EN
BANC
THE
CITY OF
MANILA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
G.
R.
No. 1975
November
10, 1905
-versus-
EL MONTE
DE PIEDAD
Y CAJA DE AHORROS DE MANILA,
Defendant-Appellee.
D
E C I S I
O N
WILLARD,
J :
It was admitted during
the trial of this case that the City of Manila was, on and prior to the
6th day of July, 1887, the owner of the land in the Plaza de Goiti, on
which the building of defendant now stands.
On the 1st day of July,
1887, the defendant presented a petition to the city of Manila, in
which
it asked that the city give to the defendant permission "editor en
su
terreno bajo la condicion de que si llega a abandonarse la edificacion
o deja de estar destinada a Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, la
propriedad
del terreno revertira al Municipio, condicion con la que cedio hace
años
terreno de su propiedad en el campo de Arroceros para la edificacion
del
Teatro del Principe Alfonso."
On the 6th day of July,
1887, the City of Manila adopted the following Resolution:
"Information being
received with reference to a communication from the most reverend
archbishop
of Manila, president of the administrative board of the 'Monte de
Piedad
y Caja de Ahorros' of the city, dated 1st instant (July 1887), stating
that the officers of those charitable establishments are installed
since
the same were opened, in the insalubrious and small place occupied by
them
on the ground floor of the 'Santa Isabel College,' and the members of
this
board having acknowledged by unanimous vote the necessity of situating
the above offices in a proper place of this city, by acquiring or
erecting
a building which, on account of its conditions, may meet the increasing
requirements of the same, the above-mentioned board had decided to
erect
a building for its offices, with the independence and security
required,
among other reasons, by the fact that property of great value was to be
kept in it, and to this effect the sad board applies to the municipal
corporations,
whose feelings of rectitude and Christian piety are well known, asking
the above corporation to take an active part in these noble purposes
and
to grant gratuitously for said building the land occupied in the 'Plaza
de Goiti' by the 'Paseo de Santa Cruz,' which is of no use to anybody,
on condition that should the building be abandoned or cease to be
devoted
to the purpose for which it will be erected, the possession of the land
will revert to the municipal corporation in the same form as a land was
granted in Arroceros some years ago, in which the 'Principe Alfonso'
theatre
was situated.
"The corporation
having
been informed of the contends of the above communication, and wishing
to
cooperate, within the limit of its powers, with the charitable purpose
intended by the board of administration of the 'Monte de Piedad,'
decided
by general consent to grant 'the gratuitous use of the land' asked for
the erection of the above-mentioned building and with the stated
condition,
this resolution having to be submitted previously to the superior
authority."
This Resolution was submitted
to and approved by the Governor-General of these Islands, the superior
authority therein mentioned. The defendant constructed its building
upon
the land in question, where it has since remained. From its
construction
until the present time the building has been and is now devoted to the
purposes mentioned to the Petition and Resolution.
On the 14th of May
1901, the defendant presented to the Court of First Instance of Manila,
a petition asking that its possession as owner of the land and building
in question be inscribed in accordance with the provisions of Article
390
of the Mortgage Law. The proceedings usual in such cases were taken,
the
prayer of the petition was granted by the Court of First Instance, and
on the 13th of June 1901, the inscription was made in the Registry of
Property
for the City of Manila.
On the 13th of October
1903, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, asking
that
the above-mentioned inscription be canceled, and that the judgment be
entered
in favor of the plaintiff for the possession of the property and the
sum
of $14,000, money of the United States, as damages. Judgment was
entered
in the court below in favor of the plaintiff so far as to order that
the
inscription be so modified as to show that the plaintiff was the owner
of the land, and that the defendant had a right to occupy it
gratuitously,
so long as devoted the land to the purpose above mentioned. The
judgment
denied the plaintiff any other relief. Plaintiff has appealed from the
judgment, but the defendant has not.
The appeal is based
upon two grounds:
The appellant claims
that the grant to the defendant was made upon the same terms as those
found
in the grant to the Teatro del Principe Alfonso, and that by terms of
the
latter grant the grantee was bound to vacate the premises whenever the
grantor desired to use them. Evidence was introduced by the plaintiff
to
sustain its claim as to the terms of the grant to the theater. There is
some doubt as to the exact conditions upon which that grant was made,
but
we will assume, for the purpose of this case, that they were as claimed
by the appellant.
In the Petition
presented
by the defendant, the conditions upon which it desired to acquire the
land
are plainly and distinctly stated. It desired to obtain the right to
bold
the land so long as it should be devoted to the maintenance of the
institution
in question. The petition there after stated that this was the same
condition
upon which land had previously been granted to the theater. It is
evident
that the petitioner then believed that the grant to the theater was
made
upon the terms which had been before stated, and the evidence shows
that
the city of Manila did make the grant to the theater upon those precise
terms, but that this action of the city was afterwards modified by the
Governor-General to the effect claimed by the appellant. We do not
think
that this mistake made by the petitioner in regard to the terms on
which
the grant was made to the theater, had the effect of modifying or
changing
in any way the conditions stated by it as the ones upon which it
desired
to acquire the use of the land.
The Resolution of the
city shows that it intended to grant the prayer of the Petition. It
recites
the condition in the same way as it is stated in the Petition. It adds
also a statement in regard to the grant to the theater, but we do not
think
that by this reference it intended to cut down or limit the grant to
the
Monte de Piedad. If the city had intended to do this it would have said
simply that it granted the land upon the same terms upon which it had
previously
granted land to the theater. It did not do that. It distinctly said
that
it granted the land upon the condition that if the building should be
abandoned,
or should cease to be devoted to a Monte de Piedad it should revert to
the municipality. This distinct and positive statement as to what the
condition
was must prevail, even if it should be discovered that there was a
difference
between that condition upon which the grant had been previously made to
the theater.
And We hold that the
defendant has a right to occupy the land in question so long as the
building
is not abandoned, and so long as it devoted to the purposes of a Monte
de Piedad y Caja de Aharros.
The appellant also
bases its appeal upon the ground that the defendant, by claiming in the
proceedings relating to the possessory information to be the absolute
owner
of the land and building, forfeited all the rights which it acquired by
virtue of the cession of 1887; that by this claim it repudiated the
relation
which had theretofore existed between it and the appellant, and
virtually
said that it no longer occupied the land under the terms of the grant,
but was the absolute owner thereof. At the trial below evidence was
introduced
by the defendant to show that this claim of ownership was made by the
officers
then in charge of the defendant institution under a mistake of fact;
that
the only documents which the then officers had before them at the time
the proceeding was commenced, indicated that the city had conveyed in
1887
to the defendant an absolute title to the land. The evidence tended to
show that the then managers of the Monte de Piedad were not informed of
and did not see copies of the petition to which we have referred, nor
of
the resolution of the city of Manila making the cession, and the claim
of the defendant is that there was no intention on its part in
presenting
the petition for the inscription, to make any claim which was not
justified
by the grant made to it by the city in 1887. We do not think it
necessary
to pass upon this question of good faith.
Did the laws in force
in these lands, at the time this grant was made in 1887, impose the
penalty
of forfeiture upon a person in the condition of the defendant who
asserted
a claim to the ownership of the land? The appellant has cited no law
which
so provides. It has limited itself, so far as the laws in force in the
Islands are concerned, to the citation of various Articles of the Civil
Code. Even if the Civil Code could be considered as governing the
rights
which the defendant acquired in 1887, We do not think that any of the
articles
cited support the claim of the appellant. Its claim is that the
defendant
is to be considered as a usufructuary, and that by claiming to be the
owner
of the property it surrendered its rights as such usufructuary. The
surrender
mentioned in Paragraph 4 of Article 513 to our minds does not include
such
an act as this. It refers to a voluntary surrender of the very rights
which
the usufructuary has, made by him with the intent to so surrender them.
It does not relate to a forfeiture which may be claimed to be the
result
of some act performed by the insufructuary inconsistent with the
relation
which exists between him and the owner of the property. The appellant,
however, seems to rely chiefly upon the law in force in the United
States
upon this point. That law has never been extended to these Islands, is
not in force here now, now was it in 1887?
The judgment, however,
should, we think, be modified in one respect. The defendant has its
possession
registered on the ground that it was the owner. It was not the owner,
and
the inscription should be canceled in its entirety. The defendant has
never
asked to have its real interest registered. If it desires to have this
done it can present a petition to that effect, and the question as to
its
right to such registry can then be decided.
The judgment of the
court below is modified so that the disposing part shall read as
follows:
"It is therefore
ordered
that possessory inscription, as above mentioned, be canceled in its
entirety,
and that a copy of this decision be sent to the register of deeds of
Manila
for its execution, and that the defendant institution pay the costs of
this trial."
In other respects the judgment
of the court below is affirmed. No costs will be allowed to either
party
in this court, and after the expiration of twenty days judgment should
be entered in accordance herewith, and the case remanded to the court
below
for execution of said judgment. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Separate
Opinions
JOHNSON
and CARSON, JJ.,
Dissenting:
We
dissent from the conclusions
of the majority opinion and hold that the defendant should be
dispossessed
of the land in question for the following reasons:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
First. The
defendant
was granted the use of the land in question for a particular purpose
only,
without any right or title in said land for any other end or purpose
than
that indicated in its grant by the City of Manila, dated the 6th of
July,
1887.
Second. When
the defendant on the 14th day of May, 1901, attempted to secure title
to
said land, it thereby renounced its former relation with the plaintiff
and forfeited its right to continue in possession of said land. The
defendant,
in its application to obtain a possessory title to said land, alleged
that
it was the owner of said land and presented there witnesses to prove
the
fact. When it asserted that it was the owner of the land and not merely
the possessor, under a grant for a particular purpose, it thereby
renounced
its relation with the City of Manila, which relation was created by the
concession of the 6th day of July, 1887. The defendant only had the
usufruct
of said land and not the title thereto, and whenever it attempted to
exercise
ownership over said land, it thereby renounced its former relation with
the grantor, the plaintiff herein. The very moment that the defendant
exercised
a control over the said land which was hostile or contrary to the
interests
of the city, other than the usufruct indicated in the said grant, it
thereby
forfeited its right to continue in possession of the land. Whenever the
defendant asserted a right over the land or an interest therein
antagonistic
to the interest of the City of Manila, it became an adverse holder
thereof.
[Doe vs. Wells, 10 Alderson and Ellis, 427; Sherman vs. Transportation
Co., 31 Vt., 162; Wilson vs. Watkins, 28 U.S. 42].
When the defendant
asserted that it owned the fee in said land, its possession became a
tortious
one and it thereby forfeited its right under its original grant.
[Peyton
vs. Stith, 30 U.S., 483; Walden vs. Bodley, 39 U.S., 156; McGinnis vs.
Porter, 20 Penn. State, 80; Civil Code, Art. 513, Par. 4].
Whenever the defendant
impugned the title of the city of Manila, affirming by a matter of
record
or otherwise the fee to said land to be in itself or another, or
claimed
a greater estate in said land that it was entitled to, it thereby
forfeited
its right to continue in possession of said land. [Fenn vs. Smart, 12
East,
444; Goodwright vs. Davides, Cowper, 803].
The act of the
defendant,
by which it attempted to secure a possessory title to the land in
question,
under the provisions of the mortgage law in force in the Philippine
Islands,
alleging that it was the owner of said land, had the effect of putting
into operation the statute of prescription, so that in due time it
might
transfer a good title to third persons as against the City of Manila.
This
act was certainly antagonistic to the interests of the City of Manila
and
amounted to a renunciation of the relation existing between the
defendant
and the plaintiff, thereby giving the plaintiff the right to terminate
the contract and bring an action to eject the defendant.
The prayer of the
petition
of the plaintiff should be granted and the defendant should be
dispossessed
of said land. |