EN
BANC
IN
THE MATTER
OF THE ESTATE OF
JOAQUINA MIJARES
DE FARIÑAS.
ENRIQUE DE LA
VEGA,
Administrator-Appellant,
G.
R.
No. 4878
February
27, 1909
-versus-
VICENTE LAVIN,
Claimant-Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
WILLARD,
J:
In the proceedings for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Joaquina Mijares de Farinas,
deceased, the heirs of Paulino Lavin presented before the commissioners
two claims against the estate, one for a debt claimed to be due from
Jose
Farinas, the husband of the deceased, to Paulino Lavin, which debt it
was
said had been assumed by the deceased, and the other for a debt due
from
the deceased herself to Paulino Lavin. The commissioners disallowed
both
claims, the heirs appealed to the Court of First Instance, which Court
allowed the debt claimed to be due from the husband and disallowed the
debt claimed to be due from the deceased herself. From this judgment
both
parties have appealed.
1. If Jose Farinas,
the husband of the deceased, owed anything to Paulino Lavin, it was by
reason of two documents, both dated the 17th day of March, 1886. They
are
substantially in the same form. One of them is as follows:
"Received from Don
Paulino Lavin the sum of nine hundred and seventy-one pesos invested in
the work on the Tribunal de Santa Catalina, as capitalist partner of
the
undersigned.
"Vigan, March 17,
1886.
(Signed) "JOSE
FARIÑAS."
The other obligation of
200 Pesos, making a total of 1,171 Pesos. There was proof other than
that
contained in the documents themselves to show that Paulino Lavin and
Jose
Farinas were partners in the construction of certain public buildings
in
Ilocos Sur. These documents do not evidence any indebtedness on the
part
of Farinas to Lavin. They prove rather that Lavin had contributed
certain
money to the business of the partnership, and whether he ever received
the money would depend upon the success of the business, a result which
could only be known after a liquidation of the partnership affairs.
There
is no evidence that any such liquidation was ever made and no evidence
that, even if such liquidation had been made and profits had resulted,
that these profits were in the hands of Farinas.
But it is said that
notwithstanding this fact, the deceased admitted that these documents
showed
the existence of a debt on the part of her husband, the payment of
which
she assumed. Her husband died on the 16th day of October, 1888. On the
30th of May, 1889, she made and signed the following indorsement upon
each
one of the documents:
"I acknowledge as
true
the contents of the foregoing receipt, as I was present at the time
when
the amount therein stated was actually delivered and at the time when
my
late husband signed it with his own hand; and in testimony thereof, I
sign
this acknowledgement before the witnesses Don Raymundo Querol, Don
Ladislao
Donato, and Don Narciso Sebastian.
"Vigan, May 30, 1889."
It will be seen that this
document signed by her is simply a recognition of the truth of the
statements
contained in the document itself, namely, that Paulino Lavin had
contributed
to the capital of the partnership certain sums of money. It does not
even
admit the existence of any debt from the husband to Paulino Lavin and
in
no way assumes the payment of any such supposed obligation.
It follows, therefore,
that when in 1894, the heirs of Paulino Lavin commenced an action
against
the deceased, she was in no way responsible for this debt supposed to
exist
in favor of the heirs and against her husband. It is claimed, however,
by the plaintiffs that in the proceedings in that action she recognized
the existence of such a debt. That proceeding was an executive action
commenced
on the 10th day of October 1894, against the deceased. The document set
out in the complaint purported to be signed by the deceased and it
stated
that after the death of her husband, Jose Farinas, she had received
from
Paulino Lavin 1,233.14 Pesos. In the proceeding she was required to
state:
(1) Whether she admitted the truth of the contents of the documents;
and
(2) whether her signature thereto was genuine. Her answer was as
follows:
"She stated that she
acknowledged the contents of the document shown to her, because it is
true
that her late husband Don Jose Farinas received from Don Paulino Lavin
the sum of twelve hundred and thirty-three pesos and fourteen cents
therein
referred to; in answering the second question, she said that she did
not
acknowledge the signature and rubric, appearing with her name in the
above-mentioned
document, as she did not remember signing a sealed document, nor having
done so in the presence of the witnesses whose signatures and rubric
appear
at the foot of the same."
It will be seen that she
did no understand the document, or that her answer was not properly
taken
down. In fact, in a subsequent proceeding in the case it was alleged by
her that there had been a mistake in this respect, for the document,
the
truth of which she admitted, says nothing about any debt due from her
husband
to Paulino Lavin. On the contrary, it relates solely to her own
personal
debt incurred after her husband's death. It is to be noticed further
that
in this answer she did not say that her husband owed Paulino Lavin, but
that he had taken a certain amount of money from him. This is entirely
consistent with the contents of the documents of the 17th of March
1886.
There is, consequently, nothing in this answer which admis the
existence
of any indebtedness from her husband to Paulino Lavin and nothing which
showed that she assumed the payment of any such supposed indebtedness.
Later in the
proceedings
an answer was presented in her behalf. In this answer she stated that
what
she declared when asked to recognize the authenticity of the documents
was that her deceased husband owed Lavin 1,171 Pesos and not 1,233
Pesos.
It does not appear that she signed this answer. It may have been signed
by her solicitor. Under these circumstances the contents of the answer
can not be considered as admissions made by her which could be used as
evidence against her in another proceeding entirely disconnected with
the
subject-matter of the proceeding in which the answer was made. There
is,
therefore, nothing in the proceeding of 1894 which proves either the
existence
of a debt from the husband Paulino Lavin or any recognition of such
supposed
indebtedness by the deceased.
The plaintiff claims
however, that there is such recognition and admission in the will of
the
deceased made on the 20th of January 1906. This supposed will contains
the following statement:
"I also declare that
at the time of the death of my husband he left unfinished a work under
contract with the Government, in the pueblo of Santa Maria, and in
order
to fulfill the obligation of my husband I had to continue the work
until
its termination, with such ill fortune that I lost about 2,000 pesos.
For
the purpose of covering the loss, I borrowed some money from Don
Vicente
Lavin, to whom I still owe P1,300, and from the nephews of Father
Evaristo
Abaya P540, all of them residents of Vigan, and I also sold the parcel
of land in Pantay above cited."
It will be seen that this
contains no admission of the existence of any debt from her husband to
Paulino Lavin. It relates exclusively to a personal debt contracted by
her after his death. It is not, therefore, necessary to consider the
effect
of this supposed will which was not admitted to probate because it
never
was signed by the deceased.
The result as to this
cause of action is that there is no evidence in the case to show any
liability
on the part of the estate of the deceased for the payment of this 1,171
Pesos, and the judgment of the court below allowing this claim, must be
reversed.
2. The other cause
of action relates to a personal debt contracted by the deceased after
the
death of her husband.
There was received
in evidence a statement of the accounts between Paulino Lavin and the
deceased
commencing in November, 1888, and ending in April, 1889, dated the 30th
day of May, 1889, signed by Paulino Lavin, from which it appeared that
the deceased owed Paulino Lavin 1,233.14 Pesos. The deceased by a
writing
signed upon the account itself agreed to its correctness.
This document proves
the existence of a debt of that amount upon that date and the only
question
in the case is, whether the statute of limitations has run against this
indebtedness.
The action commenced
by the heirs of Paulino Lavin in 1894 was an action to recover this
same
indebtedness. It is true that proceeding, being an executive action,
was
dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had not presented any
document
which entitled him to take advantage of such a summary proceeding but
when
the question of the interruption of the running of the statute of
limitations
in regard to actions is under consideration the fact that the action is
dismissed is of no importance. Article 1973 of the Civil Code is as
follows:
"Prescription of
actions
is interrupted by their institution before the courts, by extrajudicial
claim of the creditor, and by any act of acknowledgement of the debt by
the debtor." [See Manresa's
Commentaries
on the Civil Code, Vol 12, page 883].
The result is that the
judgment of the Court below refusing to allow this claim must be
reversed
and it should be allowed in the amount of 1,233.14 Pesos, with interest
at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 10th day of October 1894,
when a judicial demand for its payment was made.
3. The person who
carried
on this litigation in the Court of First Instance and in this court is
Vicente Lavin, the judicial administrator of the estate of his father,
Paulino Lavin. The persons who presented the claim before the
commissioners
were the heirs of Paulino Lavin and the defendant claims that the
plaintiff
as administrator has no standing in court because he never presented
any
claim before the commissioners. It appears that Vicente Lavin was
appointed
judicial administrator of the estate of Paulino Lavin on the 5th day of
March 1907. This was after the claim had been presented by the heirs to
the commissioners. The question involved is simply one of substitution
of parties plaintiff. Upon the appointment of Vicente Lavin as
administrator
as aforesaid he was entitled to have and receive all the claims in
favor
of the estate of which he was the administrator and entitled to be
substituted
in the place of the heirs in the prosecution of any such claims. The
objection
of the defendant, therefore, to his personality cannot be sustained.
The judgment of the
Court below is reversed and judgment entered acquitting the defendant
of
the second cause of action set out in the complaint and ordering
judgment
against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
P1,233.14,
with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the 10th day of
October
1894, and the costs of the first instance. No costs will be allowed to
either party in this Court. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur. |