EN
BANC
MANUEL
S.
CONCEPCION,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 46381
March
20, 1939
-versus-
JOSE O.
VERA AND
WEST COAST LIFE INSURANCE CO.,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I
O N
VILLA-REAL,
J :
Manuel S. Concepcion comes
to this Court praying that after proper proceedings, a Decision be
rendered
declaring null and void the resolution of the respondent judge Jose O.
Vera of October 11, 1938, in so far as it declares final and executory
his Decision of August 27, 1938, on the ground that the resolution was
issued in excess of his jurisdiction; and that the respondent judge be
ordered to admit petitioner's exception and notice of appeal, and grant
him ten days within which to file his bill of exceptions.
In Civil Case No. 62365
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for forcible entry, which
came
from the Municipal Court of the same city, wherein the herein
petitioner
was the defendant and the herein respondent, West Coast Life Insurance
Co., was the plaintiff, the said defendant, after the plaintiff had
adduced
its evidence, asked for the dismissal of the case, which was denied by
the Court. In turn, the plaintiff asked that the defendant be not
permitted,
to adduce his evidence. This prayer was likewise denied by the Court
and
the defendant proceeded with the presentation of his evidence. After
the
defendant's first witness had testified, the plaintiff moved for
reconsideration
of the Court's resolution denying its petition not to allow the
defendant
to adduce evidence. The Court granted this motion and issued its order
of July 11, 1938 prohibiting the said defendant from presenting further
evidence, but granting him, however, a reasonable period within which
to
appeal to a superior court by means of certiorari.
The
defendant-petitioner,
Manuel S. Concepcion, having failed to make use of his privilege, the
respondent
judge, on August 27, 1938, rendered his Decision therein, the
dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
"Considering these
facts and the law, the defendant is hereby ordered to restore the
possession
of the property by him illegally held, to the plaintiff, to pay the
latter
a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of said property
in
the sum of P200 monthly beginning November 1, 1937 until the property
is
vacated, and to pay the costs in both instances."
The petitioner received
a copy of this Decision on September 2, 1938.
On
September 26, 1938,
the petitioner Manuel S. Conception filed a motion entitled Motion for
Rehearing, in which it is alleged [1] that the motion for dismissal
filed
by him was not a demurrer to plaintiff's evidence but "was a motion
which
raised a sole legal question, namely, whether or not the action for
forcible
entry should be dismissed because the plaintiff, instead of producing
the
contract of lease mentioned in its complaint, presented documents A, B
and C tending to establish its ownership of the property in question";
[2] that the legal doctrine that the party asking for dismissal or
interposing
a demurrer should not be permitted to adduce evidence in his defense,
is
not applicable in the present case, because the order barring the
defendant
from presenting evidence was issued only after one of the defendant's
witnesses
had testified; [3] that the releasing be granted under the provisions
of
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure considering the facts
alleged
in the affidavit of merits attached to the motion and [4] that in the
event
of a rehearing, multiplicity of suits would be avoided because the
defendant
could establish the nullity of the documents presented by the plaintiff
tending to prove its owner. The prayer of the motion reads: "In view of
all the foregoing, we pray that, the setting aside the judgment already
rendered in the case, a rehearing be ordered giving the defendant an
opportunity
to present all his evidence."
On October 11, 1938,
the respondent judge, in a resolution, denied the above motion for
rehearing
and acceded to the petition for the execution of judgment, on the
ground
that said judgment had become final in view of the fact that the motion
for rehearing was not in the nature of a motion for new trial based on
any of the grounds contained in either Section 145 or Section 113 of
the
Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore, did not have effect of
suspending
the periods of thirty days prescribed by law for the perfection of an
appeal.
On October 17, 1938,
the herein petitioner excepted and gave notice of appeal, with an ex
parte motion asking for reconsideration of the resolution dated
October
11, 1938, in so far as it held the judgment final and executory, and
for
the allowance of the appeal.
The principal question
of law to decide in this appeal is whether petitioner's motion dated
October
17, 1938 asking for reconsideration of the resolution issued by the
respondent
judge on October 11, 1938 in so far as it held final and executory the
judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 52365 wherein the respondent West
Coast
Life Insurance Co. was plaintiff and the herein petitioner was
defendant,
and praying that he be given an opportunity to adduce all his evidence,
is equivalent to a motion for new trial provided for in Section 145 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the filing of which suspends the period of
thirty days fixed by said section.
The ground of the
motion
for rehearing - consisting in that the order of the respondent judge
denying
the petitioner's motion that he be allowed to adduce evidence in
support
of his claim of ownership, filed after the dismissal of the case
because
the said respondent judge was of the opinion that, the said petitioner
having asked for the dismissal which was granted, the latter could no
longer
present his evidence - is tantamount to the allegation that the said
order
is contrary to law, and such allegation is one of the grounds provided
by Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the granting of a new
trial. The motion for rehearing filed by the petitioner Manuel S.
Concepcion
being thus based upon one of the grounds indicated in Section 145 of
Act
No. 190, the filing thereof on September 26, 1938 suspended the
thirty-day
period; consequently, when the respondent judge acted upon it on
October
11, 1938, the petitioner still had six of the aforesaid thirty days.
Granting
that the petitioner received on October 12, 1938 the notice of the
resolution
denying the aforesaid motion for rehearing, the filing on the 17th of
the
same month and year of his exception and notice of intention to appeal
was seasonable.
Although the petition
herein filed is styled certiorari and it alleges that the respondent
judge
exceeded his jurisdiction in holding final and executory his decision
of
August 27, 1938, We nevertheless consider it as a petition for mandamus
because there was no such excess of jurisdiction but only a refusal to
allow the filing of the Bill of Exceptions.
Wherefore, the
respondent
judge is ordered to grant to the petitioner the reglementary period
within
which to file his Bill of Exceptions, with the costs to the respondent
West Coast Life Insurance Co. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J.,
Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Moran, JJ., concur. |