EN
BANC
VICENTE
SANDOVAL
Y MANLAVE, ET AL.,
Petitioners-Appellants,
G.
R.
No. 4206
February
1, 1909
-versus-
THE INSULAR
GOVERNMENT,
Respondent-Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
TORRES,
J.:
Subject to a separate statement
of the basis upon which this Court confirms the judgment of April 16,
1907,
appealed from, by virtue of which the registration of the parcels of
land,
the plans of which are marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, I, J, K,
L, M, N, O, P, and Q, and the parts of parcels F and G, with the
specifications
therein set forth, was ordered, and the application, in so far as it
refers
to the whole parcel marked H in the plan, was denied, said judgment is
hereby affirmed without costs.
Arellano, C.J.,
Mapa, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.
BASIS OF THE
DECISIONFEBRUARY 4,
1909.chanrobles virtual law libraryTORRES,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The statement of facts
and the foundations of law of the Decision entered in this matter are
of
the following tenor:
By a writing dated
February 17, 1906, Attorney Perfecto Gabriel representing Vicente
Manuela,
Manuel, and Rosario Sandoval y Manlave, asked the Court of Land
Registration,
in conformity with the Land Registration Act [Act No. 926], paragraph 6
[sec. 54], for the registration of 17 parcels of real estate owned by
his
principals marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L,
M, N, O, P, and Q, the respective descriptions, situation, and
boundaries
of which are described in said writing; the said properties, assessed
at
the last assessment, at P44,112, were acquired by inheritance from
their
late parents, Claudio Sandoval and Evarista Manlave, who died intestate
in Palawan on December 31, 1896, and January 17, 1906, respectively;
that
no encumbrance of any kind exists upon the said properties, nor has any
person any rights of participation therein, although in that parcel
marked
with the letter H, Lucio Villareal, Marcelino Bayos, Juan Endencia,
Agustin
Rodriguez, and Domingo Cacula, together with other individuals at the
instigation
of Serafin Rodriguez have, since the latter part of December, 1905,
claimed
possession of said land; the names of the lessees on shares who occupy
the said lands, and the names of the owners of the adjoining estates,
all
residents of the town of Coron, Province of Paragua, now Palawan, are
given
as well as the residence and status of the applicants; and that the
described
lands, in the possession of and owned for more than fifty years by
Evarista
Manlave, were inherited by her from her late parents, Nicolas Manlave
and
Silvestra Bartolome, who died on May 8 and September 8, 1888,
respectively,
but that parcel marked Q was purchased by Claudio Sandoval from its
original
owner, Loreto Zapla; all said parcels are used for the cultivation of
rice
and coconuts, and, with the exception of the one marked H, which is
used
as a pasture for cows and carabaos, are fenced in with bamboo; the
applicants
therefore claim the benefit of Chapter VI (Sec. 54), paragraph 6, of
the
Public Land Act, and submit the respective plans of said estates and a
descriptive report on the same together with a certificate from the
President
of the town of Culion, Calamianes.
The examiner of titles
rendered an opinion opposed to the claim of the applicants who,
however,
insisted therein. Thereafter, on October 5, 1906, the Attorney-General
appeared on behalf of the Director of Lands, setting forth that the
lands
referred to in the application presented by Vicente Sandoval and others
are public property, and that the applicants had not been in open,
continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the said 17 parcels during the
ten
years immediately preceding the enforcement of Act No. 926, and for
said
reason he objected to the registration applied for, and prayed the
court
to deny the same with costs.
At the trial of the
case, evidence was adduced by both parties, and on April 16, 1907, the
court below rendered judgment dismissing the opposition on the part of
the Attorney-General representing the Insular Government and the
Director
of Lands, owing to his statement that he did not desire to insist in
his
opposition to said application with respect to the parcels of land, the
plans of which were marked A. C, D, G, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q,
but
that from the parcel G, the triangle formed by the lines B, C, D and D,
13, should, however, be excluded, and for the reasons he gave, he
stated
that the applicants were entitled to obtain a certificate of title to
said
parcels of land in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section 54 of said
Act
No. 926.
For reasons given,
it was also held that the representative of the applicants was entitled
to a certificate of title in accordance with the paragraph, section,
and
Act cited above, to the parcels of land referred to in the plans marked
B and E, and to the greater portion of the land to which plan marked F
refers, with the exception of that portion situated between the Muchong
River and the sea and Mount Sinibtayan; therefore, the opposition of
the
Government with respect to said portion of land in the plan marked F,
bounded
on the south and west by the sea, and on the north and east by the
slopes
of Mount Sinibtayan and the Muchong River was sustained, and the
opposition
with respect to the remainder of parcel F and the parcels B and E
dismissed.
The opposition of the
Government relative to the whole of the parcel shown in the plan
Exhibit
H was sustained for reasons given, and therefore, after a declaration
of
default against all parties concerned with the exception of the
Government,
the Court decreed the adjudication and registration of the parcels
whose
plans are marked A, B, C, D, E, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q, and the
described portions of the parcels F and G in favor of counsel for the
applicants;
the application relative to the whole of parcel H, the triangle
mentioned
of parcel G, and also the indicated portion of parcel F which is
bounded
on the south and west by the sea and on the north and east by the
plains
at the foot of Mount Sinibtayan and the Muchong River was dismissed.
Counsel for the
applicants
excepted to the above decision so far as it dismissed the application
with
respect to the parcel of land marked H and the indicated portion of
parcel
F, and moved for a new trial on the ground that the evidence did not
justify
the judgment in connection with the parts excepted to, and because said
judgment was contrary to law; the motion was overruled, to which the
petitioner
excepted and presented the corresponding bill of exceptions.
On May 22, 1907, the
Attorney-General in turn presented a written exception to the said
judgment
as to the decree granting the adjudication and registration of the
parcels
of land marked A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q, and
in addition moved for a new trial; the motion was overruled.
By another writing
of the 23rd of July following, the representative of the Government
excepted
to the overruling of his former motion limiting it to the parcels of
land
marked with the letters B, E, and F. Bills of exceptions were submitted
by both the applicants and the Attorney-General, that of the applicants
relating to parcel H and that portion of parcel F, the registration of
which were denied; the Attorney-General's bill of exceptions referred
to
the three parcels mentioned above.
In view of the fact
that counsel for the Government waived his opposition made in the
beginning
against the application for the registration of the parcels of land
marked
with the letters A, C, D, I, J K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, and G, with the
exception
of that portion of the latter which is a triangle formed by the lines
BC,
CD, DB, and in view of the fact that the evidence proves that the
applicants,
by themselves and by their antecessors, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the mentioned parcels of
agricultural
land for more than the last twenty years as the owners thereof, the
judge
of the Court of Land Registration held that the interested parties were
entitled to a certificate of title in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 6, section 54, of Act No. 926, and to that effect decreed the
registration of said parcels of land, and dismissed the opposition with
respect thereto.
These parts of the
judgment have not been impugned, nor are they now the subject of
appeal;
therefore, this decision w ill not deal therewith.
As to the parcels of
land indicated by the letters B, E, and F, less that portion of the
latter
which is bounded on the south and west by the sea and on the north and
east by the slopes of Mount Sinibtayan and the Muchong River, the
record
discloses sufficient proof that the ancestors of the applicants, and
after
their death the applicants themselves, have been in possession of and
materially
occupied the said land for more than thirty years without any
interruption
whatever, cultivating certain parts thereof, and using others for the
pasture
of animals, keeping them fenced in for the purpose of preserving at the
same time the trees, shrubs, and bamboo growing thereon in order to
meet
various needs in the field.
Paragraph 6 of Section
54 of Act No. 926 reads:
"All persons who by
themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
public
lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen
hundred
and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government,
for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act,
except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively
presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and
to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title
to such land under the provisions of this chapter."
As may be seen from the
foregoing paragraph, the Act requires not that the land be cultivated,
but an open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation
of the same with good faith and under claim of ownership for more than
ten years prior to the year 1904, in which the said Act took effect,
and
since it appears of record that the applicants, together with their
predecessors
have been in possession of the three parcels of land above alluded to,
in good faith and under title of ownership, and have performed the
requirements
established by the law, no legal reason exists for revoking that part
of
the judgment appealed from referring to the three mentioned parcels of
land, with the exception of the small portion situated between the sea
and the Muchong River, and which only comprises Mount Sinibtayan; the
plain
of that name bordering the sitio of Balatbat, which, according to the
plan
marked F, constitutes the remainder of this parcel acknowledged in
favor
of the applicants is not included in this exception.
As regards the parcel
of land marked in the plan with the letter H, the Court has held that
the
evidence adduced in the case does not prove the open, continuous,
exclusive,
and notorious possession of the property with good faith which is
necessary
in order to acquire ownership and right to a certificate of title in
accordance
with paragraph 6 of the aforesaid Act.
Such a holding accords
with the result and the merits of the case, inasmuch as, considering as
a whole the testimony of the witnesses offered by the representative of
the applicants, it is not possible to infer therefrom that the open,
continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
comprised
in the parcel of 1,501 hectares, marked H, was enjoyed with good faith
for more than ten years prior to 1904, with the intention of
acquiring
the ownership thereof, since, aside from the inconsistencies observed
in
the testimony of the said witnesses, Vicente Sandoval, one of the
applicants,
nothwithstanding his allegation that he, together with his predecessors
and his coowners, had been in possession of such a large tract of land
for more than thirty years, avers that he only knew of the land in
1902,
in which year it was surveyed and posts-were placed to indicate the
boundary
lines; it does not appear that fences were placed around the entire
property;
they were only built in certain places in order to prevent the cattle
from
straying; said fences were often removed to other places as the animals
moved on.
Opposed to the
statement
of the witnesses of the applicants, there is the testimony of the
witnesses
of the Government, who unanimously aver that the land marked in the
plan
with the letter He was in its entirety a cogonal, suitable for pasture;
that animals belonging to different owners grazed over it, among which
were those of the Sandoval y Manlave family; that with the exception of
a small parcel of about 30 hectares, occupied and plowed by one of
them,
Hilario Alberto, no one else was known to have ever owned or been
entitled
to said land, nor had anyone seen the whole of it fenced in; this point
is confirmed by the Provincial Governor, Edward Y. Miller.
It may be true that
the forefathers of the applicants, and the latter themselves by means
of
their servants, allowed their cattle to graze over said land, and in
places
built fences to prevent the scattering and loss of the animals, but it
is none the less true that animals owned by others also used to graze
over
the said property; the fact that the cattle of the applicants and of
their
antecessors grazed over the land in question is no conclusive evidence
of their dominion, since it has not been proven that they exercised
acts
of ownership, were in open, continuous, and peaceful possession of the
whole of the land, and had caused it to be inclosed to the exclusion of
other persons; it does appear as proven in the case that the applicants
and their antecessors possessed the said land as owners for the time
fixed
by the law; and though for the effects of possession as owner the law
does
not require that the land shall be cultivated, yet it does
unquestionably
require that whoever claims such possession shall exercise acts of
dominion
and ownership which can not be mistaken for the momentary and
accidental
enjoyment of the property.
For the foregoing
considerations,
and those stated by the Court below, the judgment appealed from must be
and is affirmed without costs.
Arellano, C.J.,
Mapa, Carson and Willard, JJ., concur. |