EN
BANC
ARSENIO
MACALI,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 25308
February
18, 1926
-versus-
THE
HONORABLE
EULOGIO
P. REVILLA,
JUDGE OF
FIRST
INSTANCE
OF BULACAN
AND
BUENAVENTURA
OCAMPO,
PROVINCIAL
FISCAL
OF BULACAN,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I
O N
VILLAREAL,
J :
This
is a proceeding instituted
by Arsenio Macali against the Honorable Eulogio P. Revilla, Judge of
First
Instance of Bulacan, and the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, Buenaventura
Ocampo, in which he prays that an Order of Mandamus be issued ordering
the respondent judge to allow the appeal filed by the petitioner on
December
1, 1925, and to forward to this Court the record of Criminal Case No.
4438,
People of the Philippine Islands vs. Arsenio Macali, of the Court of
First
Instance of Bulacan, for a review of the judgment entered therein.
The respondents, in
answer to the complaint, admit all the facts therein set forth and, as
a special defense, allege that the petitioner had waived his right to
appeal
and had begun to serve his sentence surrendering himself to the proper
authorities for the execution of the judgment and stamping his thumb
mark
on the order of commitment of his person to the Director of Prisons.
The bare facts
resulting
from the pleadings and from the oral argument of counsel for both
parties
are the following: October 29, 1924, the respondent Provincial Fiscal
of
Bulacan filed in the Court of First Instance of said province a
complaint
against the herein petitioner Arsenio Macali, accusing him of the crime
of murder. On November 18, 1925, the said Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan,
after obtaining the permission of the court, amended the said
complaint,
changing the crime of murder for that of homicide. On being arraigned
upon
the amended information on November 18, 1925, and at the suggestion of
his attorney, petitioner pleaded guilty. Immediately thereafter, the
respondent
judge, Honorable Eulogio P. Revilla, rendered judgment, sentencing the
petitioner to seventeen years, four months, and one day reclusion
temporal,
with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
in the amount of P1,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency
on account of the nature of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs
of the action. On the same day, November 18, 1925, upon hearing the
judgment
rendered against him, the herein petitioner, through ignorance, stated
that he waived his right to appeal from said judgment and surrendered
himself
to the proper authorities, who thereupon proceeded to commit him to
Bilibid,
the petitioner having stamped his thumb mark on the order issued for
that
purpose, addressed to the Director of Prisons. On December 1, 1925, the
herein petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan,
stating that he withdrew the waiver of his right to appeal that he had
formerly made, and that he thereby appealed to the Supreme Court from
the
judgment rendered against him. On December 11, 1925, the respondent
Judge
of First Instance of Bulacan disallowed the appeal. Petitioner excepted
in due time to this order disallowing his appeal.
If the accused were
intelligent and possessed of a certain degree of education, his plea of
guilty, his waiver of the right to appeal and his submission to the
authorities
for confinement would undoubtedly be sufficient to make the judgment
final
and subject to execution and to take him out of the judicial power and
put him under the executive control, even though the period of fifteen
days fixed in section 47 of General Orders No. 58, for the perfection
of
appeals in criminal cases, may not have expired; but when dealing with
an ignorant person, without the least amount of education, as the
herein
petitioner, who at the mere suggestion of his attorney pleads guilty to
a grave crime, such as homicide, and waives his right to appeal from a
judgment whereby he is sentenced to suffer the afflictive penalty of
seventeen
years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, and to pay an
indemnity
of P1,000, there is sufficient reason, if not of a juridical nature, of
a social character, to stop and ponder to see if that person has
understood
the whole extent of, and all the consequences following, such a waiver
of a right that the constitution and statutes grant him. [Section 15
(8)
of General Orders No. 58; Section 3, Jones Law].
When he found himself
separated from the outside world and from the persons that are dear to
him by the thick iron bars of a jail, the petitioner then felt the
consequences
of his plea of guilty and of his waiver of his right to appeal from the
judgment rendered against him, and hurriedly filed an appeal,
withdrawing
the said waiver. This is a very clear indication that he did not well
understand
the significance and extent of his confession of guilt, nor of the
consequences
of his waiver of his right to appeal.
In the case of United
States vs. Rota [9 Phil. 426], cited in United States vs. Agcaoili [31
Phil. 91], this Court said the following: "The procedure for the trial
of criminal. causes makes no specific provision for the trial of a
cause
when the defendant pleads guilty. We are of the opinion, and so hold,
that
the Courts of First Instance may sentence defendants in criminal causes
who plead guilty to the offense charged in the complaint, without the
necessity
of taking testimony. However, in all cases, and especially in cases
where
the punishment to be inflicted is severe, the court should be sure that
the defendant fully understands the nature of the charges preferred
against
him and the character of the punishment to be imposed before sentencing
him." And in the said case of United States vs. Agcaoili, supra,
this Court, furthermore,. said the following: "While it is true that a
judgment convicting and sentencing a defendant may lawfully be
pronounced
upon a solemn plea of 'guilty' in open court and on arraignment,
entered
by the accused with full knowledge of the meaning and effect of his
plea,
nevertheless, where the complaint charges a capital offense, the
possibility
of misunderstanding or mistake in 80 grave a matter justifies and in
most
instances requires the taking of such available evidence in support of
the allegations of the information as the trial judge may deem
necessary
to remove all reasonable possibility that the accused might have
entered
his plea of 'guilty' improvidently, or without a clear and precise
understanding
of its meaning and effect."
The waiver of the right
to appeal, like the plea of guilty, must be voluntary, that is to say,
the accused must understand the significance and the meaning of his
act,
as also the consequences deriving therefrom. If in pleading guilty to a
grave crime such as homicide, in waiving his right to appeal from a
heavy
sentence, such as one depriving him of his liberty for seventeen years,
four months and one day, and ordering him to pay an indemnity of
P1,000,
in surrendering himself to the authorities because he could not find
bondsman
and in stamping his thumb mark in the order of mittimus, the herein
petitioner
did so, without knowing the full significance nor the meaning and
consequences
of such acts, due to his ignorance and lack of instruction, it cannot
properly
be said that he voluntarily renounced his right to appeal, and that he
submitted himself voluntarily to serve the sentence imposed upon him;
wherefore
the said judgment did not become final and subject to execution, and
since
the fifteen days fixed by law for perfecting an appeal in criminal
cases
had not elapsed, the trial court has jurisdiction to admit the appeal
filed
by the petitioner.
However, as the
petitioner
has pleaded guilty and was sentenced without any trial, this Court
cannot
review his case. But this is no bar to the revision of the Information,
as regards its validity and sufficiency, since these requisites have
not
been admitted by the plea of guilty [17 C. J., 32, par. 3295]; and also
of the judgment, as regards the qualification of the crime and the
degree
of the penalty imposed.
Wherefore, the Petition
is granted and the respondent Judge is ordered immediately upon receipt
of this order, to allow the appeal filed by the petitioner and proceed
in connection therewith as prescribed by law, without special
pronouncement
as to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J.,
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
Johns, J., did
not take part. |