FIRST
DIVISION
JUAN S.
RUSTIA,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. 48213
February
19, 1943
-versus-
THE PEOPLE
OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
D
E C I S I
O N
MORAN,
J :
On
petition of plaintiff
Roman Santos in Civil Case No. 6474 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga,
the Court, on February 2, 1939, appointed a receiver and issued a
preliminary
writ of injunction directing defendants therein who were tenants of
said
plaintiff, "sus abogados, agentes y demas mandatarios para que se
abstengan,
hasta nueva orden de este mismo Juzgado, de tomar posesion de los
terrenos
conocidos como 'Hacienda de Candaba' de apoderarse del palay cosechado
y por cosecharse dentro de dichos terrenos, de trillado y transportarlo
a otros sitios." In defiance of this Order, petitioner here, Juan
S.
Rustia, assembled the defendants on February 15, 1939 at barrio
Bahay-Pari
and incited them to proceed with the threshing and harvesting of the
palay
in the hacienda even against the opposition of the receiver, making
them
believe that the order of the Court enjoining them not to do so was
null
and void. In fact, he wrote the day following to the head of the
association
which he had organized in the aforesaid meeting, advising him that,
with
previous notice to plaintiff or to the receiver, the tenants could
proceed
with the threshing of the palay and hire a thresher to that effect.
Convinced
by the representations of the petitioner, defendants hired threshers
and
proceeded to harvest the palay in the hacienda in open defiance of the
receiver and his assistants. Provincial Commander Cruz and Provincial
Fiscal
De Jesus, informed of the action of the defendants, repaired to the
hacienda
and ordered them to cease harvesting the palay. Thereupon, petitioner
addressed
a petition to the court seeking to modify the writ of injunction with a
view to permitting the defendants to harvest the palay with the
condition
that they would deliver one-half of said palay to the plaintiff. This
petition
was denied, and on February 25, 1939, the Court, instead, issued an
order
authorizing the receiver to liquidate the palay already harvested from
the hacienda by delivering one-half thereof to the defendants if they
were
not indebted to the plaintiff, or the remainder upon payment of the
indebtedness
if otherwise so indebted, but in no case should the portion to be given
to them be less than 15 percent of one-half of the harvest.
On the basis of the
foregoing incidents, the Provincial Fiscal, at the instance of the
receiver,
charged petitioner with criminal contempt for having advised and
abetted
his clients to violate the writ of injunction and which said clients in
effect did. After attempting by himself and later through his counsel
de
officio to secure several postponements of the trial of the contempt
case
against him, he announced his intention to file a written challenge
against
the competency of the then presiding Judge to take cognizance of the
case.
This challenge appeared, however, to have never been formally filed
with
the Clerk of Court. Thereafter, the Court, after due trial, found
petitioner
guilty of contempt and sentenced him to three months' imprisonment.
Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, and while the case was pending
therein,
he asked that his pleading entitled "Peticion de Recusacion e
Inhibicion"
which he claimed he had presented to the Clerk of the Court of First
Instance
of Pampanga, be attached to the record. The petition was opposed by
respondent,
and in support of the opposition, the sworn statements of the Clerk of
Court, the Deputy Clerk of Court and the interpreter, purporting to
deny
the actual presentation of said pleading, were submitted. Various
petitions
were thereafter filed with the appellate Court wherein petitioner
sought
the annulment of the entire proceedings and the return of the record to
the lower Court for a new trial before another judge on the ground that
the record was materially deficient and that the evidence, the
transcript
of the stenographic notes and the decision had all been falsified.
Finally,
a motion for new trial was filed wherein he prayed that Lieutenant Cruz
be allowed to testify or his report to the Constabulary headquarters at
San Fernando, Pampanga, regarding the incident which took place on
February
15, 1939 at barrio Bahay-Pari, be produced and the same taken into
consideration
in the decision of the case. All these motions were denied and on
December
19, 1940, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming that of the
lower Court.
On the matter of the
competency of the trial Judge to take cognizance of petitioner's case,
it has been found by the Court of Appeals that the written challenge
has
not actually been filed with the lower Court and, even if it had been,
the Court of Appeals has not found petitioner's trial to have been
tainted
with bias or partiality. And, on petitioner's claim that the record of
the case is deficient, and that the stenographic notes, the evidence,
and
the Decision of the trial Court had been falsified, the appellate Court
found nothing to support the claim. The issue being of fact, these
findings
are conclusive upon this Court.
Petitioner contends
that it was error for the Court of Appeals to rely upon ex-parte sworn
statements of the employees of the trial Court in adjudging that no
challenge
has actually been made against the presiding judge trying the case. We
see no such error. When petitioner asked the appellate Court to attach
to the record on appeal his supposed written challenge against the
competency
of the judge which he claims was duly filed, and the respondent denied
the same, the appellate Court had every authority to rely upon any
competent
evidence that the respective parties may produce to determine the
question
as to whether such challenge had or had not in effect been filed. Upon
such a collateral issue which had reference merely to a supposed
deficiency
of the record, the Appellate Court may legally rely on affidavits of
the
officials concerned.
As to the denial by
the Court of Appeals of petitioner's motion for new trial, this Court
has
no power of review. It involves a question of fact which this Court
cannot
re-examine. [People v. Diaz, 40 Off. Gaz., 3d Sup., 22]. And besides,
the
Court of Appeals was right in denying the motion. The alleged newly
discovered
evidence, the testimony of Lieutenant Cruz or his report to the
headquarters
regarding petitioner's attitude in the meeting at Barrio
Bahay-Pari,
is not of such nature as to alter, if admitted, the outcome of the
case.
On the contrary, it only confirms his having advised his clients to
disobey
the order of the Court. The hacienda and its produce having been placed
under receivership, his advise to his clients "to take their shares of
the palay and to leave one-half to their landlord" is in defiance of
the
receivership and in disregard of the court's injunction to the effect
that
the tenants and their attorneys "se abstengan de apoderarse del
palay."
It is also argued that
the injunction was in contravention of the provisions of Act No. 4054
and
of section 452 of Act No. 190, the first regarding the division of
shares
between the landlord and the tenants, and the second regarding
exemption
from attachment of provisions for the maintenance of the debtors for
three
months. The contention involves a complete misapprehension of the
order.
The receivership does not constitute a final disposition of the harvest
of the hacienda, but is only a mode of securing the custody thereof
pending
the final determination of the rights of the parties. Possession by the
receiver is in law possession by the Court and is not adverse either to
the plaintiff or to the defendants.
There is no force in
the contention that as the order of February 2, 1939, has been annulled
by the order of February 25, 1939, there can be no contempt committed
against
an already non-existent order. The order of February 25, 1939, merely
amends,
but does not supersede, the order of February 2, 1939, as it merely
refers
to the liquidation of the palay already harvested by authorizing the
receiver
to deliver one-half thereof to the tenants. The injunction to said
tenants
or to their lawyers "para que se abstengan de trillarlo y
trasportarlo"
still subsists and petitioner's advice to his clients to proceed with
the
threshing of the palay constitutes a violation of this part of the
injunction.
Petitioner lastly
challenges
the competency of the Provincial Fiscal to institute contempt
proceedings
against him. It is contended that said official had no authority to
file
the information for indirect contempt arising from a civil case, to
which
the Government is not a party. Petitioner's advice to his clients to
violate
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court, constitutes a
direct
challenge to its authority and the contempt thus committed is criminal
in character. As the proceedings for the punishment of such contempt
are
criminal in nature, the Provincial Fiscal has the unquestionable
authority
to institute the same.
Considering, however,
that in the commission of the criminal contempt herein charged,
petitioner
does not appear to have been prompted by criminal design but was
actuated
by the mistaken belief, according to the Court of Appeals, that the
order
of the trial Court was null and void, and considering further that
although
such mistake does not and cannot justify his attitude towards the
court,
still we believe that, under the circumstances in which the incident
developed,
a fine instead of imprisonment would be a sufficient punishment for
him;
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed with the
modification
that petitioner be sentenced to pay P200 fine with subsidiary
imprisonment,
according to law, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Yulo, C.J.,
Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, JJ., concur. |