NENUCA
A.
VELEZ,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R. No.
148261
October 9, 2006
SHANGRI-LA'S EDSA PLAZA HOTEL,
TERRY KO,
COEN MASSELINK and VANESSA
SUATENGCO,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J
.:
Challenged in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is the Decision[1] dated November 22, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of May 18, 2001, granting the
petition for certiorari of the herein respondents in CA-G.R. SP No.
58182, entitled Shangri-la's Edsa Plaza Hotel, Terry Ko, Coen
Masselink, and Vanessa Suatengco v. National Labor Relations Commission
and Nenuca A. Velez.
The facts:cralaw:red
Herein petitioner Nenuca A. Velez was employed by respondent Edsa
Shangri-la Hotel (Hotel) as an Executive Housekeeper, the highest
ranking executive of the Hotel's housekeeping department, from April 1,
1991 until her dismissal on July 20, 1995. As executive
housekeeper, the petitioner directly supervised the work of three (3)
assistant executive housekeepers and eleven (11) supervisors of the
Hotel.
On April 25, 1995, all the assistants and supervisors[3] of the Hotel’s
Housekeeping Department wrote a letter to the petitioner requesting for
an audience with her to discuss some issues and problems regarding the
working relationship within the Housekeeping Department.
To address the situation immediately, the Hotel’s General Manager Terry
Ko, one of the herein respondents, met with the signatories of the
letter and asked for their explanations. In that meeting, the
staff freely expressed their fears and anxieties about their job
security, allegedly on account of the petitioner's highhanded manner in
dealing with them. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The next day, respondent Ko, together with his co-respondent Coen
Masselink, talked to the petitioner regarding the complaints of her
assistants and supervisors. On that occasion, the petitioner
asked the Hotel management that she be given a free hand on the matter
but her request was declined. In the meantime and as agreed upon,
the petitioner went on leave with pay. It was felt that the
petitioner's absence while the matter was not yet settled was necessary
because her presence not only evoked fear among the staff but also
created tension among the employees in the Housekeeping Department.
Meanwhile, during the petitioner's leave of absence, the assistants and
supervisors of the Housekeeping Department submitted their respective
individual written complaints to the management. Most of the
complaints related to the petitioner's poor inter-personal relations
with her staff. Each of the complaining employees narrated
her/his own experiences with the petitioner including the latter's
highhandedness, partiality, absence of dialogue, fault-finding and
giving no recognition. They claimed that these and other
recurring problems had resulted in the demoralization of the
supervisors.
In a letter[4] dated May 17, 1995, respondent Ko required the
petitioner to explain her side and provided her with the staff's
individual complaints. In his letter, Ko expressed to the
petitioner his desire to see the problem resolved. In part, the
letter reads:cralaw:red
You will note from the letters of the supervisors that their complaints
fall into six (6) general categories: (a) your failure or inability to
maintain close and open communications with them, collectively and
individually; (b) your methods allow an atmosphere of fear to prevail
among the group; (c) your partiality in the treatment and appraisal of
your staff; (d) your failure or inability to involve yourself in the
day to day work problems of your staff; (e) your frequent emphasis on
fault, and ignoring merit; and (f) your methods of criticism have
undermined the respect and credibility of your supervisors, among their
subordinates and with each other.
As you know, the Housekeeping Department is one of the most important
groups in the Hotel because its work immediately creates an impression
on hotel guests. The guest gets its lasting impression of the
Hotel from the room he occupies which the Housekeeping Department
maintains. It is important, therefore, that the Housekeeping
staff's morale is kept high by good management and excellent teamwork
among its members. It is with these in mind that I ask you to
give me your comments and explanation on the attached letters. As
it is important that we resolve this problem as soon as possible, I ask
that I have your written comment not later than Friday, May 26, 1995.
Instead of submitting the desired comment, the petitioner, through
counsel, requested for a formal written notice stating the particular
acts or omissions for which she was being charged.[5]
On June 14, 1995, Ko again wrote[6] the petitioner, this time
specifying the following acts or omissions which the
latter should answer and explain not later than June 22, 1995:
a)
failure or inability to communicate with them [i.e., the staff]
collectively and individually, resulting in long existing problems
being left unsolved;
b)
your arbitrary method of management instills fear in all your
subordinates, intimidating them and arousing their indifference if not
hostility;
c) you have shown partiality in the
evaluation and treatment of your subordinates;
d)
daily, you always keep to your office for the most part of the day,
thus isolating yourself from the work problems of your subordinates;
e) in criticizing the work of your
subordinates, you focus on fault, no matter how minor, and ignore merit;
f) you publicly shout
at and humiliate them, sometimes using foul words;
g)
you have abused your authority by requiring contract workers assigned
to the hotel, to work at your residence. You threaten
subordinates who displease you with immediate termination or use others
to pressure them to resign; you also use your authority to
reshuffle your subordinates, to punish them;
h) unauthorized removal of
hotel property (vacuum cleaner) from the hotel's premises for personal
use.
On
June 20, 1995, the petitioner, again through counsel, reiterated her
earlier request that the charges against her be described and
delineated with sufficient definiteness or particularity so that she or
her counsel could properly respond thereto.[7]
In another letter[8] to the petitioner, Ko reiterated that she should
submit her comment and/or explanation on the complaint not later than
July 5, 1995 and set the investigation on July 6, 1995, at 2 o’clock
p.m. However, no reply thereto was submitted by the
petitioner.
During the investigation of July 6, 1995, the petitioner, with her
counsel, appeared only to inform the investigating committee that the
individual complaints furnished her by Ko, as well as Ko’s letters to
her, were vague. Petitioner did not participate in the
investigation proceedings.
Notwithstanding the parties' disagreement on the alleged particularity
of the charges and the non-participation of the petitioner in the
fact-finding investigation, the committee proceeded and came out with
the following infractions[9] committed by the petitioner:
1. Causing
dissatisfaction among her staff as a result of her autocratic
management style.
2.
Violating some important provisions of the Hotel's Code of Conduct, to
wit:
Section 19. Use of Company Time Premises, etc., for Personal
Benefit: Using company time, premises, vehicles, tools, equipment
or materials for personal benefit.
Section
20. Unauthorized Possession of Company Property: Unauthorized
possession or use of any company, employee or guest property, hotel
supplies.
3. Violating, on the basis of
the testimonies of her staff, the following provisions of the Hotel's
Code of Conduct:
Section 4. Special Treatment or Privilege/ Bribery: Bribery in
any form or manner; soliciting or demanding anything of value in
exchange for or in consideration of any act, decision or service
connected with the performance of the employee's duties or functions.
Section
5. Borrowing, Accepting Money or Soliciting Material favors
from supplier/ customers: Borrowing or accepting money, gifts,
commission, offers of promises or soliciting material favors from
suppliers or customers with which the Company has a business
relationship for his own personal benefits.
Section
13. Kickbacks: Entering into arrangements with suppliers, customers or
guests to certain kickbacks or other preferential treatment.
On
the basis of the foregoing, the Hotel management terminated
petitioner's employment due to "loss of confidence" effective July 16,
1995.
On July 31, 1995, the petitioner filed with the Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), a complaint
for illegal dismissal against the respondents.
On January 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit. The Labor Arbiter found that the charges against the
petitioner, which include misconduct, are serious and involve violation
of the rules and regulations of the respondent Hotel. He added that the
petitioner's refusal to give any explanation regarding the charges
despite opportunities given her, could have only strengthened the
respondent Hotel's distrust on the petitioner's competency and
integrity as manager of its Housekeeping Department, compelling the
Hotel to dismiss her.
On petitioner’s appeal to the NLRC, the latter, in a decision dated
April 13, 1999, granted the appeal and reversed the Labor Arbiter,
ruling that the petitioner’s dismissal is illegal, and accordingly
rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
discussion, the appeal is hereby granted.
Consequently,
the decision appealed from is ordered Reversed and Set Aside and a new
one entered finding complainant's [petitioner's] dismissal illegal.
Accordingly,
respondents are ordered to pay complainant backwages from the time of
her dismissal up to the promulgation of this judgment.
Complainant
is likewise entitled to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement at the
rate of one month salary for every year of service, a fraction of month
is considered one whole year.
Lastly,
moral and exemplary damages are ordered awarded to complainant in
the amount of P200,000.00 and P100,000.00 respectively.
Ten percent of the total monetary award
is for attorney's fess recoverable by complainant. (Word in bracket
supplied.)
SO ORDERED.
Both parties moved for reconsideration. In its resolution
of January 31, 2000, the NLRC granted the petitioner’s partial
motion for reconsideration and denied that of the respondents.
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, the
respondents went on certiorari to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 58182,
raising the argument that the NLRC made no findings of facts from which
it based its decision.
Giving due course to the petition, the CA, in its decision[10] of
November 22, 2000, ultimately affirmed in toto the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and ordered that the writ of preliminary injunction
it issued on June 29, 2000 be made permanent,
thus:
WHEREFORE,
the petition is given due course. The assailed decision of the
NLRC is hereby set aside as well as the Resolution dated January 31,
2000. The decision of the Labor Arbiter is affirmed in
toto. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on June 29, 2000
is made permanent.
Explains the CA in its reversal action:
A
reading of the public respondent's decision reveals that it just copied
in toto the allegations of [petitioner] Velez' complaint, then followed
by the finding that there has been "insufficient evidence to warrant
the charge of loss of confidence." However, respondent
Commission failed to state profoundly why it concluded that the
evidence is insufficient, and why the statement of facts as narrated by
the [petitioner] prevailed over the finding of facts of the Labor
Arbiter.
In
trying to be very brief in resolving the appeal, the Commission
completely disregarded the evidence presented to and appreciated by the
Labor Arbiter.
In so doing, the Commission failed
to abide by the jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court ….
xxx
xxx xxx
The
Commission's decision is bereft of support from the records. It
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter without stating the reason
therefor, without explanation whatever as to why the Arbiter's
evidentiary findings were not worthy of credit. (Words in brackets
supplied.)
Hence,
this appeal by the petitioner raising the following issues: (1) whether
or not the CA erred in granting the respondents’ petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 58182 despite the fact that only three of the numerous pleadings,
affidavits, documentary evidence and other supporting papers were
attached to the said petition; and (2) whether or not the respondent
Hotel illegally dismissed the petitioner.
We affirm.
Petitioner bewails the appellate court’s refusal to dismiss the
respondents’ petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 58182 on the
ground that the petition is fatally defective as it was not accompanied
by copies of all the pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, in contravention of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
We are
not persuaded.
Acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due
course thereto are addressed to the sound discretion of a court.
The court discerns whether, on the basis of what has been submitted, it
could already judiciously determine the merits of the petition.
Section 1, Rule 65[11] of the
Rules of Court
,
in relation to Section 3, Rule 46, of the same Rules, does not specify
the precise documents, pleadings or parts of the records that should be
appended to a certiorari petition other than the judgment, final order,
or resolution being assailed. The Rules only states that such
documents, pleadings or records should be relevant or pertinent to the
assailed resolution, judgment or order. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents with the CA,
the decisions of the Labor Arbiter as well as that of the NLRC, and the
latter’s resolution denying their motion for reconsideration were duly
annexed. The Labor Arbiter summarized and discussed in his decision the
material allegations embodied in the position papers of both
parties. We see no reason, then, to disturb the appellate court's
determination that the copies of the decisions and resolution attached
to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 58182 were sufficient to make out a
prima facie case.
This brings us to the more important issue of whether the petitioner
was illegally dismissed.
For a dismissal to be valid, two requisites must concur, namely: (a)
the dismissal must be for any of the causes stated in Article 282[12]
of the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must have been accorded due
process, basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself.[13] Simply put, an employer can terminate the services
of an employee for just and valid causes, which must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence, and with due process, meaning that the
employee must be given notice with adequate opportunity to be heard
before he is notified of his actual dismissal for cause. All were
complied with by the respondents in this case.
Petitioner insists, however, that she was dismissed from
employment not for a just and valid cause and without due process of
law. She contends that the accusation of dishonesty (when she
brought a vacuum cleaner out of the Hotel's premises and utilized the
services of the Hotel contract employees to work in her house without
the knowledge of the Hotel) is wholly unsupported by the established
facts.
Paragraph (c) of Article 282 of the Labor Code provides that an
employer may terminate an employment for fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or the latter’s
duly authorized representative. A breach is willful if done
intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently. In China City Restaurant Corporation v. NLRC,[14]
the Court came up with the following guidelines for the application of
the doctrine of loss of confidence:
(a)
the loss of confidence should not be simulated;
(b)
it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper,
illegal or unjustified;
(c)
it should not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary; and
(d)
it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier
action taken in bad faith.
In
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Gulde,[15] the Court emphasized that loss of
trust and confidence, as a just cause for termination of employment, is
premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of
responsibility or of trust and confidence. As such, he must be
invested with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody,
handling or care and protection of the property and assets of the
employer. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the
act complained of must be work-related and must show that the
employee is unfit to continue to work for the employer.
Recent decisions of this Court have distinguished the treatment of
managerial employees from that of the rank-and-file personnel, insofar
as the application of the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence is
concerned. Thus, with respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust
and confidence, as ground for valid dismissal, requires proof of
involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere
uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be
sufficient. But as regards a managerial employee, the mere existence of
a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his
employer would suffice for his dismissal.[16] Hence, in the case
of managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required,
albeit the evidence must be substantial and must establish clearly and
convincingly the facts on which the loss of confidence rests and not on
the employer's arbitrariness, whims and caprices or suspicion,
otherwise the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the
employer.[17] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Here, the petitioner is not an ordinary rank-and-file employee.
For sure, she held the position of an Executive Housekeeper, the
highest ranking executive of the Housekeeping Department of the
respondent Hotel. Hers is a position of responsibility which
demands of her that she manage, control and take responsibility
over activities in her department. As such, the petitioner is tasked to
perform key and sensitive functions, which call for and bind her to
more exacting work ethics.[18] As explained by respondent
Ko in his letter of May 17, 1995 to the petitioner: the Housekeeping
Department is one of the most important groups in the Hotel because its
work immediately creates an impression on hotel guests. The guest
gets its lasting impression of the Hotel from the room he occupies
which the Housekeeping Department maintains. It is important,
therefore, that the Housekeeping staff's morale is kept high by good
management and excellent teamwork among its members. Doubtless,
petitioner’s sensitive position requires the full trust and confidence
of her employer in every exercise of managerial discretion insofar as
the conduct of her employer's business is concerned. Breaching
that trust and confidence warrants dismissal from the service. We
thus agree with the findings of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the
appellate court, that the petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence
reposed on and expected of her when she brought home the Hotel’s vacuum
cleaner and personally utilized the services of the Hotel's contract
employees to work in her house without the knowledge of her employer,
in violation of the Hotel's Code of Conduct. We quote with approval
what the Labor Arbiter said in its decision:[19]
The second ground which respondent hotel used as basis for its loss of
confidence in the complainant [petitioner] was her taking out of the
hotel, without any authority, a vacuum cleaner belonging to the
hotel, and using it in her house. She returned it to the hotel
only after six months, when her subordinates filed their written
complaint. Complainant [petitioner] did not deny the charge
regarding the vacuum cleaner and she even admitted it in writing and
under oath. This she did in her answers (Exhibit "8-A" and
Exhibit "9-A") to respondent's request for admission (Exhibit "8"),
their written interrogatories (Exhibit "9") and their request for
stipulation (Exhibit "9-B"). The complainant's [petitioner's] own
admission of the second charge provides enough basis for respondents'
loss of confidence in complainant [petitioner].
Complainant’s [petitioner’s] use of the vacuum cleaner without
authority violated her employer’s Code of Conduct (Exhibit “F”).
Section 19 and Section 20 punishes with dismissal the following
acts of dishonesty by an employee:
Section
19. Use of Company Time Premises, etc., for Personal
Benefit: Using company time, premises, vehicles, tools, equipment
or materials for personal benefit.
Section
20. Unauthorized Possession of Company Property: Unauthorized
possession or use of any company, employee or guest property, hotel
supplies.
xxx
xxx xxx
Respondents
Hotel’s third ground for its loss of confidence in the complainant
[petitioner] is the charge, also found in the written complaints of one
of her subordinates, that she required employees of the hotel’s labor
contractor, M.S. Ignacio, to clean her house and its surroundings.
Respondents' evidence is that as Executive Housekeeper, complainant
[petitioner] had the power to accept or reject any employee of the
contractor to be assigned to the Hotel. Complainant admitted that she
had this “personal arrangement” with the hotel labor contractor to
assign workers to work at her house. Her husband, Mr. Jose R. Velez,
who testified for her at hearing of the case, corroborated her
admission. He likewise admitted that complainant [petitioner] did not
pay M.S Ignacio for the work of his employees. According to Mr. Velez,
these employees worked not only on weekends but also on weekdays
whenever they did not have to work at the respondent hotel. The
arrangement stopped only when a complaint was filed against complainant
[petitioner]. After that, the couple hired regular maids to work at
their house.
The third described above is likewise not denied but even admitted. As
in the previous charges, it provides basis for respondent Hotel’s loss
of confidence in complainant [petitioner]. Complainant’s [petitioner's]
arrangement with the hotel’s contractor violates its Code of Conduct.
Section 4, 5 and 13 of the Code punish with dismissal the following act:
Section
4. Special Treatment or Privilege/Bribery: Bribery in
any form or manner; soliciting or demanding anything of value in
exchange for or in consideration of any act, decision or service
connected with the performance of the employee's duties or functions.
Section
5. Borrowing, Accepting Money or Soliciting Material favors
from supplier/customers: Borrowing or accepting money,
gifts, commission, offers of promises or soliciting material favors
from suppliers or customers with which the Company has a business
relationship for his own personal benefits.
Section
13. Kickbacks: Entering into arrangements with suppliers, customers or
guests to certain kickbacks or other preferential treatment.
The
third substantial charge against her, that she used employees of a
labor contractor of the hotel, to clean her house on a regular basis,
is another case of misconduct. Considering her authority to accept or
reject any employee of the contractor the latter may assign to the
hotel, these workers assigned to her house clearly had no choice but to
accept the assignment, despite the additional burden and the little
pay. The free labor admittedly received by the complainant [petitioner]
from the labor contractor of the respondent hotel, clearly violates the
above-quoted provisions of the Code of Conduct. The lame excuse of the
complainant [petitioner] that she can properly observe the manner of
their work fails to persuade this Arbitration Branch.
Equally unpersuasive is the petitioner's assertion that the charges
against her were not supported by substantial evidence. We note
that the Labor Arbiter used every reasonable means to ascertain the
facts by giving the parties ample opportunity to present their
respective causes. They were given the opportunity to file their
respective position papers, affidavits and other documents.
Regrettably, the petitioner failed to categorically refute any of the
charges leveled against her but even admitted her misconduct.
Undeniably, the acts committed by the petitioner adversely reflected on
her competence and integrity, sufficient enough for her employer to
lose trust and confidence in her.
Nor can there be any procedural infirmity that could have attended the
petitioner’s dismissal. Due notice and hearing were given her.
The records clearly show that the petitioner was given ample
opportunity to explain and defend herself. But instead of availing of
that right, the petitioner ignored the directives given her and chose
to remain silent on the charges against her. Evidence shows that
she was properly notified of the charges against her through the May
17, 1995 letter to her of respondent Ko, requiring her to explain her
side and even provided her with the staff's individual complaints. This
was followed by Ko’s letter of June 14, 1995 whereunder were specified
the acts and omissions which the petitioner was required to answer and
explain. And even as she appeared at the investigating committee’s
hearing on July 6, 1995, she did not take part and merely satisfied
herself by informing the committee that she could not answer the
complaints as they were not specific. That hearing could have
been her chance to clarify all matters but she purposely ignored it
until eventually, she was notified of her dismissal. If this is
not due process, then the petitioner is completely wrong.
It cannot be overemphasized that there is no substitute for honesty for
sensitive positions which call for utmost trust. Fairness dictates that
the respondent Hotel should not be allowed to continue, under its,
employ the petitioner who has breached the confidence reposed on her.
Unlike other just causes for dismissal, trust in an employee, once
lost, is difficult, if not impossible, to regain. Respondent Hotel has
every right to dismiss the petitioner as a measure of self-preservation
against acts patently inimical to its interests.
With the reality that the petitioner was not illegally dismissed, she
is not entitled to backwages. Backwages may be granted only when
there is a finding that the dismissal is illegal.[20]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
challenged Decision dated November 22, 2000 and Resolution dated May
18, 2001 of the CA are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., Chairperson,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and
Azcuna
, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (now ret.) and
concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr., (now ret.) and
Eliezer R. de los Santos; Rollo, pp. 77-85.
[2]
Id. at 88.
[3]
Namely: Edisto Graneda, Jr., Jonat Xerez-Burgos, William Obagne,
Florentino M. San Juan, Romy Betiles, August Evangelista, Ramon Jude
Serrano, Bong Sarmiento, Ma. Erlinda Gonzalez, Ismael Adlao, Noemi
Yatco, Miguel T. Fama III, Sonny Trinidad and Ramon B. Chuidian.
[4]
Rollo, p. 238.
[5]
Id. at 239-240.
[6]
Id. at 241-242.
[7]
Id. at 243-244.
[8]
Id. at 245.
[9]
Respondent's Comment, Id. at 487.
[10]
Supra note 1.
[11] RULE
65 CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3,
Rule 46.
[12]
Art. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative;
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
[13]
ACD Investigation Security Agency, Inc., v. Daquera, G.R. No.
147473, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 494.
[14]
G.R. No. 97196, January 22, 1993, 217 SCRA 443, cited in Tolentino
v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc., et al
, G.R. No. 160404, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 737.
[15]
427 Phil. 805 (2002).
[16]
Maquiling v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.,
G.R. No. 143384, February 4, 2005, 450 SCRA 465, citing Asia
Pacific Chartering (Phils.) Inc. v. Farolan, 441 Phil. 776 (2002).
[17]
Samson v. National Labor Relation Commission, 386 Phil. 669 (2000).
[18]
Gonzales v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 131653,
March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 195.
[19]
Id. at 154-156.
[20]
San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa, G.R. No. 149011, June 28, 2005, 461
SCRA 392.
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