FIRST
DIVISION
SEGUNDO
JAVIER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
G.
R.
No. L-2209
January
2, 1907
-versus-
LONGINOS
JAVIER,
ADMINISTRATOR
OF
THE ESTATE OF
MANUEL JAVIER
AND
PERFECTA TAGLE,
Defendant-Appellee.
D E C I S I
O N
MAPA, J:
This action involves the
ownership of a house and lot. This property was included in the
inventory
of the property of the estate of Manuel Javier and Perfecta Tagle,
under
which the parties to this action claim, and the plaintiff seeks to have
the property in controversy, excluded from the said inventory, alleging
that is belongs exclusively to him. The defendant contends that the
property
belongs to the said estate, and that it has been, therefore, properly
included
in the inventory. The defendant filed a counter- complaint praying that
judgment be entered against the plaintiff, who is now in possession of
the property, for the return of the same, and the payment of the rent
received
by the said plaintiff from the property, to the administrator of the
estate.
The case was decided
in the court below in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff excepted to
the judgment, made a motion for a new trial on the ground that the
judgment
was not justified by the weight of the evidence, and has brought the
case
this court, by means of a bill of exceptions, for review.
As suggested by the
appellant in his brief, the description of the property in controversy
is not very clear and definite. This, however, is of no practical
importance
in this case. No question has been raised upon this point. The parties
in discussing their respective rights have assumed that the description
was correct.
The evidence introduced
as to each of the pieces of property in question being different, we
shall
now proceed to examine the same separately.
(a) Lot. - It is beyond
dispute that this lot formerly belonged to Manuel Javier, under whom
both
parties claim. Manuel Javier sold this lot, with another lot, to
Ceferino
Joven, for the sum of 350 pesos on the 11th of September, 1862, as
appears
from a public document executed on the same date, and which is a part
of
the record in this case. The terms of this instrument are conclusive
against
the assertion of some of the witnesses for the defendant to the effect
that the contract between Manuel Javier and Ceferino Joven related to a
mortgage only, or perhaps to a sale on condition of redemption. "Having
agreed upon the sale," reads the text of the document, "with Ceferino
Joven
[Manuel Javier] declares that he actually sells and transfers the said
two lots to the said Ceferino Joven for the aforesaid sum of three
hundred
and fifty pesos. In consideration thereof he transfers to the purchaser
the title and ownership which he has to the property so that the said
purchaser
may dispose of and alienate the same, as he may see fit, as his own
properly
acquired property" According to this, it was a transfer and not a
mortgage-an
absolute and irrevocable transfer, and not subject to redemption, for
there
is nothing said in the deed as to such redemption. Such was the
contract
entered into between Javier and Joven with regard to the lot in
question.
This fact is of capital
importance in this action, because, it not appearing in any way that
Manuel
Javier or his wife, Perfecta Tagle, had repurchased, or in any other
manner
reacquired the ownership of the said lot, it can not be considered as a
part of the estate of the said spouses, as contended by the defendant
in
this case. Such a conclusion could not be arrived at even if we
admitted
for the sake of argument everything that the witnesses for the
defendant
said upon this point. These witnesses were Gavina Javier and Romualda
Javier,
the sisters and coheirs of the parties to this action. They testified
that
they and their brother, Martin, with their father's consent,
repurchased
the lot in question, paying therefor the sum of 350 Pesos, from their
own
funds, such being the price formerly paid by Ceferino Joven. If this
were
true, they and not the estate would be the owners of the lot, since the
repurchase was made, as they say, by themselves, on their own account,
and with their own funds. In such a case, they, and not the
administrator
of the estate, would have the right to contest the ownership of the
property.
But the fact is that
the testimony of these two witnesses was completely contradicted by
other
evidence in the case, which in our opinion was more conclusive,
introduced
by the plaintiff. Their testimony is in open conflict with the real
facts,
for they proceed upon the theory that the property had not been
absolutely
sold to Ceferino Joven, but simply mortgaged to him, or at most, sold
to
him on condition of redemption. This theory is plainly and manifestly
contrary
to the express terms of the deed executed and delivered on the 11th of
September, 1862, to which prior reference had been made.
Moreover, there is
nothing other than the testimony of the said witnesses, to show that
they
had reacquired the property in question from the original purchaser,
Ceferino
Joven. There is, however, on the other hand, sufficient proof to show
that
the plaintiff and his brother, Luis, bought from the heirs of the said
Joven the property in question, and that Luis subsequently sold to the
plaintiff his share in the property, the plaintiff having thus become
the
sole owner of the land. Aside from the testimony of the latter, who
testified
as to these facts, we have the sworn statement of the said Luis, which
corroborates in its entirety the testimony of the plaintiff. Luis was
one
of the heirs of Manuel Javier and Perfecta Tagle, and his testimony, in
so far as it favors the plaintiff to the prejudice of the estate in
which
he was interested as such heir is, and should be, above suspicion,
unless
it is shown that he acted in collusion with the plaintiff, something
that
the defendant has no even attempted to prove. The testimony of this
witness
upon this point is as impartial as the testimony of the witnesses,
Gavina
Javier and Romualda Javier, is improbable, for were it true that they
and
their brother, Martin, repurchased the property with their own funds,
as
they claim, it would be exceedingly to strange that instead of
contending
that the property belongs to them exclusively they should consent to
its
being considered as a part of the estate, thus giving various other
heirs,
including the plaintiff, an interest in the said property.
But above all this,
there stands the instrument executed on the 12th of March, 1884, before
the Gobernadorcillo of the District of Malate and attesting witnesses,
which was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff. This instrument
purports
to have been executed by Ceferino Joven, Jr., himself and as attorney
in
fact of his mother, and it appears therein that the said Joven in his
dual
capacities aforesaid sold and transferred to the plaintiff and his
brother
Luis, the lot in question, together with another building lot, for the
sum of 350 Pesos. Whatever probatory force the said document may have
itself,
the fact remains that its authenticity was admitted at the trial by the
vendor, Ceferino Joven. This, taken together with the fact that the
plaintiff
was then in the physical possession of the property, and that such
possession
was recorded in the Register of Property in the plaintiffs own name,
which
was admitted by the defendant at the trial, is conclusive evidence of
the
fact that the plaintiff, and not the estate of Manuel Javier and
Perfecta
Tagle is the legitimate owner of the property. The conclusion reached
by
the court below to the contrary upon this point is manifestly erroneous.
(b) House. - This
house,
according to the complaint, is built upon land belonging to the estate.
The question therefore relates only to the ownership of the building,
exclusive
of the land upon which it stands. This house was apparently built in
1880,
and it having been almost entirely destroyed by a typhoon in 1882, it
was
rebuilt while Manuel Javier, the father of the plaintiff, and the owner
of the land upon which the said house, stands, was still living. It
seems
that Manuel Javier died in 1885. In 1884 the house was already
habitable,
although it was not completely finished and painted until the year
1895,
the work having proceeded slowly.
The plaintiff alleged
in his complaint, and insisted upon it in his testimony, that he built
the said house with the knowledge and consent of his father and at his
own expense. This statement of the plaintiff is supported by five
documents,
three of which purport to be signed by Felix Javier on June 1, 1887,
November
11, 1900 and January 15, 1903, respectively; and the other two by
Martin
Javier on April 1 and July 4, 1901, respectively. Felix and Martin
Javier
are, like the plaintiff in this case, the children and heirs of Manuel
Javier, and therefore interested in the latter's estate. The document
above
referred to represent receipts for certain sums borrowed by them from
the
plaintiff as advances upon the lots left by their deceased father,
Manuel
Javier, "one of which lots," reads each and all the said documents,
"being
the lot upon which the house of strong materials, No. 520 Calle Real or
Cabanas, the exclusive property of my brother, Segundo Javier is
built."
The authenticity of the documents signed by Felix Javier was admitted
by
him at the trial; and the signatures of Martin Javier appearing
thereon,
he having died, were identified by his son, Santos Javier, who also had
an interest in the estate in question. Those documents constitute an
acknowledgment
of the fact that the house in controversy belonged exclusively to the
plaintiff,
and such acknowledgment on their parts is proof all the more
appreciable
in favor of the plaintiff since it comes from persons who, as heirs of
Manuel Javier, had an entirely adverse interest to that of the
plaintiff
in this case. This proof is further strengthened by the fact that the
plaintiff
had been continuously in possession of the said house since it was
built.
Not only the plaintiff, but Romualda Javier, a witness for the
defendant
as well, testified as to such uninterrupted possession by the
plaintiff.
Romualda, while testifying upon this point, stated that certain actions
had been brought against the plaintiff, but that they never succeeded
in
taking away from him the possession of the house, the rents for which
were
always received by him.
An attempt was made
by Felix Javier to overcome the probatory force of the documents signed
by him, by alleging that he signed the same without first informing
himself
as to their contents, except that part thereof relating to the sums of
money mentioned in the same. We can not give credit to this
explanation.
The natural presumption is the one does not sign a document without
first
informing himself of its contents, and that presumption acquires
greater
force where not only, but several documents, executed at different
times
and at different places, as is here the case, were signed. There is
nothing
in the record that can in any way overcome this presumption.
The testimony of
Romualda
Javier and Gavina Javier to the effect that the house in question
belonged
to the estate of their deceased parents can not prevail against the
evidence
introduced by the plaintiff. Their testimony is obviously interested,
and
is absolutely devoid of any corroboration, this aside from the fact
that
both witnesses have made conflicting statements. Romualda testified
that
the house was constructed at the expense of herself, her father, and of
Gavina, while according to the latter, Romualda, her brother Martin,
and
herself paid for the construction. Of course, the latter and not the
estate
would be the owners of the house if Gavina's statement is true, for
under
such an hypothesis it would appear that her parents did not contribute
at all to the expenses of the construction.
The house was built,
according to the plaintiff, with the knowledge and consent of his
father,
to whom the land upon which it was built belonged. This testimony has
not
been contradicted, but on the contrary is strengthened by the further
testimony
of the plaintiff to the effect that his father lived with him at that
time
in the house in question. This fact conclusively shows that he, the
father,
consented to the construction of the house. Consequently the house was
built by the plaintiff in good faith, and Article 361 of the Civil Code
is perfectly applicable to this case. That articles provides that the
owner
of the land on which building, sowing, or planting is done in good
faith
shall have a right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing, or
planting,
after having paid the indemnity therefor as required by Articles 453
and
454, or to compel the person who has built or planted to pay to him the
value of the land, and to force the person who sowed to pay the proper
rent.
Article
453 of the
same code provides:
"Useful expenses are
paid the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in his possession having the option of
refunding
the amount of the expenses or paying him the increase in value the
thing
has acquired by reason thereof.
The property in
controversy,
belonging to the plaintiff as it does, the cross-complaint of the
defendant
must fail.
The
judgment appealed
from is hereby reversed and We hold (1) that the house and the lot in
question
should be excluded from the inventory of the property of the estate of
the deceased, Manuel Javier and Perfecta Tagle, and (2) that the
latter's
heirs have a right to retain the said house after indemnifying the
plaintiff
in the value thereof, or to compel the latter to pay to them the value
of the land occupied by the said house, the plaintiff having the right
to retain the same in the meantime until the value of the said land is
paid. In view of the fact that there is not sufficient evidence in the
case to determine the actual value of the house and lot, the right is
reserved
to the parties to so determine the value in the manner which they deem
best. We make no special provisions as to costs. After the expiration
of
twenty days from the date hereof, let judgment be entered in accordance
herewith and ten days thereafter, the case be remanded to the Court
below
for execution. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres, and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Carson, Willard
and
Tracey, JJ., dissent from the second paragraph of the adjudging
part of the Decision. |