EN BANC
THE UNITED
STATES,
Complainant-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 1491
March
5, 1904
-versus-
LORENZO
ARCEO, ET
AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
D E C I S I
O N
JOHNSON, J :
The defendants were charged
with entering the house of one Alejo Tiongson on the night of February
20, 1903, armed with deadly weapons, against the will of the said Alejo
Tiongson.
The evidence shows
that Alejo Tiongson lived in his house in company with his wife,
Alejandra
San Andres, and his wife's sister, Marcela San Andres. On the night of
the 20th of February, 1903, between 8 and 9 o'clock at night, the
accused,
one of whom was with a gun and the other two each with a bolo, entered
the house of the said Alejo Tiongson without first obtaining the
permission
of any person. It appears from the proof that there was a light burning
in the house at that time the accused entered, which was immediately
put
out by one of the accused; that Alejo and his wife had retired for the
night; that Marcela was still sitting up sewing; that as soon as
Marcela
had discovered the accused in the house she awoke Alejo and his wife;
that
immediately after the accused were in the house, one of them wounded,
by
means of a bolo, Alejo Tiongson, the owner of the house; that the
accused
appropriated to their own use a certain quantity of money; that the
accused
took and carried away out of the said house toward the fields the said
Marcela San Andres and illtreated her.
The evidence on the
part of the defense tended to prove an alibi. The court below found
that
this testimony was not to be believed. We find no occasion , from the
proof,
to charge this finding of fact.
The Court below found
that the defendants were each guilty of the crime of entering the house
of another, with violence and intimidation, which crime is punishable
under
Subsection 2 of Article 491 of the Penal Code, and sentenced each of
them
to be imprisoned for the term of three years six months and twenty-one
days of prision correccional, and also imposed upon each a fine of 271
pesos and costs. In reaching this conclusion the court took into
consideration
the aggravating circumstance of nighttime and the extenuating
circumstance
provided for in Article 11 of the Penal Code.
Article 491 of the
Penal Code provides that:
"He who shall enter
the residence (dwelling house) of another against the will of the
tenant
thereof shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor and
a fine of 325 to 3,250 pesetas."
Subsection 2 provides that:
"If the act shall be
executed with violence or intimidation the penalty shall be prision
correccional
in the medium and maximum grade, and a fine of from 325 to 3,250
pesetas."
Under the facts
presented
in this case, was the trial court justified in finding that the accused
were guilty of the crime of entering the residence of another against
his
will and with violence and intimidation? We think that it was. We are
not
of the opinion that the statute relates simply to the method by which
one
may pass the threshold of the residence of another without his consent.
We think it relates also to the conduct, immediately after entrance, of
him who enters the house of another without his consent. He who being
armed
with deadly weapons enters the residence of another in the nighttime,
without
consent, and immediately commits acts of violence and intimidation, is
guilty of entering the house of another with violence and intimidation
and is punishable under Subsection 2 of Article 491 of the Penal Code.
[See Viada, Vol. 3, p.303; Gazette of Spain of the 28th of March, 1883;
Viada, vol. 6, p.363; Gazette of Spain of the 19th of May, 1892, p.
165].
The
inviolability of
the house is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights
declared
and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can
enter into the home of another without the consent of its owners or
occupants.
The
privacy of the
home, the place of abode, the place where a man with his family may
dwell
in peace and enjoy the companionship of his wife and children
unmolested
by anyone, even the king, except in the rare cases, has always been
regarded
by civilized nations as one of the most sacred personal rights to which
men are entitled. Both the common and the civil law guaranteed to man
the
right of absolute protection to the privacy of his home. The king was
powerful;
he was clothed with majesty; his will was the law, but, with few
exceptions,
the humblest citizen or subject might shut the door of his humble
cottage
in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that privacy
which
was regarded as sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives. The poorest
and
most humble citizen or subject may, in his cottage, no matter how frail
or humble it is, bid defiance to all the powers of the state; the wind,
the storm and the sunshine alike may enter through its weather-beaten
parts,
but the king may not enter against its owner's will; none of the forces
dare to cross the threshold even the humblest tenement without its
owner's
consent.
"A man's
house is his
castle," has become a maxim among the civilized peoples of the earth.
His
protection therein has become a matter of constitutional protection n
England,
America, and Spain, as well as in other countries.
However,
under the
police power of the state the authorities may compel entrance to
dwelling
houses against the will of the owners for sanitary purposes. The
government
has this right upon grounds of public policy. It has a right to protect
the health and lives of all its people. A man can not insist upon the
privacy
of his home when a question of the health and life of himself, his
family,
and that of the community is involved. This private right must be
subject
to the public welfare.
It may
be argued that
one who enters the dwelling house of another is not liable unless he
has
been forbidden, i. e., the phrase "against the will of the
owner"
means that there must have been an express prohibition to enter. In
other
words, if one enters the dwelling house of another without the
knowledge
of the owner he has not entered against his will. This construction is
certainly not tenable, because entrance is forbidden generally under
the
spirit of the law unless permission to enter is expressly given. To
allow
this construction would destroy the very spirit of the law. Under the
law
no one has the right to enter the home of another without the other's
express
consent. Therefore, to say that when one enters the home of another
without
his knowledge he does not enter against the will of the owner, is to
say
the one's home is open for the entrance of all who are not expressly
forbidden.
This is not the rule. The statute must not be given that construction.
No one can enter the dwelling house of another, in these Islands,
without
rendering himself liable under the law, he has the express consent of
the
owner and unless the one seeking entrance comes within some of the
exceptions
dictated by the law or by a sound public policy.
So
jealously did the
people of England regard this right to enjoy, unmolested, the privacy
of
their houses, that they might even take the life of the unlawful
intruder,
if it be nighttime. This was also the sentiment of the Romans expressed
by Tully: "Quid enim sanctius quid omni religione munitius, quam
domus
uniuscu jusque civium."
It may
be argued that
the offense punishable under Article 491 of the Penal Code corresponds
to the crime of burglary at the common law. It is true that the offense
of entering the house of another without the latter's consent and the
common-law
crime of burglary are both offenses against the habitation of
individuals.
But these crimes are distinctively different. The punishment for
burglary
is "to prevent the breaking and entering of a dwelling house of another
in the nighttime for the purpose a felony therein." while the object of
Article 491 is to prevent entrance into the dwelling house of another
at
any time, either by day or by night, for any purpose, against the will
of its owner.
In
burglary there must
have existed an intent to enter for the purpose of committing a felony,
while under Article 491 of the Penal Code entrance against the will,
simply,
of the owner is punishable. Under the provisions of the Penal Code
entrance
in the nighttime can only be regarded as an aggravation of the offense
of entering.
We are
of the opinion,
under all of the facts in the case, that the extenuating circumstance
provided
for in Article 11 of the Penal Code should not be considered in favor
of
these defendants.
We find
that the
defendants
are guilty of the crime of entering the house of another with violence
and intimidation, without the consent of the owner, with the
aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and hereby impose the maximum degree of
prision
correccional, and the fine provided for in Subsection 2 of Article 491
of the Penal Code should be imposed.
The
sentence of the
court below is, therefore, modified, and each of the said defendants is
hereby sentenced to be imprisoned for the term of six years of prision
correccional, and each to pay a fine of 271 Pesos and the costs of
this suit or in default thereof to suffer subsidiary imprisonment.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Cooper and
McDonough, JJ., dissent. |