FIRST
DIVISION
NATIONAL
STEEL
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G.
R.
No. L-74711
September
19, 1988
-versus-
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
AND
PELAGIO REMOLADO,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I
O N
MEDIALDEA,
J :
This is a Petition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul the resolution of public
respondent
National Labor Relations Commission rendered on December 27, 1985 in
NLRC
RRBX Case No. 352-78, insofar as it orders payment of backwages to
private
respondent Pelagio Remolado, from April 24, 1981 to February 13, 1984.
On June 8, 1978,
private
respondent Pelagio Remolado [hereinafter referred to as Remolado].
filed
a case for illegal dismissal against the petitioner National Steel
Corporation
with the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor and Employment at
Cagayan
De Oro City.
On September 20, 1978,
Labor Arbiter Ildefonso Agbuya rendered a decision dismissing
Remolado's
complaint. Remolado appealed the decision to the public respondent
National
Labor Relations Commission [hereinafter referred to as the Respondent
Commission].
On October 30, 1980,
Respondent Commission rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appealed Decision is as it is hereby MODIFIED by
ordering
respondent-appellee to reinstate complainant-appellant to his former
job
without backwages. Except for this modification, the appealed Decision
is hereby affirmed.
"SO ORDERED." [Page
26, Rollo].
Petitioner appealed the
above-mentioned Decision to the Office of the President which on
October
13, 1983, denied petitioner's appeal. In the Order of denial, the
aforesaid
Office, inter alia, stated:
"This conviction has
resulted in major changes in labor relations law and policy as
instituted
through and given expression in Presidential Decree Nos. 1367 and 1391
as well as Batas Pambansa Blg. 70, 130 and 277, all amending Book Five
[Labor Relations] of the Labor Code. In particular, Decisions of the
Bureau
of Labor Relations, the National Labor Relations Commission and of the
Minister of Labor and Employment in matters within their respective
exclusive
jurisdiction have been declared final and executory, and, the President
will refrain from intervening and exercising his undisputed power of
review
therein, unless in his opinion, there are compelling reasons of
national
interest for doing so." [Page 27, Rollo].
On January 31, 1984, Remolado
reported to the petitioner and, after completion of his medical
examination
and reinstatement papers, actually reported for work on February 13,
1984.
On June 22, 1984,
Remolado
filed with the Labor Arbiter a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution
of the September 20, 1978 Order of the Labor Arbiter as modified by the
October 30, 1980 Decision of the Respondent Commission. Since the
motion
sought payment of backwages, petitioner opposed the same on the ground
that neither the order nor the decision sought to be executed directed
such payment.
On April 29, 1985,
the Labor Arbiter rendered a resolution awarding backwages and other
related
benefits to Remolado, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"In view of the
foregoing,
Respondent National Steel Corporation is hereby ordered to pay
Complainant
Pelagio Remolado the total amount of P108,969.80 on the basis of the
above-quoted
computation subject to ten [10] days period given to Respondent to
verify
the computation as above-mentioned.
"SO ORDERED." [Page
34, Rollo].
Petitioner appealed the
Resolution of the Labor Arbiter to the Respondent Commission which, on
December 27, 1985, rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of
which
reads:
"Wherefore, premises
considered, judgment is hereby entered:
"[1] Dismissing the
appeal for lack of merit;
"[2] Ordering
respondent-appellant
to pay complainant-appellee backwages and from April 24, 1981 to
February
13, 1984; and
"[3] Ordering
respondent-appellant
to pay complainant-appellee his salary differential and 13th month pay.
"The Corporate
Auditing
Examiner of this Commission is directed to compute the award in this
Decision
after ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.
"SO ORDERED, [Page
16, Rollo].
Later, petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Respondent
Commission
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
As a justification
for the award of backwages, the Labor Arbiter said:
"We find merit in
Complainant's
claim that he should be paid backwages from the time Respondent NSC
received
the decision of the NLRC. When the NLRC mentioned reinstatement without
backwages, the phase (sic) 'without backwages' refers to the
period
August 9, 1977 when he was dismissed until our decision was modified by
the same. The main point to consider is, when are backwages to be
granted
or not? The principle should be, backwages is to be granted in the
event,
among others, when an employer, in this particular case Respondent NSC,
deprived a particular worker/Complainant his earnings. In this
particular
case as correctly adverted to by Complainant, had Respondent NSC
reinstated
him upon receipt of the NLRC decision then he could have earned the
wages
and benefits due him. But for appealing further the NLRC decision to
the
Office of the President, Respondent NSC took the risk that if the
appeal
is denied then it should be subjected to pay backwages from the time of
the NLRC decision, because the effectivity of the NLRC decision
retroacts
to the day it was promulgated. There is no merit therefore in the
contention
of Respondent that they already complied with the decision of the NLRC
by reinstating Complainant to his former position but without
backwages."
[Page 31, Rollo].
The Respondent Commission
upheld the April 29, 1985 resolution of the Labor Arbiter adding that
the
petitioner's appeal to the Office of the President "was seasonably
filed
but it was filed with a wrong agency and this mistake did not stop the
running of the period of appeal. Hence, the appealed decision of this
Commission
under date of October 30, 1980 became final and executory." [Page 15,
Rollo].
On the other hand,
petitioner argues that Respondent Commission gravely abused its
discretion
because [a] it granted backwages when no provision therefor was
contained
in the decision sought to be implemented; and [b] it (the petitioner)
was
merely exercising its right to appeal and hence, should not be
penalized
for doing so.
The legal issues
outstanding
in the instant case are:
[1] Whether or not
Respondent Commission erred when it decided that backwages and other
benefits
should be paid to Remolado; and
[2] Whether or not
petitioner should be held liable for the delay in the implementation of
Respondent Commission's decision of October 30, 1980.
The Respondent Commission's
Decision of October 30, 1980 simply ordered the reinstatement of
Remolado
to his former job without backwages. Nonetheless, the Labor Arbiter, in
his Resolution of April 29, 1985, awarded backwages counted from the
date
when the Respondent Commission's Decision was rendered or on October
30,
1980, to the date of the actual reinstatement of Remolado on February
13,
1984. Clearly, the Respondent Commission acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in sustaining the aforesaid resolution of the Labor
Arbiter.
It is a well-settled rule that the execution of judgment must conform
to
that which is ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the
decision
[Laingo vs. Camilo, No L-35833, June 29, 1984, 130 SCRA 144]. Where the
writ runs counter to, differs or exceeds the specific provisions in the
judgment, the same is issued without or in excess of jurisdiction
[Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Gonzales, No. L-34628, July 30,
1979,
92 SCRA 172].
The petitioner should
not be held liable for the delay in the implementation of Respondent
Commission's
decision of October 30, 1980, allegedly due to the appeal it undertook.
The petitioner was rightfully entitled to appeal. In fact it did so to
the Office of the President which the Respondent Commission considered
a wrong agency for that purpose. We really cannot find any basis for
this
conclusion of the Respondent Commission. Presidential Decree No. 1391
[took
effect on May 29, 1979] which amended Article 223 of the Labor Code
simply
eliminated appeals from the National Labor Relations Commission to the
Secretary of Labor but provided that the President of the Philippines
may
continue to exercise his powers under the aforesaid Code, that is, to
assume
jurisdiction over any case which he considers national interest cases.
Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner actually appealed to a
wrong
agency considering the law then prevailing.
The Respondent
Commission
and Remolado very well knew that petitioner appealed to the Office of
the
President but this fact did not constitute a hindrance to the early and
immediate implementation of the decision of October 30, 1980. Under
Article
223 of the Labor Code, as amended, the Decision of the National Labor
Relations
Commission is immediately executory even pending appeal. Remolado could
have moved for the issuance of a writ of execution of the decision
during
the pendency of the appeal and insisted on his right to be reinstated
or
the Respondent Commission could have issued a writ of execution on its
own initiative, conformably with Article 224 [a] of the same Code.
Thus,
the delay in the implementation of the decision cannot be wholly
attributed
to petitioner.
It is significant to
note that it was only after the Office of the President had denied
petitioner's
appeal or approximately three years from the decision of Respondent
Commission
in his favor did private respondent act by filing a motion for
execution
which included a claim for backwages for the period that the appeal had
remained pending.
What obviously caused
the delay was the sheer inaction of private respondent who was entitled
to enforce it. Under the circumstances, it would definitely be
offensive
to justice and fair play to hold petitioner liable for the consequence
of such inaction.
ACCORDINGLY, the
Petition
for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Resolution of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated December 27, 1985 is hereby annulled and set
aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa C.J., (Chairman),
Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur. |