EN
BANC
THE
UNITED STATES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 11612
June
21,
1918
-versus-
SIMEON
CAÑETE,
ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
D
E C I S I
O N
FISHER,
J :
This is an appeal from
a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Leyte,
whereby
the appellants were found guilty of the crime of libel.
Two Informations were
filed in the trial court charging the fifty persons named in each
Information
with the crime of libel. In the Information in case No. 4138 of the
trial
court, the publication complained of is averred to be a libel upon the
Rev. Nicanor Acebedo, and in case No. 4139, it is charged that the same
publication is a libel upon one Timotea Camposano. By stipulation, the
two cases were consolidated and tried together in the Court below. The
trial judge acquitted all of the defendants in case No. 4138, except
Simeon
Cañete, Hermogenes Camposano, Margarito Nolasco, Balbino
Alminario,
and Eulogio Villablanca, who were found guilty and sentenced to short
terms
of imprisonment. In case No. 4139, in which Timotea Camposano is the
complaining
witness, the Court below acquitted all of the defendants, except Simeon
Cañete and Hermogenes Camposano, each of whom was sentenced to
pay
a fine of P500, and Eulogio Villablanca whom he sentenced to pay a fine
of P100. From the consolidated judgment thus rendered in the two cases,
the convicted defendants have appealed to this Court.
The publication upon
which the informations are based consists of a charge in writing signed
by appellants and their co-defendants in the trial court, and addressed
to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, in which Father Acebedo, at
that time a parish priest of Dagami, Leyte, of which the defendants are
residents, is accused of maladministration, and misappropriation of the
funds and property of the church of Dagami under his charge,
drunkenness,
taking indecent liberties of the women of his congregation, illicit
relations
with the complainant, Timoteo Camposano, and general immoral and
indecent
behavior. The charges are in such a character that We do not believe
they
should be given further publicity by reproducing them in this decision.
The publication is
unquestionably defamatory in character, and this is admitted by the
appellants.
They based their defense upon an attempt to prove that the charges were
true and the contention that the communication was privileged, having
been
made only to Father Acebedo's superior, in order that the charges might
be investigated. The Court below held that the defendants had failed in
their effort to prove the truth of the charges, and in this conclusion
We concur. Whatever ground for doubt or suspicion there may have been,
the evidence falls short of proof that the complaining witnesses were
in
fact guilty of any of the charges made against them in the publication
upon which this prosecution is based.
Before considering
the other defense upon which appellants rely, namely that the
communication
was privileged, it will be necessary to state the facts disclosed by
the
record regarding the circumstances under which the offensive
publication
was written, the conduct of the defendants, and their efforts to
persuade
the church authorities to make and investigation into the charges.
The evidence shows
that for a long time prior to the preparation of the complaint against
Father Acebedo, which led to this prosecution, his conduct had been the
subject of general dissatisfaction in his parish. The culmination of
this
feeling was a meeting held by a number of the accused at the house of
Gil
Camposano at which the conduct and character of Father Acebedo were
discussed.
The result of the discussion was a decision to request the church
authorities
to hold an investigation, and the appellant, Simeon Cañete was
designated
to formulate the complaint in writing. For this purpose Cañete
availed
himself of the services of one Pastor, who wrote out the charges in the
form of a complaint addressed to the Catholic Archbishop of Manila.
Thereupon, a number
of the accused met again at the house of Gil Camposano, signed the
document,
and designated the accused, Simeon Cañete, to take it to Manila
and present it to the Archbishop. The document was then taken to a
number
of prominent residents of Dagami, for the purpose of obtaining their
signatures,
if possible, and several additional signatures were added to it by this
means. The subscribers include the presidente and vice-presidente of
Dagami,
the auxiliary justice of the peace, several concejales and ex-concejales,
the chief of police, an ex-presidente of the municipality, and many
other
prominent members of the community, including a number of municipal
teachers.
The names subscribed to the charges against Father Acebedo include, as
stated by the trial judge, "a very large proportion of the intelligent
and educated men of the municipality, so that in a sense the present
prosecution
is an indictment against the whole municipality."
The statement of the
charges ended with a petition as follows:
"For the reasons
cited
we pray His Grace, the Archbishop of Manila, to be pleased to order an
investigation of the charges made against the parish priest of Dagami,
Rev. Nicanor Acebedo, of the acts committed in the exercise of his
office,
as a representative of the Apostolic Roman Catholic Religion, and that
upon proof of the charges by conclusive and satisfactory evidence, to
direct
that this priest be removed from the parish of this municipality, and
sent
to some other place, and that, if found guilty, he be made to suffer a
punishment adequate to the acts committed by him."
The charges and petition
for the removal of Father Acebedo were taken by the appellant,
Cañete,
to Manila, and by him turned over to the Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
by whom the papers were referred to the Bishop of Calbayog, Leyte. He
in
turn referred the matter to his vicar general residing at Tanauan,
Leyte,
with instructions to conduct a judicial investigation before the
ecclesiastical
tribunal, if the complainants were disposed to make a deposit of P300
to
cover the costs, or to institute an administrative inquiry, at which
the
complainants and accused should be heard, if they were not willing to
make
such deposit. The Vicar General thereupon addressed a communication to
the complainants under the general designation, "the signers of the
libel
against Father Acebedo," asking them to state whether they desired an
administrative
or a judicial investigation, and in the latter event to make the
required
deposit. To this a reply was made on behalf of the defendants that they
were unable to make the deposit required of them, but would like to
have
the investigation conducted administratively or by an ex officio
judicial proceeding in the ecclesiastical courts. The Vicar General
answered
under date of February 9, 1915, that even were the inquiry to be
conducted
ex officio it would entail "not only work but also disbursements and
expenses
which will have to be paid by whomever it may concern." The
communication
ended with this statement:
"When the Bishop
receives
a complete and faithful reproduction of your written charges against
your
parish priest he will proceed in accordance with the canon law and the
Instruction of 1880, and take such action as may seem proper."
Evidently discouraged by
these requirements, and the apparent reluctance of the church
authorities
to take any action in the matter, the defendants made no effort to
comply
with the conditions imposed upon them and in July, 1915, these
prosecutions
were commenced.
The prosecution relied
upon proof of the publication of the defamatory writing, and made no
attempt
to prove actual malice. Defendants made some effort to prove the truth
of the allegations, but in this they were unsuccessful. We are of the
opinion,
however, that the record, as a whole, justifies the conclusion that at
the time of the preparation and presentation of the charges against
Father
Acebedo the belief prevailed very generally in Dagami that he had been
guilty of the misconduct imputed to him, that the appellants and their
codefendants below were actuated by no actual malice, and that their
purpose
was, in good faith, to bring about an investigation of the charges by
Father
Acebedo's ecclesiastical superiors. That being the case, are they
guilty
of libel, notwithstanding the fact that the proof fails to establish
the
truth of the charges? Is the petition addressed by them to the
Arcbishop
a privileged communication ?
In the case of the
United States vs. Bustos [37 Phil. Rep. 731], in which the defendants
were
charged with libel of a public official for statements made in a
petition
for his removal addressed to his administrative superior, Mr. Justice
Malcolm,
writing the opinion of the Court, said:
"Public policy, the
welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government, have
demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable
result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege.
'The doctrine of
privileged
communications rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and
unfettered
administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in
some
instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant
slander.'
[Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma (1899), 175 U. S., 409,
411].
"Privilege is
classified
as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned.
As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie
privilege
which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is, thus, stated by Lord
Campbell, C.J.
'A communication
made
bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has
an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it
contained
criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and
actionable.' [Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344; 1 Jur. (N. S.),
846;
25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344].
"A pertinent
illustration
of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good
faith
and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public
official
when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in
the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made
in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of
the
individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of
duty;
a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary.
All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration
of
justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is
privileged
is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in
good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact
he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the
communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the
law
of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made.
The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some
natural
and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials
such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege.
"In the usual case
malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption.
The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff
must
bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive
of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount
to proof of malice. [See White vs. Nicholls 18453, 3 How. 266].
"A privileged
communication
should not be subject to microscopic examination to discover grounds of
malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection
which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test
is that of bona fides."
It is true that the communication
in the Bustos case [supra] was addressed to a government
official,
but the American and British courts have extended the qualified
privilege
by analogy to include cases like the present, in which a member of a
church
makes a complaint regarding his minister to their common ecclesiastical
superior.
It is the established
doctrine of the American courts that in matters purely ecclesiastical
the
decisions of the proper church tribunals are conclusive upon the civil
tribunals. A church member who is expelled from membership by the
church
authorities, or a priest or minister who is by them deprived of his
sacred
office, is without remedy in the civil courts, which will not inquire
into
the correctness of the decisions of the ecclesiastical tribunals.
[Landis
vs. Campbell, 79 Mo., 433; Watson vs. Garvin, 54 Mo., 364; Stack vs.
O'Hara,
98 Penn., 213]. The right of such ecclesiastical tribunals to. try
members
offending against the canons of conduct established by the church being
thus recognized it is reasonable that their decisions should be
privileged,
however derogatory they may be to the reputation of the persons
affected.
"Persons who join
churches
voluntarily submit themselves to the jurisdiction of these bodies, and
in matters of faith and individual conduct affecting their relations as
members thereof subject themselves to the tribunals established by
those
bodies to pass upon such questions, and, if aggrieved by a decision
against
them, made in good faith by such judicatories they must seek their
redress
within the organization, as provided by its laws or regulations."
[Landis
vs. Campbell, supra].
In the case of
Farnsworth
vs. Storrs [59 Mass., 412], the defendant, the pastor of a church, was
sued for libel for having published, by reading from his pulpit, a
sentence
of excommunication in which it was stated in plain terms that plaintiff
had violated the Seventh Commandment. The defendants's plea of
qualified
privilege was sustained. Chief Justice Shaw, writing the opinion of the
court, said:
"The rights of
churches
to use, exercise, and enjoy all their accustomed privileges and
liberties,
respecting divine worship, church order and discipline, etc., are
declared
and secured by statutes passed at various times, and in force to the
present
day. Amongst these powers and privileges, established by
long
and immemorial usage, churches have authority to deal with their
members,
for immoral and scandalous conduct; and for that purpose, to hear
complaints,
to take evidence and to decide; and, upon conviction, to administer
proper
punishment by way of rebuke, censure, suspension and excommunication.
To
this jurisdiction, every member, by entering into the church covenant,
submits, and is bound by his consent. [Remington vs. Congdon, 2 Pick.,
310, 315].
"The proceedings of
the church are quasi judicial and therefore those who complain, or give
testimony, or act and vote, or pronounce the result, orally or in
writing,
acting in good faith, and within the scope of the authority conferred
by
this limited jurisdiction, and not falsely or colorably, making such
proceedings
a pretense for covering an intended scandal, are protected by law. It
appears
to us, that the defendant, as pastor of the church, and minister of the
congregation, was acting within the scope of his authority, in reading
a paper, which, it was proved had been adopted in a separate meeting of
the church, and directed thus to be read."
The right of ecclesiastical
tribunals to hear and decide cases involving the conduct of their
officers
and members being recognized, and this of necessity involving immunity
from charges of libel and slander based upon statements made in good
faith
by the members of such tribunals and by parties or witnesses giving
evidence
before them [York vs. Pease, 68 Mass., 282], a like immunity must be
extended
to persons who, in good faith, make charges, written or oral, to the
church
authorities, intended to provoke an investigation concerning the
conduct
or character of a member, officer, or minister of the institution. That
such charges are privileged communications, if made without actual
malice,
is the settled doctrine of the courts of the United States and of Great
Britain.
In the case of
Shurtleff
vs. Stevens [51 Vermont, 501], it appeared that the defendant, a member
of a religious organization, had made charges against the plaintiff, a
minister of the church, which led to his expulsion from membership by
the
tribunals of the organization. The lower court held that the charge was
defamatory and that its publication implied malice. The Supreme Court
of
Vermont reversed this decision, ruling that the communication was one
of
qualified privilege and that in the absence of proof of express malice,
did not constitute libel. The Court said:
"The plaintiff became
a member of the Windham County Association voluntarily. He entered into
its covenant and subscribed to its rules. Under its covenant and rules
it had rightful jurisdiction to investigate charges of unministerial
conduct
affecting its members, and on conviction to administer proper
punishment.
The good name and good standing of every member of the association was
a matter of common interest to all the rest. The members were all
representative
men, largely responsible for the growth and prosperity of the churches
under their charge. This association was an instrumentality whereby
they
could advance the common interest of denominational work in Windham
County;
and by virtue of its relationship to like organizations elsewhere, it
was
a factor in the prosperity of the denomination throughout the land. Not
only this, but the general public not immediately related to these
clergymen
by the ties of church covenant or society relationship, are more or
less
directly within the range of that moral influence which they are
charged
to exert. Thus the general cause of public morality which underlies all
good government, and which every good citizen, be he priest or layman,
is bound to promote, is affected by the fidelity with which ministers
of
the gospel discharge the high trust of their appointment. In order to
be
successful public teachers of morality, they must be unspotted public
exemplars
of it. Hence, if it be suspected that a wolf in sheep's clothing has
invaded
their ranks, and sits at their council board, it is not only for the
interest
of all the members of the association to know the fact, but it is their
imperative duty, to make inquiry and ascertain the fact. They owe such
duty to the plaintiff as a brother member, if he is charged with
scandalous
conduct, to the end that his innocence may be established. They owe it
to themselves, lest by indifference they give apparent approval to his
conduct. Their intimate official relation to the plaintiff in the cause
of their common work leaves them no other alternative; and if, in
making
such inquiry and in acting upon the subject matter of it, they proceed
with honesty of purpose and act from a sense of duty, the law protects
them."
Public policy is the foundation
of the doctrine of privileged communications. It is based upon the
recognition
of the fact that the right of the individual to enjoy immunity from the
publication of untruthful charges derogatory to his character is not
absolute
and must at times yield to the superior necessity of subjecting to
investigation
the conduct of persons charged with wrongdoing. In order to accomplish
this purpose and to permit private persons having, or in good faith
believing
themselves to have, knowledge of such wrongdoing, to perform the legal,
moral, social duty resulting from such knowledge of belief, without
restraining
them by the fear that an error, no matter how innocently or honestly
made,
may subject them to punishment for defamation, the doctrine of
qualified
privilege has been evolved, under which, "the occasion on which the
communication
was made rebuts the inference of malice prima facie arising
from
a statement prejudicial to the character of the plaintiff, and puts
upon
him the burden of proving that the defendant was actuated by motives of
personal spite or ill-will, independent of the occasion on which the
communication
was made." [Newell, Slander & Libel [3d ed.] pp. 477, 478].
When the publication
complained of is such that, in the absence of express malice, it is
privileged,
the burden of proving malice rests with the plaintiff.
"'malice' a term used
to indicate the fact that the defamer is prompted by personal ill-will
or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the
reputation
of the person defamed..The term 'malice' implies an intention to
do ulterior and unjustifiable harm the existence of actual malice in
any
given case can be proved either by extrinsic, internal, or
circumstantial
evidence, like any other fact necessary to make out the plaintiff's
case."
[Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, Vol. 1, p. 313].
It has been suggested that
the fact that the communication was addressed and delivered to the
Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, instead of the bishop to whom Father
Acebedo
was directly subordinate, deprives it of its privileged character. We
are
of the opinion that this view cannot be accepted. [U. S. vs. Bustos, supra].
There is nothing to show that this mistake, if such it was, was not
honestly
made, or that the purpose of appellants was to give undue publicity to
their charges.
It
must be admitted
that the Libel Law [Act No. 277] contains no express recognition of the
doctrine of qualified privilege in such a case as this. The only
section
dealing expressly with the subject of privilege is the ninth, which by
its terms is limited to private communications made for the sole
purpose
of protecting the interests of the person making the communication or
the
interests of the person to whom such communications are made. The
communication
here in question was in no proper sense a private communication as it
was
clearly made with the intention and in the hope that it would be
followed
by a public investigation. We are of the opinion, however, that it is
an
error to assume that the right to freedom of speech as now enjoyed in
these
Islands is conferred by Act No. 277, or that the scope and limit of its
exercise must be found in that statute. On the contrary, the principle
which guarantees to the people of these Islands the privileges of
freedom
of speech and of the press is firmly embedded in the fundamental law of
the land, to which all statutes are subordinate. [Philippine Bill, Sec.
5; Jones Law, Sec 3]. The right to petition the Government for the
redress
of grievances rests upon an equally solid foundation.
Nevertheless, these
rights would be of no practical value were their exercise, in the
utmost
of good faith, subjected to the condition that failure to establish the
truth of all statements made with a view to inciting official action is
to be punished as constituting the crime of defamation. With the fear
of
such consequences constantly before him, the citizen might well refrain
from exercising his perilous privilege of petition or of free speech.
The provisions relating
to freedom of speech and the right of petition contained in the
Philippine
Bill and the Jones Law are taken from the Constitution of the United
States.
Judge Cooley, in his well-known work on Constitutional Limitations [6th
ed., p. 523], expresses the opinion that publications which are
privileged
for some reason of public policy are within the constitutional
protection.
Assuming that this view is correct it is obvious that the
constitutional
right cannot be impaired, or abolished by implication, by the failure
to
make provision for it in the statute concerning libels. The Supreme
Court
of the United States, construing the provision in Section 5 of the
Philippine
Bill securing to accused persons the right to be heard by himself and
counsel,
said that if that provision of the paramount law makes the presence of
the accused indispensable at every stage of the trial, "it is of no
moment
that the Philippine laws do not go so far, for they cannot lessen its
force
or effect. It is the right which these constitutional provisions
secure to persons accused of crime in this country that was carried to
the Philippines by the congressional enactment, and, therefore,
according
to a familiar rule, the prevailing course of decision here may and
should
be accepted as determinative of the nature and measure of the right
there."
[Diaz vs. United States, 223 U. S., 442].
The plainest principles
of natural right and sound public policy require that the utmost
possible
freedom should be accorded every citizen to complain to the
supervising,
removing and appointing authorities of the misconduct of the public
officials
with whom he comes into contact, and like considerations make it
equally
proper that members of a religious organization should enjoy equal
freedom
in bringing to the attention of the church authorities the misbehavior
of their spiritual leaders or of fellow-members. Manifestly, the right
must be exercised in good faith, and may not with impunity be made the
occasion for the venting of private spite. It is subject to the
limitation
and restriction that such complaints must be made to a functionary
having
authority to redress the evils complained of; that they must be made in
good faith and that they must not be actuated by malice.
As We are convinced
that the conduct of defendants in making the complaint which has led to
these prosecutions has conformed to the conditions upon which the
qualified
privilege they claim may be enjoyed, the judgment of the trial court in
both cases is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with the costs
of both instances de officio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ.,
concur. |