VMC RURAL ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE, INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 153144
October 12, 2006
- versus -
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOEL A. GUSTILO,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for
Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which reversed the
Decision[2] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
affirming the Decision[3] of Labor Arbiter Ray Alan T. Drilon, Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, which dismissed private
respondent’s complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims, and held
that private respondent was validly terminated, as well as the
Resolution dated 19 March 2002 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and modifying its Decision to include an award for
attorney’s fees.
Petitioner VMC Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. (VRESCO) is an
electric cooperative supplying and selling electricity within the
northern part of Negros Occidental, particularly the contiguous cities
of Victorias, Cadiz, Escalante, San Carlos, and the municipalities of
E.B. Magalona, Manapla, Toboso, and Calatrava. In May 1986,
VRESCO hired private respondent Joel A. Gustillo as driver-lineman.
Private respondent himself is an electric consumer serviced by
petitioner VRESCO. On 21 February 1995, while private respondent
was on official vacation leave, the electric line carrying electricity
to his house was allegedly disconnected by Julio Prino, an employee of
VRESCO, for non-payment of electric bills. At the time of the
alleged disconnection, respondent and his wife were not at their
residence and only private respondent’s father-in-law was at the
house. According to Julio Prino, he went to the house of private
respondent upon instruction of the Head of Collection (of VRESCO) to
demand payment for the unpaid electric bills, with further instruction
to cause the disconnection should the consumer fail to pay upon
demand.[4]
On 2 March 1995, the inspection team of VRESCO surveying the Manapla
area found that there was electricity in the house of private
respondent despite the supposed disconnection. This prompted the
inspection team to conduct an ocular inspection on the line. It
was purportedly discovered that the electrical line was reconnected
without official permission from VRESCO. According to the
inspection team, the tape covering the spliced ends of the wire leading
to private respondent’s house were scrapped off and the spliced ends
were intentionally bent like a hook and made to touch or connect to the
secondary line. This supposed illegal connection caused
electrical current to flow directly from the secondary lines to private
respondent’s house without passing the meter where the alleged
disconnection was effected. After taking pictures of the
purported illegal connection and making an inspection report, the
inspection team proceeded to inform private respondent’s wife of the
illegal connection. Private respondent’s wife denied any
knowledge of said illegal connection; nonetheless, the inspection team
gave her a copy of their inspection report.
After the submission of the inspection team of its official report to
management, private respondent was sent a memorandum directing him to
explain in writing why he should not be dismissed from
employment. Subsequently, an Investigating Committee was formed
to conduct a formal investigation on the matter. After the
proceedings before the Investigating Committee, private respondent was
served a written notice of termination on 28 August 1995. In
connection with the discovery of the alleged illegal connection,
private respondent was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor for
pilferage and theft of electricity under Republic Act No. 7832
(Anti-electricity and Electric Power Transmission Lines/Materials
Pilferage Act of 1994) before the Regional Trial Court of Silay City.
Aggrieved by his dismissal from employment, private respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with claim for moral and exemplary
damages before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, National Labor
Relations Commission, Bacolod City. After submission of the
parties’ respective position papers, a Decision dated 12 January 1998
was rendered by Labor Arbiter Ray Alan T. Drilon dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit, to wit:cralaw:red
We are firmly convinced that
complainant has committed serious misconduct, if not, fraud and willful
breach of trust, to justify his termination. And there is
substantial and reasonable basis to support the conclusion that
complainant was responsible for the illegal tapping and reconnection of
his electrical connection which was officially disconnected for his
failure to pay electrical bills. As correctly observed by the
respondent, complainant was the only one who stand to benefit from the
illegal connection; he has the technical and practical knowledge about
electrical works in view of his job; he was potentially capable of
making out the electrical connection; actual inspection reveals that
the illegal connection was made and deliberately done thru the agency
of human will because of the following observable facts: first, the
wire from the meter going to the house of the complainant was dead
because it was already officially disconnected for non-payment of
bills; second, the connecting sides of both wires were spliced together
and connected by electrical tapes; third, the spliced ends were so
positioned below and away from the live secondary wire; fourth, when
found by the inspection team, the spliced ends were already bent and
forward into hooks and the electrical tape already scraped off at the
lower portion of the hook to make it bare and the wire was raised to
come into contact with the secondary live wire. This could not
have happened without somebody making and shaping the hook, scraping
the electrical tape and making the connection by hooking up the wire.
Despite his strong denial, the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor in his resolution was convinced that there is prima facie
evidence to warrant the prosecution of the complainant for violation of
RA 7832, the Law on Pilferage of Electricity and Theft of Electricity Power.
The absence of any direct testimony or eyewitness account
pointing to the complainant as the one responsible for the illegal
connection is not a strong argument to exculpate him viewed in the
light of the strong and positive circumstantial evidence which point to
the complainant as the only person who has the motive to commit the act.
In our jurisdiction, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required. All that is needed is sufficient basis to support the
conclusion of loss of trust and confidence.
It has been repeatedly held that an employer could not be
legally compelled to continue with the employment of a person who
admittedly is guilty of breach of trust towards his employer and whose
continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to its
interests. It has also been held that theft by the employee of
the very same property which the employee was entrusted to service is a
valid ground for the dismissal of said employee, as he committed the
very act which he was supposed to work or guard against.
Complainant’s position as line-man should have made him all
the more aware that the theft of electric power and pilferage of
electricity through illegal tapping is a serious offense which is
penalized by law. He should have all the more realized, and
definitely he does, that as an employee of the electric cooperative, he
was expected to watch and be vigilant against theft of electricity and
yet it appears that he was the first to commit the very same act, which
he was supposed to look out for.
There is, therefore, ample basis to justify the termination
of complainant’s employment and his weak denials cannot overcome the
evidence presented against him.
It is sufficient if the employer has reasonable grounds to
believe, if not entertain the moral conviction, that the employee
concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his
participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded by his position.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.[5]
Private respondent appealed the above-quoted Decision before the Fourth
Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, which affirmed the findings of the
Labor Arbiter in a Decision dated 22 December 1999. The NLRC
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit maintaining that VRESCO was able
to carry out its burden of proof that just cause existed for the
termination of private respondent. According to the NLRC, there
is probable cause that private respondent was guilty of misconduct
after it was found that electricity was still flowing into private
respondent’s house despite the disconnection on 21 February 1995.
The NLRC further explained that in the light of the evidence presented
by VRESCO and the fact that an Information for violation of Section 2
of Republic Act No. 7832 was filed against private respondent, puts
into naught his denial of any knowledge as to who installed the
electric supply to his house. Furthermore, such bare denial is
insufficient to overcome VRESCO’s substantial evidence to sustain the
validity of private respondent’s dismissal.
Thereafter, private respondent elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. On 25 September 2001, the assailed Decision was rendered
by the appellate court setting aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
and ordering the reinstatement of private respondent to his original
position with payment of backwages. According to the Court of
Appeals:cralaw:red
Public respondent’s basis in affirming the decision of the Labor
Arbiter is based on the following evidence, to wit: petitioner
Gustilo’s skill and position as a lineman made him a suspect that he
could have climbed and illegally tapped the wire indirectly to his
house since he incurred a two-month arrears from his payment of
electric bills with private respondent cooperative, and that only
petitioner Gustilo and his family benefited from said act.
We are not convinced.
This Court is mindful of the fact that in administrative proceedings
like illegal dismissal cases, the guilt of a party need not be shown by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. What is required is mere
substantial evidence. In this connection, the ruling in Ang Tibay v. CIR becomes relevant anew, to wit:cralaw:red
“Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
What remains uncontroverted is that when petitioner Gustilo and his
wife arrived at 7:00 p.m. on February 21, 1995, electricity had been
restored inside his house. It is noteworthy that petitioner
Gustilo, despite being an employee of public respondent cooperative,
was not notified of the disconnection. Petitioner was not aware
nor did he have an idea, that earlier that day the electric power was
cut-off and immediately reconnected when his brother-in-law Bienvenido
Clamiano promptly paid, that same afternoon his arrears to Julio Prino,
private respondent cooperative’s representative. Therefore,
petitioner Gustilo was not in the premises of his residence when power
was restored. Petitioner Gustilo could not have physically
performed the illegal connection alleged by the private respondent
cooperative. In addition, on the very same day that the
disconnection was effected by Prino, the latter received payment for
the arrears amounting to a measly Eight Hundred Five Pesos and
Sixty-two centavos (P805.62) and then restored back the power.
This act obliterates the defense of the private respondent cooperative
that it was petitioner Gustilo who climbed the electric post and
illegally connected the electric line. Petitioner Gustilo had no
reason to illegally reconnect the electric line since he did not even
know that it was disconnected earlier.
Corrolarily, We find that there was no just cause to terminate the employment of petitioner Gustilo.
Private respondent cooperative acted on mere conjuncture and
speculation just because petitioner Gustilo is a lineman and he has the
skill to do the act charged. But no evidence or witness could
prove the same.
Consequently, there being no just cause for petitioner Gustilo’s
removal from service, he is entitled to reinstatement with backwages.[6]
With the reversal of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter’s Decisions, VRESCO
filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the appellate court, which
was subsequently denied in a Resolution dated 19 March 2002.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari questioning the Court of
Appeals’ Decision and Resolution on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
In a Resolution dated 17 July 2002, the Court dismissed the instant
petition for being a wrong mode of appeal, the proper being a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner VRESCO sought the reconsideration of said Resolution
contending that what are raised in the present petition are not
questions of law but the grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the Court of Appeals. VRESCO
maintains that the Court of Appeals should not have reviewed the
findings of facts of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC since the
ambit of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is confined to issues
involving the administrative bodies’ grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, VRESCO contends that the appellate court committed grave abuse of
discretion through its unwarranted re-examination and correction of the
evidence presented before the labor Arbiter and the NLRC. On 26
March 2003, the Court granted petitioner VRESCO’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reinstated the instant petition.
For his part, private respondent expounded in his Memorandum that:cralaw:red
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as a mode of appeal, cannot be substituted with Rule 65.
It is the humble submission of private respondent that
whether petitioner is raising a question of fact or law, or mixed
questions of fact and law, the mode of appeal from the Decision of the
Court of Appeals would still be Rule 45, and not Rule 65.
Even assuming arguendo
that petitioner erroneously captioned its pleading under Rule 65
instead of Rule 45, still the present petition is dismissible outright
for being filed beyond the 15-day period to file an appeal.
x x x
Moreover, private respondent Gustilo reiterates his posture that he was illegally dismissed on the following grounds:cralaw:red
FIRST. The alleged infraction committed by private
respondent is COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED, BASELESS, and MALICIOUS. As
can be borne out from the records of the case, petitioner VRESCO’s
finding on alleged illegal tapping was based on mere speculation and
misplaced assumption.
The members of petitioner VRESCO’s raiding team were all
co-employees of private respondent Gustilo. It is quite strange
why his own co-employees would “disconnect” his household electrical
line for mere non-payment of two (2) monthly bills when they knew for a
fact that what they were disconnecting was a fellow employee and
personally known to them, not to mention the fact that private
respondent was a salaried employee who could easily pay the two
maturing bills of P276.31 and P529.31;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x
If petitioner VRESCO could extend accommodation to other
defaulting customers (who defaulted payments for several months), there
is no plausible reason why a fellow employee could not be extended a
more liberal privilege, especially so when at the time of the alleged
disconnection no member of the family was present inside the house.
Assuming arguendo his electrical line leading to his house
was disconnected by the VRESCO raiding team, still the two bills were
immediately paid right then and there by private respondent’s
brother-in-law, Bienvenido Clamiano, who was then present in the area
as the latter’s house was a stone’s throw away from Gustilo’s
house. With the payment, there was nothing suspicious that would
arouse their perception that there was disconnection, because the house
was lighted when they arrived home.
x x x
FOURTH. Just a few meters from the said electrical
post are houses of residents who could have easily witnessed private
respondent Gustilo climbing the post and making the alleged wire
tapping.
Annexes “F”, “G”, “H”, and “I”, (pictures) of the Motion for
Reconsideration (Annex “D” of the petition) dated February 9, 2000
would also show the height of said electrical post which are clear
evidence that it is not easy to just climb the post without the use of
“climber” used by a lineman. As reiterated, private respondent
had not been issued by petitioner any climber or that he was in
possession of a climber before, during, and after the alleged date of
illegal wire tapping.
x x x
SIXTH. Petitioner VRESCO’s raiding team who were also
co-employees of private respondent Gustilo did not bother to ask the
wife of the herein private respondent or any of the neighbor or
barangay official or any other impartial person to witness the climbing
by Mr. Ferdinand Sofio of said electrical post where the alleged wire
tapping occurred. Neither was she or her neighbor or barangay
official or any other impartial person asked to witness the taking of
pictures of the alleged wiretapping.
SEVENTH. Even the NEGATIVES AND PICTURES of said
wiretapping which are vital evidence to the pending criminal case are
allegedly lost by the custodian of petitioner VRESCO. The said
negatives and original pictures could have been made as vital evidence
on how the alleged wiretapping was done or could have been done by
private respondent and his wife. As to why these are lost is
highly suspicious. This would safely lead us to the conclusion
that petitioner VRESCO itself is guilty of suppressing its own evidence.
x x x
Also, about a few minutes after the alleged disconnection,
Bienvenido Clamiano, the brother of Susan Gustilo (private respondent’s
wife), minutes or immediately after the alleged disconnection, paid the
disconnecting personnel before the latter had left the area. So
that when private respondent and his wife arrived home late at night,
they were of the impression that they were not disconnected because
their lights were on.
This belief is reinforced by the fact of payment immediately
after said disconnection or before the “disconnector” left the place,
meaning that the payment was not paid at petitioner cooperative but
right then and there at the area of private respondent Gustilo.
As proof of said immediate payment by Mr. Bienvenido
Clamiano, attached to the Motion for reconsideration (Annex “D” of the
petition) are two (2) receipts which are marked as Annexes “A” and
“B”. The two receipts were in full payment of the two past due
bills. The original receipts are presently marked as exhibits in
the criminal case pending before the Regional Trial Court in Silay
City, Negros Occidental.
x x x
TENTH. Private respondent was not accorded due process
when he was dismissed. He was dismissed on bare and malicious
allegations that he wiretapped his household electrical consumption.[7]
The pivotal issue then, to be resolved in the instant case, is whether
or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
reviewing the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the
NLRC.
First and foremost, the power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC
decisions via a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari has been settled as
early as in Our Decision in the case of St. Martin Funeral Home v.
National Labor Relations Commission.[8] In said case, this Court
held that the proper vehicle for such review was a Special Civil Action
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court
,
and that this action should be filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.[9]
Moreover, it is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902[10] (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, amending for the purpose of
Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended, known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980),
the Court of Appeals – pursuant to the exercise of its original
jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari – is specifically given the
power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve
factual issues.[11] As clearly stated in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act 7902:cralaw:red
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or further proceedings. x x x.
We now come to a determination of whether or not the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in arriving at its conclusion that there
was no just cause to terminate the employment of private respondent
Gustilo.
In a Petition for
Certiorari,
it is the burden of petitioner to show grave, not just ordinary, abuse
of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists where an act of a
court or tribunal is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,[12] or where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law – mere abuse of
discretion is not enough.[13] Mere errors of fact or law
committed by the lower court are not correctable via a Rule 65 Petition
for
Certiorari.[14]
In the case at bar, petitioner VRESCO failed to prove that the Court of
Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decisions
of both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. Contrary to the claim of
VRESCO, it is not tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to
want or excess of jurisdiction for the Court of Appeals to review the
facts of the case, and thereafter, upon its own judgment, reverse the
findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. The appellate court
drew the conclusion that there is no just cause for respondent
Gustilo’s removal from service upon its own appreciation of the
arguments and pieces of evidence contained in the respective position
papers and appeal memoranda presented by the parties to this
case. Based on the Court of Appeals’ own discernment of the facts
of the case, VRESCO, in dismissing private respondent, acted on mere
conjuncture and speculation just because private respondent has the
skill to do the act charged even if there was no evidence or witness to
prove the same. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The impropriety of this conclusion, as perceived by petitioner, cannot
be the subject of a petition for certiorari. If ever there was
indeed an error committed by the appellate court in its appreciation of
the facts and the subsequent conclusions it had reached, such would be,
at the least, an error of fact which is not equivalent to grave abuse
of discretion. The special civil action for certiorari is a
remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment.[15] The raison d’etre for the rule is when a
court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged
does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error
is committed.[16] If it did, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would
be a void judgment.[17] Hence, where the issue or question
involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not
the jurisdiction of the court to render the decision – the same is
beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.[18]
Moreover, we perceive a patent error in the mode of appeal elected by
petitioner for the purpose of assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no
available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[19]
Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion.[20] In the case at
bar, the proper remedy of petitioner VRESCO to dispute the Decision of
the appellate court is to file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court
,
which should be instituted within 15 days from receipt of the assailed
decision or resolution.[21] In a long line of cases, the Court
has consistently emphasized that after the lapse of the 15-day period
to file a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is not, and cannot
be, a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal.[22] In the case at
bar, the petition was filed 45 days after receipt of the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals denying its Motion for Reconsideration, evidently
beyond the 15-day period for filing a petition for review on
certiorari, hence the period to appeal was lost. Therefore, the
instant petition cannot prevail since a petition for certiorari cannot
substitute for a lost appeal, specially if one’s error in one’s choice
of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.[23]
While there have been instances when the Court has relaxed the rule that a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
will not be a substitute or cure for the failure to file a timely
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, such as where the
application of this rule will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice,[24] this exception to the general rule is not
proper in the instant case. Petitioner, in the case at bar,
failed to establish any ground to justify its entitlement to a more
lenient application of the rules of procedure when such failure was due
to its own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60342, dated 25
September 2001 and its Resolution dated 19 March 2002 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, , C.J.,
Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
[1] CA-G.R.
SP No. 60342, dated 25 September 2001, penned by Associate Justice
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner
and Mariano C. del Castillo, concurring. Rollo, pp. 29-41.
[2]
NLRC Case No. V-000227-99, dated 22 December 1999. Rollo, pp. 104-110.
[3]
RAB Case No. 06-08-10365-96, dated 12 January 1998. Rollo, pp. 85-91.
[4] RAB Decision, p. 2; rollo, p. 86.
[5] RAB Decision, pp. 4-7; rollo, pp. 88-91.
[6] CA Decision, pp. 5-7; rollo, pp. 33-35.
[7]
Private Respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 5-10; rollo, 234-239.
[8] 356 Phil. 811 (1998).
[9]
Tanjuan v. Philippine Postal Savings Bank, Inc., 457 Phil. 993, 1006
(2003).
[10]
Section 1. Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:cralaw:red
"Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:cralaw:red
"(1) Original jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and
quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
"(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and
the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
"The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the
Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three
(3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice."
[11]
R & E Transport, Inc. v. Latag, G.R. No. 155214, 13 February 2004,
422 SCRA 698, 704.
[12]
China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 164798, 17 November 2005, 475 SCRA 332, 337.
[13]
Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161640, 9 December 2005, 477 SCRA
286, 294; citing Santos v. Commission on Elections, 447 Phil. 760, 772
(2003).
[14]
Supra, note 9, citing Elks Club v. Rovira, 80 Phil. 272, 275 (1948).
[15]
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 787
(2003).
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19]
David v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 384, 394.
[20] Id. at 395.
[21]
Alba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164041, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 495,
511.
[22]
New Ever Marketing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140555, 14 July
2005, 463 SCRA 284, 293-294; citing Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 787 (2003); and Fajardo v. Bautista,
G.R. Nos. 102193-97, 10 May 1994, 232 SCRA 291, 298.
[23] Supra, note 19.
[24]
Escudero v. Dulay, G.R. No. L-60578, 23 February 1988, 158 SCRA 69, 77.
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