EN
BANC
THE
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 48273
April
22, 1942
-versus-
VICENTE
FUENTESUELA,
Defendant-Appellant.
D
E C I S I
O N
MORAN,
J :
At
about 1 o'clock in the
afternoon of November 21, 1940, while the deceased José Simon
was
about to board a truck on Lipa Street, Sampaloc, Manila, which was to
bring
the athletes of the National University to the Rizal Memorial Stadium,
appellant Vicente Fuentesuela approached him surreptitiously on the
left
side and without warning stabbed him with a knife on the breast. To the
outcry of the deceased, "Why did you do that to me? I have not done
anything," appellant made no reply but continued his assault
causing
the deceased two mortal wounds on the chest and wrist which produced
his
death. The motive for the crime appears to be a dispute which appellant
had with the deceased who was a special policeman in the National
University
when the former sought admittance to a dancing party therein and was
refused
except upon deposit of one peso. Since then appellant harbored a grudge
against the deceased as he had disclosed one week thereafter to one
Francisco
Carrillo who was present at their dispute and to Deputy Police
Inspector
Tolentino during appellant's detention. Upon an information for murder
with allegation of recidivism, appellant was found guilty of the crime
charged and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to an
indemnity
of P2,000.
The present appeal
merely raised the question as to whether the commission of the offense
was or was not attended with the qualifying circumstance of treachery
and
whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to authority
should or should not be appreciated in appellant's favor. Upon the
first
question we have more than once held that alevosia is present where the
attack is sudden and without warning. [U. S. vs. Babasa, 2 Phil. 102;
U.
S. vs. Manlalang, 6 Phil. 339; U. S. vs. De Guzman, 8 Phil. 21; U. S.
vs.
Barnes, 8 Phil. 59]. Appellant's attack upon the deceased
is
of this character.
Upon the second
question,
it appears that two days after the commission of the offense,
appellant,
accompanied by Attorney Geronimo Paredes, voluntarily surrendered to a
policeman at the sala of Judge De la Costa. This is corroborated by
Deputy
Police Inspector Artemio Tolentino. The Solicitor-General himself does
not question the presence of this mitigating circumstance in
appellant's
favor.
The Solicitor-General
insists here that the crime is equally attended with evident
premeditation.
Two circumstances are urged to support this claim: The remark of the
appellant
to one Francisco Carrillo whom the former met one week after his
dispute
with the deceased to the effect that the deceased was chiflado and that
some day he would kill him [the deceased]; and the admission of
appellant
to Police Inspector Tolentino that he was in bad terms with the
deceased.
We do not think either or both of these circumstances will suffice to
constitute
evident premeditation. To authorize a finding of this aggravating
circumstance,
it must affirmatively appear from the overt acts of the accused that he
has definitely resolved to commit the offense; that he has from then
cooly
and dispassionately reflected both on the means of carrying his
resolution
into execution and on the consequences of his criminal design; and that
such an appreciable length of time has elapsed as to expect an aroused
conscience to otherwise relent and desist from the accomplishment of
the
proposed crime. [Cf. U. S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530; U. S. vs.
Blanco,
18 Phil. 206, U. S. vs. Nalua, 23 Phil. 1; U. S. vs. Buncad, 25 Phil.
530;
U. S. vs. Cornejo, 28 Phil. 457; U. S. vs. Bahatan, 34 Phil. 695;
People
vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363]. None of these elements can fairly be
inferred from the circumstances urged by the Solicitor-General. A
threat
to kill, unsupported by any other evidence which would disclose the
true
criminal state of mind of the accused, will only be construed as a
casual
remark naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor and not a
resolution
of the character involved in evident premeditation. This is specially
true
in the instant case when for about a year appellant has ostensibly done
nothing to carry out his threat.
On the other hand,
the evidence discloses that appellant is a recidivist, he having been
convicted
three times of light physical injuries and once of serious physical
injuries.
The crime committed
is murder with the aggravating circumstance of recidivism offset by the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The other mitigating
circumstance
of voluntary surrender to authority brings the penalty to its minimum
period,
or reclusion temporal in its maximum period, in accordance with Article
64, paragraphs 2 and 4, of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant is, thus,
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision
mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal and with this
modification,
judgment is affirmed without costs in this instance.
Yulo, C.J.,
Ozaeta, Paras and Bocobo JJ., concur. |