EN
BANC
THE
CLOROX
COMPANY,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. L-19531
August
10, 1967
-versus-
THE
DlRECTOR OF
PATENTS AND GO SIU GIAN,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I
O N
ANGELES,
J :
We have before Us a Petition
to Review the Order of the Director of Patents in "Inter Partes Case
No.
204." dated January 6, 1961, dismissing the opposition of the Clorox
Company
to the registration of the trademark "OLDROX" in the name of Go Siu
Gian,
and the Resolution of said Official dated February 12. 1962, denying
the
Clorox Company's motion and petition for relief from said Order.
The facts of the case,
either appearing in the record or admitted by the parties in their
pleadings,
are as follows:
On April 7, 1959,
respondent
Go Siu Gian filed with the Patent Office an application for
registration
of the trademark "OLDROX," with an accompanying statement that he is a
citizen of China, residing and doing business in the Philippines at 838
Folgueras St., Manila; that he has adopted the trademark "OLDROX" for
his
goods [whitening agent for bleaching] in trade and commerce in the
country;
and that said trademark, shown on printed labels affixed to the goods,
or to the containers thereof, has been used by him since February 1,
1959.
The application was allowed and published in the issue of the Official
Gazette dated April 25, 1960, which was released for circulation on
August
22, 1960.
On September 21 of
the same year, or within 30 days from the date of its publication in
the
Official Gazette, an unverified opposition to the application was filed
by the Law Firm Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili in behalf of the Clorox
Company,
herein petitioner.
On January 6, 1961,
respondent Director of Patents issued the Order appealed from
dismissing
the petitioner's opposition to the application upon the ground, which
is
stated in said Order, that the Clorox Company failed to file the
required
verified notice of opposition within the period allowed by law. Upon
notice
of the said Order, petitioner's counsel filed a motion with the Patent
Office dated January 10, 1961, advising that it has filed the verified
notice of opposition on time, i.e., on November 16, 1960;
although
it also admitted that the covering letter of said verified opposition
was
given another case number [Inter Partes Case No. 200, entitled "The
Shell
Company of the Philippines vs. Faustino Co"] which is also handled by
the
same counsel in the Patent Office. Petitioner requested in that motion
that the verified opposition be detached from the record of Inter
Partes
Case No. 200 and to transfer the same in the corresponding file of this
case. The motion was opposed by herein respondent Go Siu Gian.
Before the motion could
be acted upon by the Director of Patents, petitioner filed on January
26,
1961, a Petition for Relief from the Order dismissing its opposition,
alleging
circumstances constituting mistake or excusable negligence of its
counsel
and his employee which led to the misfiling of its verified opposition,
and praying that said order of January 6, 1961, be set aside.
After due consideration
of the arguments of both parties relative to the aforesaid motion and
petition
for relief from the Order of January 6, 1961, the Director of Patents
issued
the Resolution of February 12, 1962, also appealed from, denying both
the
motion and the petition for relief, and ordering the issuance of the
Certificate
of Registration of the trademark "OLDROX" in the name of Go Siu Gian.
The
Clorox Company has come to Us on appeal.
In a nutshell, the
various errors pointed out in the petitioner's brief which were
allegedly
committed by the respondent Director of Patents in issuing the Order
and
Resolution appealed from, really boil down to two main propositions,
namely:
[1] that the Director of Patents erred in dismissing its opposition to
the registration of the trademark in question, on the ground of failure
to file the required "verified" opposition on time; and [2] that said
Official
erred in denying altogether its motion and petition for relief from
said
order.
Under the first
proposition,
the petitioner argues that it was error for the respondent official to
have dismissed the opposition, it appearing in an indubitable manner
that
a verified opposition was timely filed. The Director of Patents, on the
other hand maintains that the verified opposition cannot be considered
as having been filed on time, for the reason that it was misfiled in
the
record of another opposition case through the negligence of its own
counsel.
Section 8
of Republic
Act No. 166 requires that an opposition to an application for
registration
of a trademark should be filed within 30 days from the publication of
the
application in the Official Gazette. This requirement is relaxed under
Rule 187(c) of the Revised Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases which
provide
as follows:
"Rule 187[c]. Notice
filed by attorney. - An unverified notice of opposition may be
filed
by a duly authorized attorney, but such opposition will be null and
void
unless verified by the opposer in person within sixty days after such
filing."
There
is no question that
petitioner's counsel filed an unverified notice of opposition to the
application
for registration of the trademark "OLDROX" within 30 days from the date
of its publication in the Official Gazette. There is no disagreement
also
that the record of the case shows that an unverified opposition was
filed,
and it was for this reason that the order of January 8, 1961, was
issued,
because the law requires that for an opposition to be valid, it must be
verified. It is not disputed, however, that immediately after it
received
the notice of dismissal of its opposition, petitioner, in due time,
filed
a motion dated January 10, 1961, advising the Director of Patents that
its verified opposition was filed on time, although it admitted its
error
in submitting it under a covering letter designating another opposition
case. Under the circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the
verified
opposition mentioned was filed on time, although it was submitted under
an erroneous covering letter. That fact alone is no argument to the
proposition
that a pleading "misfiled" is a pleading "not filed." A covering letter
is not part of the pleading. What is important is the fact that the
pleading
reached the official designated by law to receive it within the
prescribed
time, regardless of the mistake in the indorsement or covering letter
which
is not a necessary element of filing. It is the duty of the clerk of
court
to receive and file the necessary papers of a case in their
corresponding
files. It is gross negligence on the part of a clerk of court to
receive
and file pleadings in the record of a case by relying upon a letter of
submittal or covering letter without bothering to examine whether or
not
the pleading or document submitted corresponds to the enclosure
mentioned
in the letter. And when, as in this case, the pleading is misfiled in
the
record of another case through the fault of its clerk, it can not be
said
that the papers were not filed. It is admitted in this case that the
verified
opposition of herein petitioner was lodged with the proper official
authorized
to receive. Under the circumstances, we hold, that there was
substantial
compliance with the requirement of the law.
As a second
proposition,
petitioner contends that the Director of Patents erred in denying its
motion
and petition for relief from the order of January 6, 1961, dismissing
its
opposition to the registration of the trademark in question. It holds
the
view that said Official should have set aside the order and given due
course
to its opposition.
The respondents, on
the other hand, argue that the petition for relief filed by petitioner
before the order dismissing the opposition became final was premature
and
may not be legally considered for purposes of setting aside said order.
This is being too technical about it. The rule is always in favor of
liberality
in construction so that the real matter in dispute may be submitted to
the judgment of the court. Imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure should be disregarded unless substantial rights would
otherwise
be prejudiced [Gaspar vs. Dorado, et al., G.R. No. L-17884, November
29,
1965]. It should be noted that the grounds of fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence for new trial are substantially similar to the
grounds of a petition for relief under the Rules; the only difference
being
that a motion for new trial or for reconsideration is filed before the
order or judgment becomes final, while a petition for relief should be
filed after the finality of the judgment or order, but within the
periods
prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 38. Had herein respondents so minded,
the
petition for relief filed by the petitioner in this case, having been
filed
before the finality of the order dismissing its opposition, could have
been treated as a motion for reconsideration of the order of January 6,
1961, and having been previously apprised of the fact that the verified
opposition in this case was misfiled in the record of another case,
should
have set aside said order. The rule is well settled that courts may
vacate
judgments and grant new trials or enter new judgments on the grounds of
error in fact or in law. They have no power, of course, to vacate
judgments
after they have become final in the sense that the party in whose favor
they are rendered is entitled as of right, to have execution thereon,
but
prior thereto, the Courts have plenary control over the proceedings
including
the judgment, and in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, may
take
such proper action in this regard as truth and justice may require
[Arnedo
vs. Llorente and Liongson, 18 Phil. 257]. The Order of herein
respondent
dismissing the opposition of petitioner to the registration of the
trademark
in question may amount to considerable injustice to the opposer Clorox
Company, the Order having been entered not upon the merits of the
controversy;
and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful
examination of the grounds upon which it requests that the Order be set
aside. It must be remembered that the only discretion conferred upon
officers
is a legal discretion, and when anything is left to any officer to be
done
according to his discretion, the law intends it to be done with a sound
discretion and according to law [Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil. 446]. And
when, as in this case, the allegation of the pleading clearly show
circumstances
constituting mistake and excusable negligence which are grounds for a
motion
for reconsideration of the Order in question, a dismissal of the motion
and a denial of the relief sought upon the flimsy excuse that the same
was filed as a petition for relief, will amount to an abuse of that
discretion.
Neither may we consider the argument of herein respondent that the
petitioner
is not totally deprived of its right to question the registration of
the
trademark in question because it may still pursue a cancellation
proceeding
under Sections 17 to 19 of Republic Act No 166, and Rules 191 to 197 of
the Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases. The opposition to a
registration
and the petition for cancellation are alternative proceedings which a
party
may avail of according to his purposes, needs, and predicaments [Anchor
Trading Company vs. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-8004, May 30, 1956]
and herein petitioner has the right to choose which remedy it deems
best
for the protection of its rights.
Wherefore, and
considering
all the foregoing, the Order and Resolution of the Director of Patents
appealed from are hereby set aside, and the case remanded to the Patent
Office for further proceedings. Costs against the private respondent.
Reyes, J.B.L.,
Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J.
and Dizon, J., are on official leave of absence. |