EN
BANC
THE
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. L-18
December
6, 1945
-versus-
ROSENDO
VIZCONDE
Y SANTOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
D
E C I S I
O N
PERFECTO,
J :
Appellant was charged with
the crime of Qualified Theft of Personal Property valued at P15.20. The
Information was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila on April 30,
1945.
On May 25, appellant was convicted and sentenced to suffer six months
and
one day of imprisonment and to pay the costs. On appeal, the Court of
First
Instance of Manila also convicted the accused, but reduced the penalty
to two months and one day of arresto mayor.
At the trial, Alipio
Orias and Lucero Nardo testified for the prosecution. For the defense,
the accused testified.
Alipio Orias testified
that he is a private of the U.S. Army, Company A, 4th M.P. Bn., Tondo
Camp,
assigned at Post No. 6, located on Sande Street, Manila, on April 28,
1945.
He remembered having seen the accused on said date but on the date of
the
trial, June 21, he could not identify him any more, "because of the
long
time that had passed since then." He arrested the accused between 3 and
4 p.m. on April 28 " because he was carrying at that time one shirt and
two undershirts, which belong to the government, besides a pair of
shoes
that he was wearing," valued at P15.20. He turned him over to the man
in
charge Sgt. Lucero Nardo. He did not ask Vizconde where he got the
things,
because the order he received was to make arrest and turn over the
arrested
person to the man in charge. Asked to explain why he remembered the
case,
but could not remember the face of the accused, Orias answered "because
we have records in our office of this case." When the accused was
arrested
he was walking with several companions and carrying the goods wrapped
in
a piece of paper. The witnesses arrested him before searching him.
Although
the articles were wrapped in a piece of paper, the accused was carrying
the bundle without hiding it. The witness did not ask any question from
the accused, and the accused did not say anything at that time. The two
undershirts were new, the khaki shirt was slightly used, and the pair
of
shoes were used. If the articles listed in Exhibit I are shown to him,
the witness can not recognize them. The witness did not know from what
place the accused took the articles. [pages 1-4, transcript of
stenographic
notes].
Lucero Nardo testified
that he was in charge of the M. P. guarding the camp at Post No. 6. On
April 28 Orias turned over the accused to the Company Officer Ismundo.
The witness asked the accused where he got the articles, "and he told
me
that he had picked them up," but the witness did not make any further
investigation.
He does not remember exactly the accused, because "I am not familiar
with
his face" and "I have not seen him since then." The witness further
explains
that he can not remember the face of the accused "because I have seen
him
only for about fifteen minutes, and it is very hard to remember his
face."
Since April 28, many people have been arrested and investigaged. The
witness
cannot remember how many were arrested either one or two days before he
testified. The witness only asked where he got the articles, and "he
told
me that he picked them up, and I did not make any further
investigation."
[pages 5-7, transcript of stenographic notes].
After the testimony
of the two witnesses for the prosecution, the fiscal made, among other
things, the following statement:
"It is true, Your
Honor,
that in the direct examination, the two witnesses for the prosecution,
whether purposely or involuntarily, failed to identify the accused in
this
case, although in the cross- examination by the defendant's counsel,
the
last witness made reference to the defendant." [page 7, transcript of
stenographic
notes].
Appellant testified that
on April 28, he was arrested. On that afternoon "before leaving my
place
of work, I passed near the toilet and I saw a bag. Inside the bag, I
saw
one shirt and two undershirts of the Army. The bag was located in a
corner
of the toilet room, exposed to the public view. When he was arrested,
the
accused was telling the man who arrested him, "that I had picked it up
and I was going to turn it over to him, but he did not give me a chance
to tell further, and he took me to his tent." As to the pair of shoes,
he stated to the Lieutenant who ordered him to remove them from his
feet
that "I told him it was given to me when I was a guerrillero." The
accused
took the things from the toilet room "because it was my intention to
take
it to the M. P. [pages 7-9, transcript of stenographic notes].
From the evidence
presented
by the prosecution, we are constrained to conclude that the prosecution
failed to prove that the accused is guilty of the offense of qualified
theft imputed to him.
The bundle of one khaki
shirt and two undershirts wrapped in paper was picked up by him in a
corner
of the toilet room with the intention of turning them over to the M.P.
The prosecution did not offer any evidence to show the ownership or
source
of said articles. There is absolutely no evidence that they were stolen
goods. The accused in picking them up, did not have the animus fruendi,
the animus lucrandi, nor the animus furandi, of a thief, but for the
legitimate
purpose of turning them over to the M. P., so that the articles may be
returned to their owner. That intention was proved by the accused, and
not impugned or contradicted by any evidence in the record.
With respect to the
pair of shoes, there is absolutely no evidence to show that they belong
to any person other than the accused himself. The accused testified,
without
any contradiction, that said pair of shoes were given to him when he
was
a guerrilla. The fact that the accused was wearing them at the time of
his arrest and that they were used shoes, confirmed the testimony of
the
accused. If they were stolen from the Army camp, they should be new or,
if used, must be slightly used, as the khaki shirt in the bundle
wrapped
in paper, because the accused had only been working in Post No. 6 for
four
days, a period within which he could have taken the new shoes and begun
using them. Furthermore, there is not an iota of evidence that the
alleged
offended party, the U. S. Army, had found missing said pair of shoes or
any one of the articles wrapped in paper and found by the accused in a
corner of the toilet room.
We conclude that the
accused is not guilty of the offense of qualified theft imputed to him
and, with the revocation of the appealed decision, he must be acquitted.
Before leaving this
case, We deem it necessary to direct Our attention to the third
assignment
of error in appellant's brief, wherein it is pointed out that the
Municipal
Court transmitted the papers of the case to the Court of First Instance
on the eleventh day after the appeal was perfected, instead of within
five
days, as provided in section 7, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
"Sec. 7. Transmission
of Papers to the Court of First Instance, and Fiscal. - Upon such
notice
being so filed or given, as provided for in the preceding section, the
justice of the peace or judge of a municipal court shall within five
days
forward to the Court of First Instance all original papers and a
transcript
of all docket entries in the case. He shall also forward to the fiscal
a brief statement of the substance of the testimony of witnesses
testifying
in the case. The provincial fiscal shall thereupon take charge of the
cause
in behalf of the prosecution."
Appellant complains that
by the violation of said section, his constitutional right to a speedy
trial has been infringed.
We
do not believe that
by a mere delay of four days, the constitutional right of appellant for
a speedy trial has been substantially affected, but We cannot let it
pass
as a matter of principle, without any comment on the violation of a
mandatory
provision of the Rules of Court.
A
period of five days
is more than enough for the municipal court to transmit all the papers
of an appealed case to the Court of First Instance. We do not see any
reason
to justify the violation of the rule. The Municipal Court must be among
the first ones which should give example of strict compliance with the
Rules of Court, if it must keep public confidence. If the Municipal
Court
is allowed to violate a rule for four days, there is no reason why it
could
not violate it for four months, or even four years.
The violation of the
rule, which is a violation of the law of the land, must not be allowed
to pass without our disapproval and censure, in order to avoid its
recurrence.
If in the present case the delay in transmitting the papers to the
Court
of First Instance did not impair the substantial rights of appellant,
we
can close our eyes to other cases where the delay caused real injustice
and affected substantial rights of litigants. It is our hope that in
the
future, municipal and justice of the peace courts will comply with
their
official duties with more jealousy and abide by the Rules of Court, by
avoiding all violations such as the one committed in the case at bar.
Nobody
can impugn the wisdom of the rule requiring the municipal judge and
justice
of the peace to transmit the papers of an appealed case within a few
days.
In the first place, it serves the purpose of making effective the
constitutional
guaranty of speedy trial. In the second place, it is a deterrent
against
any abuse that an arbitrary judge may commit, by allowing a prompt
revision
of his actuation by a Court of First Instance. A Municipal Judge or a
Justice
of the Peace, who is not in duty bound to transmit promptly the papers
of an appealed case, may defeat the right of a party to a speedy trial
and the right of litigants to obtain the proper redress against any
error
or extra- limitation by which he may feel aggrieved. Undoubtedly, the
authors
of the rules intended to avoid such undesirable situation.
Judgment reversed and
appellant acquitted with costs de officio.
Ozaeta, De Joya and
Hilado, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J.,
concurs in the result. |