EN
BANC
THE
GOVERNMENT OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 10355
February
4, 1915
-versus-
THE HON.
PEDRO
CONCEPCION,
IGNACIO JARO,
THE
PROVINCIAL
FISCAL
OF CAVITE, ANGELA SAN AGUSTIN
AND LA
CORPORACION
DE PP. DOMINICOS DE LA PROVINCIA
DEL SAN
SANTISIMO
ROSARIO DE FILIPINAS,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I
O N
PER
CURIAM :
This is an application
for the Writ of Mandamus. Its purpose is to compel one of the
respondents,
the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, who is now and has been since the 1st of
July,
1914, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna,
and
who was for sometime prior to the 1st of July, 1914, one of the
auxiliary
judges of the Court of Land Registration, to sign and certify a bill of
exceptions. The important facts are as follows:
First. That on the
21st day of November, 1912, the petitioner presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration, in accordance with Section 61 of Act No.
926,
for the registration of a certain piece or parcel of land, divided into
274 lots, situated in the poblacion of the municipality of Cavite; that
said cause was numbered 8618.
Second. That various
oppositions were presented to the registration of said parcels of land
by the respondents, Ignacio Jaro, the prosecuting attorney of the
Province
of Cavite, Angela San Agustin, La Corporacion de PP. Dominicos de la
Provincia
de Santisimo Rosario de Filipinas, and by the commander of the naval
stations
of Olongapo and Cavite.
Third. That the
petition
and oppositions were brought on to trial in said court, and after the
conclusion
of the same, the said Hon. Pedro Concepcion, judge, on the 29th day of
November 1913, rendered a decision, in which he denied the opposition
of
the commander of the naval stations of Olongapo and Cavite.
Fourth. That on the
5th day of January 1914, the said commander of the naval stations of
Olongapo
and Cavite presented a motion for a new trial, with reference to
certain
of the parcels or lots of land involved in said original petition,
which
motion was later amended, in order to include other parcels or lots of
land involved in the said original petition.
Fifth. That on the
26th day of June, 1914, said motion was brought on for hearing before
said
judge, who, after hearing said parties, denied it.
Sixth. That on the
said 26th day of June, 1914, the said commander duly excepted to the
order
of the court denying said motion for a new trial.
Seventh. That on the
said 26th day of June, 1914, the said Commander presented a motion
asking
that he be given sixty days within which to prepare and to present his
bill of exceptions, in order to appeal to the Supreme Court, which
motion
was granted.
Eighth. That on the
11th day of July, 1914, the said bill of exceptions being duly
prepared,
was presented to said judge [Pedro Concepcion] for his certification,
which
the said judge denied upon the ground that he had lost jurisdiction
over
said cause.
Ninth. That on the
1st day of July, 1914, the said Honorable Pedro Concepcion became
judge,
by regular appointment, of the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Laguna, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2347 and by
said
appointment ceased to be a judge of the Court of Land Registration.
Tenth. That the
petitioner
is without other adequate or speedy relief, except that prayed for in
his
petition.
The plaintiff, upon the
foregoing facts, prayed that the writ of mandamus should be issued by
this
court, directing requiring, and compelling the said Hon. Pedro
Concepcion,
Judge, to sign and certify said bill of exceptions.
To the petition
presented
in said cause, the respondent, Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of the
Court
of First Instance of the Province of Laguna, presented a demurrer,
basing
the same upon the following facts:
"1. The plaintiff has
no personality to commence this action.
"2. There is a defect
of parties therein.
"3. That the facts
alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action."
With reference to the first
ground of the demurrer, the respondent judge attempts to make it appear
that the Attorney-General is without authority or personality to
present
said petition, for the reason that he did not allege nor demonstrate,
in
said petition, that he did represent the commander of the naval
stations
of Olongapo and Cavite. By reference to the bill of exceptions which
was
presented for signature to the respondent judge, at page 11 of the
record,
it will be seen that the Attorney-General for the Philippine Islands
represented
the commander of the naval stations of Olongapo and Cavite, in his
opposition
to the registration of said parcels of land, in the court below. While
it may be true that the Attorney-General, in the petition in the
present
case, failed to indicate when he signed the petition, that he was still
representing the said commander in his effort to have said bill of
exceptions
signed and certified, yet, if that was a defect, it was cured by the
fact
that the representative of the Attorney-General appeared before this
court
and expressly stated, in his oral argument, that they were representing
the said commander in his opposition to the registration of a portion
of
said parcel or parcels of land. We think the first ground of the
demurrer
should be overruled.
With reference to the
second ground of the demurrer. to wit, that there was a defect of
parties,
the respondent judge calls our attention to the title of the petition,
where he is mentioned simply as the Honorable Pedro Concepcion, without
giving his official character. That allegation is true, but,
nevertheless,
in the body of the petition we find that he is referred to and
described
as Pedro Concepcion, who was formerly one of the auxiliary judges of
the
Court of Land Registration and now judge of the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Laguna, and that he was the judge who tried said
cause
No. 8618. Where the character of the person sued is sufficiently
indicated
in the body of the complaint, the complaint will be sufficient against
him in that character, even though the title of the complaint does not
correctly designate or describe the particular character in which he is
sued.
The respondent judge,
under "defect of parties," further argues that, inasmuch as he had
ceased
to be a judge of the Court of Land Registration and had become a judge
of the Court of First Instance, that he had thereby lost jurisdiction
over
said cause, and was without authority to certify said bill of
exceptions.
We think that the contention of the respondent judge is tenable and
should
be sustained. The argument with reference to this conclusion, however,
will be stated more fully below.
The
respondent judge,
in the third ground of his demurrer, alleges that the facts stated in
said
petition are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In support
of this ground of the demurrer, the respondent argues that by virtue of
Section 7 of Act No. 2347, he had ceased to be a judge of the Court of
Land Registration after the 1st of July, 1914; that at the time of the
presentation of said bill of exceptions for certification [the 11th of
July, 1914] he was not judge of said court, and was, therefore, without
authority to sign or certify the same. We believe that contention of
the
respondent judge is a tenable one.
In the case of
Pamintuan
vs. Llorente, p. 341, ante, this court decided, where an exactly
analogous
question was presented, that it was not the intention of the
Legislature
to provide by Act No. 2347 that a judge whose position had been vacated
on the 1st of July, 1914, and who had been appointed and transferred to
another district as judge, should continue to act in his original
district
and to continue to have and to take jurisdiction of cases, criminal or
civil, theretofore pending before him; that one who has been a judge in
a particular district and who was afterwards appointed judge of another
district, has no authority, after he becomes judge of the latter
district,
to take any action in cases pending in the former district, which were
still pending at the time he retired therefrom. [U. S. vs. Abreu, 13
Off.
Gaz., 1328]. In that case, Pamintuan vs. Llorente, supra, We
held,
under Section 7, in relation with section 24 of Act No. 2347, that the
judges of the Courts of First Instance, who had been acting as such
prior
to the 1st of July, 1914, ceased to be judges of said courts and were
without
authority to continue to act in any manner whatever, in cases
theretofore
pending, unless and until they had been reappointed as judges in
accordance
with the provisions of said Act. We further held that a judge of a
particular
district or province who had been reappointed on or after the 1st of
July,
1914, but who had been assigned to a different district or province,
was
without authority or power to take jurisdiction or cognizance, in any
manner
whatever, of any case which was theretofore pending before him, in his
original district or province.
The Attorney-General,
in the present case, in his oral argument, contended that by reason of
the provisions of Section 24 of said Act, a different rule should
prevail
with reference to the judges of the Court of Land Registration. In the
case of Pamintuan vs. Llorente, supra, We held, by virtue of
the
provisions of Section 7 of said Act, that all the judges of the Courts
of First Instance ceased to have any power or authority to act in any
case,
or in any manner whatever, unless and until they should be reappointed.
The particular provision of Section 7 which, in our opinion, justifies
that conclusion, is that which says:
"The present judges
of the Courts of First Instance shall vacate their positions on the
taking
effect of this Act." [on the 1st of July, 1914].
We find now that exactly
the same provision of said Section includes also the judges of the
Court
of Land Registration. Said Section 7 provides that:
"The present judges
of the Court of Land Registration, shall vacate their positions on the
taking effect of this Act."
It
would seem to be clear
then, that all of the judges of the Court of Land Registration ceased
to
be judges and ceased to have any judicial authority to act in any case
theretofore pending, on and after the 1st day of July, 1914, unless and
until they had been revested with judicial authority by reappointment.
The Attorney-General argues, however, because of the provisions of
Section
24, which says: "all pending decision or decree or continuance of the
evidence
in the Court of Land Registration on the date on which this Act takes
effect,
shall continue until their final decision under the jurisdiction of
said
court to whom said cases were assigned," that all pending decision or
decree
must continue, until their final decision, under the jurisdiction of
the
judge to whom said cases were assigned. But we have found that all of
the
judges of both the Courts of First Instance as well as the Court of
Land
Registration, ceased to have any judicial authority to act in any
manner
whatever, after the 1st of July, 1914. We have also found that the Land
Court itself ceased to exist, as a court, on the 1st of July, 1914.
That
being true, then, of course, in the absence of an express provision to
the contrary, both the Court of Land Registration and the judges
thereof,
as such, went out of existence on the 1st of July, 1914, and all cases,
in whatever status they were found to be, were transferred to the
different
Courts of First Instance of the different provinces or districts in
which
the particular land involved was situate.
We find that there
is a conflict between this quoted provision of Section 24 and the
provisions
of section 10 of said Act. Section 10 provides that: "All the
jurisdiction
and powers heretofore conferred upon the Court of Land Registration and
upon the Court of Land Registration judges, are hereby conferred upon
the
Courts of First Instance and the judges thereof, of the provinces in
which
the land which is to be registered is situate."
It will be noted that
by Section 10, "all the jurisdiction" and powers of the Court of Land
Registration
were transferred to the Courts of First Instance, etc. This section
contains
no saving clause.
If then, "all the
jurisdiction"
of the Court of Land Registration was "hereby" conferred upon the
Courts
of First Instance, upon what kind of reasoning can we hold, after said
Act took effect, that the Court of Land Registration, or the judges
thereof,
"shall continue to take jurisdiction" of cases therein pending decision
or decree or continuance of the evidence?
In Our opinion,
considering
the provisions of Sections 7, 10, and 24 of said Act, in their relation
to each other. not only the Court of Land Registration, as a separate
entity,
ceased to exist on the 1st day of July, 1914, but that the judges
thereof
ceased to have any authority to act in any manner whatever in any case
pending decision or decree, or continuance of the evidence. Had the
Legislature
made some special provision for the continuance of the land court,
until
all cases pending decision or decree, etc., etc., should reach a final
decision then there might have been some reason for holding that the
judges
of said court might continue to take jurisdiction of cases pending
decision
or decree, etc. But when "all the jurisdiction'' which a particular
court
has, is transferred to another court, and when the judges of said court
are ordered to vacate their positions on a particular date, there seems
but little left in said original court, with which to continue the
jurisdiction
over any matter that was theretofore pending therein. It is our opinion
that all cases filed or begun and not finally concluded in the Court of
Land Registration on the 1st of July, 1914, were transferred to "the
judges
of the Courts of First Instance of the provinces where said lands, made
the object of said cases, are situate." If then, "all cases of the
Court
of Land Registration, in whatever status they may be found, were
transferred
to the Courts of First Instance of the provinces where the land
involved
is situate, we are of the opinion that said court [the Court of First
Instance
of the particular province] is the only court which has any
jurisdiction
over the cases pending decision or decree or continuance of the
evidence,
in whatever condition the case may be found, to continue with the
jurisdiction
thereof. That being true, whatever is yet to be done in order to
determine
a particular case begun in the Court of Land Registration prior to the
1st of July, 1914, must be done by the judge of the Court of First
Instance
of the province in which the land involved is situate. That being true,
it must follow that the bill of exceptions in the present case, the
land
involved being in the province of Cavite, must be presented to the
judge
of the Court of First Instance of said province.
This is not the first
time the question which We are discussing, although in a different
form,
has been presented to this Court. We have held in numerous cases that
the
certification and signing of a bill of exceptions are judicial acts,
which
cannot be executed by one who has no jurisdiction over the matter, on
account
of his having ceased to be the judge of the court in which the case was
tried by him as judge. He has no right to exercise any jurisdiction in
a court of which he has ceased to be the judge. [Enriquez vs. Watson, 3
Phil. Rep., 279; Ricamora vs. Trent, 3 Phil. Rep., 137; Osmeña
vs.
Gorordo, 5 Phil. Rep., 37; Santos vs. Johnson, 6 Phil. Rep., 473].
In view, therefore,
of the fact that the Court of Land Registration ceased to exist, as
such,
upon the 1st day of July, 1914, and that the judges thereof ceased to
have
any judicial authority on the same date, and in view of the fact that
all
cases therein pending were transferred to the Courts of First Instance
of the provinces where the land involved was situate, we are of the
opinion
and so hold, that the respondent judge, having become judge of another
province than the one in which the land is situate, is without
authority
or right to certify the bill of exceptions involved in the present
case.
Therefore, the demurrer is hereby sustained and the petitioners are
hereby
given five days within which to amend their petition, if they so
desire.
So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Carson, J.,
concurs in the result.
Moreland, J.,
dissents. |