FIRST
DIVISION
VICENTE
SY JUCO
AND
CIPRIANA VIARDO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
G.
R.
No. 13471
January
12, 1920
-versus-
SANTIAGO
V. SY JUCO,
Defendant-Appellant.
D
E C I S I
O N
AVANCEÑA,
J:
In 1902 the defendant was
appointed by the plaintiffs-administrator of their property and acted
as
such until June 30, 1916, when his authority was cancelled. The
plaintiffs
are defendant's father and mother who allege that during his
administration,
the defendant acquired the property claimed in the Complaint in his
capacity
as plaintiffs' administrator with their money and for their benefit.
After
hearing the case the trial court rendered his decision, the dispositive
part of which is the following:
"Wherefore, the court
gives judgment for the plaintiffs and orders:
"1. That the
defendant
return to the plaintiffs the launch Malabon, in question, and execute
all
the necessary documents and instruments for such delivery and the
registration
in the records of the Custom House of said launch as plaintiffs'
property;
"2. That the
defendant
return to the plaintiffs the casco No. 2584, or pay to them the value
thereof
which has been fixed at the sum of P3,000, and should the return of
said
casco be made, execute all the necessary instruments and documents for
its registration in plaintiffs' name at the Custom House; and
"3. That the
defendant
return to the plaintiffs the automobile No. 2060 and execute the
necessary
instruments and documents for its registration at the Bureau of Public
Works. And judgment is hereby given for the defendant absolving him
from
the complaint so far concerns:
"1. The rendition
of
accounts of his administration of plaintiffs' property;
"2. The return of
the
casco No. 2545;
"3. The return of
the
typewriting machine;
"4. The return of
the
house occupied by the defendant; and
"5. The return of
the
price of the piano in question."
Both parties appealed from
this judgment.
In this instance,
defendant
assigns three errors alleged to have been committed by the lower court
in connection with the three items of the dispositive part of the
judgment
unfavorable to him. We are of the opinion that the evidence
sufficiently
justifies the judgment against the defendant.
Regarding the launch
Malabon, it appears that in July, 1914, the defendant bought it in his
own name from the Pacific Commercial Co., and afterwards, registered it
at the Custom House. But this does not necessarily show that the
defendant
bought it for himself and with his own money, as he claims. This
transaction
was within the agency which he had received from the plaintiffs. The
fact
that he has acted in his own name may be only, as we believe it was, a
violation of the agency on his part. As the plaintiffs' counsel truly
say,
the question is not in whose favor the document of sale of the launch
is
executed nor in whose name same was registered, but with whose money
was
said launch bought. The plaintiffs' testimony that it was bought with
their
money and for them is supported by the fact that, immediately after its
purchase, the launch had to be repaired at their expense, although said
expense was collected from the defendant. If the launch was not bought
for the plaintiffs and with their money, it is not explained why they
had
to pay for its repairs.
The defendant invokes
the Decision of this Court in the case of Martinez vs. Martinez [1
Phil.
Rep., 647], which We do not believe is applicable to the present case.
In said case, Martinez, Jr., bought a vessel in his own name and in his
name registered it at the Custom House. This Court then said that
although
the funds with which the vessel was bought belonged to Martinez Sr.,
Martinez
Jr. is its sole and exclusive owner. But in said case the relation of
principal
and agent, which exists between the plaintiffs and the defendant in the
present case, did not exist between Martinez, Sr., and Martinez, Jr. By
this agency the plaintiffs herein clothed the defendant with their
representation
in order to purchase the launch in question. However, the defendant
acted
without this representation and bought the launch in his own name
thereby
violating the agency. If the result of this transaction should be that
the defendant has acquired for himself the ownership of the launch, it
would be equivalent to sanctioning this violation and accepting its
consequences.
But not only must the consequences of the violation of this agency not
be accepted, but the effects of the agency itself must be sought. If
the
defendant contracted the obligation to buy the launch for the
plaintiffs
and in their representation, by virtue of the agency, notwithstanding
the
fact that he bought it in his own name, he is obliged to transfer to
the
plaintiffs the rights he received from the vendor, and the plaintiffs
are
entitled to be subrogated in these rights.
There is another point
of view leading Us to the same conclusion. From the rule established in
Article 1717 of the Civil Code that when an agent acts in his own name,
the principal shall have no right of action against the person with
whom
the agent has contracted, cases involving things belonging to the
principal
are excepted. According to this exception [when things belonging to the
principal are dealt with] the agent is bound to the principal although
he does not assume the character of such agent and appears acting on
his
own name [Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, May 1, 1900]. This
means
that in the case of this exception the agent's apparent representation
yields to the principal's true representation and that, in reality and
in effect, the contract must be considered as entered into between the
principal and the third person; and, consequently, if the obligations
belong
to the former, to him alone must also belong the rights arising from
the
contract. The money with which the launch was bought having come from
the
plaintiff, the exception established in Article 1717 is applicable to
the
instant case.
Concerning the casco
No. 2584, the defendant admits it was constructed by the plaintiff
himself
in the latter's ship-yard. Defendant's allegation that it was
constructed
at his instance and with his money is not supported by the evidence. In
fact the only proof presented to support this allegation is his own
testimony
contradicted, on the one hand, by the plaintiffs' testimony and, on the
other hand, rebutted by the fact that, on the date this casco was
constructed,
he did not have sufficient money with which to pay the expense of its
construction.
As to the automobile
No. 2060, there is sufficient evidence to show that its price was paid
with plaintiffs' money. Defendant's adverse allegation that it was paid
with his own money is not supported by the evidence. The circumstances
under which, he says, this payment has been made, in order to show that
it was made with his own money, rather indicate the contrary. He
presented
in evidence his check-book wherein it appears that on March 24, 1916,
he
issued a check for P300 and on the 27th of same month another for P400
and he says that the first installment was paid with said checks. But
it
results that, in order to issue the check for P300 on March 24 of that
year, he had to deposit P310 on that same day; and in order to issue
the
other check for P400 on the 27th of the same month, he deposited P390
on
that same day. It was necessary for the defendant to make these
deposits
for on those dates he had not sufficient money in the bank for which he
could issue those checks. But, in order to pay for the price of the
automobile,
he could have made these payments directly with the money he deposited
without the necessity of depositing and withdrawing it on the same day.
If this action shows something, it shows defendant's preconceived
purpose
of making it appear that he made the payment with his own funds
deposited
in the bank.
The plaintiffs, in
turn, assign in this instance the following three errors alleged to
have
been committed by the lower court:
"1. The court erred
in not declaring that the plaintiffs did not sell to the defendant the
casco No. 2545 and that they were its owners until it was sunk in June,
1916.
"2. The court erred
in absolving the defendant from his obligation to render an account of
his administration to the plaintiffs, and to pay to the latter the
amount
of the balance due in their favor.
"3. The court erred
in not condemning the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the value of
the
woods, windows and doors taken from their lumber-yard by the defendant
and used in the construction of the house on calle Real of the barrio
of
La Concepcion, municipality of Malabon, Rizal."
Concerning
the casco No.
2545, the lower court refrained from making any declaration about its
ownership
in view of the fact that this casco had been leased and was sunk while
in the lessee's hands before the complaint in this case was filed. The
lower court, therefore, considered it unnecessary to pass upon this
point.
We agree with the plaintiffs that the trial court should have made a
pronouncement
upon this casco. The lessee may be responsible in damages for its loss,
and it is of interest to the litigants in this case that it be
determined
who is the owner of said casco that may enforce this responsibility of
the lessee.
Upon an examination
of the evidence relative to this casco, We find that it belonged to the
plaintiffs and that the latter sold it afterwards to the defendant by
means
of a public instrument. Notwithstanding plaintiffs' allegation that
when
they signed this instrument they were deceived, believing it not to be
an instrument of sale in favor of the defendant, nevertheless, they
have
not adduced sufficient proof of such deceit which would destroy the
presumption
of truth which a public document carries with it. Attorney Sevilla, who
acted as the notary in the execution of this instrument, testifying as
a witness in the case, said that he never verified any document without
first inquiring whether the parties knew its content. Our conclusion is
that this casco was lawfully sold to the defendant by the plaintiffs.
Concerning the wood,
windows and doors given by the plaintiffs to the defendant and used in
the construction of the latter's house on Calle Real of the Barrio of
La
Concepcion of the Municipality of Malabon, Rizal, we find correct the
trial
Court's decision that they were given to the defendant as his and his
wife's
property.
Concerning the
rendition
of accounts which the plaintiffs require of the defendant, We likewise
find correct the trial court's decision absolving the latter from this
petition, for it appears, from the plaintiffs' own evidence, that the
defendant
used to render accounts of his agency after each transaction, to the
plaintiffs'
satisfaction.
From the foregoing
considerations, We affirm the judgment appealed from in all its parts
except
in so far as the casco No. 2545 is concerned, and as to this, We
declare
that, it having been sold by the plaintiffs to the defendant, the
latter
is absolved. No special findings as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J.,
Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur. |