LADY LYDIA CORNISTA-DOMINGO,
SYLVIA SALANGA, LIWAYWAY SILAPAN, CYNTHIA ALICANTE, ALBERTO ANCHETA,
ANA MARIA SANCHEZ, ELENA TUMBAGA, PEDRO JOSUÉ, TERESITA VOCAL, ROSIE
ANCHETA, LILIA PINUELA-JULIAN, IMELDA ERESE, NORMA YABUT, LOURDES
PINEDA, CORAZON CARANDANG, ERLINDA GUTIERREZ, MARIO MILAN, FLAVIANO
MEJIA, JR., ESTELA AYSON, ENRIQUE GARAYGAY, ROSE DAILEG, JOSE CALDO,
RITA BATAC, MARIA CORAZON GALAN, MA. ELISA GAYO, DEBBIE RODRIGUEZ,
CAROLINA CABEBE, EDGARDO BOLIVAR, FE ILAGAN, TERESITA MONDEJAR, ELVIRA
ANGELES, PEDRO EMPIG, LUZ MARQUEZ, TERESITA DORIA, ABELARDO BONTOC,
MADELON REYES-YEE and FILOMENO CINCO, JR.,
Petitioners,
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G.R. No. 156761
October 17, 2006
- versus -
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER EDUARDO J. CARPIO, PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
and/or SUNDAY LAVIN, PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION and/or
FELIZARDO SARAPAT, AMELITA DURIAN, RICARDO RICAFRENTE, LEON MAGALONA,
FERMIN CASTILLO, NORMINIO MOJICA and OLYMPIO DE GUZMAN,
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
By this Petition for Review on
Certiorari,[1]
petitioners seek the review and reversal of the consolidated
Decision[2] dated December 21, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 51218, CA-G.R. SP No. 51219 and CA-G.R. SP No. 51220
declaring as null and void the September 14, 1993 decision and the
November 22, 1993 resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and reinstating the decision dated March 31, 1993 of Labor
Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio. Likewise, assailed is the CA Resolution of
January 8, 2003, denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The ultimate facts material to the resolution of the case are as follows:cralaw:red
On April 10, 1983, by virtue of Resolution No. 334 of the Central
Bank’s Monetary Board, the Philippine Veterans Bank (Bank, hereafter)
was placed under receivership.
In consequence, the Bank adopted a retrenchment and reorganization
program which was challenged before this Court by the Philippine
Veterans Bank Employees Union (Union, hereafter) on the ground that the
program allegedly violated the security of tenure of the Bank’s
employees, in G.R. No. 67125 entitled Philippine Veterans Bank
Employees Union-NUBE v. Philippine Veterans Bank.
While G.R. No. 67125 was pending, the Monetary Board issued Resolution
No. 612, dated June 7, 1985, ordering the liquidation of the
Bank. The Monetary Board then appointed a liquidator who,
pursuant to the authority vested by the same Board, terminated the
employment of all the employees of the Bank effective June 15, 1985.
Thereafter, the liquidator commenced payment of separation pay and
other benefits to the terminated employees.
Although a number of the Bank employees accepted their separation pay
and other benefits and executed quitclaims and releases therefor in
favor of the Bank, others chose to question their termination. Thus, on
September 25, 1985, the Union filed a supplemental petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction in G.R. No. 67125 opposing
Monetary Board Resolution No. 612.
On August 24, 1990, the Court promulgated a
consolidated[3] en banc Decision[4] in G.R. No. 67125
upholding the authority of the Monetary Board to place the respondent
Bank under liquidation as well as the legality of the termination of
all the Bank’s employees, including the members of the Union. The Court
also rejected the dismissed employees’ claim for back wages as it held
that they were not illegally dismissed but lawfully separated as a
result of the Bank’s liquidation upon order of the Monetary Board.
On January 2, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7169,[5] authorizing the Central Bank to reopen the Bank.
To facilitate the implementation of R.A. No. 7169,
a Rehabilitation Committee was created by the Monetary Board. The
committee thus created was given the power to select and to organize an
initial manning force headed by a management team to be staffed by a
trained workforce. Hiring preference was given the veterans and
their dependents, other qualifications being equal.[6]
At this juncture, several employees of the Bank initiated a series of cases claiming that the enactment of R.A. No. 7169
nullified Monetary Board Resolution No. 612 placing respondent Bank
under liquidation and, in effect, also nullified the liquidator’s
termination of the Bank’s employees.
On January 20, 1992, the Union filed a petition with the Secretary of
Labor and Employment charging the Bank with unfair labor practices and
praying that the Rehabilitation Committee be directed to cease and
desist from screening and hiring new employees and to immediately
reinstate the Bank’s former employees. The petition, docketed as
NLRC NCR No. 00-02426-92, also sought payment of the accrued collective
bargaining agreement benefits and back wages of the employees from the
time they were terminated from employment in 1985 up to the time of
their actual reinstatement. Several other petitions seeking essentially
the same relief were consolidated with NLRC NCR No. 00-02426-92.
In the meantime, on August 3, 1992, the respondent Bank resumed operations.
On March 31, 1993, Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio rendered a
decision[7] dismissing NLRC NCR No. 00-02426-92 and all cases
consolidated therewith for lack of merit. The dispositive portion
of said decision reads:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the claim of the Union for reinstatement of the individual
complainants it represents as well as the claims for payment of
backwages, other benefits and damages are hereby, as they should be,
dismissed for lack of merit.
The charge for unfair labor practice filed by the Union
against the respondent Bank is likewise dismissed for lack of factual
and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.
In time, the Union appealed the Labor Arbiter’s decision to the NLRC proper.
On September 14, 1993, the NLRC rendered a Decision[8] reversing and
setting aside that of the Labor Arbiter. Additionally, the NLRC
directed the immediate reinstatement of all Union members subject to
the operational requirements of the Bank which it likewise ordered to
cease and desist from further hiring new employees. More
specifically, the fallo of the NLRC decision reads:
chan robles virtual law library
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of
the Labor Arbiter is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered, finding
the claim for reinstatement of the appellant to be legal and
proper. Accordingly, Appellee bank therefore is hereby ordered to
immediately reinstate all members of the appellant union inclusive of
those who have executed their quitclaims and release and all the rest
of the PVBEU members, who will signify their intention to be reinstated
from the date of this Decision. In the meanwhile, however, that
the bank has not fully reopened and activated all its operational
departments, offices and branches, the employees’ reinstatement shall
be conditioned to actual personnel requirement of the department branch
office to be reopened, for which reason, preference shall be given to
employees formerly occupying the position being reinstated or
reactivated or at the prerogative and discretion of management, to any
position in the office provided the latter is of equivalent rank and at
least has the same rate of pay.
For this purpose, appellee is hereby ordered to temporarily
cease and desist from further hiring new employees which might affect
the full compliance to this Decision. The claim for backwages and
other CBA benefits are hereby denied for lack merit.
The claim for unfair labor practice is also hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On October 1, 1993, the Bank sought a reconsideration of the said
decision. Six days later, or on October 7, 1993, the Union also
moved for its partial reconsideration. Both motions, however, were
denied by the NLRC in its resolution of November 22, 1993.
Therefrom, the Bank and the Union interposed separate petitions to this Court.
The Bank, in its petition, docketed as G.R. No. 113423,[9] sought to
nullify the NLRC decision of September 14, 1993, reinstating the
members of the Union, and its Resolution of November 22, 1993,
denying the Bank’s motion for reconsideration. While in its petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 115421,[10] the Union sought a modification of the
same decision so as to include the award of backwages.
On January 26, 1996, while G.R. Nos. 113423 and 115421 were pending
before the Court, the Union, through its duly authorized officers, and
the Bank entered into a Compromise Agreement[11] for the amicable
settlement of all other cases and claims then pending with the NLRC
and/or other tribunals arising from the employment of the individual
complainants with the Bank.
A substantial majority of the members of the Union ratified the compromise agreement.
On February 16, 1996, Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio approved the compromise agreement and issued an Order[12] which reads:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, finding the terms
and conditions set forth in the Compromise Agreement to be not contrary
to law, morals and public policy, the same is hereby approved and
considered as in complete and full satisfaction of the Decision in the
above-entitled case dated September 14, 1993.
The parties are hereby enjoined to comply strictly and faithfully with the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement.
SO ORDERED.
A number of the employees, in separate appeals to the NLRC, contested
the foregoing Order of the Labor Arbiter. They argued that the
compromise agreement is contrary to law and jurisprudence.
On February 29, 1996, the Bank and the Union filed before the Court
their Joint Motion to Dismiss Petition in G.R. Cases No. 113423 and
115421.
chan robles virtual law library
In a Resolution dated June 17, 1996, the Court denied said Joint
Motion. In the same resolution, the Court gave due course to an
Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Oppose Motion to Dismiss
Petition filed by the bank employees led by a certain Nestor Garcia and
the Urgent Motion With Leave of Court for Individual Union Members
Petitioners to Intervene and to Participate in Their Individual
Capacities And To Oppose Joint Motion to Dismiss Petition filed by the
herein petitioners Lady Lydia Domingo, et al.
On October 2, 1996, the NLRC decided the aforementioned separate
appeals from the Labor Arbiter’s Order of February 16, 1996 approving
the compromise agreement. The NLRC ruled that those who received and
acknowledged receipt of the first payment, as agreed upon in the
questioned Compromise Agreement, and who executed the corresponding
Quitclaim, Waiver and Release were bound by the same Compromise
Agreement. The decision dispositively reads:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, in the interest
of substantial justice and fair play, the order appealed from is hereby
partially vacated and Set Aside in that:cralaw:red
a) For those union members who received and
acknowledged receipt of the first payment as agreed upon in the
Compromise Agreement dated January 26, 1996 and who executed the
corresponding Quitclaim, Waiver and Release will be bound by the said
Compromise Agreement which was made the basis of the Order dated
February 16, 1996 appealed from and they shall continue to receive the
money due them on the second and third payments due on December 15,
1996 and December 15, 1997, respectively.
b) For those union members who signified their opposition
and those who are similarly situated who did not receive and
acknowledge receipt of the money, let the case be remanded to the
Arbitration Branch of origin for further proceedings. The Labor
Arbiter so designated to hear is hereby ordered to proceed with
dispatch so as not to prejudice the parties as the disposition hereof
has been duly delayed.
SO ORDERED.
Separate petitions were then filed with the Court by the Bank, the
Union and the petitioners. The Bank assailed the reinstatement of
union members while the Union questioned the lack of award for
backwages. For their part, the petitioners questioned the
validity of the compromise agreement.
On December 7, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution referring the three
aforesaid petitions to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition, pursuant to St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.[13] In
the CA, the Bank’s petition, PVB v. NLRC, et al., was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 51218, that of the Union, PVBEU-NUBE v. NLRC, et
al., was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51219, and that of herein
petitioners’ Lady Lydia Cornista Domingo, et al. v. NLRC, et al., was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51220. The three (3) petitions were
thereafter consolidated.
On December 21, 2001, the CA rendered the herein challenged
consolidated decision declaring that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in ordering the reinstatement of the union members and
accordingly declared null and void its September 14, 1993 decision and
the November 22, 1993 resolution, and instead reiterated the March 31,
1993 decision of the Labor Arbiter, to wit:cralaw:red
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
assailed NLRC decision dated September 14, 1993 as well as its
Resolution dated November 22, 1993 (CA-G.R. SP No. 51218) are both
declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated March
31, 1993 of the Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio is hereby ordered
REINSTATED.
Accordingly, the other two (2) petitions, CA-G.R. SP No. 51219 and CA-G.R. SP No. 51220 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Partly says the CA in its decision:cralaw:red
1. The Supreme Court
said in G.R. No. 67125 (189 SCRA 14) that the PVB employees were not
“illegally dismissed but lawfully separated.” This is a pronouncement,
as categorical as can be, that the employment relationship between the
Bank and the separated employees had definitely ceased to exist as of
that time;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x x x x x x x
4. It is a well-settled doctrine that reinstatement is
proper only in cases of illegal dismissal. The pronouncement of
the Supreme Court that the PVB employees were “not illegally dismissed”
forecloses any right of reinstatement under any circumstance.
While the PVB employees concerned should be given priority in hiring, they cannot demand it as a matter of right.
x x x x x x x x x
Evidently, Domingo, et al. ratified the Compromise
Agreement and even voluntarily received the first payment under that
agreement, executing the corresponding Quitclaim, Waiver and Release in
the process. Having done that, they are deemed bound by the
Compromise Agreement under the previously discussed principle of res
judicata and/or estoppel.
x x x x x x x x x
Petitioners are now before the Court via the present
recourse essentially arguing that the CA committed reversible error in
foreclosing their right to be reinstated to their former employment
with the Bank upon its rehabilitation and in upholding the validity of
the Compromise Agreement entered into by the Bank and the Union.
Petitioners argue that the passage of R.A. No. 7169,[14]
which reopened and rehabilitated the Bank, gave them the right to be
reinstated and entitled them to the payment of back wages and other
benefits. They call the Court’s attention to Congress Resolution No.
1104 expressing the sentiments of some congressmen to give preference
to veterans and their dependents in the employment with the Bank.
This resolution, according to petitioners, strengthens their claim for
reinstatement.
We are not persuaded.
As we see it, upon implementation of Monetary Board Resolution No. 612
and prior to the passage of R.A. No. 7169, the Bank ceased to exist.
Its subsequent rehabilitation was not an ordinary rehabilitation.
R.A. No. 7169 had to be passed as a legislative fiat to breathe life
into the Bank. While it is true that the Bank used its old name,
a new law had to be enacted to restructure its outstanding liabilities.
As it is, the Bank’s present state of finances, the enormous cost of
backwages and other benefits that have to be paid its employees seeking
to be reinstated would surely put an end to the economic viability of
the Bank.
chan robles virtual law library
The enactment of
R.A. No. 7169
did not nullify Monetary Board Resolution No. 612 which earlier placed
the Bank under liquidation and caused the termination of employment of
the petitioners. The Bank’s subsequent rehabilitation did not, by any
test of reason, “revive” what was already a dead relationship between
the petitioners and the Bank. Neither did such rehabilitation affect
the Court’s pronouncement in Philippine Veterans Bank Employees
Union-NUBE v. Philippine Veterans Bank[15] that the actions of the
Monetary Board and its duly appointed liquidator were valid and that
the former employees’ claim for back wages must be rejected as they
were lawfully separated. Reinstatement is a relief accorded only to an
employee who was illegally dismissed.[16]
To reiterate, the forcible closure of the Bank by operation of law
permanently severed the employer-employee relationship between it and
its employees when it ceased operations from April 10, 1983 to August
3, 1992. Thus, the claim for reinstatement and payment of back wages
and other benefits, having no leg to stand on, must necessarily fall.
Whilst House Resolution No. 1104 expressed sentiments of some
congressmen that “preferential right to employment be given to veterans
and their dependents” under Section 7(b) of
R.A. No. 7169
,
without more, such sentiments did not operate as a compulsion to the
newly opened Bank to accept an employee earlier separated from work as
a result of its closure. If at all, such sentiments only provide
that all things being equal, preference shall be given to veterans and
their dependents in the hiring of new employees. While the employees
concerned should be given priority in hiring, they cannot demand it as
a matter of right.
Verily, the clear wordings of Section 7 of
R.A. No. 7169
gave the rehabilitation committee created thereunder a free hand in the
selection and appointment of the Bank’s new employees. We quote Section
7 of the law:cralaw:red
Sec. 7. Rehabilitation
Committee. – To facilitate the implementation of the provisions this
Act, there is hereby created a rehabilitation committee which shall
have a term of three (3) months from the date of the approval of this
Act composed of the following: the Executive Secretary, as Chairman,
and the Administrator of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, the
President of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines, a
representative from the executive board of the Veterans Federation of
the Philippines and a representative from the Board of Trustees of the
Veterans of World War II or their respective representatives, as
members.
Specifically, the committee shall:
(a) Prepare, finalize and submit a viable rehabilitation plan to the Monetary Board of the Central Bank;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(b) Select and organize an initial manning force headed by a
management team to be composed of competent, experienced and
professional managers who must possess all qualifications and none of
the disqualifications provided under Central Bank rules and
regulations. The management team shall be staffed by a trained
workforce: Provided, That preference shall be given to the veterans and
their dependents, other qualifications being equal;
The mandate given the Bank’s rehabilitation committee to “select and
organize an initial manning force” shows that the lawmakers recognize
the fact that the new bank is entirely without any working force.
Congress, therefore, gave the Bank full authority and discretion to
recruit and form a new staff. Had Congress intended that
separated employees be rehired and given priority in the hiring of new
employees, it would have clearly stated this in
R.A. No. 7169
The fact that it did not only shows its clear legislative intent to
give the new bank a free hand in the selection and hiring of its new
staff.
We have to acknowledge the sad reality that giving in to petitioners’
demand of wholesale reinstatement with back wages, bonuses, holiday
pay, vacation and sick leave benefits would be a fatal blow to the very
intention of
R.A. No. 7169
to rehabilitate the Bank. The payment of such substantial amounts
would definitely further dissipate the remaining assets of the Bank and
cripple its finances even as, at this point, the Bank is barely making
a profit under the weight of its present liabilities, and
ultimately make impossible its desired rehabilitation. This
clearly contravenes the intent and spirit of
R.A. No. 7169
chan robles virtual law library
Petitioners fault the CA in upholding the validity of the Compromise
Agreement. They claim that said agreement is not binding on
employees who did not ratify it and even to those who were allegedly
tricked and/or deceived by the Union into accepting the first payment
under the same agreement.
The argument is utterly baseless. A labor union’s function is to
represent its members. It can file an action or enter into
compromise agreements on behalf of its members. Here, majority of
the Bank’s employees authorized the Union to enter into a compromise
agreement with the Bank on their behalves. Union members were
bound by the resulting compromise agreement when they affixed their
signatures thereon, thereby giving their individual assent thereto, and
when they accepted the benefits due them under that agreement. As
it is, the Compromise Agreement in question detailed the amounts to be
received by each employee. Petitioners and other employees of the
Bank knew exactly what they were ratifying when they affixed their
signatures in the said compromise agreement.
Further, respondent Union is a closed shop union. For this
reason, it was the only one with legal authority to negotiate,
transact, and enter into any agreement with the Bank. The
Compromise Agreement was ratified by 282 Union members representing a
majority of its entire 529 membership. The ratification of the
Compromise Agreement by the majority of the Union members necessarily
binds the minority.
The general rule that the Labor Arbiter must be present during the
signing of the compromise agreement is not immune to certain
exceptions. Here, the submission of the Compromise Agreement on joint
motion of the parties for approval by the Labor Arbiter cured whatever
defect the signing of the agreement in the absence of the Labor Arbiter
would have caused. So it is that in Santiago v. De Guzman,[17] the
Court ruled:cralaw:red
A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence
of the Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending shall be approved
by him, if after confronting the parties, particularly the
complainants, he is satisfied that they understand the terms and
conditions of “the settlement and that it was entered into freely and
voluntarily by them.
It is incumbent upon the Labor Arbiter not only to persuade the parties
to settle amicably, but equally to ensure the compromise agreement is a
fair one and that the same was forged freely, voluntarily with full
understanding of the terms and conditions embodies therein as well as
the consequences thereof.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is likewise noteworthy that as of March 31, 2004, thirty (30) of the
herein thirty-seven (37) petitioners already received payment under the
same Compromise Agreement. The acceptance by said petitioners of the
benefits bars them from repudiating the agreement. They cannot be
allowed to adopt an inconsistent position at the expense of the
Bank. Petitioners cannot belatedly reject or repudiate their acts
of accepting the monetary consideration under the compromise agreement,
to the prejudice of the Bank.[18] We, thus, quote with approval the
following observation of the CA in its challenged Decision of December
21, 2001:cralaw:red
As regards the third petition for certiorari filed by Lady Lydia
Cornista Domingo, et. al. (CA-G.R. SP No. 51220), the position taken by
the petitioners is that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by: a)
ordering petitioners who received the first payment under the
Compromise Agreement to be bound by it, and b) resolving to remand the
case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings insofar as those who
did not receive payment are concerned.
Petitioners Domingo et. al. allege that “(a)s found out by the
respondent NLRC, the Compromise Agreement was not entered into in the
presence of the labor Arbiter and it (NLRC) faulted the latter in not
calling the parties especially the complainants, to a conference and
satisfy himself that they (complainants) understand the terms and
conditions of the settlement; and that the agreement was entered into
freely and voluntarily” (Rollo of SP No. 51218-20, p. 886) as called
for under Section 2, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.
Further, petitioners contend that “(h)ad the respondents NLRC and Labor
Arbiter Carpio followed the rules, they would have found out that those
who received the first payment were only tricked and deceived in(to)
receiving the payment;” that “had the respondents Labor Arbiter and
NLRC been more circumspect in their solemn duties, they should have
required the respondent union officers to present a special power of
attorney as required under Article 1878(3) of the Civil Code.” (Ibid., pp. 886-887).
chan robles virtual law library
We are not convinced.
Evidently, Domingo, et. al. ratified the Compromise Agreement and even
voluntarily received the first payment under that agreement, executing
the corresponding Quitclaim, Waiver and Release in the process.
Having done that, they are deemed bound by the Compromise Agreement
under the previously discussed principle of res judicata and/or
estoppel.
We find that the subsequent decision of petitioners Domingo, et. al. to
repudiate the Compromise Agreement was merely an afterthought, whatever
would be the reason for their subsequent change of mind. Since
they had entered into a binding contract on their own volition and
received benefits therefrom, they are therefore estopped from
questioning the validity of said contract later on.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that while the petitioners
try to impugn the Compromise Agreement that they themselves entered
into, they have not made any offer or effort to return the money they
received as first payment under said agreement.
The other allegation of the petitioners that “those who received the
first payment were only tricked and deceived in(to) receiving the
payment” deserves scant consideration. Said petitioners are
not only ordinary laborers but mature, educated and intelligent people
with college degrees, and considering the size of their group, it is
unbelievable that they could have been easily duped into doing
something against their will and self-interest. Absent a showing
that they were indeed victims of trickery and deception, outside of
their own self-serving affidavits, the petitioners’ allegation does not
hold water.
Here, the petitioners and other employees legally separated were in
fact given termination or separation pay despite the staggering loss
sustained by the Bank. They were given a very good bargain in the
compromise agreement. They, therefore, have no reason to
complain. Without the subject compromise agreement, they would
not have received any separation pay in light of our ruling in State
Investment House, Inc. v. CA,[19] and North Davao Mining Corporation v.
NLRC,[20] where we held that in cases of serious losses or
financial reverses, the Labor Code does not impose any obligation upon
the employer to pay separation benefits, for obvious reasons.
Records reveal that when the Bank offered termination or separation pay
to its remaining employees by way of a compromise agreement, a great
majority of them accepted the amount as justifiable settlement of
their claims.[21] Like these quitclaims and releases, there are
voluntary agreements which represent reasonable settlements and are
considered binding on the parties.[22] Petitioners, therefore, cannot
renege on the compromise agreement they entered into after accepting
benefits earlier simply because they may have felt that they committed
a mistake in accepting their termination/separation pay. As no
proof was presented to show that the compromise agreement in dispute
was entered into through fraud, misrepresentation or coercion, the same
must be recognized as valid and binding upon all the 529 employees of
the Bank. In fine, the petitioners and the other employees are
estopped from questioning the validity of the Compromise Agreement.
chan robles virtual law library
In law, a compromise agreement, once approved, has the effect of res
judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for
vices of consent, forgery, fraud, misrepresentation and coercion,[23]
none of which exists in this case. The Compromise Agreement between the
Union and the Bank binds the minority Union members.
All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no
reversible error in rendering its challenged decision of December 21,
2001 and Resolution of January 8, 2003.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[1]
As filed, the Petition impleads the Court of Appeals as among the
respondents. This need not be under Sec. 4 of Rule 45.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adelfuin-Dela Cruz, with Associate
Justices Wenceslao A. Agnir, Jr. and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador,
concurring. Rollo, pp. 33-45.
[3]
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE v. Philippine Veterans
Bank, G.R. No. 67125, August 24, 1990, 189 SCRA 14, consolidated with
Simeon Medalla, et al. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R.
No. 82387.
chan robles virtual law library
[4] 189 SCRA 14 (1990).
[5] An
Act to Rehabilitate the Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under Republic
Act 3518, Providing the Mechanisms Therefor and for other
Purposes.
[6]
R.A. No. 7169
, Section 7, paragraph b.
[7] Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[8] Rollo, pp. 86-107.
[9]
Philippine Veterans Bank v. NLRC and PVBEU-NUBE.
[10]
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union – PVBEU v. National Labor
Relations Commission and the PVB, et al.
[11] Rollo, pp. 80-85.
[12] Rollo, pp. 78-79.
[13] G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494.
[14] Supra note 5.
[15] Supra note 3.
[16] Philippine Carpet
Employees Association v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation,
G.R. Nos. 140269-70, September 14, 2000, 340 SCRA 383.
[17] G.R. No. 84578, September 7, 1989, 177 SCRA 344.
[18]
Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Mangulit, G.R. No. 141423,
November 15, 2000, 344 SCRA 838.
[19]
G.R. No. 96437, February 19, 1992, 206 SCRA 349.
[20] G.R. No. 112546, March 13, 1996, 254 SCRA 721.
[21] Rollo, pp. 794-803.
[22]
Agustilo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142875, September 7, 2001, 364
SCRA 740.
[23]
Salvador v. Ortoll, G.R. No. 140942, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 658.
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