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FIRST
DIVISION
THE UNITED STATES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 2307
April
9, 1906
-versus-
CHU CHANG,
Defendant-Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
CARSON, J:
The evidence of record
in this case fully sustains the findings of the trial court, and we
find
no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
Counsel for the
appellant
contends that while the facts as found by the trial court might perhaps
be sufficient to support a conviction as accomplice of the crime of
rape
they do not constitute the crime of corruption of minors of which the
accused
was convicted because, as he alleges, it does not appear that the
accused
acted with abuse of authority, or that the minor who is alleged to have
been prostituted or corrupted had given her consent to the carnal
relations
into which she had entered with various Chinamen in the house of the
accused.
Articles 444 of the
Penal Code is as follows:
"He who habitually
or with abuse of authority or of confidential relations (confianza)
promotes
or facilitates the prostitution or corruption of minors for the purpose
of satisfying the lust of another, will be punished with the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum and medium degree, and temporary
absolute
disqualification if he be a public official."
It was proven at
the trial
that the relation of master and servant existed between the accused and
the girl whom he is charged to have corrupted, and in accordance with
the
decision of the supreme court of Spain of December 17, 1883, the
relation
of master and servant is one of confidence [confianza], and
therefore
the accused, having taken advantage of his position as master to commit
the offense, did so with abuse of confidence [con abuso de confianza].
It is not necessary to consider whether there was or was not abuse of
authority.
The
evidence
conclusively
proves that the minor was living in prostitution in the house of the
accused,
and while it appears that at first she entered this mode of life
unwillingly,
nevertheless there can be no doubt that she finally gave her consent
and
ceased to oppose her will to the wishes of her master.
The
judgment and
sentence
appealed from should be affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against
the appellant. After the expiration of ten days from the date of final
judgment let the cause be remanded to the court from whence it came for
proper action. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Willard, JJ., concur. |