EN
BANC
THE
CITY OF
MANILA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
G.
R.
No. 24414
January
15, 1926
-versus-
J. C.
RUYMANN, ET
AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
D
E C I S I
O N
OSTRAND,
J :
This action was originally
brought by the City of Manila on March 26, 1914, for the expropriation
of the so-called Hacienda de Pinugay, embracing 3,043 hectares of land
and situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal.
By authority of Act
No. 648 of the Philippine Commission, the Civil Governor of the
Philippine
Islands, on July 26, 1904, issued Executive Order No. 33 reserving some
90 square miles of the watershed of the Mariquina river in the Province
of Rizal for the protection of the water supply system of the City of
Manila.
Before the issuance of said Executive Order, the Philippine Commission,
on May 10, 1904, passed Act No. 1150 which among other things provided
that "ordinances enacted for the purpose of protecting the purity of
the
water supply of Manila shall apply to and be enforced over all
territory
within the drainage area of such water supply or within one hundred
meters
of any reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, or pumping station used in
connection with the city water service."
The Hacienda de Pinugay
was then the property of the heirs of one Robert Wilson and was
situated
within the limits of the reservation. On November 3, 1908, subsequent
to
the establishment of the reservation, the defendants J. C. Ruymann and
H. G. Farris bought the hacienda from Wilson's widow, the value of the
consideration, consisting partly in Manila real estate, being worth
over
P18,000 according to the defendants' estimate; the plaintiff places the
value at P8,678.
On August 17, 1911,
the City of Manila, by virtue of its charter and under the provisions
of
Act No. 1150, passed Ordinance No. 149 prescribing regulations for the
prevention of the contamination of the Miriquina river and its
tributary
streams. Tre enforcement of the regulations was carried out partly by
the
Constabulary and partly by reservation guards appointed by the city
and,
in course of time, led to friction with the defendants' tenants some of
whom were arrested for bathing in the streams. The defendants
complained
that by reason of the trespasses and interference of the agents of the
city, their tenants were frightened away from the hacienda and, on
February
17, 1914, an action was brought in the Court of First Instance of
Manila
in which the herein defendants asked for a writ of injunction against
the
city and for damages in the sum of P100,000. In its decision of the
case
that court, Judge Crossfield presiding, said, among other things:
"The City of Manila
undoubtedly is endeavoring to protect its citizens against the use of
impure
water, and its action in that regard should not meet with objection,
but
in order to do so within its rights, it should exercise the right of
eminent
domain which it may have over the land in question, even though beyond
its geographical limits.
xxx
"While the
defendant
is not warranted in trespassing upon plaintiffs' lands and preventing
plaintiffs
from the ordinary use and control of them, yet for the purposes
hereinbefore
stated, there may be some justification in what it has done, though
such
justification will cease to exist unless defendant should promptly
proceed
to exercise any power which it may have in order to carry out the
purposes
referred to.
"I am of the opinion
that there is no question but that the plaintiffs are entitled to have
defendant restrained from trespassing upon their premises, or
performing
any act which shall prevent them from the ordinary exercise of care and
custody over their property. I am also of the opinion that an
opportunity
should be given the defendant to take the necessary steps looking to
obtain
the possession and control over the lands in question by legal
procedure.
"Let judgment be
entered
restraining the defendant from, through its officers, agents, or
employees,
or any other person in its behalf, entering upon the land hereinbefore
described according to the plan thereof. as appears from the map marked
13, attached to the record herein, or from interfering in any way with
plaintiffs' entry thereupon through themselves or their agents or
tenants
or employees, or from in any way interfering with the use and
occupation
by the plaintiffs of the land in question, within the ordinary,
reasonable
limits of rightful use and occupation for agricultural or other
purposes
to which the lands are adapted.
"The judgment thus
ordered will not be executed before the 25th day of March, 1914; and
not
then, if in the meantime the defendant shall have taken the proper
legal
steps to exercise its right and control over the land described by
purchase
thereof or by the exercise of the right of eminent domain."
No appeal was taken from
this Decision and upon the expiration of the term fixed therein, the
city
instituted the present action for the expropriation of the hacienda.
The
defendants filed their answer and the Court ordered the deposit by the
plaintiff of the sum of P13,090, the assessed value of the land, to
enable
the plaintiff to take immediate possession of property. The money was
duly
deposited by the plaintiff, who nevertheless now maintains that it
never
took actual possession of the land. As we shall presently see, this
court
has already decided that the plaintiff did take possession and the
plaintiff's
contention in that respect need, therefore, not be here considered.
On February 24, 1915,
the Governor-General issued Executive Order No. 33 modifying the
boundary
lines of the reservation so as to exclude therefrom the Hacienda de
Pinugay.
As a consequence thereof, the plaintiff presented a motion for the
dismissal
of the expropriation proceedings and, on April 27, 1915, the Court of
First
Instance issued an order dismissing the case upon payment of the costs
of suit and of the fees of the commissioners of valuation, without
prejudice
to the defendants' right to bring another action for damages. The
plaintiff
paid the bill of costs and the fees of the commissioners and on July
21,
1915, the Court declared the case definitely dismissed. From that order
the defendants appealed to this court.
In its Decision upon
appeal, this Court said among other things:
"This appeal presents
three questions of law. They are: (1) May the petitioner, in an action
of expropriation, after he has been placed in possession of the
property
and before the termination of the action, dismiss his petition? (2) In
case said action is dismissed, may the defendant recover damages
growing
out of the action and said possession of the plaintiff? and (3) May
said
damages be ascertained as an incident in the principal action, or must
the defendant submit to the dismissal of the action and commence an
independent
action for damages?
xxx
"Upon the second
question,
whether or not the defendant should be entitled to damages, if any had
been occasioned by the abandonment of the proceedings by the plaintiff,
must, we think, depend upon the question whether or not any damages had
been caused. Upon that question, whether damages may at all be
recovered
in cases like the present, the authorities are again in great conflict.
A careful examination of the decisions upon that question, We think,
will
show that the result has been due to the fact that no damages had been
occasioned, rather than to the rule that no damages could be recovered.
We think the rule which should be established in cases like the present
is no different from the rule in any other case where one party causes
damage to another. In this jurisdiction, the petitioner, upon the
presentation
of his petition, the ascertainment of the value of the property in
question,
and the deposit of said value with the proper official, is justified in
taking possession of the land being expropriated. In the present case
the
petition was presented, a value was fixed upon the land, the deposit
was
made, and the plaintiff took actual possession of the land, thereby
causing
the defendant to quit the possession of the same, to remove his animals
and machinery therefrom, and to cease to exercise any right or control
over the same. The plaintiff remained in possession of the land for
some
time prior to the presentation of his motion to dismiss his action. To
deny defendant at least the right to prove that he had been damaged by
such dispossession would be to deny him the right to prove, in any
case,
that he had been damaged by the dispossession of his property by
another.
Whether or not he has been damaged is a question of proof. He is
entitled,
at least, to an opportunity to present proof upon that question.
xxx
"Therefore, and for
the reasons hereinbefore given, it is hereby ordered and decreed that
the
judgment of the lower court be affirmed, reserving to the defendants
the
right, before a final judgment is rendered in the court below, and
within
a period of twenty days after the return of the record to the lower
court
and notice thereof, to present their claim for damages, either as an
incident
to the present action or in a separate action. And without any finding
as to costs, it is so ordered." [City of Manila vs. Ruymann, 37 Phil.
421].
Upon the return of
the case to the Court of First Instance, the defendants elected to
treat
the determination of the damages as an incident to the expropriation
case
and, on May 24, 1918, filed a cross-complaint asking damages in the sum
of P150,000.
The plaintiff in its
answer denies the principal allegations of the cross-complaint and sets
up as special defenses: (1) That it never had actual possession of the
land and had limited its acts to the carrying out of sanitary
regulations
and to the protection of the city water supply against contamination,
and
(2) that under Section 2430 of the Administrative Code, the city cannot
be held liable for damages or injuries to persons or property arising
from
the failure of the Municipal Board, or any city officer, to enforce the
provisions of the charter of the city, or any other law or ordinance,
or
from negligence of said board or other officers while enforcing or
attempting
to enforce the same.
Upon trial, the Court
below held that considering that the defendants' claim for damages was
presented as an incident to the expropriation proceedings, no damages
could
be awarded neither for the period preceding the institution of said
proceedings
on March 26, 1914, nor for the period subsequent to the dismissal of
the
action by the Court of First Instance. Judgment was rendered in favor
of
the defendants and against the plaintiff for the sum of P3,384.50, as
damages
sustained by the defendants during the period from March 26, 1914,
until
July, 1915, with the costs. From this judgment, both parties appealed.
The plaintiff-appellant
assigns as errors:
"(1) That the court
erred in declaring that the city took possession of the defendants'
property
sought to be expropriated; (2) that it likewise erred in awarding the
defendants
damages; and (3) that it erred in declaring that the plaintiff, and not
the Metropolitan Water District, was responsible for such damages as
the
defendants might have suffered."
The first assignment of
error was decided adversely to the plaintiff's contention in the case
of
City of Manila vs. Ruymann [37 Phil., 421], and the second assignment
will
be considered in connection with the defendants' appeal. The third
assignment
is clearly without merit; the Metropolitan Water District has assumed
liability
for certain contractual obligations of the city, but cannot be held
liable
in damages for the torts of the latter.
The defendants in their
brief on appeal insist that they should have been awarded damages in
the
total sum of P20,367 upon the following items:
1. For loss in the
sale of 48 carabaos 2,880.00
2. For loss in the
sale of 5 horses 76.00
3. For loss in the
sale of 32 head of swine 460.00
4. For loss in the
sale of 70 goats 130.00
6. For loss of
fowls
120.00
6. For loss of wire
fencing 865.00
7. For damages
suffered
by the defendants from 1911
to April,
1914
21,250.00
8. For damages
suffered
by defendants for the years
1916 and
1917
45,500.00
9. For the year
1914
22,740.00
10. For the year
1915
22,740.00
11. For damages on
account of the burning of houses
and contents
12,777.00
12. For damages to
roads, trails, dikes and irrigation ditches 2,300.00
13. For damages
arising
from the forced sale of
defendants'
plantation 350,000.00
14. For attorneys'
fees 15,000.00
15. For damages
from
loss of advances and destruction
of
business
23.240.00
______________
Total
620.367.00
=============
Upon
the first item, the
Court allowed the sum of P900 and items Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 were
allowed
in full. The Court further allowed the sum of P251.10 for loss of palay
in 1914 and P293.40 for palay lost in 1915. All other claims were
rejected.
In Our opinion, the
Court did not err in rejecting items Nos. 7 and 15; it is self-evident
that in this action only damages arising out of the expropriation
proceedings
can be considered and that the plaintiff cannot here be held liable for
damages for acts occurring before such proceedings were commenced.
The lower court found
that the damages referred to in items Nos. 9 and 10 amounted only to
P544.50
and its estimate is probably as nearly correct as it was possible to
make
it, taking into consideration the general unreliability of the evidence.
As to item No. 11,
the defendants are undoubtedly entitled to damages for the loss of the
houses which burned down during the time the plaintiff held possession
of the land; the houses were part of the property to be expropriated
and
upon the dismissal of the proceedings, it was the plaintiff's duty to
return
the buildings to the defendants, or in default thereof, to pay damages.
But we fail to see upon what ground the plaintiff can be held liable in
damages for the loss of the personal property stored in the houses;
such
property was not the subject of the expropriation proceedings and the
defendants
must be held to have left it on the land at their own risk. It is
possible
that the defendants are entitled for damages upon some of the other
items,
but their evidence is so unsatisfactory that it is impossible to arrive
at any exact estimate of their losses. In fact, We feel justified in
saying
that the only thing clearly shown by the testimony of their principal
witness
is a remarkable disregard for the truth.
Considering the record
as a whole, the majority of this Court is of the opinion that the
defendants
should be allowed a total amount of P10,000, in full satisfaction of
the
damages suffered by them through the aforesaid expropriation
proceedings.
The judgment appealed
from is, therefore, modified by increasing the amount of the
defendants'
recovery to the total sum of P10,000, with interest at 6 per cent per
annum
from May 24, 1918, the date of the filing of the cross-complaint. No
costs
will be allowed. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J.,
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur. |