EN
BANC
RAFAELA
CAMPO,
ERNESTO
GILUANO,
REMEDIOS GILUANO,
ROSALINA GILUANO
AND FELIX GILUANO,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
G.
R.
No. L-9147
November
29, 1956
-versus-
JUAN
CAMAROTE AND
GREGORIO GEMILGA,
Defendants
JUAN
CAMAROTE,
Appellant.
D
E C I S I
O N
LABRADOR,
J :
Juan Camarote was in 1953
the registered owner of a jeep with Plate License DV-807 while Gregorio
Gemilga, a duly licensed [professional] driver with License No. 77675,
was his driver. On August 30, 1953, as Gemilga drove the jeep along the
road in Davao, it bumped against the rear of another which two
passengers
had just boarded. As a result of the impact, Felix Giluano suffered
many
physical injuries and he later died. So, on October 26 a criminal
Information
was filed against Gemilga. The trial was scheduled for December 11,
1953,
but on December 5, 1953 Gemilga pleaded guilty to the Information and
was
sentenced to imprisonment and indemnity of P3,000. No execution of the
indemnity was asked for and none was issued.
On October 19, 1953,
before Gemilga entered his plea of guilty, the present action was
instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Davao by the heirs of the deceased
Giluano
against Juan Camarote, the owner of the jeep, and Gemilga, the driver.
The case was submitted for judgment upon a stipulation of facts, the
most
important of which are set forth in the above statement. On the basis
of
the stipulation, judgment was entered for plaintiff against defendants
sentencing them to pay plaintiff P6,000 as damages and P500 as
attorney's
fee. Against this judgment this appeal was presented.
The principal
contentions
of the defendants Juan Camarote are: [1] that his liability as owner of
the jeep is only subsidiary; and [2] that if the action is against him
for his negligence, he is not guilty of such negligence but exercised
the
diligence of a good father of a family because he was not in the jeep
at
the time of the accident and the driver of the jeep whom he employed is
a competent driver. There is no question that the basis of the action
is
the supposed negligence or lack of good diligence on the part of the
owner
of the vehicle. Thus the Complaint alleges:
"and neither the
operator
[owner] observed the due care and diligence of a good father of a
family
in the employment of the driver Gregorio Gamilga." [Paragraph 5].
The law which defines the
scope of the liability of a car owner in relation to accidents and
injuries
caused by the vehicle driven by another is Article 2180 of the Civil
Code
which provides:
"Art. 2180. - The
obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
"Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx
"The responsibility
treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage."
Under the Civil Code of
Spain the provisions governing the case were Articles 1903 to 1910.
Article
1903 of said Code provides as follows:
"The obligation
imposed
by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal acts
and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible.
"The father, or in
case of his death, or incapacity, the mother, is liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.
"Guardians are liable
for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their
authority
and living with them.
"Owners or directors
of any establishment or business are, in the same way, liable for any
damages
caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in
which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
"The State is subject
to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if
the damage shall have bean caused by the official upon whom properly
devolved
the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions or
the
next preceding article shall be applicable.
"Finally, teachers
or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by
their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
"The liability
imposed
by this Article shall cease in case the persons subject thereto prove
that
they exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage."
A comparison between the
above Article and Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
shows
that paragraph 5 of the latter is not contained in the former. This
paragraph
reads as follows:
"Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry."
Rulings under the old provision
[Article 1903] are to the effect that the owner of a vehicle will not
be
liable if at the time of the accident causing injury to a third person
the owner of the vehicle is not present therein, because he does not
fall
within the list of persons enumerated in Article 1903 of the Civil Code
[Johnson vs. David, 5 Phil. 663; Chapman vs. Underwood, 27 Phil. 374;
Marquez
vs. Castillo, 40 Off. Gaz. No. 5, 204]. Under the new Civil Code,
however,
the owner of the vehicle is included among the persons who may respond
for the acts of their employees who cause damage to third persons in
the
course of their employment. By reason of this newly inserted provision
the owner of a jeep driven by another becomes responsible for the
driver's
negligence under the terms and circumstances specified in the last
paragraph
of Article 2180. In accordance with this paragraph the owner of the
vehicle
is responsible unless he proves that he exercised the diligence of a
good
father of a family to prevent the damage. But in the case at bar,
Camarote,
the jeepney owner, was not in the jeep; and the only manner in which he
could have avoided damage to third persons would have been by the
exercise
by him of the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or
selection
of his driver. Did he satisfy the requirement of the law in this case?
Defendant Juan Camarote
argues that the mere fact that the driver was a professional driver is
a sufficient exercise of the diligence required of a good father of a
family,
which would exempt him from responsibility. We think that this is a
mistaken
view of the law, taking into account the fact, of which we take
judicial
notice, that licenses are easy to obtain and no strict examination is
required
before professional driver's licenses are given, and that the holding
of
a driver's license is no guarantee or assurance of the carefulness of
the
holder of the license. In order that the defendant may be considered as
having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should
not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional
driver's
license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment
as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service.
Defendant-appellant
did not take these steps, which are considered essential, and we must
hold
that he has failed to exercise all due diligence required of a good
father
of a family in the choice or selection of his driver.
The reason for the
law is obvious. It is indeed difficult for any person injured by the
carelessness
of a driver to prove the negligence or lack of due diligence of the
owner
of the vehicle in the choice of the driver. Were we to require the
injured
party to prove the owner's lack of diligence, the right will in many
cases
prove illusory, as seldom does a person in the community, especially in
the cities, have the opportunity to observe the conduct of all possible
car owners therein. So the law imposes the burden of proof of innocence
on the vehicle owner. If the driver is negligent and causes damage, the
law presumes that the owner was negligent and imposes upon him the
burden
of proving the contrary.
Finding that the
conclusion
of the trial judge as to defendant-appellant's responsibility is
correct,
We hereby affirm the Decision, with costs against defendant-appellant.
Paras, C.J.,
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B.
L. and Endencia, JJ., concur. |