SECOND DIVISION
LORETO T. YU,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-99-1463
January 16, 2001 -versus-
JUDGE MATEO M.
LEANDA
(RET.)REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT,
BRANCH 8, TACLOBAN CITY,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DE
LEON, JR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Complainant Loreto T. Yu,
Municipal Mayor of Alanglang, Leyte charged1 Complainant initially
brought
the complaint on April 14, 1997 before the Tacloban City Prosecutor’s
Office.
He charged respondent judge with violation of Article 206 of the
Revised
Penal Code (Knowingly Rendering An Unjust Interlocutory Order) and
Section
3 (a) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Upon
a petition filed by respondent judge to request that the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) conduct a preliminary investigation, the case was
turned
over to the said Office. Finding, however, that the charges
against
respondent judge involved the performance of his official duties in the
administration of justice, the Ombudsman, in a letter dated August 29,
1997, referred the case to the Supreme Court. respondent Mateo M.
Leanda,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC, for brevity) of
Tacloban
City, Branch 8 with (a) making special arrangement with the protestant
in an election case pending before the respondent’s court and (b)
discourtesy
during a hearing on April 7, 1997. On June 10, 1998, or during the
pendency
of this administrative case, respondent retired after more than
nineteen
(19) years of public service.
The complaint stemmed
from the actions of respondent relative to Election Case No. 95-05-58
entitled
"Ricardo Salazar v. Loreto T. Yu." Complainant alleged that
sometime
in the first week of January 1997, respondent instructed Ramon Cortel,
a court stenographer in the RTC, Branch 8, Tacloban City, which was
then
presided over by respondent, to go on leave on the first two weeks of
March
1997 in order to assist him in drafting the decision in Election Case
No.
95-05-58. Respondent allegedly told Cortel that Ricardo Salazar, the
protestant
in the election case involving the mayoralty post of Alangalang, Leyte,
would pay him P200.00 per day for his services.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Since Cortel did not
want to use his leave credits as he was contemplating of optional
retirement,
he wrote a letter dated January 10, 1997 to Judge Leodegario
Alimangohan
(retired), respondent’s predecessor, asking for advice on his
quandary.2
Exhs. "A", "A-1" and "A-2". Judge Alimangohan advised Cortel to remain
in the office and be more patient. Nevertheless, respondent’s
instruction
was not followed.cralaw:red
In the second week of
February 1997, respondent allegedly told Cortel that he (respondent)
would
draft the decision in the said election case in the evening, instead of
daytime, and that Salazar would pay Cortel P100.00 per hour for his
services.
It was in the evening of February 17, 19, 20, 24 and 27, 1997 and March
3 and 6, 1997 and early morning of February 26, 1997 that Cortel
allegedly
rendered secretarial services to respondent in the drafting of the
decision.
Each session lasted for at least three hours. For Cortel’s
services,
respondent gave him P800.00 but allegedly told him to collect the
balance
from Salazar.cralaw:red
On March 10, 1997, complainant
Yu, the protestee in the said election case, filed a petition3 Exh.
"E".
for the inhibition of respondent principally on the basis of Cortel’s
letter
dated January 10, 1997. However, respondent denied the
petition.
Complainant sought reconsideration of the denial order, which was set
for
hearing on April 7, 1997, at 8:30 a.m.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On April 7, 1997, Judge
Alimangohan appeared before respondent’s court. However, the
motion
for reconsideration was not included in the court calendar for that
day.
Consequently, Judge Alimangohan invited respondent’s attention to the
omission.
In the presence of several persons, including complainant, lawyers and
the public prosecutor, respondent allegedly shouted, "I cannot
entertain
that Motion that is not found in the calendar. You can go to the
Supreme Court, you can file charges against me and the employee who
failed
to include your case in the calendar."
When Judge Alimangohan
requested the stenographer on duty, Mrs. Jenny Aguilar, to take down
respondent’s
remarks, the latter allegedly shouted, "You are no longer the presiding
judge of this Court, you cannot dictate what to do." On April 9,
1997, Judge Alimangohan wrote to respondent recalling what transpired
on
April 7, 1997.4 Exh. "G".cralaw:red
On May 2, 1997, respondent
allegedly asked Cortel to refund the amount of P800.00 for the reason
that
the latter was a witness of Judge Alimangohan. Immediately,
Cortel
returned P600.00 to respondent. He remitted the balance of
P200.00
last May 21, 1997 thru the Branch Clerk of Court.5 Exh. "B".cralaw:red
While admitting that
Cortel rendered secretarial services to him in connection with the
drafting
of the decision in the election case, respondent denied that the money
for Cortel’s remuneration came from Salazar. He claimed that he paid
Cortel
with money from the Revision Committee Fund, which he borrowed and
would
later repay out of his salary.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
With respect to the
alleged shouting incident on April 7, 1997, he averred that retired
Judge
Alimangohan, in open court, yelled at the court stenographer to take
down
his observation concerning the non-inclusion of the motion for
reconsideration
in the court’s calendar for that day. Judge Alimangohan who was
respondent’s
classmate in the college of law, was mad and suspected that the
omission
was intentional. Being the presiding judge, respondent told
retired
Judge Alimangohan that it was improper to take down his observation, as
it was not part of the proceedings. He did not shout at Judge
Alimangohan
nor did he bang the gavel. Neither was he rude nor guilty of
unbecoming
behavior.cralaw:red
Respondent concluded
that charges against him were part of complainant’s dilatory
scheme.
Earlier, complainant asked for the inhibition of Judge Butalid and
respondent
and filed two motions for extension of time to file memorandum.6 Exhs.
"16" and "19". Although respondent granted7 Exhs. "17" and "18". the
motions,
complainant did not file the required memorandum.cralaw:red
The case was referred
to Court of Appeals’ Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz to conduct the
necessary
investigation, report and recommendation.8 Per Resolution dated June
16,
1999. After weighing the two conflicting versions before him, Justice
Cruz
submitted his findings per his Report and Recommendation, thus9 Report
and Recommendation dated January 17, 2000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Despite the conflicting
versions of the parties on the charge, there is no dispute that
respondent
gave Cortel the sum of P800.00 (or "money") as remuneration for the
latter’s
secretarial services in the drafting of the decision in the election
case.
It is on the identity of the payor where there is controversy.cralaw:red
Complainant asserts
that respondent told Cortel that the expense for said secretarial
services
would be shouldered by Salazar. This assertion is supported by
Cortel’s
letter dated January 10, 1997, Affidavit dated April 29, 1997,
Reply-Affidavit
dated August 27, 1997 and Testimony (T.S.N. October 14, 1997, pp. 5-9
and
25).cralaw:red
On the other hand, respondent
testified that he borrowed the money from the Revision Committee fund
which
he would repay upon receiving his salary but that he immediately
returned
the same when it was voluntarily refunded by Cortel (Answer to Question
No. 10 of respondent’s Sworn Statement dated October 26, 1999
[Exh.
"29"]; T.S.N., October 27, 1999, pp. 11, 15 and 18-22). Incidentally,
Exh.
"29" served as respondent’s testimony on direct-examination upon
agreement
of the parties.cralaw:red
In par. (a) of his Amended
Counter-Affidavit dated August 7, 1997 (rollo, p. 110), respondent did
not state that he borrowed from the Revision Committee. Here merely
alleged
that Cortel was "entitled to receive said amount from the Revision Fund
contributed by both litigants for the revision proceedings as provided
by law."
Denying that he received
the money from Salazar, respondent stated in his order dated May 2,
1997
(Exh. "27") that - protestee’s counsel know (sic) it very well that
stenographers
in our courts of law are authorized to collect the amount from
litigants
corresponding to the volume or pages of the notes they transcribed out
of court proceedings. In effect, respondent was saying that the
money
was given as payment for Cortel’s transcript of stenographic notes.cralaw:red
Consequently, it appears
that respondent identified three payors of the money, namely: (i)
himself
(respondent), although borrowed from the Revision Committee; (ii) the
Revision
Committee, for Cortel’s services to it; and (iii) Salazar, as payment
for
transcript of stenographic notes.cralaw:red
If respondent borrowed
the money from the Revision Committee, which is anomalous, it must have
been documented. But no record of such "transaction" was
presented.
On the other hand, respondent’s order dated September 30, 1996 (Exh.
"15")
states that the "revision of the contested ballots x x x both for the
protestant
and the protestee, x x x (was) already completed and terminated." Since
the Revision Committee’s work had been finished as early as September
30,
1996, Cortel was not entitled to remuneration from the former for
secretarial
services "rendered" five months thereafter. Finally, it has not
been
explained why the money, whether originating from the Revision
Committee
or Salazar, had to be coursed thru respondent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As between the two versions,
Cortel’s testimony inspires belief. He was consistent and
steadfast
in his testimony that respondent told him that he (Cortel) would be
paid
by Salazar for his secretarial services. On the other hand,
respondent
gave conflicting and vague statements on the source and application of
the money.cralaw:red
Moreover, there is nothing
in the record indicating that Cortel was actuated by improper
motive.
While Judge Alimangohan was Cortel’s former "boss", respondent was his
current "boss". If Judge Alimangohan wielded moral ascendancy
over
Cortel, so did respondent and even at a greater degree.cralaw:red
Consequently, the undersigned
believes that respondent really told Cortel that the money would come
from
Salazar. Such representation generates the suspicion that
respondent
had entered into an arrangement with Salazar for the latter to finance
the typing of the decision which he fulfilled and, worse, to give
something
to respondent for his (respondent) own labor in making the decision.cralaw:red
While there is no proof
of delivery of the money from Salazar to respondent, the latter’s
actuation
engenders doubt on his impartiality and integrity. He did not
observe
the dictum that a judge, like Cesar’s wife, must not only be pure but
beyond
suspicion (Palang v. Zosa, 58 SCRA 776). He violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct ordaining that a judge "should uphold the integrity
and
independence of the judiciary" and "should avoid impropriety and the
appearance
of impropriety in all activities" (Canon 1 and 2). He has
demonstrated
that he cannot be a model of uprightness, fairness and honesty (Rural
Bank
of Barotac Nuevo v. Cartagena, 84 SCRA 128).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the other hand, the
charge of discourtesy is planted on the gratuitous allegation of Judge
Alimangohan. Although the remarks imputed to respondent were
allegedly
uttered in the presence of several people, including the public
prosecutor,
complainant, lawyers and court stenographer, nobody - not even
complainant
- came forward to corroborate Judge Alimangohan’s testimony. Even
as Judge Alimangohan asked the court stenographer to take down the
proceedings,
the transcript of stenographic notes was not presented, with the former
giving the lame excuse that the same was not recorded.cralaw:red
The undersigned believes
that the second charge was merely prompted by an intention to delay the
disposition of the election case. Since respondent had denied
complainant’s
petition for his inhibition, the latter must have thought that the
charge
would convince respondent to relent and finally inhibit himself from
sitting
in the election case, thereby causing further delay in the disposition
thereof.cralaw:red
Concluding, Justice
Cruz recommended that respondent be found guilty of the first charge
and
fined in an amount equivalent to two months of his salary as of his
retirement;
and that the second charge be dismissed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This Court agrees with
the factual findings of the investigator, Justice Cruz. The people’s
confidence
in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge
and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest
standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to
possess.10
Dawa v. De Asa, 292 SCRA 703, 724-725 [1998]. In line with this
sacrosanct
goal, the Code of Judicial Conduct strongly mandates the following:
RULE 1.02. A Judge
should administer justice impartially and without delay.cralaw:red
CANON 2. A JUDGE
SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.cralaw:red
RULE 2.01. A judge
should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the
integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.cralaw:red
CANON 3. A JUDGE
SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND
DILIGENCE.cralaw:red
The spirit and philosophy
underlying these Canons is eloquently expressed in Castillo v.
Calanog11
199 SCRA 75, 83-84 [1991]. thus:
The Code of Judicial
Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties,
but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual.
There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by
his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to
promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
must
behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently
explained,
a judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his
personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of
constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions
on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A judge should personify
judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in
private life should be above suspicion.12 See also Junio v. Rivera,
Jr.,
225 SCRA 688 [1993]; Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690 [1994].cralaw:red
This Court has often
stated that a judge, being the visible representation of the law and
the
embodiment of the people’s sense of justice, must adhere to the highest
tenets of judicial conduct and he should constantly keep away from any
act of impropriety,13 Marces, Sr. v. Arcangel, 258 SCRA 502, 517
[1996].
not only in the performance of his official duties but also his
everyday
actuations14 Panganiban v. Guerrero, Jr., 242 SCRA 11, 15 [1995]. for
no
other position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness
of an individual than perhaps a seat in the judiciary.15 Legaspi v.
Garrete,
242 SCRA 679, 701 [1995]. A judge should always be a symbol of
rectitude
and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt
whatsoever about his honesty.16 Office of the Court Administrator v.
Barron,
297 SCRA 376 [1998], citing Yuson v. Noel, 227 SCRA 1 [1993].cralaw:red
Respondent has displayed
conduct that falls short of the standards expected of a magistrate of
the
law. Accordingly, this Court must wield its disciplinary
power.
However, this Court finds that the amount of fine recommended, i.e.,
equivalent
to respondent’s two months salary is somewhat excessive. Besides,
this is the first and only time that respondent judge, now retired, was
ever administratively charged. The amount of P10,000.00 as fine
to
be imposed on the respondent is more appropriate given the
circumstances
of this case.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, for committing
an act of impropriety, respondent Judge Mateo M. Leanda, now retired,
is
hereby ordered to pay a FINE of P10,000.00, the same to be deducted
from
whatever retirement benefits are due him.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ.,
concur. |
