EN
BANC
PEOPLE
OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Complainant-Appellee,
G.
R.
No. L-19567
February
5, 1964
-versus-
SOLEDAD
NERY,
Accused-Appellant.
D
E C I S I
O N
REYES,
J.B.L., J :
This is an appeal from
a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
convicting
Soledad Nery for estafa. The Court of Appeals certified it to this
Supreme
Court, the one and only issue raised in the appeal being one of law.
The accused-appellant,
Soledad Nery, conforms to the following findings of fact of the trial
court:
On 15 November 1954,
in a market stall in Bacolod City, the said accused received from
Federico
Matillano two [2] diamond rings to be sold by her on commission. The
agreement
was for the accused to deliver on the following day, the sum of P230.00
to her principal, to whom the accused had represented having a ready
buyer,
and whatever overprice could be obtained in the sale would be retained
by the accused as her commission.
Soledad Nery failed
to show up on the following day; after several days, in a casual
encounter
with Federico Matillano, she claimed that her prospective buyer
withdrew
from the transaction and that she was looking for another buyer. Days,
weeks, and months passed; and, his patience exhausted, Federico brought
the matter to the attention of the police authorities of Bacolod on 5
January
1955. In no time, Soledad was found and brought to the police station;
then and there, she promised, in writing [Exh. "A"], to deliver the
price
of the rings or the rings on 25 January 1955.
When the last-mentioned
date arrived and Soledad failed to comply with her promise, the City
Attorney,
at the instance of Federico Matillano, filed on 12 February 1955 a
complaint
with the Municipal Court. The case was either withdrawn or dismissed,
however,
the accused making two payments of P20.00 each to Federico. After these
payments, the accused failed to pay further; hence, the fiscal filed
the
corresponding information, dated 30 June 1958, with the court of first
instance.
On 10 October 1958,
during the pendency of the case in the court of first instance, the
accused,
assisted by counsel, Atty. Marcos Gomez, executed a deed, which is
copied
hereunder, as follows:
"Bacolod City
"October 10, 1958.
"I hereby promise to
pay Mr. Federico Matillano, the sum of One Hundred Ninety Pesos
(P190.00)
Philippine Currency, to be paid in the following manner:
For the month of
Nov.
1958 — P 50.00
For the month of
Dec.
1958 — 40.00
For the month of
Jan.
1959 — 100.00
"In the event that
I fail to comply with the above compromise, the complaint for estafa
filed
against me by Mr. Matillano will be push through.
"[Sgd.] Soledad Nery.
"I hereby bind myself
jointly and severally to the above-mentioned obligation of Soledad Nery.
"[Sgd.] Atty. Marcos
S. Gomez
"Witness:
"[Sgd.] Leopoldo
Lopez."
During the month of March,
1959, the accused Soledad Nery tendered a P50.00-payment to Federico
Matillano,
which the latter accepted, but the balance of the price of the two
rings
was never paid.
Finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, the trial Court
imposed an indeterminate sentence of no less than two (2) months and
one
(1) day of arresto mayor to no more than one (1) year and one
(1)
day of prisión correccional; to indemnify Federico
Matillano
the sum of P140.00, representing the unpaid balance, with subsidiary
imprisonment
in case of insolvency at the rate of P2.50 a day but not exceeding a
third
of the principal penalty; and to pay the costs.
The only issue is
defined
in the appealed Decision as follows:
"La cuescion mas
importante que se plantea ante la consideracion del Juzgado, es si la
transaccion
original habida verbalmente entre la acusada y el ofendido es la
mañana
del 15 de Noviembre de 1954, formalizada mas tarde el 5 de Enero de
1955,
por medio del documento de compromiso, Exh. A, ha sido movada por
virtud
de los pagos parciales de a P20. cada uno, Exhs. 1 y 2, y del otro
documento
de compromiso, Exh. E, de manera que la responsabilidad criminal de la
acusada originada por la infraccion de la transaccion originada ha
venido
a convertirse en una simple responsabilidad civil."
Borrowing from a theory
expressed in four Decisions of the Court of Appeals, namely: People vs.
Galsim, CA-G.R. No. 531-R, Feb. 26, 1948, 45 O. G. 3466, Aug. 1949;
People
vs. Trinidad, 53 O. G., 731, Feb. 15, 1957; People vs. Doniog, CA-G.R.
No. 16993-R, 53 O. G., No. 15, 4500; and People vs. de la Rama, CA-G.R.
No. 17677-R, May 21, 1958, the accused in the present case insists that
there is no prohibition in our law to prevent the parties to a contract
to novate it so that any incipient criminal liability under the first
is
thereby avoided.
The novation theory
may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the criminal Information in
Court
by the state prosecutors because up to that time, the original trust
relation
may be converted by the parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor
situation,
thereby placing the complainant in estoppel to insist on the original
trust.
But after the justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime
and
instituted action in Court, the offended party may no longer divest the
prosecution of its power to exact the criminal liability, as
distinguished
from the civil. The crime being an offense against the state, only the
latter can renounce it [People vs. Gervacio, 54 Off. Gaz., 2898: People
vs. Velasco, 42 Phil., 76; U.S. vs. Montañes, 8 Phil. 620].
It may be observed
in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by the
Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the
role
of novation may only be to either prevent the rise of criminal
liability
or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction,
whether or not it was such that its breach would not give rise to penal
responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or
other similar disguise is resorted to [Cf. Abeto vs. People, 90
Phil. 581; U.S. vs. Villareal, 27 Phil. 481].
Even in civil law,
the acceptance of partial payments, without further change in the
original
relation between the complainant and the accused, cannot produce
novation.
For the letter to exist, there must be proof of intent to extinguish
the
original relationship, and such intent can not be inferred from the
mere
acceptance of payments on account of what is totally due. Much less can
it be said that the acceptance of partial satisfaction can effect the
nullification
of a criminal liability that is fully matured, and already in the
process
of enforcement. Thus, this Court has ruled that the offended party's
acceptance
of a promissory note for all or part of the amount misapplied does not
obliterate the criminal offense [Camus vs. Court of Appeals, 48 Off.
Gaz.,
3898].
The Court of Appeals
Decisions conform to the views here expressed. In the Galsim case, the
principal had accepted the sub- agent to answer for the jewelry,
thereby
releasing the agent. In the case of Trinidad, the Court expressly found
that the compromise had taken place "immediately after the loss of the
money in question, and long before the case was brought to court". In
the
case before Us, however, the alleged novation occurred after the
criminal
case had been instituted, and while it was pending trial. In fact, the
novation theory advanced by the accused has been rejected, time and
again,
by this Supreme Court, in a legion of decisions. Of late, We stated:
"It is well-settled
that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or
novation
of contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and
punished
by the Government on its own motion though complete reparation should
have
been made of the damage suffered by the offended party [U.S. vs.
Mendozona,
2 Phil. 353; U.S. vs. Ontengco, 4 Phil. 144; U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 9
Phil.
153; People vs. Leachon, 56 Phil. 739; Javier vs. People, 70 Phil.
550].
As was said in the case of People vs. Gervacio 102 Phil. 687, 'a
criminal
offense is committed against the People and the offended party may not
waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the
commission of the offense'. The fact, therefore, that the accused
herein
had, with the consent of the offended party, assumed the obligation of
paying the rentals, which he collected, out of his own salary after he
had committed the misappropriation, does not obliterate the criminal
liability
already incurred." [People vs. Benitez, L-15923, June 30, 1960].
Nor is the case altered
by the dismissal of the first charge in the Municipal Court, since
under
the law in force in 1955 [Rep. Act 296] that court had no jurisdiction
over the offense, which was properly cognizable in the Courts of first
instance that had original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which
the penalty is more than six months or fine of more than P200.00 [Sec.
44 (f)].
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING,
the appealed Decision should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with costs
against the accused-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J.,
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon,
Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur. |