FIRST
DIVISION
THE
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 34039
January
16, 1931
-versus-
LEONCIO
VILLEGAS
Y TULIO
[ALIAS
LUCIO
VILLEGAS
AND FRANCISCO BRAVO],
Defendant-Appellant.
D
E C I S I
O N
ROMUALDEZ,
J :
The defendant was prosecuted
for attempted robbery in an inhabited house upon the following
Information:
"The undersigned
accuses
Leoncio Villegas y Tuliao [alias] Lucio Villegas [alias] Francisco
Bravo
of the crime of attempted robbery in an inhabited house, committed as
follows:
"That on or about
the
9th days of July, 1930, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent of gain and against the consent of the owner thereof, enter
the dwelling house [first floor] of Miss S. H. Olson, situated at No.
558
San Luis Street, of said city, by means of force upon things, to wit:
by
cutting off and forcibly breaking open the wire screen of a window of
said
premises, an opening not intended for entrance or egress, thru which
said
accused gained entrance to said house, thus commencing the commission
of
the crime of robbery directly by overt acts; that if said accused did
not
accomplish his unlawful purpose, that is, to take, steal and carry away
by means of force upon things, personal property valued at P1,000
contained
in the said dwelling house, it was not because of his own and voluntary
desistance, but because of the timely detection and intervention by
third
persons who caused the arrest of said accused.
"That the said
accused
has heretofore been convicted eight [8] times of the crime of theft and
twice [2] of estafa, by virtue of final judgments rendered by competent
courts, the last date of conviction being on February 3, 1925, and is
therefore
a habitual delinquent under the provisions of Act No. 3586 of the
Philippine
Legislature.
"All contrary to
law."
[pp. 2 and 3, Record].
The defendant appeared
in the Court below and upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty. On the
following
day, however, accompanied by his lawyer, the accused withdrew his plea
of not guilty and entered one of guilty. The trial court found him
guilty
of the crime charged and as recidivist and habitual criminal, as
alleged
in the Information and sentenced him to suffer two months' arresto
mayor,
under paragraph 2, Subsection 5, Article 508 of the Penal Code, plus
twenty-one
years' imprisonment under Act No. 3586, with costs.
The instant appeal
has been taken from that judgment, based upon the following assignments
of error:
"1. In finding the
defendant guilty of the crime of robbery in an inhabited house.
"2. In sentencing the
defendant to the additional penalty of twenty-one years, in addition to
the two months, because the information alleged that the defendant had
been a recidivist ten times."
In support of the first
assignment of error, the defense contends that the crime to which the
defendant
pleaded guilty was not attempted robbery in an inhabited house, but, at
most, trespass to dwelling. When the defendant pleaded guilty, he
admitted
certain facts alleged in the Information. It is contended that the
allegation
in the Information touching the defendant's purpose in breaking into
the
house, together with subsequent statements, are mere conclusions drawn
by the fiscal. We think otherwise. That part of the Information
explains
the defendant's intent of gain, setting forth as facts that he proposed
to take, steal, and carry away by means of force upon things, personal
property valued at P1,000 contained in the dwelling house, and that if
he failed to accomplish said purpose, it was not because of his own
voluntary
desistance, but because of the timely detection and intervention by
third
persons who caused the arrest of said accused. Perhaps the information
could have been drawn up with greater clearness, but considering its
contents,
We deem it sufficient. The use of the words of the law in the
Information
is not a defect. [U. S. vs. Salcedo, 4 Phil., 234; U.S. vs. Grant and
Kennedy,
18 Phil., 122; U. S. vs. Go Changco, 23 Phil., 641]. The absence
of a detailed list of the personal property found in the house on that
occasion, the value of which is specifically alleged in the
Information,
vitiates neither the proceedings nor the judgment, not being
jurisdictional
in nature. The defendant could have demanded such a detailed list, but
he failed to do so and thereby waived the objection, and, therefore,
that
question cannot be raised for the first time in the present instance.
[U.
S. vs. Del Rosario, 2 Phil., 127; U. S. vs. Mack, 4 Phil., 185 and 291;
U. S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil., 566; U. S. vs. Paraiso, 5 Phil., 149; U. S.
vs. Aldos, 6 Phil., 381; U. S. vs. Eusebio, 8 Phil., 574; U. S. vs.
Lampano
and Zapanta, 13 Phil., 409].
The second assignment
of error is based upon the fact that Act No. 3586, by virtue of which
the
appellant was sentenced to twenty-one years of additional imprisonment,
took effect in the year 1929 [the original Act, No. 3397 was passed in
1927], and upon the contention that said Act should not be given
retroactive
effect unless therein expressly provided; and, that the former offenses
alleged in the Information had been punished by judgments rendered
prior
to the enforcement of said Act. It must be borne in mind that it is a
principle
of law in this jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided by statute, that
in order to apply such a law as Act No. 3586, it is not necessary that
the former felonies constituting the habitual criminality have been
committed
after the law regarding habitual criminals took effect; it is
sufficient
that the crime, the prosecution of which gives rise to the application
of the additional penalty for habitual criminality, has been committed
after said law became effective. And this rule is in accord with the
North
American jurisprudence:
"Unless otherwise
provided
by statute, in order to authorize the infliction of a more severe
penalty
upon conviction for a second or a subsequent offense, it is not
necessary
that the first conviction should occur subsequent to the enactment of
the
statute." [16 C. J. 1341].
The judgment appealed from
is affirmed, with the understanding that the appellant is further
condemned
to the accessory penalties, and the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J.,
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur. |