Republic
of the
PhilippinesSUPREME
COURTEN
BANC
ANDRES
BORROMEO,
Plaintiff,
G.
R.
No. 16808
January
3, 1921
-versus-
FERMIN
MARIANO,
Defendant.
D
E C I S I
O N
MALCOLM,
J :
Quo Warranto proceedings
have been instituted in this Court to determine the right of the
plaintiff
and of the defendant to the office of Judge of the Court of First
Instance
of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District.
The only facts, and
these are undisputed ones, which need be noticed, are the following:
Andres
Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-fourth
Judicial
District, effective July 1, 1914. He duly qualified and took possession
of the office on that date. On February, 25, 1920, he was appointed
Judge
of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed
Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since
the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the
Twenty-first
Judicial District.
Judges of First
Instance
are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the
Philippine
Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years. [Adm. Code, secs.
65, 66, 148]. One Judge of First Instance is commissioned for each
judicial
district, except the ninth. [Sec. 154]. The oath of office of the
judge is "filed with the clerk of the court to which the affiant
pertains
and shall be entered upon its records." [Sec. 128]. Judges of First
Instance
may only be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty in a
district other than their own for the purpose of trying land
registration
cases and for vacation duty. [Sec. 155]. The concluding portion of
Section
155 of the Administrative Code, to which particular attention is
addressed
by the Attorney-General, is, "but nothing herein shall be construed to
prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed
to be judge of another district." A Judge of First Instance can be
removed
from office by the Governor-General only if in the judgment of the
Supreme
Court sufficient cause shall exist involving serious misconduct or
inefficiency
in office. [Sec. 173].
The cardinal rule of
statutory construction requires the Court to give effect to the general
legislative intent if that can be discovered within the four corners of
the Act. When the object intended to be accomplished by the statute is
once clearly ascertained, general words may be restrained to it and
those
of narrower import may be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the
intent.
Along with this fundamental principle is another, equally
well-established,
that such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted, as will give
effect
to all provisions of the statute. [2 Lewis Sutherland, Statutory
Construction,
pp. 662, et seq.; In re Allen (1903), 2 Phil., 630; Code of
Civil
Procedure, sec. 287].
Leaving out of
consideration
for the moment the last part of Section 155 of the Administrative Code,
the provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. Judges
of
First Instance are appointed judges of the courts of first instance of
the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They are
not
appointed judges of first instance of the Philippine Islands. They hold
these positions of judges of first instance of definite districts until
they resign, retire, or are removed through impeachment proceedings.
The
intention of the law is to recognize separate and distinct judicial
offices.
The concluding portion
of Section 155 of the Administrative Code, although not beginning with
the usual introductory word, "provided," is nevertheless, in the nature
of a proviso, and should be construed as such. The office of a proviso
is to limit the application of the law. It is contrary to the nature of
a proviso to enlarge the operation of the law. It should not be
construed
so as to repeal or destroy the main provisions of the statute. A
proviso
which is directly repugnant to the purview or body of an Act is
inoperative
and void. (See generally, 25 R. C. L., pp. 984, et seq.; and
specifically,
the leading cases of McKnight vs. Hodge [1909], 55 Wash., 289, 104
Pac.,
504, 40 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1207; McCormick vs. West Duluth [1891], 47
Minn.,
272, 50 N. W., 128; Idaho Power & Light Co. vs. Blomquist [1916],
26
Idaho, 222; 141 Pac., 1083, Ann. Cas. [1916 E], p. 282, where these
principles
concerning, provisos are applied).
To arrive at a correct
decision with reference to the proviso before us, let it first be
recalled
that the law is emphatic in its specification that, save when judges of
first instance are detailed to try land registration cases or when
assigned
to vacation duty, "no judge of first instance shall be required to do
duty
in any other district than that for which he is commissioned." The
keyword
to the proviso which follows is "appointed." This word should here be
given
its usual signification. Many of the decisions follow the definition
of;
"appoint" found in the Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia. "Appoint"
is
there defined as "to allot, set apart, or designate; nominate or
authoritatively
assign as for a use, or to a position or office." All the authorities
unite
in saying that the term "appoint" is well-known in law and whether
regarded
in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the
nomination
or designation of an individual. Appointment signifies no more than
selection
for public office. [4 C. J., 1402, 1404, citing numerous decisions].
The effect to be given
to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the law of
public
officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and
distinct
things. Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to
make
it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen
for office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can
compel
a man to accept the office. [22 R. C. L., 423]. If,
therefore,
anyone could refuse appointment as a judge of first instance to a
particular
district, when once appointment to this district is accepted, he has
exactly
the same right to refuse an appointment to another district. No other
person
could be placed in the position of this Judge of First Instance since
another
rule of public officers is, that an appointment may not be made to an
office
which is not vacant. [29 Cyc., 1373]. In our judgment, the
language
of the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code, interpreted
with
reference to the law of public officers, does not empower the
Governor-General
to force upon the judge of one district an appointment to another
district
against his will, thereby removing him from his district.
Returning again to
the principle of statutory construction that a proviso should not be
given
a meaning which would tend to render abortive the main portions of the
law, it should further be recalled that judges of first instance are
removable
only through a fixed procedure. Moreover, impeachment proceedings, as
conducted
by the Supreme Court, may be in the nature of jurisdiction, conferred
upon
the Supreme Court by ratification of the Congress of the United States,
which, it has uniformly been held, cannot be diminished. [We make no
ruling
on this point because unnecessary for the resolution of the
case].
But, certainly, if a judge could be transferred from one district of
the
Philippine Islands to another, without his consent, it would require no
great amount of imagination to conceive how this power could be used to
discipline the judge or as an indirect means of removal. A judge who
had,
by a decision, incurred the ill-will of an attorney or official, could,
by the insistence of the disgruntled party, be removed from one
district
demoted, and transferred to another district, at possibly a loss of
salary,
all without the consent of the judicial officer. The only recourse of
the
judicial officer who should desire to maintain his self-respect, would
be to vacate the office and leave the service. Unless We wish to
nullify
the impeachment section of the Administrative Code, and thus possibly
to
encroach upon the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court by the
Organic Law, Section 155 must be interpreted so as to make it
consistent
therewith.
What We have said is
reenforced by the authorities most directly in point. In the early
decision
of Marbury vs. Madison [(1803), 1 Cranch, 137], the Supreme Court of
the
United States, in unmistakable terms, explained the powers of the
Judiciary
in enforcing the Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land and held
that
the President of the ,United States had no power to remove a justice of
the peace of the District of Columbia from office. Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall
said that "When the officer is not removable at the will of the
executive,
the appointment is not revocable, and cannot be annulled: it has
conferred
legal rights which cannot be resumed. The discretion of the executive
is
to be exercised, until the appointment has been made. But having once
made
the appointment, his power over the office is terminated, in all cases
where, by law, the officer is not removable by him. The right to the
office
is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute unconditional
power of accepting or rejecting it." The great jurist further on
observed
that "It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial
department,
to say what the law is."
In State of Louisiana
vs. Downes [(1869), 21 La. Ann, 490], the Supreme Court of Louisiana
said
that a judge of a court could, under the Constitution of that State,
only
be removed from office by impeachment, by address of the Legislature,
or
by proceedings under the intrusion act. It was held that the
appointment
and commissioning by the Governor of the State of a party to an office
which has legally been filled, without the vacancy being first declared
according to law, was an absolute nullity.
The Attorney-General
brings to our notice an obsolete law which had escaped us, and which,
if
any lingering doubts exist, would serve to remove them. This law is Act
No. 396, enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1902. Section 4
thereof,
separate and distinct from the other provisions of the Act, and not
tacked
on as a proviso, provided that "any judge of a Court of First Instance
may be transferred from one judicial district to another by order of
the
Civil Governor, with the advice and consent of the Commission. Any
judge
so transferred shall, upon such transfer, cease the performance of
judicial
duties in the district to which he was originally appointed, and shall
be the regular judge thereafter in the judicial district to which he
has
been so assigned." But Act No. 396 was thrice repealed by the
Philippine
Legislature; the first time, impliedly by the enactment of Act No.
2347,
the Judiciary Reorganization Act, and subsequently, expressly by the
Administrative
Code of 1916 and the Administrative Code of 1917. Instead, also, of
continuing
the phraseology of Section 4 of Act No. 396, the Legislature merely
included
the proviso to which we have alluded. It cannot, therefore, admit of
doubt
that the members of the Philippine Legislature had before them the Act
of the Philippine Commission and preferred, not to perpetuate the old
law,
but to insert language of their own. The purpose of the Philippine
Legislature
was clearly to safeguard the interests of the judiciary, and this
laudable
purpose, it is for us now to effectuate.
Far more convincing
than precedent or argument are great and basic principles long inherent
in popular government intended to create an independent judiciary. A
history
of the struggle for a fearless and an incorruptible judiciary prepared
to follow the law and to administer it regardless of consequences, can
be perused with ever-recurring benefit. Since the early days of the
Republic,
the judicial system in the United States, with certain exceptions which
only served to demonstrate more fully the excellence of the whole, has
been viewed with pride, and confidently relied upon for justice by the
American people. The American people considered it necessary "that
there
should be a judiciary endowed with substantial and independent powers
and
secure against all corrupting or perverting influences; secure, also,
against
the arbitrary authority of the administrative heads of the government."
[Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States, pp.
17,
142]. It was such a conception of an independent judiciary which was
instituted
in the Philippines by the American administration and which has since
served
as one of the chief glories of the government and one of the most
priceless
heritages of the Filipino people.
The Attorney-General
in the argument in support of his motion for reconsideration, quotes
the
last preceding sentence and says that he dissents therefrom. The number
of authoritative replies to the proposition advanced by the law officer
of the government relative to the intention to establish an independent
judiciary in these Islands, is limited only by space in which to quote
them. Possibly we can do no better than to make our own the language of
Mr. Justice Trent, speaking for a unanimous court, in Severino vs.
Governor-General
and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros [(1910), 16 Phil., 366, 384],
when he said: "This government, being modelled after the Federal and
State
governments in the United States, now possesses a complete governmental
organization, with executive, legislative, and judicial departments,
which
are exercising functions as independent of each other as the Federal or
State governments." [For the legislative version of the same idea, see
Administrative Code, Sec. 17].
On occasion, the
Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands has applied the accepted theory of the
division of powers, termed by the United States Supreme Court as "one
of
the chief merits of the American system of written constitutional law"
[Kilbourn vs. Thompson (1881), 13 Otto, 168], and has unhesitatingly
refused
to interfere with the official acts of the Governor-General or to
intrude
on the rights and privileges of the Philippine Legislature. (In re
Patterson
[1902], 1 Phil., 93; Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board
of Occidental Negros, supra; In re McCulloch Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41;
U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7; U. S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil.,
1; Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil.,
886.) As an instance of this class of decisions, in Veloso vs. Boards
of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, supra, this Court, in
considering
the right of the Philippine Senate to be the judge of the elections,
returns,
and qualifications of its elective members, said:
"The grant of power
to the Philippine Senate and the Philippine House of Representatives,
respectively
is full, clear, and complete. The judiciary, with its traditional
and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this
exclusive
privilege of the legislature to remain where the sovereign authority
has
placed it. Since, therefore, the Philippine Senate is made the sole
judge
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members,
this tribunal neither can, nor ought, to take jurisdiction of the case."
Although much more
reluctantly, and also much more infrequently we are happy to add, the
court
has had to defend the judiciary against legislative and executive
encroachment.
(Ocampo vs. Cabangis [1910], 15 Phil., 626; In re Guariña
[1914],
24 Phil., 37; Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44; and Province of
Tarlac vs. Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338.) As an instance of the latter
class
of decisions, in Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, supra, Mr. Justice
Moreland,
speaking for the Court, said:
"The judiciary is one
of the coordinate branches of the Government. [Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco,
16 Phil., 534; United States vs. Bull, 15 Phil., 7]. Its preservation
in
its integrity and effectiveness is necessary to the present form of
Government.
It is clear that each department is bound to preserve its own existence
if it live up to the duty imposed upon it as one of the coordinate
branches
of the government. Whatever a person or entity ought to do or must do
in
law, it has the power to do. This being true, the judiciary has the
power
to maintain its existence; and whatever is reasonably necessary to that
end, courts may do or order done. But the right to live, if that i3 all
there is of it, is a very small matter. The mere right to breathe does
not satisfy ambition or produce results. Therefore, courts have not
only
the power to maintain their life, but they have also the power to make
that existence effective for the purpose for which the judiciary was
created.
They can, by appropriate means, do all things necessary to preserve and
maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective
institution
of Government. Courts have, therefore, inherent power to preserve their
integrity, maintain their dignity and to insure effectiveness in the
administration
of justice. This is clear; for, if the judiciary may be deprived of any
one of its essential attributes, or if any one of them may be seriously
weakened by the act of any person or official, then independence
disappears
and subordination begins. The power to interfere is the power to
control,
and the power to control is the power to abrogate. The sovereign power
has given life to the judiciary and nothing less than the sovereign
power
can take it away or render it useless. The power to withhold from the
courts
anything really essential for the administration of justice is the
power
to control and ultimately to destroy the efficiency of the judiciary.
Courts
cannot, under their duty to their creator, the sovereign power, permit
themselves to be subordinated to any person or official to which their
creator did not itself subordinate them."
A stirring plea has been
made by the learned representative of the Government for a decision
which
will work for the public welfare. We agree that, under the peculiar
conditions
existing in the Philippines, it is sometimes well for a judge not to
remain
indefinitely in a particular district. But it is a far cry from this
premise
to the use of a method not sanctioned by existing law and savoring of
military
discipline. Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who
have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in
accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the
office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and
self-respecting
human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two
departments of government. We are pleased to think of judges as of the
type of the erudite Coke who, three centuries ago, was removed from
office
because when asked "if in the future he would delay a case at the
King's
order," replied: "I will do what becomes me as a judge."
For the reasons given,
we are of opinion that the reasonable force of the language used in the
proviso to Section 155 of the Administrative Code taken in connection
with
the whole of the Judiciary Law, and the accepted canons of
interpretation,
and the principles of the law of public officers, leave room for no
other
construction than that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of
another district only with his consent.
It is our holding that
the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the possession of
the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-Fourth
Judicial District. It is our judgment that the defendant Fermin Mariano
shall be ousted from the office of Judge of the Twenty fourth Judicial
District, and the plaintiff placed in possession of the same. The
motion
for reconsideration filed by the Attorney-General is denied. No costs
shall
be allowed. Let this be entered as the order of the court. So ordered.
Araullo, Street and
Avanceña, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J.,
signed the original decision, but was not present when the motion for
reconsideration
was filed and when this decision was promulgated.
Separate
Opinions
VILLAMOR,
J.,
Dissenting:
I dissent. The interpretation,
which the majority give to the last clause of Section 155 of the
Administrative
Code, in the sense that it requires the consent of a Judge of the Court
of First Instance in order that he may be transferred from one judicial
district to another, is an amendment of the law, an act which should be
done only by the legislative branch of the government. I am not unaware
of the possibility that the power of the Governor-General to effect
such
transfers of Judges of First Instance with the consent of the Senate
may
produce as a result the resignation of the judge thus transferred if he
does not accept the transfer. However, this fact should be referred to
the legislature in order that it may amend the law if it sees fit to do
so. The provisions of the law being clear, the court should apply it in
the manner and form in which it has been passed by the legislature,
without
attempting to attach thereto a condition, as that of the consent of the
judge transferred, which the legislature did not see fit to require.
It is pretended that
the appointment to a specific position in the Government requires,
among
other elements, the acceptance thereof, without which it would not
produce
any effect. However, with reference to the transfer of judges a new
appointment
is made only to distinguish a permanent transfer from a temporary
assignment
to sit in another district, which is forbidden by law, except for the
purposes
of land registration cases; and a new oath is taken only to attest the
fact that the transfer has been effected and that the transferred judge
has taken possession of the office in the new district for the purposes
of jurisdiction. But, in reality, in this case there is no new
employee,
there is not a different office. The transferred judge continue, being
a judge as much as before his transfer, holds the same office with all
the attributes and powers thereto annexed, and enjoys the same
privileges,
with the sole difference as to the place in which jurisdiction is
exercised.
In this case, according to the law, the prior consent of the judge is
not
necessary in order that he may be transferred to another district, for
the good of the public service, which is the basis of the power to make
such transfers, is over and above the personal interests of every
citizen.
It is also contended
that the last clause of Section 155 is a danger to the independence of
the judiciary. But if this legal provision is considered in relation to
Section 5 of the Administrative Code, which presumes that
administrative
discretion is exercised for the good of the service and the benefit of
the public; and if it is furthermore considered that the executive
power
to effect transfers of judges is subject to the approval of a
restraining
body, that is, the Senate, it seems, in my opinion, that this legal
provision
is a prudent measure tending to protect the interest of good public
service.
According to law, the
Governor-General has the discretion to make transfers of judges from
one
district to another, with the consent of the Senate. Therefore, to the
Governor-General and to the Senate, and not to the judges, is the power
granted to determine how such discretion should be exercised. In the
case
at bar there is not even a single allegation that such discretion has
been
abused in disregard of the law, and therefore, there is no way by which
this court may disapprove the transfer of the petitioner decided to be
effected by the Governor-General in the exercise of the discretionary
powers
conferred upon him by law.
If the consent of a
judge is an essential requisite to his transfer to another district, it
must also be an essential requisite to his assignment to sit in another
district to try land registration cases or as vacation judge, for in
both
cases, the same reason exists, that is, the danger to the independence
of the judiciary, which is the foundation of the majority opinion. The
result would be the complete repeal of Section 155 of the
Administrative
Code through the interpretation given by this court. And an
interpretation
leading to such result should be discarded for it is contrary to the
doctrines
of statutory construction cited in the majority opinion, to wit: That
the
court should give effect to the general intention of the legislator, if
it may be gathered from all the viewpoints from which the law is
examined;
and that, if possible, that construction should be adopted which gives
effect to all the provisions of the law [2 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, page 662 et seq.; In re Allen (1903), 2 Phil.,
630;
sec. 207 of the Administrative Code].
But what is the
intention
of the legislator in the legal provision now under consideration? The
provisions
of the law are clear and it is not necessary either to stretch the
imagination
or resort to other jurisdictions, to discover the intention of the
legislator.
Section 155 of the Administrative Code provides:
"For the purpose of
trying land registration cases only a judge of first instance may, if
the
public interests so require, be detailed by the Department Head to
temporary
duty in a district other than his own. Save when so detailed or when
assigned
to vacation duty, no judge of first instance shall be required to do
duty
in any other district than that for which he is commissioned; but
nothing
herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one
district
from being appointed to be judge of another district."
It is admitted by the authorities
on the subject that the object of a saving clause or proviso is (1) to
except something from the legal provision in question, or (2) to
restrict
the provisions thereof, or (3) to exclude all possible reason for
erroneously
construing such provision so as to make it applicable to cases which
the
legislature did not intend to include therein.
In whatever sense the
proviso in question is interpreted, there is no reason for requiring
the
consent of the judge for a temporary or permanent transfer to another
district
The intention of the legislature, as gathered from the provisions of
the
law, is that no judge shall be required to render services in another
district,
except to try land registration cases or to act as vacation judge, but
without prejudice to his being appointed by the Governor-General as
judge
of another district.
That discharge is a
different thing from transfer is a self-evident proposition requiring
no
proof. That a judge appointed to another district may refuse to accept
his transfer is not disputed by anyone. But if he leaves the office by
abandonment or resignation, such result is not a necessary effect of
the
transfer but of his free will.
The majority decision
tries to solve the proposition that if the remedy prayed for is not
granted
judges would lose their judicial independence. But we should remember,
in this connection what Judge Cooley, one of the most eminent American
jurists, in resolving the proposition that if it should be held that
the
Governor cannot be compelled to fulfill purely ministerial duties,
those
in possession of legal rights would, in many cases, be without remedy,
said in the case of Sutherland vs. Governor [29 Mich., 320], to wit:
"Practically, there
are a great many such cases, but theoretically, there are none at all.
All wrongs, certainly, are not redressed by the judicial department. A
party may be deprived of a right by a wrong verdict, or an erroneous
ruling
of a judge, and though the error may be manifest to all others than
those
who are to decide upon his rights, he will be without redress. A person
lawfully chosen to the Legislature may have his seat given by the house
to another, and be thus wronged without remedy. A just claim against
the
State may be rejected by the board of auditors, and neither the
governor
nor the courts can give relief. A convicted person may conclusively
demonstrate
his innocence to the governor, and still be denied a pardon. In which
one
of these cases could the denial of redress by the proper tribunal
constitute
any ground for interference by any other authority ? The law must leave
the final decision upon every claim and every controversy somewhere,
and
when that decision has been made, it must be accepted as correct. The
presumption
is just as conclusive in favor of executive action as in favor of
judicial."
A case in which the Court
discussed the proposition that there can be no wrong whatever without
any
remedy is that of People vs. Bissell [19 III., 229]. In that case the
Court
said:
"It is urged upon Us,
that in a government of laws there must be an adequate remedy for every
wrong, and that where a clear right exists, there must be some mode of
enforcing that right. While human society is governed by so imperfect a
being as man, this can be true only in theory. If we are to compel the
Governor or the legislature to right every wrong which may arise from
their
omissions of duty, then surely they must, in order to make this Utopian
system perfect, have the power to compel us to do right in every case.
May it not be as well supposed that we will act perversely, and refuse
to perform a duty imposed upon us, to the injury of the citizen, as
that
the Governor will do so? In the formation of the government, equal
confidence
was rightfully reposed in each department, to which appropriate and
independent
duties were assigned."
The proceeding instituted
in this case is entitled quo warranto, a proceeding for determining the
right of a Judge of First Instance to sit in a determined judicial
district.
But there can be no doubt that in this question is involved the power
of
the Governor-General to appoint Judges of First Instance. While the
petition
in this case does not include the Governor-General as party respondent,
nevertheless, the judgment of this court must in the same manner
necessarily
affect him who authorized the appointment now in dispute and the
appointee,
now respondent Judge Fermin Mariano. This conclusion is inevitable for
the case deals with the appointment of a judge made by the Governor
General
in the exercise of his discretional powers. Indeed this court cannot
decide
this case by granting the prayer of the petitioner without disapproving
the manner in which this power of the Governor-General has been
exercised.
Has the court jurisdiction to do this?
Section 26 of the Jones
Act provides, among other things:
"The Judges of the
Courts of First Instance shall be appointed by the Governor-General, by
and with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate."
In view of this legal provision
and of Section 155 of the Administrative Code, to maintain that a Judge
of First Instance may not be transferred to another district without
his
consent amounts to judicially determining that the Governor-General
cannot
exercise the power conferred upon him by law to transfer a judge from
one
district to another without the consent of the judge concerned.
The question whether
courts possess or do not possess jurisdiction to control the official
acts
of the Governor has been raised before many courts of the United
States.
And this Supreme Court, in the case of Severino vs. Governor-General
and
Provincial Board of Occidental Negros [16 Phil., 366, 387, 400, 402],
after
examining the various cases in which this question was raised in the
United
States, said:
"We think that the
weight of authority, based upon legal principles and sound reasoning,
supports
the proposition that in the United States the supreme courts of the
States
do not have jurisdiction to control the official acts of the governor.
For better reasons we conclude that this court has no jurisdiction,
either
by mandamus or injunction, to control the official acts of the
Governor-General,
inasmuch as we have seen that his duties, powers, and responsibilities
are more comprehensive than those conferred upon any State Governor.
When
the Philippine legislative body confers upon the Governor-General
powers
and duties, it does so for the reason that he is in a better position
to
know the needs of the country than any other member of the executive
department,
and with the full confidence that he will perform such duties, under
his
official oath, as his best judgment dictates. If this had not been the
intention of the legislatures they could have placed the duty upon some
other official of the executive department. It no doubt is sometimes
very
necessary for the Governor-General to perform certain important
executive
duties without delay, and should this court attempt to distinguish
between
purely ministerial and discretionary duties, conferred upon him by law,
and attempt to determine in each case which are purely ministerial,
which
are political, or which are discretionary, the Governor-General, to
that
extent would become subservient to the judiciary. To avoid this is why
the three great coordinate departments of the Government were created
and
made independent of each other. President McKinley in creating civil
government
in this country took into consideration these fundamental principles of
separate and independent departments, which have been demonstrated to
be
essential to a republican form of government, and conferred upon the
Governor-General,
as the Executive of the Philippine Islands, the power to execute the
laws
according to his best judgment, holding him responsible to the
President
of the United States, without interference on the part of the
judiciary.
In so doing he reposed in the Executive of this country great
confidence,
realizing that he, the Executive, acting independently of the
judiciary,
would be in a better position to carry out the great underlying
principles
of American institutions for the peace and happiness of the inhabitants
of this country. The President realized that the final decision of
every
question in controversy must be left somewhere, and when such decision
has been made it must be accepted as correct. The presumption is just
as
conclusive in favor of executive actions as to its correctness and
justness,
as it is in favor of judicial action."
In another part of this
decision, this Court added:
"Inasmuch as the
three
coordinated departments of the Government, the executive, legislative,
and judicial, have been established and are operating, as we have said,
as independently of each other as the same three coordinated branches
created
under the constitution of the Federal and State governments are
operating
in the American Union, and in view of the fact that there have been
conferred
upon the Chief Executive of these Islands more extensive powers, duties
and responsibilities than have been conferred upon the governors of the
various States of the Union, we think the reason for the holdings of
the
courts of the United States, which have passed upon this question are
worthy
of consideration. We might here add that we have no doubt that the
present
incumbent of the office of Governor-General, a man who is ready and
willing
at all times to render obedience to the law, would follow the mandate
of
this court, but such willingness to be governed by the order of this
court
would not of itself give us jurisdiction. Nor should he manifest (which
he has not done) his intention to not obey the mandate of this court,
this
would not be sufficient reason for us to abstain from requiring him to
comply with such mandate in case we have jurisdiction."
And in the dispositive
part of the Decision, the Court among other things said:
"That We cannot and
should not entertain a complaint which seeks to control or interfere
with
the official duties of the Governor-General."
In the case of Forbes vs.
Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield [16 Phil., 534], this Court, adhering to
the
same principle announced in the case of Severino vs. Governor-General
and
Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, supra, established the following
doctrine:
"In a government of
separate and independent departments, executive, legislative, and
judicial,
with separate and distinct functions, one department will not attempt
to
interfere with the performance of the exclusive duties of another. To
permit
such an interference would destroy the independence of the separate
departments
and would make one subject to the control of the others. For the
judiciary
to interfere, for the purpose of questioning the manner of exercising
the
legal and political duties of the chief executive head of the
Government
or to control the action of the legislative department, would, in
effect,
destroy the independence of the departments of the Government and would
make all departments subject to the ultimate control of the judicial.
Such
a conclusion or condition was never contemplated by the organizers of
the
Government."
In
deciding the present
petition, ordering that the respondent judge Fermin Mariano should be
ousted
from the office of Judge of the Twenty-fourth District and that
possession
thereof should be surrendered to the petitioner Andres Borromeo, has
not
this court judicially determined that the appointment of the former to
said district and that of the latter to the twenty-first, both made by
the Governor General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine
Senate,
are not well made and are contrary to the immovability of judges and
should
therefore be annulled by this court? What does the decision of the
majority
mean but that it is a real intrusion in the exercise of the powers
conferred
upon the executive and legislative departments of the Government? And
is
this not openly contrary to the doctrines established in the decisions
cited of this Supreme Court itself, where the much-vaunted independence
of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments is proclaimed?
The petition is denied.
The motion for
reconsideration
should be granted. |