FIRST
DIVISION
JOSE
RABINO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 4040
January
10, 1910
-versus-
TOMAS
RAVIDA,
Defendant-Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
MAPA, J:
The object of the Complaint
in this action is the recovery of 14 carabaos. The trial court rendered
judgment sentencing the defendant to return them to the plaintiff, and
against said judgment the former has interposed an appeal.
In November 1904, Tomas
Ravida, the defendant herein, filed a complaint with the Court of the
Justice
of the Peace of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon, against Francisca
Rabino
in connection with the delivery of thirteen (13) carabaos, and obtained
a final judgment in his favor. As no carabaos were found in the
possession
of the said Francisca, the sentence was executed by seizing fourteen
carabaos
that were in the possession of Jose Rabino, the father of said
Francisca
and plaintiff in the present case. The sheriff who executed that
sentence
testified at the trial that although Ravida only claimed thirteen and a
half carabaos, fourteen (14) were delivered to him because no such
fraction
existed.
The plaintiff alleges
that the fourteen carabaos delivered to Ravida were of his sole and
exclusive
ownership, and not of his daughter Francisca, against whom the said
Ravida
obtained judgment in the court of the justice of the peace of
Cajidiocan.
The latter on his part, maintains that said carabaos belong to him as
one-half
of the product of a caraballa [female carabao] which he
delivered
to Francisca to keep for breeding purposes on condition that they
should
divide between them such calves or offspring as it might have.
We have now before
Us the record of the action brought by Tomas Ravida against Francisca
Rabino
in the Court of the Justice of the Peace of Cajidiocan, not to
proceedings
followed in the execution of the sentence entered therein. But Emiterio
Riva, the Deputy Sheriff who executed the said sentence, was presented
as witness by the defendant, and it appears from his declaration that
when
he sought to execute the sentence, Francisca told him that she did not
have a single carabao, for which reason the justice of the peace
"issued
another order of execution (these are his own words) not upon Francisca
Rabino, but upon Jose Rabino, because the latter was the head of the
family,
and the former was single and lived under the shelter of her father."
And
the witness adds, "in compliance with the second order of execution,
the
sentence was executed on said carabaos occupied by Jose Rabino."
The said witness has
very clearly stated that the carabaos delivered to Tomas Ravida by
virtue
of the execution of the sentence against Francisca Rabino were taken,
not
from the possession of the latter but from that of her father Jose
Rabino,
who owned them, or, as asserted by said witness, occupied them; that to
this end a second order of the execution was issued, nominally
addressed
to the said Jose Rabino, and that the Justice of the Peace of
Cajidiocan
had in acting, thus, was the fact that said Rabino is the father of
Francisca,
and because the latter being a single woman, lived under the shelter of
her father's roof.
Such a declaration
is of great importance as being that made by the officer who executed
the
sentence entered against Francisca Rabino, and its terms speak fully in
favor of the plaintiff herein inasmuch as it was not lawful a judgment
rendered only and exclusively against the former, and much less to
dispossess
him without due process of law of his carabaos, as occurred by reason
of
said order of execution. To thus deprive the plaintiff of the carabaos
that he possessed was manifestly illegal, therefore he is entitled to
recover
them from the defendant, who by such unlawful means acquired the
possession
thereof. [Article 464, Civil Code].
The asseveration of
the said witness for the defendant that is was the plaintiff herein,
not
his daughter Francisca, who possessed the fourteen carabaos in
question,
is fully corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses who testified
in the same sense at the trial. Moreover, said witnesses positively
aver
that said carabaos are the property of the plaintiff. The appellant
states
in his brief that said witnesses did not know, nor could they know what
they were testifying except from hearsay, but he advances no reason
whatever
in support of such allegation. The truth is that their declarations
appear
as made from their own knowledge of the matter and not merely from
hearsay.
Apart from the
declaration
of the witnesses above alluded to in connection with the plaintiff's
ownership,
it is unquestionable that he is protected by a just and lawful title in
that he was in possession of the said carabaos and it has not been
demonstrated
that he possessed them with bad faith. It is an express provision of
law
that the possession of personal property acquired with good faith, is
equivalent
to a title thereto. [Article 464, supra].
The title set up by
the defendant against that of the plaintiff is based on the right of
accession,
because it is said that the carabaos in question were the get of a
carabao
that 18 years ago he delivered into the care of Francisca Rabino, the
daughter
of said plaintiff. Such a claim can not prosper except by clear and
positive
proof that the carabaos above referred to are out of the defendant's caraballa.
It does not suffice to say or prove that the latter had a given number
of calves, but it must be shown in addition that such calves are
precisely
the ones herein referred to, and the record does not contain sufficient
evidence of such identification. The declarations of the witnesses for
the defendant, given in vague and general terms, do not, nor can they
lead
to such proof. None of them positively and categorically asserts that
said
carabaos are the get of the caraballa placed by the defendant
in
the care of said Francisca, and we certainly believe that it would be a
difficult matter for them to make such an assertion, taking into
account
that the oldest carabao was but about four years old, the rest being
three,
two, and one year old only, as testified by the defendant himself. It
seems
to us that it would be an extraordinary thing if a caraballa
could
produce fourteen calves in a period of four years, yet this is what
would
actually appear from the plain statement, made without any explanation
whatever, in the written answer of the defendant, that the carabaos
above
referred to are the product of his caraballa.
In support of his
claims,
he makes the following statement in paragraph 2 of the Complaint:
"That on the 16th of
November, 1904, the defendant Tomas Ravida, presented a complaint in
the
court of the justice of the peace of Cajidiocan, Romblon, Philippine
Islands,
against Francisca Rabino in connection with thirteen carabaos, and she
was sentenced to deliver said carabaos to the then plaintiff, Tomas
Ravida;
the sentence was executed by Emiterio Riva, the sheriff of the said
town
of Cajidiocan.
"Indeed, it is not
easy to understand how this allegation can constitute evidence of any
kind
in favor of the defendant. It is set out therein that Francisca Rabino,
in an action brought against her by the defendant therein, was
sentenced
to deliver to the latter thirteen carabaos, but that does not say or
mean
that the carabaos that were taken from the possession of Jose Rabino to
be delivered to the defendant in compliance with said judgment were the
property of the defendant and not of Jose Rabino, which is the subject
of this controversy. Neither can the other assertion in the appellant's
brief, to the effect that Francisca had consented to said judgment,
mean
such a thing, because from the fact that the latter was obliged to
deliver
thirteen carabaos, it does not follow that the carabaos here in
question,
which were in the possession of the plaintiff and not of said
Francisca,
were the property of the defendant, or that they were the identical
ones
that were the subject of the complaint filed by him against Francisca
Rabino.
For the rest, it is quite unnecessary to say that the judgment entered
against the latter should not, nor can it prejudice the plaintiff
herein
who was not a party to the suit in which the same was rendered." [Par.
2, Sec. 306, Code of Civil Procedure].
The trial judge found that
when the delivery of the fourteen carabaos was made to Tomas Ravida,
the
brands on the same [property of the plaintiff] were new and most of
them
recently made, and that they had apparently been branded some three or
four days prior to said delivery. This fact is put forward by the
appellant
as proving that said carabaos did not really belong to the plaintiff
Rabino.
It seem that he desired to say by this that if the latter were really
the
owner of the carabaos he would have branded them long before that date;
but if this observation were of any value it would necessarily be
against
the appellant, inasmuch as said animals did not then bear his brand
they
bore was owned by the plaintiff, and duly registered by him in
September
1904.
It is literally stated
in the appellant's brief that:
"Two witnesses, the
defendant Tomas Ravida and Jose Ramiro, declare that in the time of the
Spanish Government, that is to say, in the year 1894, when the present
plaintiff was a defendant and his property was attached, he declared
that
the said carabaos all belonged to his daughter Francisca, and that the
plaintiff did not in any manner deny such declarations."
He certainly had no need
to deny them. If the witnesses refer therein to the carabaos now in
question,
it is evident that they perverted the truth, inasmuch as the oldest of
the animals being but four years old, none of them existed in the year
1894; and if as it seems they speak of other carabaos, their testimony
is of no importance since it does not refer to the subject matter of
the
present litigation.
In view of the
foregoing
it can not be said that the statement contained in the judgment
appealed
from, that the fourteen carabaos mentioned in the complaint are the
exclusive
property of and belong to the plaintiff, and that the defendant Rabino
has not shown a better titled or right to the said carabaos that the
plaintiff,
is contrary to the weight of the evidence in the case. After arriving
at
this conclusion it appears entirely unnecessary to discuss the doctrine
established in the said judgment in connection with the statute of
limitations
of personal property, prescription which has also been considered by
the
Court below as a title of dominion in favor of the plaintiff. We
therefore
expressly refrain from considering this particular point of the
judgment
appealed from. The said judgment is hereby affirmed with the costs of
this
instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur. |