FIRST
DIVISION
FRANCISCO
ROSCO,
ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
G.
R.
No. 9518
January
3, 1916
-versus-
MARIANO
REBUENO,
Defendant-Appellant.
D
E C I S I
O N
MORELAND,
J:
This is an appeal from
a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Albay in favor of the
plaintiff,
Francisco Rosco, and against the defendant for the sum of P200,
interest
and costs.
The history of this
case is rather an unusual one. In the year 1905, two actions were begun
in the justice's court of Oas, one entitled Francisco Rosco vs. Mariano
Rebueno and another, Ignacio Rosco vs. Mariano Rebueno and others.
These
actions were tried separately in the justice's court, resulting in a
judgment
in favor of the defendants in each case. Appeals were taken to the
Court
of First Instance of Albay by the respective plaintiffs. After the
appeals
had been taken and perfected, the attorney who had acted for the
plaintiffs
in the two actions in the justice's court filed a complaint in the
Court
of First Instance in which the two plaintiffs in the appealed cases
were
joined as plaintiffs and the defendants in both actions in the
justice's
court were joined as defendants. The complaint thus filed in the Court
of First Instance, while including the causes of action in the two
appealed
cases, also set out new and different allegations, and judgment was
prayed
in that complaint for P2,300, a sum will be noted, quite beyond the
jurisdiction
of a justice's court. To this complaint, answer was duly made. The
Court
of First Instance refused to try the action on the pleadings filed,
holding
that it was not an original action but was a continuation of the
appeals
in the two actions in which judgments had been rendered in the
justice's
court. It accordingly decided that the action which the court would try
was that of Francisco Rosco vs. Mariano Rebueno, and that the trial
would
be considered a new trial in the appeal from the judgment rendered by
the
justice's court in the action of Francisco Rosco vs. Mariano Rebueno.
It appears that when
the action was begun in the Court of First Instance , some of the
parties
who were named as defendants in the two actions in the justice's court
were excluded as defendants in the action in the Court of First
Instance;
so that, when the court decided that it would not try the action begun
in that court but would try the action entitled Francisco Rosco &
Mariano
Rebueno, it was found that some of the parties who had been defendants
in that action in the justice's court were not parties in the action
filed
in the Court of First Instance. Accordingly the court said:
"But no judgment can
be rendered against the defendants who were excluded from the new or
the
amended complaint. The plaintiff had a right to exclude the other
defendants
when he reproduced his complaint, and this court has no jurisdiction n
this case other than its appellate jurisdiction."
After trial, the court
rendered judgment in favor of Francisco Rosco for the sum of P300 and
interest.
An appeal was taken from that judgment to the Supreme Court, where it
was
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. The court, in
accordance
with the judgment of the Supreme Court, tried the action on the issues
framed by the pleadings in the Court of First Instance, treating it as
an original action in that court and not as a trial on appeal, and
rendered
a judgment against the defendant, with interest and costs. The appeal
now
before Us is from that judgment.
The defendants in the
Court of First Instance pleaded res judicata, founded on the
existence
of final judgments in the justice's court of Oas in favor of the same
plaintiffs
and against the same defendants based on the same cause of action. The
contention of the appellant is that the two judgments in the justice's
court, one in favor of Francisco Rosco and the other in favor of
Igancio
Rosco, are final judgments and that no action between the same parties
based on the same cause of action can now be founded or maintained. His
argument is that, although the two judgments of the justice's court
were
appealed and the appeals perfected in 1906, those appeals were
abandoned
when the two plaintiffs in the actions in the justice's court joined
together
as plaintiffs in a single action brought in the Court of First
Instance,
which was based on additional allegations to those found in the
complaints
in the justice's court and in which a joint judgment was demanded in
favor
of the two plaintiffs for a sum greatly in excess of the jurisdiction
of
the justice's court. He asserts that the action in the Court of First
Instance,
being a new and original action in that court, was, in effect, an
abandonment
of the appeals theretofore taken from the judgments in the justice's
court,
and that those appeals having been abandoned, the judgments were
revived
and thereafter remained and now are in full force and effect as final
judgments.
He reasons that the trial court was in error when, over the plea and
objection
of the defendant, it changed not only the parties to the action then
pending
before it but also the substance thereof by holding that it would not
try
the action then before it for trial, namely, the action entitled
Francisco
and Ignacio Rosco vs. Mariano Rebueno and others, which was an original
action in the Court of First Instance for a sum of money over which a
justice's
court had no jurisdiction, but rather would try the action entitled
Francisco
Rosco vs. Mariano Rebueno, which was an action not then before it for
trial,
which the parties had not placed on the calendar it for trial, which
the
parties had not placed on the calendar and had not prepared for trial.
He alleges that the court also erred in holding that the action then
before
it for trial was not an original action in that court but was a
continuation
of the two actions in which appeals had been taken from judgments of
the
justice's court.
Appellant's arguments,
apart from that one relating had been res judicata, were
applicable
to the case as it stood on the first appeal to this Court but not on
this
appeal. After the cause was returned by the Supreme Court, the trial
court,
on the second trial, treated the action as an original action in that
court
and tried the case on the issues framed by the pleadings in that
action,
including of res judicata, and not on those presented to the justice's
court. This was necessary by reason of the decision of the Supreme
Court
on the first appeal. That the action then before the Court for trial
was
an original action and had, under the circumstances, no legal relation
with the actions tried in the justice's court, was beyond question at
the
time of the second trial by reason of the opinion of the Supreme Court
just mentioned rendered on the first appeal in the same action. [Rosco
vs. Rebueno, 11 Phil. Rep., 300]. In that case the Court said:
"It is true that the
plaintiffs did not appeal from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance,
but we think that the defendant was clearly entitled to a final
adjudication
of all the material issues raised by the pleadings, and that the trial
court was not justified in limiting itself to a determination of only
so
much of the complaint filed so in one of the cases, apparently selected
arbitrary, which had come up on appeal from the trial court. There can
be no doubt in no sense be regarded as a reproduction of the separate
complaints
filed in separate actions in the court of the justice of the peace,
which
were appealed to that court, nor could it be considered as a
reproduction
of the complaint in either of them, since it alleges and prays for
damages
in an amount over which the court of the justice of the peace had no
jurisdiction."
[Alonzo vs. Municipality of Placer, 5 Phil. Rep., 71].
The
declaration of the
Supreme Court "that the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance
could in no sense be regarded as a reproduction of the separate
complaints
filed in separate actions in the court of the justice of the peace,
which
were appealed to that court, nor could it be considered as a
reproduction
of the complaint in either of them," is a finding, in effect, that the
action was an original action in the Court of First Instance and, as we
have before stated, bore no legal relation to the actions in the
justice's
court or either of them. This being the case, the action was an
original
action in the Court of First Instance, separate and distinct from
anything
that had gone before, and should have been tried, as it was on the
second
trial, on the issues raised by the pleadings in that action and not on
those offered by the pleadings in some other action.
Turning now to the
defense of res judicata. The action being an independent and
original
action in the Court of First Instance, the plea of res judicata
offered by the defendant in that action, based on the existence of
judgments
rendered between the same parties in the same cases, must be held good
and the action dismissed if it is true, as claimed by appellant, that
such
judgments are still in existence. A party can rarely be permitted to
have
two remedies relating to the same rights, both of which may be made use
of successively. It cannot be the law that a party may bring an action
in a justice's court and, having an adverse judgment rendered against
him,
appeal from that judgment, and, thereafter, without further proceedings
in such appeal, begin an independent and original action in the
appellate
court including the cause of action on which the judgment of the
justice's
court was founded, but tendering new issues and demanding a judgment in
excess of the jurisdiction of the justice's court, and then, after a
defeat
in that action, return to his neglected appeal and try the action in
which
the appeal was taken. A party has a right to only one judgment, or one
opportunity for judgment, against the same person for the same cause of
action. In this case the appellee had opportunity for his judgment in
the
justice's court; and if the judgment in that case is still alive,
he cannot have a second opportunity against the same person on the same
cause of action in the Court of First Instance.
While the question
has not been raised or argued in this Court, it has occurred to Us that
there might be some doubts as to whether the judgments of the justice's
court, which were appealed from and the appeals abandoned, are still in
existence. Section 75 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it stood at
the
time the appeals from the judgments of the justice's court were taken
and
perfected, provided that "a perfected appeal shall operate to vacate
the
judgment of the justice of the peace." Section 78, which now provides
that
a dismissal of an appeal when it was taken by the plaintiff "shall
revive
the judgment of the lower court," contained no such clause at the time
the appeals in question were taken and perfected, and We have been
unable
to find any other law in force at that time providing for a revival of
the justice's judgment in case of the abandonment of an appeal by the
plaintiff.
Under the section as it then stood. This Court held that a justice's
judgment
from which an appeal had been taken to a Court of First Instance was
vacated
and annulled and that nothing could thereafter revive it. [Lim vs. Lim,
13 Phil. Rep., 605; Knight vs. McMicking, 2 Phil. Rep.,
698].
The law has not amended Section 78 so as to provide, as we have seen,
that
"the dismissal of the appeal shall revive the judgment of the lower
court."
Up to that time, under the provisions of Section 75, a justice's
judgment
could not be revived by a dismissal or abandonment of an appeal. Act
No.
2111 remedied this anomalous condition and, after its passage, a
justice's
judgment could be revived. The question which occurs to Us therefore is
this: Is Act No. 2111 applicable to an appeal from a judgment of a
justice's
court entered in April, 1906, the Act not having gone into effect until
January 31,1912? On this question, We entertain the opinion that the
Act
was not applicable at the time the appeals from the judgments of the
justice's
court in the case before Us were taken or at the time they may be said
to have been abandoned by virtue of positive statute the judgments of
the
justice's court disappeared when the appeals were taken. In
contemplation
of law, they did not exist from that moment. As a necessary conclusion
of law, they could not thereafter be pleaded in bar of the suit
subsequently
brought in the Court of First Instance by the same plaintiffs against
the
same cause of action. While the result produced by such a holding is
anomalous,
it is the one which necessarily follows from the plain terms of the
Act;
and the Supreme Court, if it had the disposition, lacks the power to
change
it.
On the merits, We are
of the opinion that the judgment is correct. The evidence of the
plaintiffs
fully supports the findings of fact and the Court correctly applied the
law.
The judgment appealed
from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Trent, J., did
not sit in the case. |