EN
BANC
THE
UNITED STATES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 12700
September
4, 1917
-versus-
PANTALEON
OLAIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
D
E C I S I
O N
MALCOLM,
J :
The findings of fact
are
clearly stated by the trial court as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"This case happened
at midnight of the cited date when Vivencio Tercero, on coming from a
house
where there was a certain dead person [casa mortuoria], in order
to husk palay, was returning to the house of one Julian where he used
to
sleep because his own house was quite far. On the way, the accused and
one Braulio had been waiting for Vivencio Tercero when the latter
arrived
at the place where the dead was. Vivencio Tercero answered Robles that
he was courting a young lady named Paciencia Lera. Jacinto then told
him
to stop courting the girl. Vivencio answered that he could not do so
and
that if Jacinto and his companion like to court the girl, they could do
so at any time. The accused Pantaleon Reyes replied that whether
Vicencio
Tercero desisted or not, they would injure him on that night, and they
began to assault him. Vivencio Tercero fell to the ground and his
aggressors
left him there thinking he was dead.
"The wounds of the
offended party lasted for thirty-five days before they were cured with
medical assistance, he having spent for medicine the sum of P10. All
the
wounds are now healed; but the wound inflicted on the right hand which
cut the arteries of the ring finger and the title finger makes said
hand
useless or at least the two fingers mentioned."
Additional to the foregoing,
it is only necessary to mention that the testimony of one witness is
sufficient
to support a judgment of conviction if it satisfies beyond a reasonable
doubt. In the present case, the testimony of the complaining witness is
positive, clear, and free from contradiction. [U. S. vs. Dacotan
(1903),
1 Phil. Rep., 669; U. S. vs. Mondejar (1911), 19 Phil. Rep.,
158].
The accused relied on an alibi. But to establish such a defense, it
must
be proved by nothing less than full, clear, and satisfactory evidence.
In the present case an alibi has not been proved by probable evidence
which
reasonably satisfies the Court of the truth of such a defense. [U. S.
vs.
Pascua (1903), 1 Phil. Rep., 631; U. S. vs. Oxiles (1915), 29 Phil.
Rep.,
587].
There being present
in the commission of the crime the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity,
the sentence of the trial court must be modified by imposing upon the
defendant
and appellant the maximum penalty, which is two years eleven months and
eleven days of prision correccional, with one-half of the costs
of the first instance and all the costs of this instance, and to
indemnify,
with his co-accused who did not appeal, singly and jointly, the
offended
party Vicente Tercero in the amount of P62.50, or to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Separate
Opinion
STREET,
J.,
Concurring:
I
concur on the ground
that the proof of alibi presented in this case is not such as
reasonable
to satisfy the Court of its truthfulness; but I regret to see the
unqualified
proposition appear in the opinion of the Court to the effect that an
alibi
"must be proved by full, clear, and satisfactory evidence." The use of
this unqualified language tends to give currency to the idea that when
proof of an alibi is offered in a criminal case, the burden of proof
for
some mysterious reason shifts to the defendant. This is certainly not
true.
The burden of proof
rests upon the Government to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt; and this ones must be sustained throughout and in
respect
to every essential factor necessary to make out the crime. The
expressions
found in the book indicating that an alibi must be proved to the
satisfaction
of the Court have their origin in the circumstance that when proof of
an
alibi is introduced, it comes from the defendant at a time when there
has
already been placed before the Court evidence connecting the defendant
with the crime. In such situation, the defendant must first meet and
overcome
what has already been offered before a reasonable doubt as to his guilt
can arise in the mind of the judge. Consequently, the proof which he
may
be required to adduce in order to generate a reasonable doubt of his
guilt
will depend upon the weight and character of the evidence already
before
the Court showing or tending to show his connection with the crime. In
regard to the proof of the alibi presented in U. S. vs. Pascua [1 Phil.
Rep. 631], the Court in that case said: "While the proof as to the
alibi
is well supported by the testimony of witnesses, yet such proof can
have
little weight when the identity of the defendants as the persons who
committed
the offense has been fully established by eyewitnesses." [Emphasis
ours].
In U. S. vs. Oxiles [29 Phil. Rep., 592], Justice Torres quotes the
following
syllabus from an American decision: "Where the Commonwealth rests upon
positive and undoubted proof of the prisoner's guilts, it should not be
overcome by less than full, clear and satisfactory evidence of the
alleged
alibi." When the words "full, clear, and satisfactory evidence" are
thus
put in opposition to the words "positive and undoubted proof," as here,
there can be little objection to the mode of statement; but it is
obvious
that the words "full, clear, and satisfactory evidence" would never be
penned by a judge whose mind was not in a measure preoccupied with the
fact that the positive evidence connecting the accused with the crime
and
already before the court is sufficient to establish the defendant's
guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, apart from the alibi. The language in
question
should, therefore, in Our opinion, not be stated in the form of an
abstract
rule. |