FIRST
DIVISION
EL
HOGAR FILIPINO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. 48244
January
22, 1943
-versus-
SANTOS
INVESTMENTS,
INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
D
E C I S I
O N
OZAETA,
J :
Does
a general denial fail
to tender an issue so as to entitle the plaintiff to a judgment on the
pleadings? That is the question raised herein for the first time under
the new Rules of Court.
Plaintiff is suing
defendant for rents upon two causes of action. Under the first cause of
action it is alleged that defendant occupied rooms 303 and 305 of the
Crystal
Arcade belonging to the plaintiff from November 10, 1936, to September
30, 1939, under a written contract of lease at an agreed monthly rental
of P260, but failed to pay the rents corresponding to the months of
February
to September, 1939, inclusive, aggregating the sum of P2,080. Under the
second cause of action it is alleged that defendant also occupied room
334 of the same Building from May, 1937, to September, 1939, at an
agreed
monthly rental of P95, but failed to pay the rents corresponding to the
months of January to September, 1939, inclusive, aggregating the sum of
P855.
In its Answer, the
defendant denied "generally and specifically each and every allegation
contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint," and prayed the
court to dismiss the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
Upon motion of the
plaintiff and over the objection of the defendant, the trial court
rendered
judgment on the pleadings as prayed for in the complaint; and from that
the defendant appealed.
Section 6 of Rule 9
provides that the answer shall contain either a specific denial or a
statement
of matters in avoidance of the cause or causes of action asserted in
the
complaint; Section 7 says that the defendant must deal specifically
with
each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit
and,
whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters
which
he will rely upon to support his denial; and Section 8 provides that a
material averment in the complaint other than that as to the amount of
damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. It will
be noted that this rule does away with a general denial, in contrast
with
Section 94 of the former Code of Civil Procedure which expressly
allowed
it and provided that "a general denial only puts in issue the material
allegations of the complaint."
Defendant's Answer
wherein it merely "denies generally and specifically each and every
allegation
contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint," is but a
general
denial. It is not a specific denial under Section 7 of Rule 9, because
it does not deal specifically with each material allegation of fact,
nor
does it set forth the substance of the matters upon which the defendant
relies to support his denial. It does not serve the purpose of
requiring
the defendant to make a specific denial, which is to compel him to
specify
the matters which he intends to disprove and disclose the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial, thereby limiting the issues and
avoiding unnecessary delays and surprises. Under the old procedure the
plaintiff was compelled by defendant's mere general denial to prove
facts
alleged in the complaint which the defendant did not even attempt to
dispute.
The new procedure does away with that unnecessary burden. [Moran on the
Rules of Court, volume 1, page 93].
As a sanction to the
provisions of Sections 6, 7, and 8 of Rule 9 above cited, Section 10 of
Rule 35 provides that where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. We find
that the trial court has correctly applied this rule.
The judgment is
affirmed,
with costs. So ordered.
Yulo, C.J.,
Moran, Paras, and Bocobo, JJ., concur. |