ManilaFIRST
DIVISION
JOSE
EMETERIO
GUEVARA,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 94
October
7, 1901
-versus-
TUASON
& CO.,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I
O N
WILLARD,
J :
The
petitioner, seeking
to bring himself within the provisions of Act No. 75 of the Civil
Commission,
prays that he be permitted to appeal from the judgment rendered against
him by the Court of Quiapo on December 13, 1898, in an action of
forcible
entry and detainer. The said petitioner, during the trial of the case
in
question, was represented by his attorney, and his attorney was
properly
notified of the judgment rendered in the said case on December 22,
1898.
The said petitioner does not allege that he has been prevented from
interposing
his appeal by reason of fraud. Nor have any allegations been made which
show that it would not have been possible to interpose the appeal in
case
he had attempted to do so; but in his petition he argues that the Court
of Quiapo had no jurisdiction over the matter, since the property in
question
is located in what is now the Province of Rizal and outside of the
limits
of the territory occupied at that time by the Government of the United
States. In the same manner, the said petitioner alleges that "having
been
persuaded that the proceedings held by the Court of Quiapo could have
no
validity or efficacy, both for the reasons indicated and because the
judicial
terms, according to the royal decree issued on July 26, 1898, by the
colonial
office (Minister de Ultramar) of the aforesaid Spanish Government were
suspended until the date of the Treaty of Paris, i.e., until
December
10, 1898 - Don Jose Emeterio Guevara did not appeal from that judgment;
that his omission to do so was due, therefore, to an excusable
accident,
to wit, the past occurrences which produced radical changes in all of
the
orders and in the royal decree above cited."
These are the only
reasons which are alleged. From the above it appears that it was not
the
royal decree which induced the petitioner to delay his appeal, since he
himself states that the said decree remained in force only until
December
10, 1898. It may be that he has committed an error with reference to
this
matter; but such error could not have affected in any manner his action
with reference to his appeal. In order that he may avail himself of the
said act, it does not suffice that it appear that there was a mistake,
but it must likewise appear that he was unable to interpose the appeal
by reason of the said mistake.
Furthermore, it is
contended that the court below had no jurisdiction over the case in
question.
It is not incumbent upon us to determine whether or not he is correct
in
this contention. Even on the supposition that he was right his
allegations
can not prevail inasmuch as they are based upon the fact that the said
court committed an error in deciding that it was competent to determine
the matter. The word "mistake," according to its signification in the
act
referred to, does not apply, and never was intended to apply, to a
judicial
error which the court in question might have committed in the trial
referred
to. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal. The act in
question
can not in any way be employed as a substitute for the said remedy.
In general terms the
"mistake or excusable negligence" of which the said act treats should
be
understood as that committed by the party and not that of the Court.
There seems to be a
certain contention on the part of the petitioner to the effect that he
has the right to said remedy on the ground that the court may have been
in the right concerning its jurisdiction and that the petitioner was
mistaken
in forming a contrary opinion.
It is neither necessary
nor proper to establish rules which foretell absolutely all of the
cases
which may arise under the said act. In order to decide the matter which
occupies us at present it suffices to state that the erroneous opinion
of one of the parties concerning the incorrectness of the judicial
decision
of the court can not constitute grounds for the said relief. For
example,
the court renders judgment in a matter against the defendant. The said
defendant believes at the time that said judgment is correct and
understands
that an appeal would be useless and therefore he does not interpose the
same. Later he believes firmly that the said judgment was incorrect, as
indeed it was, and that he committed a mistake when he believed that it
was correct. This, although it constitutes a mistake of the party, is
not
such a mistake as confers the right to the relief. This is so because
in
no wise has he been prevented from interposing his appeal. The most
that
may be said is that by reason of an erroneous interpretation of the law
he believed that all recourse of appeal would be useless.
Therefore, the prayer
of the petition is denied with costs against the petitioner.
Torres, Cooper, Ladd,
and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J.,
did not sit in this case. |