FIRST
DIVISION
MARTINIANO
VALDEZ
CO SY CHIOK,
Petitioner-Appellant,
G.
R.
No. 11086
February
2, 1916
-versus-
THE
INSULAR
COLLECTOR
OF CUSTOMS,
Respondent-Appellee.
D
E C I S I
O N
MORELAND,
J:
On or about June 3, 1915,
the appellant arrived at the port of Manila claiming the right to enter
the Philippine Islands as a citizen thereof by reason of having been
born
therein. He was refused admission by the immigration inspector who
boarded
the vessel on which he arrived and held for examination by a Board of
Special
Inquiry. On June 4th of the same year, he was brought before a Board of
Special Inquiry composed of Messrs. Northrup and Nepomuceno,
immigration
inspectors, and Mr. Cushman, a stenographer employed in the Burean of
Customs,
which proceeded to inquire into his right to enter the Philippine
Islands.
After hearing the testimony of the witnesses offered on behalf of the
appellant,
the board rendered its decision refusing him landing on the ground that
he was a Chinese person of the pure blood, not a mixture of Chinese and
Filipino, that he was not the person with the certificate required by
law
for the admission of Chinese persons or persons of Chinese descent into
the Philippine Islands. An appeal was taken from this decision to the
Collector
of Customs, where it was affirmed. Application was then made to the
Court
of First Instance of Manila for a writ of habeas corpus and, an order
having
been issued directing the appellee to show cause why the writ should
not
be issued, the matter came on for hearing in that Court. After hearing
the parties and after due consideration, the Court found that the
appellant
had not shown any abuse of discretion or violation of law by the Board
of Special Inquiry and accordingly refused to issue the writ and
remanded
the appellant into the custody of the customs officials for
deportation.
This appeal is taken from that judgment.
Several errors have
been assigned and argued in this Court. The first one, based on the
ground
that the Court refused to strike from the files on motion of the
appellant
the return to the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that it was made
and signed by the Attorney-General and not by the person to whom it was
directed, can be disposed of in a word. We have already held on several
occasions that the Attorney-General has authority to make and sign the
return to a writ of habeas corpus when the writ is directed to an
official
of the Bureau of Customs. [Lee Jua vs. Collector of Customs, 32 Phil.
Rep.,
24].
The assignment of error
is also based on the ground that the return does not state all of the
facts
required by law to be contained in the return. The question, like the
other,
has been disposed of by this court and needs no further consideration
here.
[Que Quay vs. Collector of Customs, p. 128, ante].
The second assignment
of error is based on the refusal of the Court of First Instance to take
testimony in the proceedings for the writ of habeas corpus. This same
question
was discussed in the case of Que Quay, supra, but was not there
decided. It having been squarely presented here, We take this occasion
to pass on it finally. The Supreme Court has held in many cases that a
Court of First Instance, to which a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus
of the character of the one before Us is presented, acquires no
jurisdiction
or authority to proceed in the premises until after the applicant for
the
writ demonstrates that the customs officials abused their authority or
acted on a wrong principle of law or in violation of law. Until that is
done, the Court can do nothing but dismiss the proceeding. A condition
precedent, absolutely essential to further progress of the proceedings
in habeas corpus, is the demonstration to the satisfaction of the Court
which entertains the proceedings, of abuse of discretion or violation
of
law. If that condition is not met, then the proceedings must be
dismissed.
In the case at bar, the petitioner offered testimony before the Court
of
First Instance for the purpose of showing his right to enter the
Philippine
Islands without having shown that the customs officials had exceeded
their
authority in one way or another or had violated the law. The offer was
rejected by the Court on the ground that no foundation had been laid
for
a trial in that Court. It was held in the case of Chin Low vs. United
States
[208 U. S., 8], that the Court in which the application for the writ
was
pending based on the ground that the applicant was a citizen of the
United
States and had been refused admission to the country arbitrarily and
without
the hearing provided by law would hear testimony relative to his
citizenship
but added that "unless and until it is proved to the satisfaction of
the
judge that a hearing properly so-called was denied, the merits of the
case
are not open, and, We may add, the denial of the hearing cannot be
established
by proving that the decision was wrong." From this, it is clear that
while
the court in which the proceeding for the writ is pending may hear
evidence
on the merits, it can do so only when it has been established to its
satisfaction
that the customs officials abused their authority or violated the law
in
refusing to give the hearing which the law required, or in some other
manner.
Moreover, the mere fact that the decision of the customs official or
officials
was wrong does not establish the right to be heard on the merits in the
Court in which the proceeding for the writ is pending. As We have
already
seen in the case at bar, the Board of Special Inquiry gave the
appellant
a full hearing and every opportunity to establish his right to enter
the
Philippine Islands. In the judgment of the board, he failed to
establish
such right in that he was unable to prove to the satisfaction of the
board
that he was a half-breed of Chinese and Filipino blood and that he was
born in the Philippine Islands. On the evidence before it, the greater
part of which consisted in the personal appearance, language, dress,
custom
and manner of the appellant and the fact that he came from a Chinese
port,
the board found that he was a person of pure Chinese blood unmixed with
that of any other nationality or race. This also included the finding
that
the board, under all the facts and circumstances of the case, did not
believe
the testimony of the witnesses for the appellant and, accordingly, did
not consider that the evidence offered by him established his right to
enter. [Que Quay vs. Collector of Customs, p. 128, ante].
The third assignment
of error is based on the claim that the Board of Special Inquiry before
which appellant appeared and which passed on his right to enter was not
legally constituted, in that it consisted of two immigration inspectors
and a stenographer in the employ of the Bureau of Customs and not of
three
immigration inspectors.
This question has been
frequently decided by this Court adversely to the appellant's
contention
and needs no further consideration at this time. [Que Quay vs.
Collector
of Customs, supra; Chieng Ah Sui vs. Collector of Customs, R.
G.
No. 6579 (22 Phil. Rep., 361), affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
United
States].
The fourth assignment
of error is based on the fact that the Board of Special Inquiry, in
determining
appellant's right to enter, took into consideration his personal
appearance,
ethnological and racial characteristics, language, dress, custom,
manner
and deportment and the fact that he came direct from a Chinese port,
and
based their decision in part thereon. The Supreme Court has already
held
that such evidence is competent and a finding based thereon is not
without
evidence to support it. Such evidence is sufficient to make a prima
facie
case for the Government. [Que Quay vs. Collector of Customs, supra; Tan
Beko vs. Collector of Customs, 26 Phil. Rep., 254]. The board, however,
had other facts and circumstances on which it relied. A portion of its
finding is:
"He does not
understand
a word of the Pangasinan language. His alleged mother and brother
cannot
speak Chinese. His alleged mother testified that Martiniano lived with
her before he went to China and could speak the Pangasinan language.
The
detained has no knowledge of Tayug or Dagupan. He does not resemble his
alleged mother or brother, and does not appear to be a mestizo, but has
the appearance of a full-blooded Chinaman.
"The board
does not
believe that he is the person mentioned in the certificate presented,
and
does not believe that he was born in the Philippine Islands. The board
decides that he is a Chinese person, coming here without the
certificate
required by law. He is therefore refused landing."
The
case of Que Quay vs.
Collector of Customs, supra, also disposes of the fifth and
sixth
assignments of error which, among other things, refer to the fact that
the Insular Collector of Customs decided the appeal without having seen
the person of the appellant.
The eighth and ninth
assignments of error are discussed together and relate to the claim
that
the appellant having been born in the Philippine Islands, he is a
citizen
thereof. It is a sufficient answer to the argument of counsel based on
these alleged errors to refer to the fact that the Board of Special
Inquiry
on competent, material and relevant evidence found that the appellant
was
not born in the Philippine Islands. It has also been held by this Court
in Muñoz vs. Collector of Customs [20 Phil. Rep., 494], and Lee
Jua vs. Collector of Customs [32 Phil. Rep., 24], that even though a
person
is born in the Philippine Islands, he may lose his Philippine
citizenship
by emigrating to a foreign country and remaining there for a length of
time after he has reached his majority sufficient to justify, if not
require,
the conclusion that he has renounced his Philippine citizenship and has
elected to become a subject of the country to which he emigrated.
According
to the testimony of appellant himself, he went to China when he was 8
years
of age and returned here when he was 25. He does not appear to have
expressed
any intention of returning during that time or performed any act from
which
such an intention could be inferred. We are of the opinion that, on the
record, the case falls within the doctrine laid down in the case of Que
Quay vs. Collector of Customs, supra.
The judgment appealed
from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres, Johnson, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur. |