ManilaFIRST
DIVISION
THE UNITED STATES,
Complainant-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 448
September
20, 1901
-versus-
PHILIP K.
SWEET,
Defendant-Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
LADD, J :
The offense charged in
the Complaint is punishable under the Penal Code now in force by arresto
mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. (Article
418.)
By Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission, section 56
(6),
Courts of First Instance are given original jurisdiction "in all
criminal
cases in which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a
fine
exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed." The offense was
therefore
cognizable by the court below unless the fact that the appellant was at
the time of its alleged commission an employee of the United States
military
authorities in the Philippine Islands, and the further fact that the
person
upon whom it is alleged to have been committed was a prisoner of war in
the custody of such authorities, are sufficient to deprive it of
jurisdiction.
We must assume that both these facts are true, as found, either upon
sufficient
evidence or upon the admissions of the prosecuting attorney, by the
court
below.
Setting aside the claim
that the appellant was "acting in the line of duty" at the time the
alleged
offense was committed, which is not supported by the findings or by any
evidence which appears in the record, the contention that the court was
without jurisdiction, as we understand it, is reducible to two
propositions:
First, that an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon
a prisoner of war is not an offense under the Penal Code; and second,
that
if it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless the military character
sustained by the person charged with the offense at the time of its
commission
exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.
As to the first
proposition,
it is true, as pointed out by counsel, that an assault of the character
charged in the complaint committed in time of war by a military person
upon a prisoner of war is punishable as an offense under the Spanish
Code
of Military Justice (Article 232), and it is also true that under the
provisions
of the same Code (Articles 4,5) the military tribunals have, with
certain
exceptions which it is not materials to state, exclusive cognizance of
all offenses, whether of a purely military nature or otherwise,
committed
by military persons. But the fact that the acts charged in the
complaint
would be punishable as an offense under the Spanish military
legislation
does not render them any less an offense under the article of the Penal
Code above cited. There is nothing in the language of that article to
indicate
that it does not apply to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction
of the law. Under articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Military Justice
above
cited a military person could not be brought to trial before a civil
tribunal
for an assault upon a prisoner of war, but by the commission of that
offense
he incurred a criminal responsibility for which he was amenable only to
the military jurisdiction. That criminal responsibility, however, arose
from an infraction of the general penal laws, although the same acts,
viewed
in another aspect, might also, if committed in time of war, constitute
an infraction of the general penal laws, although the same acts, viewed
in another aspect, might also, if committed in time of war, constitute
an infraction of the military code. We are unable to see how these
provisions
of the Spanish Military Code, no longer in force here and which indeed
never had any application to the Army of the United States, can in any
possible view have the effect claimed for them by counsel for the
appellant.
The second question
is: Does the fact that the alleged offense was committed by an employee
of the United States military authorities deprive the court of
jurisdiction?
We have been cited to no provision in the legislation of Congress, and
to none in the local legislation, which has the effect of limiting, as
respects employees of the United States military establishment, the
general
jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts of First Instance by Act No. 136
of the United States Philippine Commission above cited, and we are not
aware of the existence of any such provision. The case is, therefore,
open
to the application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of
the
civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character
of the person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly
established
in the law of England and America and which must, We think, prevail
under
any system of jurisprudence unless controlled by express legislation to
the contrary. [United States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710]. The
appellant's
claim that the acts alleged to constitute the offense were performed by
him in the execution of the orders of his military superiors may, if
true,
be available by way of defense upon the merits in the trial in the
court
below, but can not under this principle affect the right of that court
to take jurisdiction of the case.
Whether under a similar
state of facts to that which appears in this case a court of one of the
United States would have jurisdiction to try the offender against the
State
laws [See In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149], it is not necessary
to
consider. The present is not a case where the courts of one government
are attempting to exercise jurisdiction over the military agents or
employees
of another and distinct government, because the court asserting
jurisdiction
here derives its existence and powers from the same Government under
the
authority of which the acts alleged to constitute the offense are
claimed
to have been performed.
It may be proper to
add that there is no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions in
the
present case nor any claim of jurisdiction on the part of the military
tribunals. On the contrary it appears from the findings of the court
below
that the complaint was entered by order of the commanding general of
the
Division of the Philippines, a fact not important, perhaps, as regards
the technical question of jurisdiction, but which relieves the case
from
any practical embarrassment which might result from a claim on the part
of the military tribunals to exclusive cognizance of the offense.
The Order of the Court
below is affirmed with costs to the appellant.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Separate
Opinion
COOPER, J., concurring:
I concur in the result
of the Decision of the Court, but am not prepared to assent to all that
is said in the opinion. An offense charged against a military officer,
acting under the order of his superior, unless the illegality of the
order
is so clearly shown on its face that a man of ordinary sense and
understanding
would know when he heard it read or given that the order was illegal,
and
when the alleged criminal act was done within the scope of his
authority
as such officer, in good faith and without malice, and where the
offense
is against the military law — that is, such law as relates to the
discipline
and efficiency of the Army, or rules and orders promulgated by the
Secretary
of War to aid military officers in the proper enforcement of the
custody
of prisoners — is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the
Civil
Government. [In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149]. The civil courts,
however, may examine the evidence for the purpose of determining
whether
the act alleged to be criminal was done in the performance of duty
under
the circumstances above indicated, but should cease to exercise
jurisdiction
upon such facts appearing.
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