chairman (later Minister of the Budget)
Manuel S. Alba ordered the immediate payment of complainant's
accumulated salaries in faithful compliance with the orders of higher
authorities, respondent, then reverted to mere Commissioner, objected
thereto with threats of contempt of court. Chairman Alba, however,
brushed aside respondent's objections and contempt threats and stood
firm on his order for the payment of complainant's accumulated salaries.
"Unable to further delay the
payment of complainant's accumulated salaries and smarting from the
decisions of this Office and of the abovementioned competent agencies,
respondent urged, in her letter of December 16, 1976, Major General
Fabian C. Ver, then Commanding General of the Presidential Security
Command (PSC) and concurrently Director-General of the National
Intelligence Security Authority (NISA), 'to conduct a thorough and
immediate investigation and prosecution (not only) all officials and
employees who were responsible for the issuance, preparation,
processing, release, recording and approval of the appointment of Mrs.
Herminia J. Tayco as Special Assistant to the Chairman, Tariff
Commission (but also) those who caused the payment, accounting and
auditing of the corresponding salaries arising from said appointment,'
as if then Major General Ver, as such PSC Commanding General and NISA
Director General, can overturn the decisions of those officials whom
she wanted to be investigated and prosecuted, including Deputy
Executive Secretary Roberto Reyes and Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B.
Zamora who rendered the aforesaid OP decisions 'by authority of the
President'; Civil Service Commissioners Epi Rey Pangramuyen and F.P.
Valera; Budget Commissioner F. Sy-Changco; Justice Secretary Vicente
Abad Santos; Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director General
Gerardo Sicat; and Tariff Commission Chairman Manuel S. Alba. Again,
respondent was rebuffed in her new attempt to invalidate complainant's
appointment and to harass complainant and said officials through
military intervention, when COA Chairman Francisco Tantuico Jr., to
whom her said letter was indorsed by General Ver, rendered his Opinion
No. 207, series of 1977, holding that 'the legality of the appointment
of Mrs. Tayco and (the) ancilliary issue of payment of her salary are
no longer open to question.'
"Reasons for the defiance
Why had respondent risked
herself of insubordination charge (as in fact she was warned by no less
than this Office that disciplinary action may be taken against her
should she continue to defy its decision on complainant's appointment
and salaries) by repeatedly defying the decisions and orders of her
superior officials, particularly that of her immediate supervisor,
Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director General Sicat; that of
the Civil Service Commission (the very agency vested by the
Constitution, and by law with jurisdiction over matters involving
appointment in the civil service); and that of the Office of the
President (which has control over all departments, bureaus and offices
in the executive branch of the government)? Respondent offers, as her
only defense, good faith or honesty or sincerity of belief on the
grounds of her continued refusal to recognize complainant's appointment
and to pay her salaries.
"We cannot now in this
proceeding pass upon the validity of her said grounds or objections as
they had long been put to rest by the final decisions of the Civil
Service Commission and of this Office.
"But, good faith on the part of
respondent may be conceded at the start. But, after the appropriate
superior authorities (whose jurisdiction she herself had sought to
precisely resolve her objections to complainant's appointment and her
right to receive the corresponding salaries) had dismissed her said
objections as legally untenable and sustained the validity of
complainant's appointment and ordered the payment of complainant's
accumulated salaries, her subsequent acts of repeatedly refusing to
recognize said appointment and to pay complainant's accumulated
salaries simply negate her defense of good faith. One's good faith or
honesty or belief, being a process of the mind, may only be
approximated by her actions.
"The actions taken by the
respondent in complainant's case show that they were done not because
of the honesty of her belief in the nullity of complainant's
appointment, but because of personal hostility, passion, partiality,
vindictiveness, malice, and cruelty. Her acts were clearly intended to
harass, prejudice and cause sufferings on the complainant through
excessive use of authority as further shown by the following acts of
respondent:
"1)
'Sally, pls. take a look at
this. Comment if necessary. See the implication of this re your
protest, future adjustments, etc.
If you recall terms use by the Queen Pig, use them here. Pls. finalize.'
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
"Because
of all these unwarranted 'acts of harassment and vindictiveness', to
use the language employed by the CFI of Quezon City in its decision of
May 12, 1981 in Civil Case No. Q-20481 (Herminia Tayco vs. Corazon
Marcos), complainant 'felt very bad and there was financial problem as
she was not receiving her salaries, could not also sleep and not at
ease. She resorted to work for loans and had to go back and forth to
the province to borrow money with interest, and therefore, had no peace
of mind and could not sleep thereby incurring damages.'
"The
said Court continued:
'A perusal of all evidence
presented shows that indeed defendant (respondent herein) employed a
pattern of harassment as she was never satisfied with decisions and
rulings of higher authorities, not to mention that of His Excellency,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos because the indorsement and decisions of
Malacañang were done 'By authority of the President.' Not only
that, but despite directives from other higher authorities, defendant
did not implement the same and insisted on her personal view, holding
the payment of salaries of plaintiff (complainant herein), even when
she was no longer Acting Chairman, and continued to do so up to the
last, when finally plaintiff was given what is due her by Chairman
Manuel Alba. She acted beyond the scope of her authority and what is
called for by virtue of her official position, and therefore, could be
held liable in her personal capacity. Her insistence and defiance to
comply with decisions called for to make decisions, aggravated the
situation, as she took it upon herself to appear as the lone crusader
under the New Society. Personality crept in when plaintiff did not
consider the appointment of her protegee, and the fact that it was not
Miss Saldaña who got the position of Special Assistant to the
Chairman. Harassment by her actuations could be deduced and patently
shown, and as such, she is liable for damages for her acts. Such
actions of defendant should not be countenanced in a government of
laws, as it borders upon anarchy when one person demands that her
opinion or belief should prevail over the decisions, rulings and
directives of superior agencies and/or authorities such as the Civil
Service Commission, the NEDA, the WAPCO, the Office of the President,
the Budget Commission, the Commission on Audit and even the Department
of Justice.
It is not right for those who
hold the rein of an office to let their own doubts preclude the
judgment of superior authorities especially so, if these authorities
are the very ones who are given the power or prerogatives to pass
judgment and render decision, like in the case at bar. There is no
journey that does not begin with a single step, but certainly,
overzealousness has some limits.' (CFI Decision, dated May 12, 1981,
supra.)'
"Indeed,
'overjealous(ness)' or 'overzealousness' in protecting the people's
money', as the basis of respondent's defense of good faith, finds no
concurring reflections from her acts of further refusing to pay
complainant's accumulated salaries after the CSC (the agency vested by
the Constitution and by law with authority to determine the validity of
appointments in the civil service), the NEDA (the agency that has
direct administrative supervision over the Tariff Commission or over
the respondent as Acting Chairman thereof then), the Budget Commission
(the agency charged by law with the determination of classification and
compensation of positions in the government), and this Office (the
highest office in the land with the power of control and supervision
over all offices in the executive department, including the Tariff
Commission) had all sustained the validity of complainant's appointment
and ordered the payment of her accumulated salaries. Her defense of
good faith was umbrageous from the start, considering that complainant
was entitled to receive her salaries even before the approval of her
appointment by the CSC (it was already approved by the CSC when
complainant demanded payment of her salaries) pursuant to Sec. 16(h)
of R.A. 2260, as amended (her appointment was issued/approved before
P.D. 807), and that it was not respondent but then Commissioner (later
Acting Chairman) Haresco (being the official who issued complainant's
appointment) who was liable for any unlawful payment of salaries
pursuant to said Sec. 16(h). Thus, even if complainant's appointment
and payment of her salaries were held illegal and invalid, the
government would not have lost a single centavo, because then
Commissioner Haresco was by law liable therefore. There was then no
basis for respondent to be, to quote her words, 'overjealous in
protecting the people's money'.
"The
true nature of respondent's 'overjealousness' or overzealousness is
unmasked and her defense of good faith crumbles into pieces as we
unfold the subsequent actions she had taken in this case: After her
protegee (Miss Saldaña) kept her peace with the CSC decision
(dismissing the latter's protest against complainant's appointment),
respondent, in her capacity as Acting Chairman of the Tariff
Commission, recalled complainant's appointment and declared
complainant's position as vacant and later proposed for its abolition —
to insure complainant's ouster from the Tariff Commission and to render
the CSC decision (sustaining the validity of complainant's appointment)
ineffective and ineffectual. These acts betray lack of good intention
on the part of respondent, taken, as they were, on the heels of the
decisions of this Office (upholding the authority of then Commissioner
Haresco to issue complainant's appointment), for, in the language of
then Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director General Gerardo
Sicat, the 'other position of Special Assistant must be retained in
view of a recent decision of the Civil Service Commission upholding the
appointment of (complainant) to the said position.'
"Evidently, as found by the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Quezon City, personality crept into
the case. And correctly so, because respondent, again taking advantage
of her position as Acting Chairman, had to seize every opportunity,
however insignificant, trivial and unmeritorious, to pin down the
complainant, like her act of questioning complainant's failure to
report to the Tariff Commission from the effective date (February 17,
1975) of the termination of complainant's detail with this Office,
although the special order terminating such detail was issued (and
dated) only on March 11, 1975 and complainant received it only on March
17, 1985.
"Although
the filing of the instant case on December 27, 1974 had further
strained their relationship, respondent sought complainant's return to
the Tariff Commission by requesting on February 13, 1975 the
termination of her detail with this Office. And while complainant was
still on detail with this Office, respondent, again as Acting Chairman
of the Commission, issued on February 17, 1975 an office order (No.
6-A) assigning complainant in the Office of the Executive Director
Emilio Cruz, effective immediately, and requiring her to use the bundy
clock in recording her daily attendance, although personnel of lower
rank were not required to do the same. (This office order was revoked
by Acting Chairman Haresco when she returned from Bangkok.)
"Again, as Acting Chairman of
the Tariff Commission and knowing that complainant was not then
receiving her salaries as she withheld the same, respondent refused to
act on or indorse to the GSIS complainant's applications for salary
loans — even after being apprised that complainant needed the same
loans for the school tuition fees of her children. Complainant had to
shuttle between Manila and her province to secure loans with interest.
"Likewise, respondent, again as
Acting Chairman, stopped the remittance of or did not remit
complainant's MEDICARE premiums from February 1974 and slept on
complainant's request made in August 1975 (her premiums unpaid for more
than a year then) to remit her unpaid MEDICARE premiums as her daughter
was then scheduled to be confined in a hospital for the removal of her
cyst. Respondent should have remitted even just the premiums
corresponding to the position she insisted upon as the one legally
occupied by the complainant, namely: Administrative Officer II.
"Offenses
committed
Clearly, respondent had
excessively used, in a hostile, inordinate and cruel manner, the
authority of her position as Acting Chairman of the Tariff Commission
in unduly causing much difficulties, hardship, and sufferings to her
lowly subordinate, the complainant. She is thus guilty of oppression.
"The charge of grave abuse of
discretion is absorbed by the offense of oppression as the latter is
committed by, among others, an excessive use of one's authority. (see:
Ochate vs. Deling, supra, at p. 390.)
"The charge of 'conduct
unbecoming of a public official' may only be traced to respondent's
continued defiance of the decisions and directives of her superior
officials which, as held by then Secretary of Justice Abad Santos, 'are
presumed valid and legal, and should therefore be obeyed by the
government officials and employees concerned' and to respondent's acts
of harassment causing much difficulties, hardship and sufferings on the
part of the complainant (when other heads of offices take special
concern over the welfare and interests of their subordinates). But all
such acts of respondent involved only the relationship of a superior
and a subordinate, or internal matters.
"As this particular
administrative offense has been defined as referring to conduct which
'has a great tendency to destroy public respect (Carlisle Borough v.
Admas, Ps., 12 Cum. 53), the constitutive acts therefore must
necessarily involve or affect the public rather than the public
official's subordinates, in such a manner and to such an extent as to
lose public respect on the public official concerned.
"We, therefore, rule that
respondent's acts did not constitute conduct unbecoming of a public
official.
"But
respondent's open defiance of superior authorities' decisions and
directives constitute another offense — insubordination. And this
defiance becomes even more reprehensible as it was taken mainly to
accomplish respondent's desire to prejudice and harass her lowly
subordinate, under the cloak of overjealousness and overzealousness of
protecting the people's money, when, as head of office, respondent has
to care for the welfare and interests of her subordinates. Indeed,
respondent has acted in such a way as if the Tariff Commission was her
exclusive domain over which no higher authority, not even this Office
nor the Civil Service Commission, can change or vary her position or
stand on the validity of an appointment thereto and the payment of the
corresponding salary, solely for the purpose of harassing and
prejudicing one subordinate.
"Although insubordination is not
specifically mentioned in the complaint, as updated, the allegations
thereof show that the offense of insubordination is likewise charged
therein.
"Considering the
one-penalty-for-one-case rule and following Perez vs. Abiera, supra,
respondent may be fined in an amount equivalent to her 3-months' salary
as Chairman of the Tariff Commission, deductible from whatever
retirement and other benefits she will receive from the government.
"V.
"The Committee hereby recommends
that respondent be fined in an amount equivalent to her 3-months salary
as Chairman of the Tariff Commission, deductible from whatever
retirement and other benefits she will receive from the government.
I agree with and adopt the above findings and recommendation supported, as they are, by the evidence on record.
WHEREFORE, and upon recommendation of the Committee created under Memorandum Order No. 41, dated September 25, 1986, respondent CORAZON B. MARCOS, former Chairman of the Tariff Commission, is hereby fined in an amount equivalent to her 3-months' salary as such Chairman, deductible from whatever retirement and other benefits she may be entitled to and will receive from the Government.
Done in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
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Since 19.07.98.